Torture, text and the reformulation of spiritual identity in old English religious verse by Fee, Christopher Richard
Torture,  Text,  and  the  Reformulation  of  Spiritual  Identity 
in  Old  English  Religious  Verse 
by 
Christopher  Richard  Fee 
Submitted  for  the  Degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy 
to  the  University  of  Glasgow 











@  Christopher  Richard  Fee  1997 
Tt ii 
THESIS  ABSTRACT 
Pain,  in  our  culture,  often  is  perceived  as  the  enemy  which  we 
should  spare  no  expense  to  eradicate;  torture  likewise  is  condemned 
universally  as  a  barbaric  throwback  to  earlier,  more  brutal,  less 
enlightened  times.  As  reductive  as  these  axioms  are,  I  have  no  wish  to 
dispute  their  fundamental  truths.  One  of  the  most  interesting  discoveries 
of  my  study,  however,  has  been  that,  although  we  share  certain 
understandings  regarding  pain  and  torture  with  Anglo-Saxon  culture,  we 
go  too  far  when  we  assume  that  the  Anglo-Saxons  shared  our  most  basic 
assumptions.  ý  Pain  and  torture  are  not  evil  in  the  literary  contexts  which  I 
examine;  indeed,  they  are  quite  the  opposite,  and  they  represent,  in  fact, 
both  necessary  and  desirable  physical  and  spiritual  exercises.  In  my 
thesis  I  explore  most  especially  those  areas  of  Anglo-Saxon  literary 
culture--regarding  torture--which  are  most  alien  to  the  modem  mind;  I 
find  that  these  areas  often  lurk  just  around  the  comer  from  those 
concepts  which  mesh  most  closely  with  our  own.  The  Introduction  to 
this  thesis  includes  a  brief  discussion  of  various  understandings  of  what 
torture  is,  and  a  statement  of  the  definition  of  torture  adopted  for  the 
purposes  of  this  study.  Torture,  as  it  is  examined  in  this  study,  is  not  so 
much  an  act  of  violence  as  it  is  a  violent  process;  that  is,  torture  is  a 
means,  not  an  end  in  itself,  and  torture  always  presupposes  intent  and 
causality.  Chapter  One  provides  the  historical  and  legal  contexts  for 
later  literary  and  theoretical  discussions  of  torture.  This  chapter  is 
divided  into  two  parts,  the  first  dealing  with  instances  of  torture  which 
appear  in  Anglo-Saxon  historical  records,  and  the  second  dealing  with 
legal  codes  which  are  concerned  with  torture.  In  the  course  of  this 
chapter  it  becomes  apparent  that  torture  as  a  public  act  serves  as  a 
document  of  sorts,  sometimes  recording  and  sometimes  interpreting, iii 
political  realities.  Any  study  of  torture  must  be  grounded  in  an 
understanding  of  pain,  and  Chapter  Two  is  concerned  with  the  nature  of 
pain,  and  with  its  relationship  to  torture.  The  paradox  of  pain  is  that  it  is 
universal  and  at  the  same  time  isolating  and  inexpressible.  In  Chapter 
Two,  a  close  examination  of  the  language  and  structure  of  The  Dream  of 
the  Rood  serves  to  illustrate  that  the  Anglo-Saxons  understood  this 
paradox.  The  graphic  and  sometimes  almost  loving  detail  with  which 
the  poet  describes  the  passion  of  Christ  functions  as  a  language  "of 
weapons  and  wounds",  and  helps  to  convey,  in  some  measure,  the  almost 
incommunicable  nature  of  intense  physical  pain.  Chapter  Three  explores 
the  way  in  which  torture  acts  may  function  as  language  acts,  and  the 
necessarily  public  nature  of  such  performative  language.  This  chapter 
begins  with  a  discussion  of  linguistic  theories  concerning  pragmatics  and 
performative  language  acts.  Then,  drawing  upon  textual  examples  from 
such  Old  English  sources  as  Elene,  Juliana,  and  Daniel,  this  chapter 
examines  how  torture  may  be  construed  as  a  form  of  language,  and  how 
the  performative  nature  of  an  act  of  torture  articulates  that  act's  context 
of  power  and  politics  in  the  culture  at  large.  Chapter  Three  concludes 
with  an  exploration  of  the  transformative  function  of  torture,  a  function 
which  provides  the  foundation  for  the  models  of  torture  discussed  in 
Chapter  Four  and  in  Chapter  Five.  Torture,  as  it  is  defined  for  the 
purposes  of  this  study,  is  the  deliberate  and  systematic  application  of 
pain  used  to  forward  a  particular  agenda.  The  model  of  torture  explored 
in  Chapter  Four,  that  of  inscription,  involves  productive  acts  of 
destruction;  that  is,  in  the  context  of  such  torture  an  act  of  reduction  is 
the  necessary  precursor  to  an  act  of  reformulation.  This  discussion  of 
inscription  draws  upon  evidence  from  textual  acts  such  as  Judith's 
decapitation  of  Holofernes  (in  the  Old  English  Judith)  and  Andreas's 
torment  at  the  hands  of  the  Mermedonians  (in  the  Old  English  Andreas). iv 
In  the  inscription  model  of  torture,  through  theapplication  of  pain  upon 
the  body,  the  identity  of  the  victim  is  reduced  to  a  blank  slate  which  then 
may  be  written  upon  afresh.  The  writing  of  wounds  upon  the  flesh 
echoes  and  explicates  this  spiritual  transformation.  Chapter  Five  moves 
from  the  realm  of  earthly,  corporeal  pain  and  torture  to  the  related 
spiritual  transformations  wrought  in  Anglo-Saxon  depictions  of 
eschatology.  This  chapter  is  concerned  with  a  model  of  torture  which 
might  be  termed  transmutation.  The  retribution  of  divine  judgment  in 
these  poems  both  resembles  and  validates  the  acts  of  temporal  torture 
examined  earlier.  Further,  the  language  of  metallurgic  purification 
utilized  by  thepoets  further  refines  the  image  of  the  body  tortured  as  a 
malleable  surface  or  substance  which  may  be  altered  in  order  to  affect  a 
spiritual  transformation.  ý Drawing  upon  several  such  instances  of  Old 
English  eschatology  for  context,  Chapter  Five  is  concerned  with 
manifestations  of  "  spiritual  metallurgy"  which  appear  in  religious  poems 
(such  as  Chzist  III,  Judgment  Day  I  and  H,  Phoenix,  and  the  fire  of 
judgment  scene  in  Elene)  which  are  concerned  with  purgation,  purity, 
and  related  issues  of  spiritual  identity  and  transformation.  The 
Conclusion  of  this  thesis  i's  concerned  primarily  with  the  role  of  the 
44  other"  in  the  terms  of  Anglo-Saxon  torture.  Such  a  conception  of  the 
role  of  the  alien  is  not  new  to  literary  studies,  but  in  the  context  of  the 
function  of  the  other  in  contemporary  understandings  of  the  nature  and 
prerequisites  of  torture,  this  facet  of  Anglo-Saxon  torture  both 
illuminates  and  is  illuminated  by  modem  studies  of  the  other  and  its 
place  in  an  anthropology  of  torture.  The  Conclusion  discusses  the  points 
of  convergence  and  divergence  between  contemporary  and  medieval 
conceptions  of  torture,  and  examines  how  this  study  is  significant  in  the 
context  of  both  Anglo-Saxon  studies  and  contemporary  torture  studies. TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 
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INTRODUCTION:  Torvure,  Text,  and  Context  I- 
This  thesis  is  a  study  about  the  nature  and  function  of  torture 
generally  in  Anglo-Saxon  literature,  and  specifically  in  Old  English 
religious  verse.  Its  most  fundamental  focus,  as  the  title  suggests,  is  upon 
how  pain  and  torture  function  in  Old  English  poetic  texts  as  a  process  of 
spiritual  production,  whereby  the  application  of  physical  pain  serves  as  a 
means  by  which  identity  is  transformed.  However,  in  a  broader  sense 
this  thesis  is  a  study  of  the  nature  of  torture,  and  of  pain.  Torture,  as 
shall  become  apparent,  is  not  an  unintelligible  artifact  from  a  bygone 
barbaric  era,  but  rather  an  intelligible,  albeit  still  barbaric,  continuum  of 
practices  which  remains  widely  prevalent  today.  The  fact  that  torture  is 
a  contemporary  phenomenon  as  well  as  an  object  of  historical  interest, 
therefore,  necessitates  that  this  topic  be  treated  with  respect  and  with 
empathy.  Although  the  focus  of  this  dissertation  is  on  how  Anglo-Saxon 
poetic  explorations  of  the  relationship  between  the  body  and  the  spirit 
led  to  exploitations  of  this  relationship  in  the  context  of  literary  torture, 
similar  models  of  torture  are  yet  in  operation  today,  and  it  would  not  do 
to  hide  from  this  fact  behind  musty  definitions  and  historical  examples. 
Rather,  Iwill  argue  that  an  understanding  of  Anglo-Saxon  perceptions  of 
torture  can  illuminate  to  some  extent  the  darkness  which  surrounds 
torture,  medieval  and  modem.  This  study  is  grounded  in  that  hope. 
ýBut  just  what  is  "torture"?  "Torture"  is  a  term  in  common  use,  but 
it  has  meant  different  things  to  different  people  in  different  times  and 
places.  Further,  even  amongst  those  historians,  social  scientists,  and 
lawyers  who  have  made  an  effort  to  codify  and  define  torture,  there  is 
room  for  ambiguity,  and  even  a  fair  measure  of  contradiction.  In  order 
to  begin  to  understand  the  nature  of  Anglo-Saxon  torture  and  its 
relationship  to  contemporary  practices,  it  will  be  necessary  to  establish Introduction  2 
some  definitions.  To  develop  a  working  definition  of  torture,  I  will 
begin  this  Introduction  with  a  brief  discussion  of  the  various  ways  in 
which  torture  has  been  understood,  and  then  describe  the  definition 
adopted  here.  Torture,  as  I  will  examine  it,  is  not  so  much  an  act  of 
violence  as  it  is  a  violent  process;  that  is,  torture  is  a  means,  not  an  end 
in  itself,  and  torture  always  presupposes  intent  and  causality.  Having 
established  a  working  definition  of  torture  in  the  light  of  the 
sociological,  legal,  and  historical  schools  of  thought  on  the  matter,  I  will 
outline  the  place  of  this  study  as  a  whole  within  its  larger  critical 
context.  I  will  conclude  this  Introduction  with  a  brief  overview  of  my 
thesis  as  a  whole,  focusing  on  the  links  which  I  have  established 
between  torture,  pain,  and  issues  of  power  and  identity. 
A  useful  point  of  departure  for  discussing  what  we  understand 
torture  to  be  is  the  history  of  torture  as  a  legal  concept,  and  the  definition 
of  torture  from  a  legal  historian's  perspective.  Historians  and  legal 
scholars  define  torture  quite  narrowly  as  a  coercive  process  of  gathering 
evidence.  This  process,  which  was  most  fully  codified  in  Roman  law, 
was  developed  during  classical  times,  disappeared  from  -European  law 
with  the  fall  of  the  Roman  empire,  reemerged  with  the  Fourth  Lateran 
Council  of  1215,  and  subsequently  formed  the  basis  of  most  European 
jurisprudence  throughout  the  medieval  period,  and  indeed  well  into  the 
eighteenth  century.  Under  this  definition,  "torture"  is  the  term  used  to 
describe  physical  torment  applied  to  the  accused  or  witnesses  in  a, 
criminal  case,  which  is  applied  according  to  strict  rules  of  procedure, 
and  which  is  applied  in  order  to  extract  evidence  (and  most  especially 
confession)  having  to  do  with  that  case  (the  history  of  the  law  of  torture 
is  dealt  with  in  detail  in  Chapter  One).  According  to  such  a  definition, 
punitive  measures,  and  indeed,  any  other  application  of  physical 
violence  (even  those  which  are  overtly  coercive  and  political),  such  as Introduction  3 
execution  and  punitive  mutilation,  are  not  "torture".  1  John  H.  Langbein 
offers  a  succinct  analysis  of  the  distinction  which'historians  draw 
between  torture  and  other  forms  of  torment: 
When  we  speak  of  "judicial  torture,  "  we  are  referring  to  the  use  of 
physical  coercion  by  officers  of  the  state  in  order  to  gather 
evidence  for  judicial  proceedings.  The  law  of  torture  regulated 
this  form  of  judicial  investigation.  In  matters  of  state,  torture  was 
also  used  in  circumstances  not  directly  related  to  judicial 
proceedings.  Torture  has  to  be  kept  separate  from  the  various 
painful  modes  of  punishment  used  as  sanctions  against  persons 
already  convicted  and  condemned.  No  punishment,  no  matter 
how  gruesome,  should  be  called  torture.  2 
This  definition  of  torture  is  rather  too  narrow  for  our  purposes, 
and  would  in  fact  make  a  discussion  of  "Anglo-Saxon  torture"  almost 
impossible.  I  am  not  the  first  to  draw  attention  to  the  short-comings  of 
such  a  definition  of  torture  which  is  constrained  by  the  boundaries 
imposed  by  legal  history.  '  Notwithstanding  the  common  usage  of 
"torture"  as  a  general  catch  phrase  for  anything  unpleasant,  many 
contemporary  journalists,  sociologists,  human  rights  advocates,  and  even 
scholars  of  international  law  utilize  much  broader,  although  still  clearly 
defined,  definitions  of  torture.  Edward  Peters  takes  exception  to  any 
broadening  of  our  understanding  of  the  term,  arguing  that  to  do  so  is 
legally  redundant,  and  obfuscates  jurisprudence  through  its  gratuitous 
appeal  to  sentiment:  III 
When-  journalists,  and  occasionally  legislators  (as  well  as 
inter-national  jurists  and  legal  philosophers),  use  the  term  'torture' Introduction  4 
to  designate  activities  that  may  be  (and  usually  are)  already 
adequately  and  technically  defined  as  assault  and  battery,  or 
trespass,  the  term  'torture'  itself  becomes  simply  picturesque,  its 
legal  definition  is  gutted  and  in  its  place  is  substituted  a  vague 
idea  of  moral  sentiment.  It  is  then  easy  to  argue  torture  away 
simply  by  applying  to  a  higher  moral  sentiment  than  that  of  one's 
opponents  or  critics.  3 
Peters's  argument,  although  not  without  merit,  seems  to  be  flawed 
precisely  because  it  attempts  to  close  off  the  law  from  a  larger  cultural 
analysis.  As  I  will  discuss  in  detail  below,  I  define  torture  as  I  do  in 
order  to  attempt  to  illuminate  a  unified  conception  (in  philosophical, 
theological,  historical,  legal,  literary,  and  linguistic  terms)  of  the 
function  of  applied  violence  in  an  Anglo-Saxon  cultural  context.  The 
definition  of  torture  which  allows  me  to  do  so  is  based  upon  the  work  of 
contemporary  social  scientists,  as  well  as  that  of  international  human 
rights  organizations  and  bodies  concerned  with  international  law;  such 
organizations  and  individuals  are  interested,  as  I  am,  in  a  theory  of 
torture  which  defines  it  as  violence  which  extends  as  a  cross-section  of  a 
culture,  rather  than  a  highly  rarefied  and  discrete  component  thereof. 
Various  human  rights  organizations  and  bodies  of  international 
law  have  developed  their  own  working  definitions  of  torture,  definitions 
which  are,  as  a  rule,  more  useful  than  that  of  legal  historians  in  the 
context  of  this  study.  It  is  only  fair  to  note,  however,  that  although  these 
definitions  may  be  more  inclusive  than  that  of  the  legal  historian,  these 
conceptions  of  torture  are,  like  that  described  above,  limited  and  shaped 
by  those  fields  of  interest  associated  with  those  who  are  framing  the 
definition.  Thus,  just  as  the  definition  above  reflects  the  legal  precision 
crucial  to  the  historian  of  procedures  of  jurisprudence,  the  vision  of Introduction  5 
torture  adopted  by  the  United  Nations,  and  that  adopted  by  Amnesty 
International  (both  discussed  below),  each  reflects  the  concerns  and 
prejudices  of  that  particular  body.  Further,  as  a  study  of  torture 
published  by  Amnesty  International  has  indicated,  torture  is  difficult 
(both  in  practice  and  in  theory)  to  define  not  simply  due  to  the  subjective 
values  of  those  who  would  define  it,  but  also  due  to  the  fundamentally 
subjective  nature  of  the  experience  itself: 
Everyone  has  an  idea  of  what  torture  is;  yet  no  one  has  produced 
a  definition  which  covers  every  possible  case.  There  is  good 
reason  why  the  concept  of  torture  resists  precise  and  scientific 
definition;  it  describes  human  behaviour,  and  each  human  being 
is  unique,  with  his  own  pain  threshold,  his  own  psychological 
make-up,  his  own  cultural  conditioning.  Furthermore,  torture  is  a 
concept  involving  degree  on  a  continuum  ranging  from  discomfort 
to  ill  treatment  to  intolerable  pain  and  death,  and  a  definition  must 
resort  in  part  to  qualitative  terms  which  are  both  relative  and 
subjective.  4 
The  difficulties  inherent  in  the  task  notwithstanding,  a  definition 
of  torture  is  necessary,  and  not  just  for  academic  reasons.  At  the  present 
time  torture  is  commonly  condemned,  even  by  those  who  practice  it. 
Because  of  the  consensus  against  torture,  contemporary  practitioners  of 
torture  are  careful  to  deny  or  carefully  rationalize  and  redefine  any 
activities  which  might  run  afoul  of  global  opinion.  5  Torture  is  the  object 
of  much  international  discussion  and  concern,  perhaps  because  it  has 
been  so  universally  practiced,  on  one  level  or  another.  Thus  the  United 
Nations  has  issued  and  revised  a  number  of  statements  defining  and 
condemning  torture.  The  primary  concern  of  the  United  Nations  is  in Introduction  6 
governmental  abuses,  and  in  the  institutionalization  of  practices 
considered  illegal  under  international  law;  this  concern  is  reflected  in 
the  statements  issued  by  the  United  Nations  regarding  torture.  The 
short-comings  of  such  a  position  are  really  twofold:  in  the  first  place,  by 
limiting  attention  to  state-sanctioned  actions,  such  a  definition  denies  the 
fundamentally  personal  nature  of  the  torture  act;  in  the  second  place,  the 
loophole  provided  by  the  "lawful  sanctions"  clause  opens  the  door  for 
regular,  institutionalized  abuse.  6  The  definition  of  torture  agreed  upon 
by  the  General  Assembly  of  the  United  Nations  in  its  Convention 
Against  Torture,  adopted  in  December  of  1984,  is  illustrative  of  the 
position  of  the  United  Nations: 
For  the  purpose  of  this  Convention,  the  term  'torture'  means  any 
act  by  which  severe  pain  or  suffering,  whether  physical  or  mental, 
is  intentionally  inflicted  on  a  person  for  such  purposes  as 
obtaining  from  him  or  a  third  person  information  or  a  confession, 
punishing  him  for  an  act  he  or  a  third  person  has  committed,  or 
intimidating  or  coercing  him  or  a  third  person,  or  for  any  reason 
based  on  discrimination  of  any  kind,  when  such  pain  or  suffering 
is  inflicted  by  or  at  the  instigation  of  or  with  the  consent  or 
acquiescence  of  a  public  official  or  other  person  acting  in  an 
official  capacity.  It  does  not  include  pain  or  suffering  arising  only 
from,  inherent  in  or  incidental  to  lawful  sanctions.  7 
The  definition  offered  by  Amnesty  International  attempts  to 
address  those  short-comings  inherent  in  the  convention  of  the  United 
Nations,  and  thus  while  this  definition  maintains  the  emphasis  on  the 
systematic  and  deliberate  nature  of  torture,  and  also  recognizes  that 
torture  must  always  be  a  means  to  a  specific  end,  it  removes  the  political Introduction  7 
and  institutional  stipulations  which  characterize  the  United  Nations 
convention.  The  United  Nations,  of  course,  is  interested  in  issues  of 
international  law,  and  in  regulating  the  nature  of  the  political  behavior  of 
its  member  states;  Amnesty  International,  on  the  other  hand,  while 
sharing  an  interest  in  institutionalized  and  politicized  acts  of  torture,  is 
predominately  interested  in  issues  of  fundamental  human  rights,  and 
therefore  views  torture  on  an  interpersonal,  as  well  as  an  institutional, 
level.  This  interest  with  torture  as,  fundamentally  and  necessarily,  a 
process  which  is  conducted  on  the  level  of  an  extremely  intimate  and 
personal  relationship  (i.  e.  that  between  the  torturer  and  the  victim),  albeit 
a  perverse  relationship,  is  particularly  well-suited  to  my  own 
examination  and  understanding  of  torture,  and  provides  the  basis  for  my 
working  definition.  The  definition  of  torture  adopted  by  Amnesty 
International  is,  therefore,  a  touchstone  for  this  study: 
Torture  is  the  systematic  and  deliberate  infliction  of  acute  pain  in 
any  form  by  one  person  on  another,  or  on  a  third  person,  in  order 
to  accomplish  the  purpose  of  the  former  against  the  will  of  the 
latter.  8 
It  is  of  paramount  importance  that,  as  different  as  these  definitions 
might  be,  both  place  pain  firmly  at  the  center  of  their  discussions  of 
torture;  even  the  legalistic  definition  offered  by  Langbeiniwith  its 
euphemistic  reference  to  "physical  coercion",  pays  homage  to  the 
centrality  of  pain  to  torture.  Pain  is  a  necessary  component  of  torture. 
Pain  itself,  however,  is  complex  and  difficult  to  define,  and  therefore 
complicates  further  our  understanding  of  the  nature  of  torture.  Further, 
pain  is  a  universal  phenomenon,  and  therefore  torture,  as  the  deliberate Introduction  8 
and  systematic  application  of  pain  by  one  person  upon  another,  -taps  into 
a  universal  vein  of  horror  and  repugnance: 
...  even  in  an  age  of  violence,  torture  stands  out  as  a  special  horror 
for  most  people.  Pain  is  a  common  human  denominator,  and 
while  few  know  what  it  is  to  be  shot,  to  be  burned  by  napalm,  or 
even  to  starve,  all  know  pain.  Within  every  human  being  is  the 
knowledge  and  fear  of  pain,  the  fear  of  helplessness  before 
unrestrained  cruelty.  The  deliberate  infliction  of  pain  by  one 
human  being  on  another  to  break  him  is  a  special  horror.  9 
Pain  is  also  a  volatile  social  force  because  it  bridges  the  gap  between 
interiority  and  exteriority,  and  thus  offers  a  window  into  the  relationship 
between  body  and  soul.  I  am  especially  interested  in  Anglo-Saxon 
conceptions  of  the  relationship  between  the  soul  and  the  body,  and;  as 
shall  be  discussed  in  Chapter  Two,  this  relationship  further  complicates 
not  only  our  understanding  of  pain,  but  also  that  of  the  nature  and 
function  of  torture.  Any  definition  of  torture,  therefore,  must  be 
informed  by  a  conception  of  the  shifting  and  ambiguous  nature  of  the 
pain  which  is  its  motive  force;  further,  the  importance  of  the 
relationship  between  the  physical  body  and  spiritual,  mental,  emotional, 
and  other  non-tangible  aspects  of  identity  and  consciousness  must  not  be 
underestimated.  10  Torture  is  difficult  to  understand  and  to  define 
precisely  because  of  the  complex  nature  of  the  relationships  between  the 
physical,  the  spiritual,  and  pain,  which  are  the  very  relationships  upon 
which  torture  is  founded. 
It  is  in  the  light  of  such  understandings  of  torture,  pain,  and  the 
relationship  between  interiority  and  exteriority  that  I  developed  my 
working  model  of  torture.  "Torture",  as  I  define  it,  is  any  deliberate  and Introduction  9 
systematic  application  of  pain  (physical,  mental,  spiritual)  and/or 
destruction  which  is  used  to  achieve  some  specific  end;  usually,  in  the 
contexts  which  I  will  examine,  torture  is  concerned  with  issues  of 
identity  and  power,  and  Anglo-Saxon  torture  consistently  is  utilized  to 
exploit  the  bridge  which  pain  provides  between  exterior  body  and 
interior  consciousness.  I  define  torture  this  broadly,  and  as  opposed  to 
the  definitions  offered  by  legal  historians  and  others,  because  torture 
thus  conceived  affords  a  unifying  conceptual  framework  (and  metaphor) 
around  which  many  Anglo-Saxon  social  structures  (legal,  historical, 
theological,  philosophical,  and  literary)  may  be  organized.  - 
According  to  my  definition,  torture  must  be:  deliberate--the  agent 
must  intentionally  cause  pain  to  and/or  wreak  acts  of  destruction  upon 
the  victim;  s7stematic--the  application  of  pain  and/or  destruction  (e.  g. 
judicial  torture,  punitive  mutilation,  dismemberment  or  other  maiming, 
beheading  or  other  physically-  expressive  acts  of  execution,  etc.  )  must  be 
organized  around  some  guiding  principle(s),  aim(s),  or  need(s);  and 
used  to  achieve  some  specific  ends--these  might  be  personal,  political, 
spiritual,  etc.,  but  at  least  some  such  end  must  be  sought  deliberately  by 
the  torturer  (whether  consciously  or  unconsciously).  Many  acts  which 
fall  outside  of  this  definition  are  violent  and  destructive,  to  be  sure,  but 
they  are  not  torture;  for  example,  acts  which  are  not  deliberate,  or  which 
do  not  seek  to  achieve  some  end,  do  not  qualify  as  torture. 
There  are  many  different  possible  reasons  or  aims  for  torture;  I 
will  briefly  list  and  discuss  some  examples  which  are  relevant  to  this 
study,  but  this  list  should  be  considered  suggestive,  and  not  by  any 
means  comprehensive.  Various  types  of  torture  acts  may  be  loosely 
grouped  together  under  the  heading  of  the  primary  aim  of  such  acts; 
although  many,  if  not  most,  acts  of  torture  have  more  than  one  purpose, 
quite  often  one  such  purpose  seems  dominant.  An  example  already  - Introduction  10 
touched  upon  briefly  is  that  of  judicial  torture;  that  is,  the  application  of 
pain  utilized  as  a  means  of  obtaining  confession  as  part  of  a  coherent 
system  of  jurisprudence,  which  is  discussed  in  detail  in  Chapter  One. 
Punitive  torture,  that  is,  the  application  of  pain  as  punishment  for  actual, 
potential,  imagined,  or  alleged  civil,  criminal,  religious,  spiritual,  or 
political  offenses  is  discussed  at  length  in  Chapter  One,  and  is  also  of 
some  importance  (in  spiritual  terms)  in  Chapter  Five.  Political  torture, 
that  is,  acts  used  as  a  means  to  gain  or  consolidate  control  through  the 
removal  of  rivals  to  power  and  the  public  display  of  power  over  their 
bodies  is  discussed  at  some  length  in  Chapter  One,  and  has  resonance 
with  some  acts  of  semiotic  torture  (I  examine  this  type  of  torture  at 
length  momentarily)  discussed  in  Chapter  Four. 
Two  related  and  particularly  relevant  types  of  torture  in  the 
context  of  this  project  would  be  what  might  be  termed  evidentiary 
torture  and  transformative  torture.  The  former  includes  physically 
painful  and/or  destructive  acts  which  the  victim  is  forced  to  undergo  in 
order  to  affect  a  physical  manifestation  of  spiritual  nature  upon  the  body 
of  the  victim,  as  in  the  ordeal,  discussed  in  Chapter  One;  the  latter 
includes  physically  painful  and  ultimately  destructive  acts  which  the 
victim  is  forced  to  undergo  in  order  to  manifest  a  transformation  of 
spiritual  identity,  as  in  the  fire  of  judgment  eschatological  model 
discussed  in  Chapter  Five.  In  both  cases,  such  acts  overtly  rely  upon  an 
understanding  of  spiritual  identity  as  directly  linked  to  the  physical 
body.  The  transformative  model  of  torture  is  of  primary  importance  to 
my  analysis  of  the  function  of  torture  in  Anglo-Saxon  England,  and 
works  in  conjunction  with  the  semiotic  model,  although  they  are  not  the 
same.  I  explicate  the  transformative  model  in  Chapter  Three,  and  it  is  of 
primary  importance  (along  with  the  semiotic  model)  in  my  discussions 
in  Chapters  Four  and  Five.  What  we  might  term  semiotic  torture  is  also Introduction  II 
of  special  significance  to  this  study;  this  involves  an  act  of  torture 
and/or  the  physical  results  thereof  which  serves  as  a  language  act,  that  is, 
which  conveys  some  message  or  meaning  to  those  who  witness  the  act 
or  the  results  thereof.  Further,  such  torture  often  also  functions  as  a 
means  of  signifying  identity;  that  is,  the  text  of  the  act  itself,  and/or  the 
text  produced  upon  the  tablet  of  the  flesh  of  the  victim  through  the  act  of 
torture,  is  representative  of  some  personal,  spiritual,  and/or  political  truth 
concerning  the  victim,  the  agent,  and/or  the  power  hierarchies  which 
they  represent.  The  semiotic  function  of  torture  is  a  cornerstone  of  this 
project:  I  discuss  at  some  length  the  semiotic  nature  of  historical  records 
of  torture  and  laws  pertaining  to  such  acts  in  Chapter  One;  I  examine  in 
detail  the  linguistic  model  which  is  the  basis  for  understanding  the 
nature  of  such  acts  in  Chapter  Three;  and  I  explore  the  semiotic 
significance  of  manifestations  of  what  I  have  termed  the  transformative 
model  of  torture  in  literary  examples  in  Chapters  Four  and  Five. 
This  project  draws  upon  a  number  of  critical  influences,  both  in 
the  details  of  its  construction  and  in  its  general  organizing  principles. 
The  specific  nature  and  number  of  the  former  debts  are  enumerated  in 
the  notes,  and  need  not  be  repeated  here;  the  latter  influences  are  more 
implicit,  and  bear  a  brief  examination.  This  work,  dealing  as  it  does 
with  subjects  which  do  not  readily  lend  themselves  to  the  traditional 
categories  of  academic  study,  is  fundamentally  and  necessarily 
interdisciplinary.  My  area  of  specialization  is  Old  English  literature,  and 
it  was  an  interest  in  the  literary  aspects  of  torture  in  this  context  which 
led  me  to  this  project.  I  soon  discovered,  however,  that  the  scholarship 
most  pertinent  to  my  work  had  little  to  do  with  literature,  and  less  with 
Old  English.  The  role  of  my  fellow  specialists  in  the  formation  of  this 
project  was  more  tangential  than  is  usual,  then,  and  while  I  do  have 
debts  to  literary  theorists  (most  notably  feminist  scholars  of  the  body  as Introduction  12 
text,  and  semiotics  experts),  the  most  formative  influences  have  been 
from  the  social  sciences,  medicine,  and  history.  In  the  following 
paragraphs,  therefore,  'I  will  discuss  these  influences  in  order  to  place 
this  project  in  its  critical  context,  to  reconstruct  my  basic  methodology, 
and  to  outline  the  nature  of  the  sources  and  evidence  upon  which  this 
study  is  founded. 
,  No  work  on  pain,  the  body,  or  torture  written  in  the  last  decade  is 
without  its  debt  to  Elaine  Scarry's  The  Body  in  Pain:  The  MaEng  and 
Unmaking  of  the  World.  Scarry's  work  was  ground-breaking,  and 
scholarship  in  this  field  is  indebted  to  her  in  a  number  of  ways.  First  and 
foremost,  -  Scarry's  systematic  and  thorough  grounding  of  her  subject  in  a 
series  of  disparate  and  yet  necessary  disciplines  is  a  model  for  scholars 
interested  in  the  points  of  contact  between  the  arts  and  their  larger 
cultural  context.  Second,  Scarry's  copious  notes  and  extensive 
bibliography  provide  a  foundation  (although  now  a  bit  dated)  for  any 
study  in  the  field.  Third,  Scarry's  discussion  of  the  transformative 
power  of  pain  is fundamental  to  an  understanding  of  the  productive 
function  of  the  destructive  practice  which  is  torture;  indeed,  such  a 
conception  is  vital  to  an  understanding  of  torture  in  an-Anglo-Saxon 
literary  context.  As  important  as  Scarry's  work  is  in  terms  of  -, 
groundwork,  however,  her  focus  and  methodology  converge  with  mine 
only  at  a  few  points.  In  fact,  Scarry's  interest  in  torture,  although  hardly 
tangential,  is  not  central,  and  so  the  bulk  of  her  work  is  not  of  immediate 
value  to  the  scholar  of  torture.  Scarry's  first  chapter,  "The  Structure  of 
Torture:  The  Conversion  of  Real  Pain  into  the  Fiction  of  Power"  deals 
with  "the  world  destroying  structure  of  torture,  "  while  the  balance  of  the 
book  deals  with  "the  creative,  world-making  activities  of  human  labor 
and  imagination,  where  pain's  transforming  powers  take  a  kinder 
shape".  II  Scarry's  interest  is'primarily  contemporary  and  political  and Introduction  13 
largely  non-literary,  yet  elements  of  her  discussion,  especially  those 
pertaining  to  body  and  voice,  are  particularly  well-suited  to  an 
examination  of  the  parallels  between  the  infliction  of  pain  (the 
destructive  nature  of  torture)  and  the  inscription  of  spiritual  identity  (the 
productive  nature  of  torture)  in  the  texts  which  I  examine. 
The  two  most  notable  scholars  in  the  field  of  the  history  of  judicial 
torture  are  Henry  Charles  Lea  and  Edward  Peters.  Lea's  work  on  torture 
and  the  ordeal,  although  now  more  than  a  century  old,  is  still  useful, 
informative,  and  often  cited.  Superstition  and  Force  is  the  compendium 
volume  of  Lea's  work,  available  in  separate  modem  editions  (edited  by 
Peters)  under  the  titles  Torture  and  The  Ordeal.  Peters,  on  the  other 
hand,  has  carried  the  torch,  as  it  were,  into  the  latter  part  of  this  century, 
and  is  in  many  ways  the  self-styled  successor  to  Lea,  having  edited  the 
former's  work  in  modern  editions,  as  well  as  having  authored  the  most 
seminal  contemporary  texts  on  the  history  of  torture  (most  notably  the 
book  entitled  Torture,  not  to  be  confused  with  the  modem  edition  of 
Lea's  work;  at  the  time  of  writing  Peters's  book  has  just  been  re- 
released  in  a  new  edition).  The  contributions  of  these  two  men  to  this 
field  cannot  be  over  stressed;  neither,  however,  can  the  limits  of  the 
value  of  their  works  to  the  present  project  be  overlooked.  As  I  have 
already  outlined,  what  legal  scholars  term  "torture"  comprises  only  a 
small  fraction  of  the  complex  cultural  organism  which  is  of  concern  to 
me;  further,  the  history  of  Anglo-Saxon  law  is  such  that  this  narrow 
legalistic  definition  of  torture  is  of  little  or  no  use  in  our  study  of  applied 
violence  and  pain  in  this  context.  Lea's  study  of  the  ordeal  is  much 
more  useful,  however,  as  the  ordeal  was  a  primary  mechanism  of  Anglo- 
Saxon  law  from  the  earliest  Germanic  invaders  right  up  until  the 
Norman  Conquest;  indeed,  Lea's  work  on  the  ordeal  brings  together 
many  concepts  and  records  which  are  invaluable  to  the  study  of  the Introduction  14 
Anglo-Saxon  conception  of  the  relationship  between  the  physical  and 
the  spiritual. 
The  most  pertinent  contemporary  work  on  torture  which  has  a 
direct  bearing  on  this  study,  however,  is  that  of  Amnesty  International. 
Through  a  series  of  regularly  updated  reports,  Amnesty  International 
keeps  abreast  of  the  most  current  material  pertinent  to  this  field,  from 
first-hand  victim  reports  of  torture  practices  to  current  international 
legislation  governing  such  abuses.  Two  particularly  useful  and 
accessible  works  are  Report  on  Torture  and  Torture  in  the  Eighties.  The 
working  definition  upon  which  I  base  this  study  of  torture  is  indebted  in 
large  part  to  that  adopted  by  Amnesty  International.  Amnesty 
International  is  a  human  rights  organization,  of  course,  and  so  the  focus 
of  these  works  is  contemporary  and  non-literary.  Further,  this 
organization's  work  is  by  nature  highly  specific,  graphic  and  unsettling, 
and  not  always  easily  removed  from  the  real  world  of  torture  into  the 
theoretical  one.  However,  that  is  the  greatest  strength  of  this  material, 
and  has  indeed  done  much  to  ground  my  personal  conception  of  the 
nature  of  torture  in  the  reality  of  horrific  bodily  mutilation.  It  is  too  easy 
for  a  study  such  as  this  one  to  remove  itself  into  the  realm  of  the 
academic  and  the  theoretical,  and  to  substitute  a  highly  evolved 
conceptual  model  for  a  real  attempt  at  understanding  human  suffering. 
The  work  of  Amnesty  International  is  crucial  for  any  scholar  who  wants 
a  practical  window  into  the  world  of  torture  to  balance  historical  records 
and  philosophical  arguments. 
Any  study  of  torture  must  begin  with  a  study  of  pain,  and  any 
study  of  pain  must  begin  with  a  knowledge  of  Melzack  and  Wall. 
Melzack  and  Wall  are  medical  writers  whose  works,  including  The 
Textbook  of  Pain  and,  most  notably,  The  Challenge  of  Pain,  are  required 
reading  for  medical  students,  laymen  interested  in  the  nature  and Introduction  15 
function  of  pain,  and  scholars  of  torture  alike.  In  1965,  Melzack  and 
Wall  were  responsible  for  a  revolution  in  medical  conceptions  of  the 
nature  of  pain  with  the  development  of  the  "gate  control"  theory  of  pain. 
Further,  their  emphasis  on  the  nature  of  pain  as  an  affective  state  which 
relies  upon  emotional  and  psychological  components  as  well  as  physical 
stimuli  is  directly  related  to  the  work  of  contemporary  theorists  of  pain 
such  as  Scarry,  as  well  as  to  very  medieval  conceptions  of  the  nature  of 
the  relationship  between  the  body  and  the  spirit.  Much  of  their  work  is 
of  more  interest  to  the  student  of  physiology  than  to  the  scholar  of 
torture,  but  at  least  a  passing  knowledge  of  the  various  physiological 
factors  involved  in  pain  is  desirable  for  such  scholars. 
This  study  conceptualizes  torture  as  a  rational  process  utilized  to 
achieve  specific  ends,  and  inmany  of  the  cases  which  I  examined  these 
torture  acts  seemed  designed  to  express,  on  some  level,  information 
regarding  the  individuals  involved,  the  hierarchies  of  which  they  were  a 
part,  and  the  nature  of  the  power  structures  in  conflict  which  resulted  in 
the  act.  Both  the  acts  themselves  and  the  bodies  upon  which  they  are 
wrought  can  serve  such  a  semiotic  function.,  The  linguistic  model  which 
I  developed  in  order  to  articulate  such  functions  is  based  upon  the  work 
of  a  number  of  linguists,  notably  Carol  A.  Kates  and  most  especially 
Geoffrey  Leech;  for  my  understanding  of  pragmatics  I  am  especially 
indebted  to  Kates's  Pragmatics  and  Semantics:  An  Empkicist  Theory, 
and  to  Leech's  Rinciples  of  Pragmatics.  Pragmatics  is  that  field  of  - 
linguistics  concerned  with  how  signs  are  utilized  to  convey  meaning 
within  a  particular  cultural  and  linguistic  context;  pragmatics  is 
therefore  distinct  from  semantics  in  that  the  former  is  context-sensitive 
while  the  latter  has  to  do  more  generally  with  the  relationship  between 
signs  and  meanings,  and  therefore  is  not  context-sensitive.  My  I 
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understanding  of  the  conventional  and  contextually-sensitive  nature  of 
both  torture  acts  and  language  more  generally.  The  study  of  pragmatics 
has  much  to  offer  scholars  of  torture  and  related  cultural  phenomena 
which  utilize  physical  acts  to  convey  political,  personal,  and  social 
meanings. 
The  concept'of  torture  as  language  act  is  clearly  related  to  post- 
modem  critical  models  of  inscription  and  the  body  as  text-,  the  work  in 
this  field  is  immense  and  ever  growing,  but  there  are  a  few  names  which 
are  undoubtedly  central.  In  general  terms,  Ann  Rosalind  Jones  provides 
a  good  introduction  into  the  concept  of  gender  as  a  cultural  construct  in 
"Writing  the  Body:  Toward  an  Understanding  of  I'Ecriture  feminine", 
while  Susan  Gubar  offers  a  similar  introduction  into  the  concept  of  the 
body  as  text  in  "'The  Blank  Page'  and  the  Issues  of  Female  Creativity". 
For  a  more  in-depth  study  of  the  former  concept,  the  seminal  text  is 
probably  Thomas  Laqueur's  Making  Sex:  Body  and  Genderfrom  the 
Greeks  to  Freud.  For  the  latter  concept,  a  very  good  and  thorough  study 
is  Sheila  Delany's  Wiiting  Woman:  Women  Wziters  and  Women  in 
Literature,  Medieval  to  Modern.,  To  my  mind,  however,  the  most  central 
text  concerning  inscription  and  the  body  as  text  in  the  field  of  medieval 
English  literature  is  Carolyn  Dinshaw's,  Chaucer's  Sexual  Poetics. 
Dinshaw  sees  all  language  as  gendered  in  a  patriarchal  society.  She 
draws  upon  the  work  of  Levi-Strauss  and  Lacan  to  provide  examples  of 
what  she  sees  as  a  male  historical-intellectual  trend  regarding  the  passive 
role  of  women  as  signifiers.  Building  upon  this  assumption,  she  posits 
that  when  Chaucer  wrote  about  writing,  or  about  other  signifying 
activities,  he  did  so  in  such  a  way  that  we  can  apply  Dinshaw's  concept 
of  gender  to  the  agents,  recipients,  and  vessels  of  those  activities. 
Dinshaw  draws  upon  an  impressive  body  of  texts  ranging  from  Aristotle, 
through  the  Church  Fathers,  and  into  the  twentieth  century,  in  order  to Introduction  17 
demonstrate  the  philosophical  basis  for  this  model;  she  also  illustrates 
how  such  a  concept  of  gender  fits  within  the  power  structure  of  a- 
patriarchal  culture.  Further,  she  argues  that  Chaucer  was  aware  of  such 
gendered  constructions,  and  of  the  social  mechanisms  which  operated  to 
keep  them  in  place.  Although  Dinshaw  is  of  course  interested  in 
Chaucer  and  Middle  English  literature  rather  than  a  culture-wide  survey 
of  the  nature  of  inscription  upon  the  body  in  early  England,  her 
theoretical  construct  of  inscription,  as  well  as  her  notes  and  (now  dated) 
bibliography  on  the  subject  make  her  an  invaluable  source  for  fellow 
medievalists  interested  in  the  subject. 
,  Anglo-Saxon  studies  has  produced  few  works  with  direct 
influence  over  a  project  such  as  this.  However,  Anglo-Saxonists  with  an 
interest  in  the  application  of  contemporary  theoretical  models  to  Old 
English  texts  are  indebted  to  Allen  I  Frantzen  for  the  insights  into  the 
changing  nature  and  function  of  the  field  outlined  in  his  book  Desire  for 
Origins:  New  Language,  Old'English,  and  Teaching  the  Tradition,  and 
for  the  discussion  of  the  role  of  contemporary  literary  criticism  in 
medieval  studies  in  his  collection  of  essays  Speaking  Two  Languages: 
,y 
in  Medieval  Studies.  Traditional  Disciplines  and  Contemporarv  Theor 
Further,  any  scholar  of  medieval  English  literature  with  an  interest  in- 
history  should  have  at  least  a  passing  knowledge  of  Lee  Patterson's 
Negotiating  the  Past:  The  Historical  Understanding  of  Medieval 
Literature,  although  Patterson's  interest  is  in  Middle  English,  and  so  his 
work  is  not  directly  related  to  Anglo-Saxon  studies.  These  texts  are,  in 
any  case,  of  general  interest  in  the  context  of  this  project;  the  two  works 
on  Old  English  literature  most  directly  related  to  this  one,  however,  are 
Graham  D.  Caie's,  The  Judgement-Day  Theme  in  Old.  English  Literature, 
and  John  P.  Hermann's  Allegories  of  War.  Language  and  Violence  in 
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Caie's  conception  of  the  metaphorical  relationship  between  the 
transformation  described  in  the  doomsday  fire  and  the  spiritual  nature  of 
the  individual  Christian  believer  helps  to  explicate  the  fundamental 
philosophical  construct  of  the  link  between  the  body  and  the  spirit.  This 
construct  is  central  to  Anglo-Saxon  sensibilities,  and  is  thus  important  to 
the  model  of  torture  which  I  describe.  Further,  Caie's  is  the  most 
important  work  on  Old  English  doomsday  sequences,  and  the  model  of 
the  fire  of  judgment  upon  which  he  focuses  so  much  attention  is  crucial 
to  our  understanding  of  the  relationship  between  spiritual  identity  and 
physical  torture.  Thus,  while  a  work  on  Old  English  eschatological 
poetry  might  not  seem,  to  scholars  of  torture,  immediately  related  to  the 
subject  at  hand,  the  resonances  between  spiritual  purgation  and  applied 
physical  abuse  are  such  that  the  former,  in  this  context,  does  much  to 
inform  the  latter.  Caie  does  not  deal  specifically  with  torture,  of  course, 
and  his  interest  is  strictly  literary;  the  points  of  contact  between  his 
work  and  this  one,  then,  are  likewise  limited.  Caie's  work,  however, 
concerns  the  spiritual  equivalent  of  physical  duress,  and  so  helps  to 
elucidate  the  transformative  function  of  torture  in  an  Old  English  poetic 
context. 
Hermann's  work  is  a  milestone  in  Anglo-Saxon  studies  for  two 
reasons  which  are  of  primary  significance  to  the  present  study.  First,  in 
his  book  Hermann  attempts  to  determine  the  points  of  convergence  and 
divergence  between  traditional  philological  analysis  and  post- 
structuralist  critiques  of  the  very  basis  of  such  philological  techniques  as 
source  studies,  iconography,  exegesis,  and  allegoresis.  While  not 
rejecting  such  traditional  approaches,  Hermann  questions  the  uncritical 
acceptance  of  their  theoretical  assumptions.  Second,  Hermann  analyzes 
the  relationship  between  violence  and  spirituality  in  Old  English  poetry 
by  defining  and  examining  the  dichotomous  nature  (Good  vs.  Evil,  -, Introduction  19 
Church  vs.  D  evil,  S  oul  vs.  Bo  dy,  Spirit  vs.  L  etter)  of  spiritu  al  w  arfare  in 
this  context,  and  the  rhetorical  borders  between  such  opposites.  Such  an 
approach  is  of  obvious  interest  in  the  light  of  my  project,  and  in  fact  my 
Conclusion  discusses  just  such  a  dichotomous  nature  (Self  vs.  Other)  in 
the  function  of  torture,  which  is  itself  a  form  of  spiritual  violence  in  Old 
English  poetry.  Allegoties  of  Waris  a  deftly  argued  and  theoretically 
sophisticated  approach  to  Old  English  literature,  and  indeed  serves  as  a 
manifesto  of  sorts  for  post-structuralist  studies  of  both  medieval  texts 
and  the  traditional  methodologies  associated  with  them.  My  own  project 
is  not  nearly  so  theoretically  astute,  but  the  nature  of  Hermann's  critical 
apparatus  was  in  any  case  an  influence  in  the  conception  of  this  project. 
However,  the  greatest  impact  of  Hermann's  work  upon  my  own  has  been 
the  significant  presence  of  absence.  Hermann,  concerned  as  he  is  with 
rhetorical  strategies,  and  aware  as  he  is  of  the  limitations  of  historical 
contextualization,  makes  no  effort  to  contextualize  literary  violence 
within  its  larger  cultural  milieu.  The  violence  which  is  torture  is  by 
necessity  context-bound;  that  is,  although  we  may  never  fully 
understand  the  complex  social  process  which  is  torture,  we  may  only 
begin  to  understand  it  within  its  historical,  legal,  spiritual,  and 
anthropological  environment.  A  linguistic  or  thematic  analysis  of  torture 
outside  of  such  an  environment  is  a  semiotic  game,  a  vain  attempt  to 
attribute  meaning  to  a  sign.  It  is  only  by  contextualizing  such  acts  of 
conventional  and  ritualized  violence  that  they  begin  to  signify  at  all. 
Further,  such  signification  has  as  much  to  tell  us  about  ourselves  as  it 
does  about  Old  English  literature,  and  this  seems  to  me,  in  the  terms  of 
the  study  of  torture,  no  bad  thing. 
This  project  is  by  nature  interdisciplinary  and  by  necessity 
eclectic,  in  that  torture  and  pain  are  events  which  occur  and  recur 
constantly  across  and  throughout  cultures,  demanding  attention  as  they Introduction  20 
simultaneously  defy  definition  and  collapse  traditional  generic 
boundaries.  The  perspective  of  any  given  discipline  allows  one  to, 
perceive  these  entities  only  as  those  cross-sections  thereof  which  are 
pertinent  to  that  particular  discipline.  Each  torture  act  represents  a  vast 
complex  of  organizing  principles  and  functions  (legal,  political, 
historical,  sociological,  psychological,  linguistic,  literary)  which  is 
crystallized  in  the  moment  of  the  act,  but  which  is  not  easily  - 
reconstituted  into  its  component  parts.  The  focus  of  this  study  is  torture 
as  this  phenomenon  manifests  itself  in  Old  English  religious  verse,  and  it 
is  clear  that  my  treatment  of  material  from  other  disciplines  and  genres  is 
secondary  to  this  primary  focus.  I  do  not  claim  that  my  survey  of 
Anglo-Saxon  culture  is  by  any  means  exhaustive,  nor  do  I  claim  that  my 
literary  poetic  model  of  torture  is  representative  of  the  phenomenon  in 
Anglo-Saxon  culture  at  large.  Still,  by  examining  a  number  of  historical 
records,  -legal  codes,  philosophical  and  theological  works,  medical  texts, 
psychological,  sociological,  and  anthropological  studies,  linguistic 
models,  and  semiotic  theories,  and  by  attempting  to  compare  medieval 
with  modem  models  of  many  of  these,  I  have  attempted  to  contextualize 
(to  a  limited  extent,  and  within  the  parameters  of  my  poetic  focus)  the 
violence  of  torture  in  Anglo-Saxon  literary  texts.  ý  While  interdisciplinary 
studies  are  nothing  new,  I  believe  that  the  contextual  approach  to  a 
cultural  phenomenon  such  as  torture  which  my  study  suggests  offers  a 
valuable  direction  for  further  scrutiny  by  Anglo-Saxonists.  Further,  I 
believe  that  an  in-depth  examination  of  multiple  cultural  facets  of  torture 
within  a  single  culture  would  be  of  great  value  to  scholars  of  torture.  - 
Hence,  I  hope  that  this  work,  and  the  model  for  further  study  which  it 
suggests,  will  be  of  interest  and  of  use  to  scholars  of  Anglo-Saxon 
England  and  scholars  of  the  history  and  practice  of  torture  alike. Introduction  21 
A  note  on  sources  and  evidence  is  in  order  at  this  point.  -  My 
primary  sources  are  poetic,  and  I  rely  upon  standard  edited  editions  of 
such  works  throughout  this  study;  exact  citations  appear  in  the  notes  the 
first  time  a  particular  text  is  cited,  and  also  in  the  General  Bibliography. 
The  texts  to  which  I  most  often  refer  include  Elene,  'Andreas,  The  Fates 
of  the  Apostles,  and  The  Dream  of  the  Rood  from  the  Vercelli  Book; 
Juliana,  Phoenix,  and  Chiist  from  the  Exeter  Book;  Judith  from  London, 
British  Library,  Cotton  Vitellius  A-xv;  and  Judgment  Day  II  from 
Cambridge,  Corpus  Christi  College  20  1.  My  work  is  not  paleographical, 
but  I  did  consult  the  Vercelli  Book  and  CCCC  201  concerning  minor 
editorial  matters.  ,  For  a  sense  of  the  character  of  any  given  term  - 
throughout  the  Old  English  corpus,  and  for  examples  of  usages  in 
various  contexts,  I  have  relied  upon  the  Microfiche  Concordance  to  Old 
English.  A  Thesaurus  of  Old  English  is  likewise  a  vital  resource  for 
determining  semantic  overlap  in  the  use  of  terms  regarding  pain  and 
torture.  In  the  cases  where  I  have  pursued  a  detailed  linguistic  or 
semantic  study  drawing  upon  the  Concordance;  ýI  have  tried  to  take  into 
account  orthographic  irregularities,  and  have  relied  upon  Bosworth- 
Toiler  and  Clark-Hall  for  the  variations  to  be  expected.  In  all  cases  of 
citations  drawn  from  poetic  texts,  in  all  cases  of  supporting  texts  drawn 
from  the  Concordance,  and  in  all  cases  relying  upon  a  high  degree  of 
linguistic  analysis,  I  have  cited  the  original  Old  English  text  first,  and 
added  a  translation  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.  In  such  cases  my 
argument  always  rests  upon  the  original  language  (as  it  appears  in  the 
edited  text  cited),  and  not  the  translation.  These  translations  are  based 
upon  the  edited  glossaries  (where  available),  and  Bosworth-Toiler,  with 
occasional  reference  to  Clark-Hall;  however,  all  translations  are 
ultimately  the  author's  own.  - Introduction  22 
The  historical  and  legal  examples  cited  in  Chapter  One  are  the 
exception  to  my  general  rule  regarding  the  nature  of  texts  and  their 
translations.,  Except  where  noted,  all  such  references  are  drawn  from 
English  Histotical  Documents,  volumes  I  and  II;  English  Histolical 
Documents  is  the  standard  compendium  source  in  the  field,  and  while 
not  exhaustive,  it  is  suitable  for  the  limited  context  which  I  have  sought 
to  provide.,  The  primary  historical  source  upon  which  I  have  relied  is  the 
Anglo-Saxon  Chronicle,  from  which  I  have  culled  every  identifiable, 
example  of  torture;  under  my  working  definition  torture  must  be  to  a 
specific  end,  and  thus  I  have  included  examples  only  where  a  case  for 
causality  and  intent  may  be  made.  Where  there  are  variances  between 
the  available  Anglo-Saxon  Chronicle  texts,  I  have  made  reference  to 
such  in  the  notes.  Citations  from  historical  records  other  than  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  Chronicle  are  specifically  noted  in  the  text.  In  cases  where  I 
found  the  need  to  present  a  cogent  narrative  of  historical  events,  or 
where  I  needed  any  other  such  clarification,  I  turned  to  Sir  Frank 
Stenton's  Anglo-Saxon  England,  the  standard  secondary  reference  work. 
The  primary  legal  sources  upon  which  I  have  relied  include  the  laws  of 
Ine,  Alfred,  Athelstan,  Cnut,  and  William,,  although,  I  cite  from  many 
other  sources  as  well.  My  primary  f  ocus  in  my  study  of  legal  records 
was  identifying  those  laws  concerning,,  for  instance,  the  ordeal, 
execution,  penal  mutilation,  etc.,  which  imposed  painful  and/or 
destructive  acts  for  a  stated  or  implicit  purpose.  Each  historical  and 
legal  reference  is  individually  cited  in  the  notes,  with  reference  both  to 
the  specific  text  involved  and  to  the  page  and  volume  number  of  English 
Histotical  Documents.  Since  very  little  of  my  argument  in  historical  and 
legal  cases  rests  upon  linguistic  analysis,  since  the  few  such  suppositions 
I  do  make  are  amply  supported  in  later  chapters,  and  since  the  sheer  bulk 
of  the  passages  involved  would  make  double  entries  unwieldy,  -in  such Introduction  23 
cases  I  have  included  only  the  translated  text.  These  translations  are  to 
be  credited  to  the  editors  of  those  works. 
Although  I  have  made  a  distinction  in  form  in  my  use  of  this 
historical  material,  I  do  not  generally  consider  Anglo-Saxon  historical 
sources  to  be  "non-literary".  That  is,  I  subscribe  to  the  tenet  that  texts 
are  texts,  and  the  generic  boundaries  which  we  impose  upon  them 
delineate  our  understanding  of  their  function,  and  not  the  functions 
themselves.  12  In  the  Anglo-Saxon  period,  particularly,  it  is  often  hard 
to  distinguish  between  "history",  "hagiography",  "literature",  etc.,  and  it 
is  not  clear  that  we  should  try  to  do  so.  13  In  the  case  of  Anglo-Saxon 
historical  records  and  legal  codes  which  pertain  to  torture,  I  have  found 
evidence  of  an  overwhelming  resonance  between  these  texts  and 
"literary"  texts  concerned  with  the  same  issues.  It  is  only  fair  to 
emphasize,  however,  that  the  focus  of  this  project  is  poetic,  and  I  am 
interested  most  specifically  in  Old  English  poetic  hagiography  and 
eschatology.  This  focus  is  valuable  to  a  study  such  as  mine  for  a  number 
of  reasons.  It  is  in  the  poetry  (and  most  specifically  hagiography  and 
eschatology)  that  we  find  the  most  detailed  and  developed  descriptions 
of  pain  and  torture  in  the  Old  English  corpus.  Along  the  same  lines,  the 
development  of  the  themes  underlying  pain  and  torture  in  which  I  am 
interested  is  most  fully  and  self-consciously  manifested  in  such  works. 
Further,  in  Old  English  poetry  we  find  a  deliberate  and  often  self  - 
conscious  use  of  language  and  modification  of  source  texts  which 
illuminates  for  us  the  authors'  sensibilities  concerning  pain  and  torture 
much  more  clearly  than  in  any  other  contemporary  genre.  Although  my 
focus  is  poetic,  however,  I  do  look  at  a  large  number  of  non-poetic  texts 
to  provide  some  context  for  poetic  torture,  and  to  show  the  semantic 
range  of  some  of  the  terminology  involved.  Further,  I  consider  physical 
acts,  legal  principles,  -  philosophical  constructs,  and  religious  poetry  all  to Introduction  24 
be  equally  valid  texts  for  the  purposes  of  this  project,  although  my  most 
intense  interest  is  more  traditional  and  literary.  ,  In  short,  I  will  attempt  to 
discover  what  torture  "means"  in  Anglo-Saxon  poetry  by  conflating  a 
great  deal  of  poetic  and  non-poetic  information  into  what  Michel 
Foucault  termed  "a  sort  of  great,  uniform  text": 
One  shows  how  the  different  texts  with  which  one  is  dealing  refer 
to  one  another,  organize  themselves  into  a  single  figure,  converge 
with  institutions  and  practices,  and  carry  meanings  that  may  be 
common  to  a  whole  period.  Each  element  considered  is  taken  as 
the  expression  of  the  totality  to  which  it  belongs  and  whose  limits 
it  exceeds.  And  in  this  way  one  substitutes  for  the  diversity  of  the 
things  said  a  sort  of  great;  uniform  text,  which  has  never  before 
been  articulated,  and  which  reveals  for  the  first  time  what  men 
'really  meant'  not  only  in  their  words  and  texts,  their  discourses 
and  their  writings,  but  also  in  the  institutions,  practices, 
techniques,  and  objects  that  they  produced.  14 
In  the  context  of  this  project,  Foucault's  "uniform  text"  is  that  unified 
conception  of  the  nature  and  function  of  torture  to  which  I  earlier, 
referred.  I  turn  now  to  an  overview  of  the  stages  through  which'I  hope 
to  achieve  this  conception. 
'  Chapter  One  provides  the  historical  and  legal  components  of  my 
larger  cultural  exploration  of  Anglo-Saxon  torture.  This  chapter  is  in 
two  parts,  the  first  dealing  with  instances  of  torture  appearing  in 
historical  records,  and  the  second  examining  legal  codes  dealing  with 
torture.  Throughout  both  sections  I  develop  conceptions  of  the  roles 
(legal,  political,  spiritual,  popular)  and  the  significance  of  torture  in 
Anglo-Saxon  England.  In  the  second  section,  in  addition  to  the  laws Introduction  25 
themselves,  I  discuss  the  development  of  Anglo-Saxon  legal  models  and 
practices  from  early  Germanic  customary  law  through  the  changes 
wrought  after  the  Norman  Conquest.  In  both  discussions,  issues  of  the 
relationship  between  the  body  and  the  spirit,  the  nature  of  spiritual 
identity,  and  the  function  of  torture  as  a  symbolic  and  political  force 
come  up  again  and  again;  these  same  issues  are  central  to  my  larger 
discussion.  Symbolically,  the  body  may  act  as  a  page  upon  which  the 
torturer  composes,  for  example,  the  text  of  the  victim's  criminal  guilt,  or 
the  nature  of  a  power  relationship;  conversely,  spiritual  identity  may 
manifest  its  nature  on  the  tablet  of  the  victim's  flesh  through  such 
practices  as  the  ordeal.  Chapter  One  confronts  the  relationship  between 
philosophical  models  and  practical  consequences  in  law  and  act. 
Pain  is  central  to  torture,  and  thus  it  is  fitting  to  ground  an 
exploration  of  torture  in  an  understanding  of  pain.  In  Chapter  Two, 
therefore,  I  discuss  the  universal  experience  of  pain  as  an  isolating  and 
inexpressible  force.  I  begin  this  chapter  with  a  discussion  on  the  nature 
of  pain,  exploring  the  links  between  the  modern  and  the  medieval. 
Examining  carefully  the  language  and  imagery  of  The  Dream  of  the 
Rood,  I  illustrate  that  the  Anglo-Saxons  understood  the  paradox  of  pain 
and  the  linguistic  and  intellectual  difficulties  in  communicating  its 
nature.  The  Anglo-Saxons  understood  pain  to  be  a  largely  affective 
state,  closely  related  to  spiritual  matters.  Further,  in  a  way  that  modem 
psychologists,  anthropologists,  and  physicians  are  just  beginning  to 
understand  and  define,  the  Anglo-Saxons  utilized  a  language  "of 
weapons  and  wounds"  in  order  to  confront  these  difficulties  in 
communicating  between  individuals  the  diverse  and  intensely  personal 
phenomena  which  we  group  together  under  the  rubric  "pain". 
In  Chapter  Three  I  discuss  the  nature  of  torture  acts  as  language 
acts,  and  explore  the  necessarily  public  nature  of  such  a  language  of Introduction  26 
weapons  and  wounds.  I  also  examine  the  role  of  the  body  as  document, 
and  develop  more  fully  the  transformative  model  of  torture  which  allows 
such  a  document  to  be  inscribed  upon.  I  begin  this  chapter  by 
developing  a  linguistic  model  for  understanding  the  function  of  torture 
as  language;  I  do  so  by  drawing  upon  the  work  of  linguists  interested  in 
pragmatics.  Having  laid  out  my  conceptual  model,  I  discuss  at  length 
the  overtly  public  nature  of  torture  acts  in  Old  English  poetry,  and  the 
necessary  relationship  between  witnessing  and  signification  to  which 
this  public  nature  attests.  I  conclude  this  chapter  with  a  discussion  of  the 
transformative  function  of  pain  and  torture,  a  function  which  is  of 
primary  importance  to  the  following  two  chapters. 
In  Chapter  Four  I  examine  the  significance  of  this  transformative 
model  of  torture  in  the  context  of  the  concepts  of  "inscription"  and  "the 
body  as  text".  I  discuss  at  length  the  philosophical  basis  for  both 
conceptions,  and  illustrate  that  these  contemporary  critical  models  are 
grounded  in  analogous  traditions  which  span  from  classical  through 
medieval  times.  I  then  examine  at  length  the  model  of  torture  as 
"writing"  upon  the  body,  especially  in  terms  of  spiritual  identity.  I 
discuss  a  number  of  Old  English  texts  which  exploit  such  models,  and  I 
also  uncover  an  Old  English  linguistic  tradition  which  links  the  concept 
of  literal  engraving  upon  a  surface  with  metaphorical  inscription  upon 
the  soul,  and  which  conversely  equates  literal  burying  with  the 
metaphorical  concealment  of  a  spiritual  reality. 
In  Chapter  Five  I  move  from  the  realm  of  earthly,  corporeal  pain 
and  torture  to  the  related  spiritual  transformations  wrought  in  Anglo- 
Saxon  depictions  of  eschatology.  In  the  fire  of  judgment  model  we  find 
a  conception  of  spiritual  transmutation  expressed  through  a  metaphor  of 
material  purgation.  This  model  is  particularly  well-represented  in  Old 
English  literature,  and  helps  to  explicate  the  nature  of  the  Anglo-Saxon Introduction  27 
perception  of  the  relationship  between  the  body'and  the  soul,  a 
relationship  which  is  crucial  to  our  understanding  of  the  function  of 
torture  in  this  culture.  I  begin  this  chapter  with  an  exploration  of  the 
roots  of  the  transmutative  tradition,  move  into  an  analysis  of  the 
development  of  the  related  fire  of  judgment  model,  and  conclude  with  a 
statement  concerning  the  relationship  between  this  model  and  our  larger 
discussion  of  torture. 
I  begin  my  Conclusion  by  re-examining  the  unified  conception  of 
torture  which  I  have  attempted  to  describe,  drawing  attention  to  the 
parallels  between  Anglo-Saxon  and  contemporary  models  and  practices 
of  torture.  Building  upon  this  foundation,  I  discuss  the  significance  of 
this  study,  both  in  terms  of  its  value  to  scholars  of  Anglo-Saxon  poetry, 
and  in  terms  of  its  place  in  contemporary  torture  studies.  I  conclude  by 
examining  the  nature  and  function  of  the  concept  of  the  "other"  in 
Anglo-Saxon  models  of  torture.  Such  a  conception  of  the  role  of  the 
alien  is  new  neither  to  literary  studies,  nor  indeed  to  medieval 
scholarship;  in  light  of  the  function  of  the  other  in  contemporary 
profiles  of  torturers  and  the  necessary  pre-conditions  of  torture,  however, 
this  facet  of  Anglo-Saxon  torture  is  particularly  telling,  and  indeed, 
chilling.  Anglo-Saxon  perceptions  of  pain  and  torture  were,  in  some 
ways,  in  stark  contrast  to  our  own:  these  were  often  perceived  as 
necessary  and  desirable  processes,  a  perception  due  in  large  part  to  the 
spiritual  models  associated  with  torture.  These  very  perceptions  and 
associations  are  at  the  heart  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  conception  of  the  other, 
however,  and  the  nature  of  the  rationalization  inherent  in  the  perceptions 
of  these  processes  is  a  valuable  object  of  study  to  those  interested  in  the 
nature  of  torture,  medieval  or  modem. Introduction  28 
INTRODUCTION  NOTES 
I  See  John  H.  Langbein,  Tortur 
,e 
and  the  Law  of  Proof.  Europe  and 
England  in  the  Ancien  R  egim  e.  Chicago:  U  of  Chicago  P,  1976.  Pages 
3-4.  Langbein  refers  to  punitive  mutilation,  execution,  and  the  like  as 
"blood  sanctions".  See  also  Edward  Peters,  Torture.  New  Perspectives 
on  the  Past  Series,  R.  1.  Moore,  gen.  ed.  Oxford:  Basil  Blackwell,  1985. 
Pages  1-10;  see  especially  his  discussion  of  the  necessity  of  a  precisely 
narrow  definition  for  torture,  page  2,  and  the  distinction  between  torture 
and  what  Langbein  calls  "blood  sanctions",  page  4.  Peters  offers  a  very 
precise  summary  of  Roman  through  modem  definitions  of  torture,  its 
methods  and  components;  see  especially  pages  1-2  and  28. 
2  Langbein,  page  3.  In  his  first  chapter,  Langbein  provides  a  useful 
overview  concerning  the  jurisprudence  of  torture  under  Roman-canon 
law,  the  abolition  of  the  ordeal  in  favor  of  such  a  system  of 
jurisprudence,  and  the  origins  of  judicial  torture  (pages  4-8).  See  also 
Langbein's  citation  of  Poullet,  note  3,  page  145: 
"Torture  was  not  a  punishment  ...  ;  it  was  not  a  mode  of  proof, 
which  some  writers  on  criminal  law  call  it;  it  was  a  mode  of 
procedure  which  the  judge  employed  to  obtain  ...  proof  ...... 
3  Peters,  page  153.  See  also  page  152: 
The  term  torture  now  exists  almost  wholly  in  a  generalized 
vocabulary.  And  because  it  does,  it  is  easy  for  torturers  to  deny 
that  what  they  do  is  torture  ...  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  difficult  for 
people  who  use  the  term  for  anything  that  seems  synonymous 
with  cruelty  to  carry  much  conviction  when  they  use  it  for 
something  close  to  its  original  meaning. 
4  Amnesty  International,  Report  on  Torture.  London:  Duckworth  in 
association  with  Amnesty  International  Publications,  1973.  Page  33; Introduction  29 
see  also  pages  35-37  for  legal  and  political  problems  regarding  any 
definition  of  torture. 
5  See,  for  example,  Amnesty  International,  Report,  page  21: 
It  is  significant  that  torture  is  the  one  form  of  violence  today  that  a 
state  will  always  deny  and  never  justify.  The  state  may  justify 
mass  murder  and  glorify  those  that  kill  as  killers,  but  it  never 
justifies  torture  nor  glorifies  those  that  torture  as  torturers. 
A  lot  depends,  of  course,  on  who  is  doing  the  torturing,  their 
rationalization  for  doing  it,  and,  most  importantly,  in  what  terms  and 
with  what  identity  the  torturers  construe  the  victims;  see  my  discussion 
of  the  "  other"  and  torture  in  the  Conclusion. 
6  Such  abuses  which  take  advantage  of  this  loophole  are  discussed  in 
Amnesty  International,  Torture  in  the  Eighties.  An  Amnesty 
international  Report.  Oxford  and  London:  Martin  Robertson  & 
Company,  Ltd.,  and  Amnesty  International  Publications,  1984.  Pages 
14-17.  Amnesty  International  cites  two  examples  of  governmental 
actions  which,  under  the  auspices  of  this  loophole,  may  seem  to  be  legal, 
but  which  seem  to  contradict  the  spirit  of  the  convention  as  a  whole. 
Amnesty  International  condemns  the  United  Kingdom  for  their 
interrogation  methods  of  prisoners  in  Northern  Ireland,  and  Germany  for 
certain  cases  of  the  solitary  confinement  of  prisoners.  Cases  of  capital 
punishment,  such  as  are  common  in  the  United  States,  also  could  be 
construed  as  legal  only  by  the  grace  of  this  loophole  in  international  law. 
7  The  World  Alliance  of  Reformed  Churches,  Against  Torture.  With  a 
preface  by  Allan  A.  Boesak  and  Edmond  Perret.  Vol.  8,  Studies  from 
the  World  Alliance  of  Reformed  Churches.  Geneva:  World  Alliance  of 
Reformed  Churches,  1987.  Page  4;  see  also  the  explication  offered  of 
the  terms  of  the  convention  adopted  by  United  Nations,  pages  5-8.  The Introduction  30 
authors  point  out  that  as  a  legal  instrument  this  definition  contains  four 
basic  elements.  These  are  that  an  act  of  torture:  1.  must  be  inflicted  by 
a  public  official;  2.  must  comprise  severe  pain  and  suffering;  3.  must 
be  intentionally  inflicted;  4.  must  be  inflicted  for  one  of  the  categories 
of  purposes  listed.  Under  the  terms  of  the  convention,  all  four  of  these 
elements  must  be  present  for  an  act  to  qualify  as  torture.  Further,  there 
are  four  categories  of  purposes  listed  within  this  document:  a. 
discrimination;  b.  the  securing  of  information;  c.  punishment;  d. 
intimidation.  Each  of  the  four  elements  and  the  four  categories  is 
discussed  in  some  detail.  See  also  Amnesty  International's  explication 
of  the  1975  United  Nations's  declaration  against  torture:  Amnesty 
International,  Eighties,  pages  13-14.  The  explication  of  Amnesty 
International's  definition  of  torture  is  more  useful  to  this  study,  and  so  is 
included  in  its  entirety  below. 
8  Amnesty  International,  Report,  page  35.  See  also  the  explication  of 
these  basic  principles  offered  on  pages  34-35: 
There  are  certain  essential  elements  which  give  torture  its 
particular  meaning  and  which  should  be  incorporated  in  any 
comprehensive  definition.  In  the  first  place  the  nature  of  torture 
assumes  the  involvement  of  at  least  two  persons,  the  torturer  and 
the  victim,  and  it  carries  the  further  implication  that  the  victim  is 
under  the  physical  control  of  the  torturer.  The  second  element  is 
the  basic  one  of  the  infliction  of  acutepain  and  suffering.  It  is  the 
means  used  by  the  torturer  on  the  victim  and  the  element  that 
distinguishes  him  from  the  interrogator.  Pain  is  a  subjective 
concept,  internally  felt,  but  is  no  less  real  for  being  subjective. 
Definitions  that  would  limit  torture  to  physical  assaults  on  the 
body  exclude  'mental'  and  'psychological'  torture  which Introduction  31 
undeniably  causes  acute  pain  and  suffering,  and  must  be 
incorporated  in  any  definition.  The  concept  of  torture  does  imply 
a  strong  degree  of  suffering  which  is  'severe'  or  'acute'.  One 
blow  is  considered  by  most  to  be  'ill-treatment'  rather  than 
'torture',  while  continued  beatings  over  48  hours  would  be 
'torture'.  Intensity  and  degree  are  factors  to  be  considered  in 
judging  degrees.  Thirdly,  there  is  implicit  in  the  notion  of  torture 
the  effort  by  the  torturer,  through  the  infliction  of  pain,  to  make 
the  victim  submit-,  to  'break  him'.  The  breaking  of  the  victim's 
will  is  intended  to  destroy  his  humanity,  and  the  reaction  to  the 
horror  of  this  finds  expression  in  various  human  rights  instruments 
in  such  phrases  as  'respect  for  the  inherent  dignity  of  the  human 
person'.  Finally,  torture  implies  a  systematic  activity  with  a 
rational  purpose.  The  unwitting,  and  thus  accidental,  infliction  of 
pain,  is  not  torture.  Torture  is  the  deliberate  infliction  of  pain,  and 
it  cannot  occur  without  the  specific  intent  of  the  torturer.  Inherent 
in  this  element  of  purpose  are  the  goals  or  motives  for  employing 
torture,  and  while  torture  can  be  used  for  a  variety  of  purposes,,  it 
is  most  generally  used  to  obtain  confessions  or  information,  for 
punishment,  and  for  the  intimidation  of  the  victim  and  third 
persons.  The  first  two  motives  relate  directly  to  the  victim,  while 
the  purpose  of  intimidation,  in  wide  use  today  as  a  political 
weapon,  is  intended  to  be  a  deterrent  to  others  as  well  as  the 
victim. 
Amnesty  International,  Report,  page  21. 
10  This  complex  of  relationships  between  the  body  and  the  spirit,  and 
between  these,  pain,  and  torture,  are  discussed  extensively  in  Chapters Introduction  32 
Two  and  Three;  for  a  cogent  introduction  into  the  complexities  of  such 
relationships,  however,  turn  to  Amnesty  International,  Report,  page  39: 
An  analysis  of  the  effect  of  torture  inevitably  involves  a  study  of 
human  tolerance  to  pain  or  stress.  This  raises  two  preliminary 
difficulties  of  a  theoretical  as  well  as  a  practical  nature.  First,  pain 
or  stress  produces  biological  responses  in  man  which  are  best 
understood  in  terms  of  a  combination  of  mental  and  physical 
processes.,  Secondly,  it  is  virtually  impossible  to  discuss  isolated 
torture  methods  and  their  effects  without  reference  to  the  context 
in  which  the  torture  is  being  administered.  The  second  difficulty 
is  particularly  relevant  to  the  problem  of  relating  results  from 
laboratory  stress  situations  to  actual  torture  environments 
themselves.  The  first  difficulty,  particularly  that  of  'discussing 
experiences  of  pain,  arises  from  the  traditional  and  convenient 
habit  of  considering  the  'body'  and  the  'mind'  as  discrete  entities. 
This  theoretical  separation  has  been,  by  and  large,  axiomatic  in 
cultures  with  religious  and  philosophical  roots  as  diverse  as  the 
Judaeo-Christian  and  the  Hindu.  But,  however  appropriate  this 
concept  of  a  mind-body  dichotomy  may  appear  to  be  in  the 
development  of  moral  and  behavioural  norms,  it  poses  severe 
obstacles  to  a  proper  understanding  of  certain  human  phenomena 
such  as  pain.  In  spite  of  the  research  which  yet  needs  to  be  done 
in  this  field,  it  is  nevertheless  significant  for  the  purposes  of  this 
report  that  contemporary  pain  studies,  as  well  as  research  into 
psycho-somatic  illnesses  and  stress,  point  to  increasing  acceptance 
of  a  synthetic  (i.  e.  unified)  concept  of  the  body/mind  relationship. 
It  has  become  unacceptable  to  insist  upon  a  division  between 
'physical'  and  'mental'  experiences  of  pain.  This  development Introduction  33 
prevents  one  from  cataloguing  torture  methods  and  effects 
according  to  discrete  categories  of  the  physical  and  psychological. 
David  B.  Morris,  "  How  to  Read  The  Bod  in  Pain.  "  Literature  and 
Medicine  6  (1987):  139-155.  Page  142. 
12  By  "texts  are  texts",  I  mean  that  all  signifying  activity  is  subject  to 
the  same  sort  of  analysis.  In  this  context  I  am  referring  to  narrative 
written  texts.  For  an  argument  that  we  must  apply  conceptions  of  textual 
analysis  to  all  symbolism,  see  Tzvetan  Todorov,  Introduction  to  Poetics. 
Richard  Howard,  trans.,  Sussex:  -Harvester  P,  198  1.  See  especially  page 
71. 
13  For  a  discussion  of  the  relationship  between  history  ("fact")  and 
literature  ("fiction"),  see,  for  example,  Linda  Orr,  "The  Revenge  of 
Literature:  A  History  of  History.  "  New  Literary  Historv  12  (Autumn 
1986):  1-22.  For  seminal  sources  concerning  the  subjectivity  of  all 
narratives  (including  history),  see  Edward  Said,  The  World,  the  Text  and 
the  Ckitic.  Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard  UP,  1983.  See  especially  page 
178.  See  also  Michel  Foucault,  The  Archaeolpg7  of  Knowledge  &  the 
Discourse  on  Language.  A.  M.  Sheridan  Smith,  trans.  NY:  Pantheon 
Books,  1972.  See  especially  page  8.  The  literature  on  this  subject  is 
immense. 
14  Foucault,  page  118. Chapter  One  34 
CHAPTER  ONE:  Torture  in  Anglo-Saxon  England 
Part  I:  Torture  in  Anglo-Saxon  History 
Torture,  ordeal,  dismemberment,  and  execution  tend  to  be  matter- 
of-fact  common-places  in  Anglo-Saxon  historical  narratives;  most  of 
the  references  to  violent  death  and  disfigurement  (and  there  are  many) 
stick  to  a  minimum  of  facts  and  avoid  graphic  description  and  specific 
detail.  This  is,  of  course,  indicative  of  the  chronicle  genre  in  general; 
while  the  later  entries  tend  to  be  more  informative  than  the  early  ones, 
chronicles  are  by  their  very  nature  sparse  and  understated.  A  striking 
early  example  concerns  one  Mul,  the  brother  of  ,  Ceadwalla  (the  latter  for 
a  short  time  between  685  and  688  laid  claim  to  the  throne  of  Wessex).  A 
chronicle  entry  for  the  year  685  makes  mention  of  Mul's  death  by 
burning  some  two  years  later,  but  this  death  is  mentioned  as  an 
afterthought  to  a  passage  that  reads  much  more  like  an  Old  Testament 
series  of  "begats"  than  the  description  of  bone-bursting  conflagration 
which  we  might  expect  from  a  tradition  which  has  left  us  Phoenix  and 
the  graphic  pyre  scenes  of  Beowulf.  1  Here  the  author  is  far  more 
interested  in  genealogy  than  in  the  consumption  of  a  body  by  fire  so 
luridly  recorded  by  some  Anglo-Saxon  poets:  2 
In  this  year  Ceadwalla  began  to  contend  for  the  kingdom. 
Ceadwalla  was  son  of  Cenberht,  the  son  of  Ceadda,  the  son  of 
Cutha,  the  son  of  Ceawlin,  the  son  of  Cynric,  the  son  of  Cerdic; 
and  Mul,  who  was  afterwards  burned  in  Kent,  was  Ceadwalla's 
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The  entries  for  686  agree  that  in  this  year  Ceadwalla  and  his  doomed 
brother  "ravaged  Kent  and  the  Isle  of  Wight"  ý4  and  though  the  only 
information  given  for  the  following  year  has  to  do  with  these  same  two 
brothers,  all  that  is  recorded  are  the  most  basic  facts: 
In  this  year  Mul  was  burnt  in  Kent,  and  twelve  other  men  with 
him,  and  that  year  Ceadwalla  again  ravaged  Kent.  5 
This  matter-of-fact  recitation  of  the  basic  information  is  indicative  of 
many  such  descriptions;  deaths  in  battle  are  hardly  ever  recounted  in 
any  detail,  while  execution  and  dismemberment  tend  to  be  recorded 
generically:  in  other  words,  although--for  instance  --d  e  capitation  and 
blinding  are  mentioned  with  some  regularity,  they  generally  are  not 
described  in  any  detail.  We  simply  learn  of  the  means  by  which  a 
particular  individual  was  put  to  death  or  dismembered;  we  are  offered 
precious  little  insight  into  the  details  of  the  practices  involved,  or  indeed 
into  the  specifics  of  any  particular  occasion.  Thus,  for  example,  we 
learn  that  in  792  Ethelbert  (king  of  East  Anglia)  lost  his  head,  although 
we  are  offered  no  other  information,  either  regarding  Mercian  practices 
of  execution,  or  concerning  the  political  significance  of  this  particular 
act  (or  of  decapitation  in  general): 
In  this  year  Offa,  king  of  the  Mercians,  had  Ethelbert  beheaded.  6 
Even  in  the  longer,  much  more  detailed  narrative  entries,  this  economy 
of  description  tends  to  be  the  rule  regarding  acts  of  torture  and  violent 
death.  In  the  entry  for  896,  for  example,  we  are  told  of  the  devastation 
of  a  group  of  marauding  Danes:  most  of  the  information  is  fairly  vague, 
although  we  do  learn  that  the  king's  reeve  Lucuman--along  with  a Chapter  One  36 
handful  of  other  named  notables--fell  at  their  hands;  some  of  the  Danes, 
however,  had  the  misfortune  to  be  captured  as  they  attempted  to  make 
their  way  to  the  open  sea,  and  the  king  ordered  them  to  be  hanged.  7  We 
are  left  to  draw  our  own  conclusions  as  to  the  specific  arrangements 
involved  in  such  an  execution,  or  indeed  as  to  the  actual  number  of 
Vikings  put  to  death  in  this  manner;  further,  the  significance  of  this 
particular  form  of  execution  (often  reserved  for  thieves  and  common 
criminals--see  my  discussion  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  laws,  below)  is 
something  which  we  are  left  to  discover  from  other  sources. 
My  point  in  citing  these  examples  is  to  underscore  that  they  are,  in 
fact,  representative  of  the  bulk  of  such  instances  which  come  to  us 
through  such  sources  as  the  Anglo-Saxon  Chronicle;  this  is  not  to  say 
that  there  are  not  more  descriptive  examples  which  have  much  to  tell  us 
about  the  functions  and  significance  of  torture,  dismemberment,  and 
execution  in  the  context  of  Anglo-Saxon  historiography.  I  turn  now  to 
dozens  of  examples  which  offer  us  ample  evidence  for  reconstructing 
just  such  functions  and  significance.  It  is  crucial  to  begin,  however,  with 
an  understanding  of  the  bland,  common-place  nature  of  many  of  these 
descriptions,  which  serve  to  throw  their  more  graphic  and  informative 
counterparts  into  sharp  relief.  In  other  words,  those  accounts  which  do 
contain  background  information  or  more  vivid  descriptions  are  notable 
for  this  very  reason,  and  are  therefore  worthy  of  special  scrutiny.  I  am 
concerned  with  examples  which  help  to  illuminate  issues  of  intent, 
causality,  and  the  relationships  between  such  violent  acts  and  political, 
legal,  and  socio-economic  realities.  I  will  focus  most  specifically  on  The 
Anglo-Saxon  Chronicle  (hereafter  ASC)  and  extracts  from  the 
vernacular  laws.  I  cite  many  other  sources--both  vernacular  and  Latin￿ 
in  support,  but  the  ASC  offers  a  unique  vernacular  historical  resource 
which  is  of  particular  interest  to  the  scholar  of  specifically  Germanic  and Chapter  One  37 
Anglo-Saxon  cultural  systems.  Furthermore,  as  a  scholar  of  Old  English 
literature  and  language  who  focuses  on  vernacular  poetic  traditions,  I  am 
of  course  most  interested  in  related  vernacular  historical  and  legal 
traditions.  I  therefore  focus  on  these  vernacular  traditions  while 
supplementing  this  evidence  with  appropriate  information  from  other 
sources.  Taking  my  cue  from  Stenton,  however,  I  focus  most  especially 
on  material  from  before  the  death  of  William  the  Conqueror,  with  the 
exception  of  the  ASC,  which  continues  as  a  peerless  vernacular  source 
up  to  the  time  of  the  ascension  of  Henry  II  in  1154.  In  the  following 
chapters  I  demonstrate  how  pain,  torture,  and  violence  are  utilized  in  Old 
English  poetry  as  a  language  of  spiritual  and  political  power  which  helps 
to  elucidate  the  nature  of  perceptions  of  such  power  in  an  Anglo-Saxon 
poetic  context.  In  this  chapter  I  will  focus  on  how  some  of  these  same 
issues  manifest  themselves  in  the  political,  social,  and  spiritual 
significance  of  "real-life"  acts  of  torture,  ordeal,  dismemberment,  and 
execution  in  the  context  of  Anglo-Saxon  historical  writings.  8 
In  my  discussion  of  Anglo-Saxon  law  codes  in  the  second  half  of 
this  chapter,  I  will  explore  the  significance--in  the  context  of  Germanic 
traditions,  and  most  especially  in  the  terms  of  the  evolution  of  the 
concepts  of  trial  by  ordeal  and  judicial  torture--of  prescribed  penalties 
such  as  dismemberment,  castration,  blinding,  and  decapitation  for  the 
commission  of  certain  crimes.  In  the  first  half  of  this  chapter,  however, 
my  interest  is  in  examining  actual  recorded  examples  of  such  acts  of 
physical  mutilation  in  their  historical,  political,  and  social  contexts,  and 
to  attempt  thereby  to  determine  wherever  possible  what  was  signified 
through  the  performance  of  particular  acts  upon  particular  bodies  in 
particular  settings  and  circumstances.  It  is  self-evident  that  many  such 
acts  are  politically  and  socially  significant.  Further,  however,  I  argue 
that  many  of  these  acts  served  to  convey  specific  messages--sometimes Chapter  One  38 
consciously  on  the  part  of  the  perpetrators,  sometimes  not--regarding 
personal  relationships,  political  realities,  and  the  nature  of  power  in  the 
world  which  generated  them.  These  acts,  in  effect,  served  to  articulate  a 
language  of  power,  and  this  language  was  often  as  intelligible  to  the 
chroniclers  of  these  events  as  it  is  to  us.  In  Chapter  Three  I  discuss  at 
length  just  how  physical  acts  may  function  as  language,  and  I  develop 
theoretical  linguistic  models  which  help  to  explicate  literary  examples 
thereof;  in  Chapter  One  my  model  of  interpretation  is  more 
rudimentary,  and  is  founded  on  the  basic  assumption  that  physical  acts 
can  convey  relatively  explicit  meanings  regarding  power  relationships.  I 
begin  the  present  section  of  Chapter  One  by  describing  the  relationship 
between  punitive  torture  and  dismemberment  and  perceptions  of  treason, 
oath-breaking,  and  criminal  acts;  I  move  on  to  explore  how  acts  such  as 
decapitation  and  castration  serve  to  explicate  the  political  realities  of 
power  transfers,  And  then  note  how  similar  acts  are  utilized  as  a  means  of 
cons  olid  ating--and  illustrating  the  consolidation  of--political  power. 
Next,  I  analyze  how  a  pattern  of  such  acts  was  sometimes  perceived  by 
chroniclers  as  an  indication  of  the  stability  and  strength  of  existing 
power  structures,  while  an  inconsistent  or  non-existent  pattern 
conversely  was  viewed  as  an  indication  of  political  weakness  and  lack  of 
direction.  Finally,  I  look  at  how  traditions  of  ritualized  bodily  affliction- 
-such  as  the  ordeal--were  organized  around  central  philosophical 
principles  concerning  the  nature  of  the  relationship  between  the  spirit 
and  the  flesh. 
Many  examples  of  torture,  dismemberment,  blinding,  and 
execution  which  are  mentioned  in  the  annals  are  performed  as  punitive 
acts  for  serious  offenses--most  notably  treason  and  oath-breaking-- 
sometimes  even  including  criminal  acts  (such  as  thievery)  which  a 
modern  audience  might  perceive  of  as  relatively  minor  transgressions. Chapter  One  39 
Such  punitive  torture  serves  a  number  of  social  functions,  and  each  act 
offers  a  text  concerning  cultural  assumptions  and  mechanisms  of  social 
control  which  may  be  read  on  a  number  of  levels.,  The  enactment  of 
highly  visible  maiming--such  as  the  loss  of  limbs,  ears,  noses,  etc.,  and 
most  especially  decapitation  and  castration--does  much  more  than 
simply  cause  the  victim  to  suffer;  such  maiming  serves  as  a  highly 
symbolic  way  of  communicating  the  very  nature  of  crime  and 
punishment  in  this  cultural  context.  9  It  is  in  this  sense  a  form  of  writing, 
and  the  broken  bodies  produced  through  such  acts  of  composition  thus 
may  be  categorized  as  texts.  The  disfigured  bodies  of  such  transgressors 
act  as  signs  which  articulate  the  sins  of  the  bearers  of  these  signs  (or--in 
the  case  of  hostages--of  the  faithlessness  of  those  whom  the  hostages 
represent),  and  which  simultaneously  articulate  the  power  of  those  who 
exact  such  bloody  retribution.  Both  living  and  dead  bodies  may  serve  as 
texts;  and  disembodied  limbs--and  most  especially  heads--offer  highly  - 
evocative  and  easily  portable  tokens  of  sin  and  power.  Living  survivors 
of  visible  torture  offer  long-term  witness;  thus,  a  living  testimony  to 
power  and  to  the  consequences  of  faithlessness  and  sin  could  prove  a 
stronger  agent  of  social  constraint  than  a  corpse  or  a  head.  Such  punitive 
acts  of  torture  are  distinct  from  the  other  practices  which  I  will  detail 
below,  but  they  do  have  important  traits  in  common.  The  practice  of 
equating  sin  with  mutilation,  spiritual  state  with  physical  body,  for 
example,  has  philosophical  resonance  with  the  relationship  between 
body  and  spirit  which  is  crucial  to  the  practice  of  the  ordeal;,  likewise, 
the  utilization  of  the  body  parts  rendered  through  torture  to  articulate  a 
message  about  power  is  related  to  political  acts  of  decapitation  which  I 
will  examine  presently. 
Blinding  was  a  common  form  of  punitive  mutilation  in  Anglo- 
Saxon  England,  and  it  was  often  meted  out  for  treason.  Such Chapter  One  40 
punishments  were  sometimes  carried  out  upon  the  kin  of  offenders; 
responsibility  for  one's  kin  was  a  cornerstone  of  Germanic  culture,  and 
such  punitive  practices  would  extend  the  symbolic  text  of  the  mutilated 
body  onto  a  further  level  of  signification  (see  my  discussion  of  the 
mutilation  of  hostages,  below).  In  the  account  for  the  year  992  we  learn 
of  the  treason  of  one  Ealdorman.,  Elfric,  who--according  to  the  "F 
chronicler--was  "  one  of  those  in  whom  the  king  trustedmost".  10  This 
Aýlfric-along  with  Earl  Thored,  Bishop  Elfstan,  and  Bishop  E  scwig-- 
was  to  lead  a  naval  expedition  against  a  force  of  marauding  Danes.  On 
the  night  before  battle  was  to  be  joined,  however,  Elfric  warned  the 
Danes  and  fled  under  cover  of  darkness;  due  to  his  treachery  all  but  one 
Danish  ship  escaped  unscathed.  Evidently  the  English  caught  up  to  the 
retreating  Danes  and  captured  the  very  ship  upon  which  the  traitor  was, 
but  the  Ealdorman  himself  escaped.  11  The  punishment  for  the  sins  of 
the  father  may  have  been  exacted  upon  his  son,  however,  as  we  learn  in 
the  following  entry--which  is  quite  brief  and  offers  little  indication  as  to 
motive  or  causality--of  a  blinding  carried  out  according  to  royal  orders: 
... 
In  this  year  the  king  had  Aýlfgar,  son  of  Ealdorman.,  Elfric, 
blinded.  12 
We  are  not  specifically  informed  that  this  AElfric  is  the  traitor  of  the 
previous  year,  or  for  what  reason  this  blinding  was  carried  out.  It  is 
extremely  common  in  these  annals,  however,  -  to  describe  implicitly  the 
relationship  between  two  events  through  simple  juxtaposition.  It  is 
logical  to  assume  in  this  instance  that  the.,  Elfric  mentioned  casually  in 
the  entry  for  993  is  the  same  one  who  played  such  a  large  role  in  the 
events  described  for  992.  In  addition,  given  that  blinding  was  a  common 
enough  penalty  for  treason  (see,  for  example,  the  entry  for  1075, Chapter  One  41 
discussed  below),  and  that  hostages  were  routinely  dismembered  or 
executed  for  acts  of  treachery  by  their  kin  or  lord  (see,  for  example,  the 
entry  for  10  14,  discussed  below),  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  assert  that  this 
act  of  blinding  may  have  been  a  result  of  the  aforementioned  betrayal  by 
,  Elfric. 
Treason  against  a  sworn  lord  is  the  most  serious  kind  of  oath- 
breaking,  and  the  punishment  of  traitors  must  necessarily  serve  a 
symbolic  function  which  emphasizes  the  magnitude  of  this  offense.  In 
the  annal  for  1075  we  learn  about  a  plot  against  King  William  and  of  the 
consequences  to  the  conspirators.  Both  the  "D"  and  "E"  chroniclers 
agree  that  Earl  Roger  and  Earl  Ralph  were  "the  ringleaders  in  this 
foolish  plot",  13  which  was  hatched  at  the  wedding  of  Earl  Ralph  to 
Emma,  the  daughter  of  William  fitz  Osbern.  We  are  informed  that  both 
Earl  Roger  and  Earl  Waltheof  were  in  attendance,  along  with  a  number 
of  bishops  and  abbots,  and  that  all  were  in  agreement  to  expel  William 
from  England.  The  plot  unraveled  almost  as  quickly  as  it  was  devised, 
however,  and  soon  all  of  the  conspirators  were  attempting  to  flee  or  to 
make  terms  with  William,  or--as  in  the  case  of  Earl  Waltheof--both. 
Earl  Roger--kinsman  to  the  king--was  seized  and  imprisoned,  but  Earl 
Waltheof--who  had  the  good  sense  to  flee  the  country  and  attempt  to  pay 
out  a  cash  settlement  from  there--was  duped  into  returning  to  England, 
and  interred  to  await  a  harsher  fate  the  next  year.,  Concerning  the  many 
conspirators  the  outcome  is  somewhat  vague,  'although  we  do  learn  that 
all  of  the  Bretons  who  were  seduced  into  treason  at  the  wedding  feast 
were  "destroyed",  14  and  that  the  penalties  for  most  of  those  involved 
included  banishment,  blinding,  and  public  humiliation: 
Some  of  them  were  blinded 
And  some  banished  from  the  land Chapter  One  42 
And  some  were  put  to  shame 
Thus  were  the  traitors  to  the  king 
Brought  low.  15  -- 
The  concept  of  "shame"  here  is  particularly  enlightening,  as  it 
underscores  the  public  nature  and  purpose  of  such  punishments:  the 
victims  of  shaming  and  blinding  serve  as  living  testaments  to  their 
treason,  as  well  as  to  the  power  of  the  king  against  whom  they  so  futilely 
rebelled.  Those  who  are  banished  serve  the  same  symbolic  function, 
although  they  are  "  empty"  signs,  who--by  the  presence  of  their 
conspicuous  ab  s  enc  e  --reinforce  these  very  same  messages.  Earl 
Waltheof  was  the  only  named  conspirator  to  suffer  capital  punishment, 
as  we  learn  in  the  annal  for  1076  that  he  was  decapitated: 
And  Earl  Waltheof  was  beheaded  at  Winchester  on  St. 
Petronella's  Day;  and  his  body  was  taken  to  Crowland;  and  he  is 
buried  there.  16 
As  we  shall  see  in  other,  -  similarly  politically  significant  examples,  the 
severed  head  itself  serves  as  a  particularly  potent  sign.  We  learn  that 
Earl  Waltheof's  body  is  buried  at  Crowland,  but  no  specific  mention  is 
made  of  the  head;  throughout  English  history,  traitor's  severed  heads 
have  been  displayed  to  signify  the  nature  of  their  crime  and  the  power  of 
the  monarch  against  whom  they  plotted,  and  it  is  not  unreasonable  to 
suggest  that  the  same  may  have  been  the  case  with  Waltheof.  In  any 
event,  as  we  shall  see  shortly,  beheading  is  an  act  of  notable  political 
valence,  and  it  is  therefore  pertinent  to  note  the  manner  chosen  for 
Waltheof's  disposal. Chapter  One  43 
It  is  not  simply  the  acts  of  torture  and  dismemberment  themselves 
which  serve  to  assert  executive  power  and  to  provide  a  means  of  social 
and  political  control.  Although  the  implicit  threat  of  such  mutilation  is 
inarguably  a  powerful  coercive  force,  an  explicit  threat--in  a  context  in 
which  such  acts  are  regularly  carried  out--offers  an  extremely  potent  tool 
for  exerting  pressure  in  particularly  volatile  instances.  In  the  annal  for 
the  year  1095  we  find  an  example  where  a  threat  of  blinding  serves  as  an 
effective  means  to  a  short-term  military  end,  staves  off  a  potential 
rebellion,  and  serves  as  a  warning  to  others  who  might  question  royal 
authority  in  the  future.  In  Easter  of  that  year,  King  William  II  held  his 
court  at  Winchester  and  expected  all  of  his  nobles  to  be  in  attendance; 
Earl  Robert  of  NorthuMbria  refused,  however,  to  the  fury  of  the  king. 
When  Robert  again  refused  to  attend  the-king  at  Windsor  at  Whitsuntide, 
the  king  summoned  his  army  and  marched  on  Northumbria.  The  royal 
forces  took  the  fortresses  at  Newcastle  and  Tynemouth  quickly  enough, 
and  with  them  many  of  the  earl's  retainers  and  kin,  but  when  the  king 
turned  to  Bamborough--where  the  earl  was  encamped--he  had  less  luck 
and  had  to  make  do  with  a  siege.  Earl  Robert  removed  himself  one  night 
with  some  retainers,  however,  and  made  his  way  towards  Tynemouth; 
he  had  the  bad  luck  to  be  captured,  though,  and  William  thus  was  able  to 
use  the  threat  of  the  blinding  of  his  prisoner  to  reduce  the  besieged  castle 
at  Bamborough: 
When  the  king  came  back  he  ordered  Earl  Robert  of  Northumbria 
to  be  seized  and  taken  to  Bamborough,  and  both  his  eyes  to  be  put 
out,  unless  those  who  were  within  would  give  up  the  castle.  His 
wife  and  Morml,  who  was  his  steward  and  his  kinsman,  too,  were 
holding  it.  Through  this  scheme  the  castle  was  then  given  up,  and 
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many  people,  both  clerics  and  lay,  who  had  been  instigators  of 
rI  ebellion  against  the  king,  some  of  whom  the  king  had  ordered  to 
be  reduced  to  captivity  before  that  time.  And  afterwards,  he 
ordered  it  to  be  announced  very  pre-emptorily'all  over  this 
country  that  all  those  who  held  land  of  the  king  must  be  at  court  in 
season  if  they  wished  to  be  entitled  to  the  king's  protection.  And 
the  king  ordered  Earl  Robert  to  be  brought  to  Windsor  and  to  be 
kept  in  the  castle  there.  17 
The  regular  attendance  of  all  nobles  at  court  was  a  means  of  keeping  an 
eye  on  the  major  figures  and  potential  rivals  for  power,  and  of  sounding 
out  loyalty  and  potential  conspiracies.  It  therefore  constituted  a  chief 
method  of  controlling  the  powerful  landholders,  and  Robert's  refusal  to 
attend  was  both  an  attack  on  the  king's  authority  to  demand  attendance 
and  an  important  indicator  that  a  larger  power  struggle  was  afoot.  It  is 
crucial  to  note  that  William  used  his  response  to  this  crisis--not  just  as  a 
means  of  defusing  this  particular  situation--but  as  a  way  of  ensuring  that, 
in  the  future,  all  nobles  would  be  cowed  into  attendance  at  the  court, 
which  substantially  reduced  the  risk  of  insurrection. 
The  next  year  King  William  asserted  his  authority  by  making 
good  such  threats  of  physical  punishment  and  mutilation,  and  the  broken 
bodies  (and  most  especially  the  blinded  and  castrated  William  of  Eu) 
produced  through  such  acts  served  to  underscore  the  power  of  the  King, 
the  futility  (and,  indeed,  foolishness)  of  rebellion,  and  the  guilt  of  the 
individual  mutilated  conspirators: 
In  this  year  King  William  held  his  court  at  Christmas  at  Windsor, 
and  William,  bishop  of  Durham,  died  there  on  New  Year's  Day.  - 
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were  at  Salisbury.  There  Geoffrey  Bainard  accused  William  of 
Eu,  the  king's  kinsman,  of  having  been  a  party  to  the  treason 
against  the  king:  and  fought  it  out  with  him,  and  overcame  him  in 
a  trial  by  battle,  and  when  he  was  overcome,  the  king  ordered  his 
eyes  to  be  put  out  and  that  afterwards  he  should  be  castrated.  And 
his  steward,  called  William,  who  was  son  to  his  mother's  sister, 
the  king  ordered  to  be  hanged  on  a  gallows.  Also,  Odo,  count  of 
Champagne,  the  king's  uncle,  and  many  others  were  deprived  of 
their  lands  there,  and  some  men  taken  to  London  and  there 
destroyed.  18 
The  case  of  William  of  Eu  is  interesting  to  my  discussion  for  a  number 
of  reasons.  First  of  all,  it  is  noteworthy  that  the  king  leaves  William 
alive--and  horribly  mutilated  --while  he  puts  the  steward  of  William  to  a 
quick--albeit  ignoble--end.  The  living  testimony  to  royal  power,  the 
futility  of  rebellion,  and  the  treacherous  sin  of  William  provided  through 
the  text  of  his  mutilated  body  served  to  broadcast  a  message  which  was 
not  likely  to  be  misinterpreted  by  its  audience,  and  did  so  in  a  manner 
which  may  have  been  much  more  effective  and  long-lasting  than  that 
provided  through  the  text  of  a  corpse.  Furthermore,  the  methods  of 
mutilation--whereby  the  victim  is  deprived  of  both  the  power  to  function 
without  assistance,  and  the  power  to  procreate--are  particularly 
significant  in  the  context  of  a  nobility  whose  two  ends  were  to  lead  and 
to  leave  heirs.  19  Finally,  the  fact  that  William  was  convicted  through 
the  process  of  trial  by  combat--in  which  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the 
accused  is  made  manifest  through  God's  intervention  on  the  side  of 
justice--is  derived  from  the  same  tradition  as  the  process  of  trial  by 
ordeal  (discussed  below  and  in  Chapter  Six),  and  is  in  fact  founded  upon Chapter  One  46 
the  same  basic  principle  that  the  state  of  the  spirit  may  be  divined 
through  some  sign  made  manifest  through  the  flesh. 
The  practice  of  torture  and  mutilation  as  a  means  to  combat 
treason  amongst  the  ruling  classes  is--in  its  basic  functions  and  '- 
underlying  principles--very  similar  to  the  practice  of  torture  and 
mutilation  as  a  means  to  control  the  populace  at  large.  An  interesting 
divergence,  however,  between  these  two  methods  of  control  occurs 
when  the  latter  shifts  from  a  coercive  model  to  a  propagandistic  one;  in 
both  cases  the  texts  of  broken  bodies  produced  through  torture  articulate 
a  language  of  power,  guilt,  and  identity,  but  the  message  of  that 
language  shifts  in  the  latter  case,  as  does  the  perception  of  such  torture 
by  its  intended  audience.  We  find  such  an  interesting  contrast  between 
depictions  of  mutilations  for  criminal  offenses  in  the  adjacent  entries 
1124  and  1125.  In  both  cases  it  is  clear  that  times  were  hard 
economically,  and  we  may  infer  that  the  king's  government  was  using 
the  public  mutilation  and  execution  of  criminal  offenders  in  order  to 
affect  varying  forms  of  control  over  what  must  have  been  a  disgruntled 
populace.  What  is  interesting  is  the  contrast  between  the  methods 
involved,  the  ends  towards  which  these  methods  were  directed,  and  the 
public  perception  of  these  methods,  which  seems  clearly  recorded  in  the 
wildly  divergent  tones  of  the  two  annals.  In  the  first  case,  the  king's 
representatives  seem  to  have  been  taking  severe  measures  in  order  to 
combat  rising  crime  in  a  troubled  period,  and  also  probably  to  reassert 
forcibly  and  graphically  to  a  discontented  public  the  nature  and  extent  of 
royal  power: 
In  the  course  of  this  same  year  after  St.  Andrew's  Day  before 
Christmas,  Ralph  Basset,  and  the  king's  thegns  held  a  council  at 
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been  hanged  before;  that  was  in  all  forty-four  men  in  that  little 
time:  and  six  men  were  blinded  and  castrated.  A  large  number  of 
trustworthy  men  said  that  many  were  destroyed  very  unjustly 
there,  but  our  Lord  God  Almighty  that  sees  and  knows  all  secrets-- 
he  sees  the  wretched  people  are  treated  with  complete  injustice-- 
first  they  are  robbed  of  their  property  and  then  they  are  killed.  It 
was  a  very  troublous  year.  the  man  who  had  any  property  was 
deprived  of  it  by  severe  taxes  and  severe  courts:  the  man  who  had 
none  died  of  hunger.  20 
It  is  clear  that  public  perception  of  this  crackdown  was  largely  negative, 
and  that  these  iron-fisted  measures  simply  served  to  reaffirm  the  popular 
perception  that  the  common  man  was  suffering  at  the  hands  of  an  unjust 
and  greedy  aristocracy.  The  measures  taken  the  following  year, 
although  no  less  horrible,  were  far  more  cleverly  considered,  and  seem 
to  have  proven  immensely  popular.  In  1125,  moneyers  were  mutilated 
for  their  "treasonous"  "false-dealing";  according  to  the  chronicler  this 
was  their  just  dessert,  and  the  public  was  to  understand  that  their 
mutilated  bodies  served  as  a  testament  to  their  "sin".  In  fact,  this  is  a 
striking  example  because  the  government  had  found  a  convenient 
scapegoat  for  the  economic  problems  which  were  clearly  ravaging  the 
country,  and  they  madeU'se  of  torture  as  a  means  to  write  a  testimony  of 
guilt  upon  the  bodies  of  these  scapegoats.  In  order  to  deflect  public 
blame  from  the  king,  his  agents,  tax  men,  etc.,  the  King  chose  publicly  to 
blame,  condemn,  and  mutilate  the  moneyers;  their  bodies  then  were  on 
public  display,  both  reinforcing  the  government  accusation  of  their  guilt, 
and  reinforcing  the  public's  opinion  of  the  just  retribution  of  the  king, 
who  seems  through  these  texts  powerful,.  just,  and  able  to  find  the  root  of 
the  economic  troubles  and  to  deal  with  it.  Most  striking  of  all  is  that  this Chapter  One  48 
gambit  seems  to  have  worked--judging  from  the  rabid  opinion  of  the 
Chronicler--which  is  especially  notable  in  juxtaposition  with  the  implicit 
criticism  of  royal  power,  justice,  and  taxation  in  the  previous  entry: 
I,  I 
In  this  year  King  Henry  sent  to  England  from  Normandy  before 
Christmas,  and  ordered  that  all  the  moneyers  who  were  in  England 
should  be  mutilated--i.  e.  that  each  should  lose  the  right  hand  and 
be  castrated.  That  was  because  the  man  who  had  a  pound  could 
not  get  a  pennyworth  at  a  market.  And  Bishop  Roger  of  Salisbury 
sent  all  over  England  and  ordered  them  all  to  come  to  Winchester 
at  Christmas.  When  they  got  there,  they  were  taken  one  by  one 
and  each  deprived  of  the  right  hand  and  castrated.  All  this  was 
done  before  Twelfth  Night,  and  it  was  done  very  justly  because 
they  had  ruined  all  the  country  with  their  great  false-dealing:  they 
all  paid  for  it.  21 
, 
The  removal  of  the  offending  member--that  is,  the  right  hand--of  each 
moneyer  is  especially  significant,  as  this  is  the  hand  with  which  they 
were  presumed  to  have  struck  coins,  and  therefore  that  with  which  they 
were  presumed  to  have  sinned.  There  are  several  references  in  Anglo- 
Saxon  law  to  exactly  such  mutilation  of  duplicitous  moneyers,  and  the 
function  of  the  lost  hand  as  a  sign  was  not  lost  upon  the  lawmakers:  it 
was  sometimes  mounted  above  the  door  of  the  mint  where  the  crime 
took  place  (see  my  discussion  of  the  laws,  below).  Here  the  lawmakers 
are  just  as  aware  of  the  value  of  symbols  of  guilt  and  of  power,  although 
the  symbols  in  this  context  take  a  somewhat  different  form.  It  is  clear  in 
such  contexts  that  the  possibility  of  a  signifying  function  of  torture  and 
dismemberment  was  not  always  lost  on  either  those  who  utilized  such  a 
function  or  those  interpreted  it  in  the  annals.  Not  all  acts  of  language Chapter  One  49 
composed  through  torture,  however,  were  self-conscious,  and  I  move 
now  to  acts  which  have  much  to  tell  us  about  the  nature  of  political  and 
military  power  in  Anglo-Saxon  England,  without  necessarily  having 
been  composed  to  do  so. 
Accounts  concerning  the  Danes  often  seem  to  imply  that  their  acts 
of  torture  and  mutilation  upon  helpless  victims  were  indicative  of  their 
own  blood-thirsty  nature,  and  not  representative  of  any  sort  of  organized 
or  recognizable  system  of  morality,  justice,  or  law.  There  is  certainly  an 
element  of  truth  in  this  generalization:  the  terrible  ransacking,  looting, 
and  pillaging  wrought  by  the  Northmen  often  seemed  to  follow  few 
rules,  except  primitive  principles  concerning  profit,  glory,  and  personal 
satisfaction.  Such  a  simplification,  however--although  understandable  in 
the  minds  of  their  victims--is  not  altogether  just.  The  Scandinavian 
raiders  who  so  oppressed  the  English  were,  in  a  cultural  and  ethnic 
sense,  amongst  their  closest  kinsmen,  and  their  systems  of  waging  war, 
affecting  treaties,  exchanging  hostages,  etc.,  plainly  derived  from  the 
same  Germanic  organizing  principles  as  did  the  Anglo-Saxon  systems. 
This  is  nowhere  more  clear  than  in  the  fact  that  the  cultural  systems  both 
groups  utilized  were  so  similar  that  the  various  chroniclers  did  not  take 
the  trouble  to  explain  concepts  such  as  the  exchange  of  hostages,  the 
purchasing  of  peace  with  tribute  money,  and  the  like;  these  were  self- 
explanatory  social  systems  developed  in  the  volatile  Germanic  north  in 
order  to  allow  for  a  certain  measure  of  stability  in  negotiating 
settlements  between  constantly  warring  tribes,  and  both  groups  in 
question  participated  in  systems  derived  from  a  common  Germanic 
source.  It  is  only  fair  to  note  that,  as  loathsome  and  unredeemingly  evil 
as  the  chroniclers  often  found  the  Vikingsý2  it  is  occasionally  remarked 
that  they  maintained  their  pan  of  a  particular  bargain--at  least  for  a 
while,  and  when  it  was  in  their  interest  to  do  so--which  is  about  as  much Chapter  One  50 
as  can  be  said  for  their  Anglo-Saxon  counterparts.  23  Indeed,  some 
references  to  Danish  actions  might  be  seen  to  imply  that  they  sometimes 
took  Germanic  customs  and  legal  concepts  extremely  seriously,  most 
notably  the  sanctity  of  the  sworn  oath  and  the  important  place  of 
hostages  in  treaty  negotiations  and  compliance. 
A  case  in  point  involves  the  conquest  of  England  under  Swein, 
and  the  consequences  of  treaty  violations  in  the  aftermath  of  Swein's 
untimelydeath.  Inthe  entryforthe  year  1014  we  are  offered  an 
example  of  the  mutilation  of  hostages  by  Cnut,  Swein's  successor,  in 
return  for  the  breaking  of  faith  by  the  English.  During  his  rapid 
subjugation  of  the  whole  of  England  in  1013,  Swein  received  hostages 
from  each  area  in  turn  as  it  came  under  his  control: 
... 
And  then  at  once  Earl  Uhtred  and  all  the  Northumbrians 
submitted  to  him,  as  did  all  the  people  of  Lindsey,  and  then  all  the 
people  belonging  to  the  district  of  the  Five  Boroughs,  and  quickly 
afterwards  all  the  Danish  settlers  north  of  Watling  Street,  and 
hostages  were  given  to  him  from  every  shire  ... 
he  then  turned  to 
Oxford,  and  the  citizens  at  once  submitted  and  gave  hostages;  and 
from  there  to  Winchester,  where  they  did  the  same  ...  then  King 
Swein  turned  from  there  to  Wallingford,  and  so  west  across  the 
Thames  to  Bath,  where  he  stayed  with  his  army.  Then  Ealdorman 
,  Ethelmwr  [of  Devon]  came  there,  and  with  him  the  western 
thegns,  and  all  submitted  to  Swein,  and  they  gave  him  hostages. 
When  he  had  fared  thus,  he  then  turned  northward  to  his  ships, 
and  all  the  nation  regarded  him  as  full  king.  And  after  that  the 
citizens  of  London  submitted  and  gave  hostages,  for  they  were 
afraid  that  he  would  destroy  them.  24 Chapter  One  51 
In  the  final  line  of  this  passage  we  are  clearly  informed  that  hostages 
were  given  in  order  to  avoid  destruction,  and  therefore  stood  in  lieu  of 
such  destruction;  in  that  sense  they  must  also  be  recognized  as  a, 
tangible  sign  of  their  captor's  power.  Hostage-giving  was  a  common 
Germanic  practice,  and  the  understanding  was  that  by  surrendering  and 
tendering  such  hostages,  the  citizens  of  each  area  in  question  were 
recognizing  their  debt  of  loyalty  to  Swein;  the  hostages  stood  in  lieu  of 
the  ravagement  which  the  country  might  have  undergone  without  this 
symbolic  act  of  fealty,  and  they  stood  to  suffer  the  consequences  if  and 
when  the  agreed  compact  was  broken.  It  did  not  take  long  to  test  the  ' 
strength  of  these  oaths.  Swein  died  suddenly  in  1014,  leaving  his  young 
son  Cnut  in  control  of  the  Danish  forces,,  but  not  in  any  position  to  lay 
proper  claim  to  his  inheritance.  In  the  face  of  this  power  vacuum,  the 
English  aristocracy  offered  to  come  to  terms  with  the  currently,  - 
disenfranchised  King  Ethelred,  in  return  f  or  certain  oaths  on  his  part  that 
he  should  remedy  his  more  unpopular  ways.  He  agreed  to  these  terms 
quickly  enough,  and  with  this  agreement  the  English  lords  recognized 
him  as  king,  and  pronounced  Cnut  (and  any  Danish  successors)  outlaw. 
Cnut  was  forced  to  withdraw  for  the  moment,  but  not  before  wreaking  a 
frightful  vengeance  upon  those  hostages  who  had  been  given  to  his 
father  as  assurances  of  the  loyalty  of  the  English  to  their  Danish  king: 
Then  after  Swein  was  dead,  Cnut  stayed  in  Gainsborough  with  his 
army  until  Easter,  and  he  and  the  people  in  Lindsey  came  to  an 
agreement  that  they  would  provide  him  with  horses  and  then  go 
out  and  ravage  together.  Then  King  Ethelred  came  there  to 
Lindsey  with  his  full  force  before  they  [Cnut  and  his  followers] 
were  ready,  and  it  [Lindsey]  was  ravaged  and  burnt,  and  all  the 
men  who  could  be  got  at  were  killed;  and  Cnut  put  out  to  sea  with Chapter  One  S2 
his  fleet,  and  thus  the  wretched  people  [of  Lindsey]  were  betrayed 
by  him.  And  then  he  turned  south  till  he  reached  Sandwich,  and 
he  caused  to  be  put  ashore  the  hostages  who  had  been  given  to  his 
father,  and  he  cut  off  their  hands,  ears  and  noses.  2S 
Just  as  these  hostages  were  symbolic  of  the  loyalty  of  the  conquered 
provinces  to  Swein--and  therefore  also  served  as  signs  of  his  political 
and  military  power--the  ritual  dismemberment  which  they  suffered  when 
the  treaties  were  broken  signifies  the  guilt  and  faithlessness  of  their  lords 
and  kinsmen.  Their  broken  bodies  provided  an  unambiguous  and  easily 
intelligible  text  in  which  all  who  viewed  them  could  plainly  read  this 
guilt,  this  greatest  of  Germanic  sins;  ý  further--more  abstractly--such 
mutilation  serves  as  a  horrifying  testimony  to  the  nature  of  the  Germanic 
conception  of  oath,  loyalty,  and  power  relationships,  as  well  as  to  the-- 
momentarily--otherwise  impotent  rage  of  the  ousted  Cnut. 
Such  hostages  as  those  given  to  Swein  were  not  prisoners  for 
ransom  in  the  modem  sense  of  the  term  "hostage";  they  were,  rather, 
high-ranking  individuals  exchanged  between  Germanic  tribes  or 
kingdoms  to  ensure  adherence  to  peace-treaties,  and  were  actually 
usually  quite  privileged  members  of  the  courts  in  which  they  stood 
hostage.  They  lived  and  often  fought  alongside  those  who  were 
ostensibly  their  "  captors",  and  in  fact  the  day-to-day  role  of  the  hostage 
in  a  foreign  court  serves  to  underscore  their  symbolic  value  as  a  pledge 
of  faith;  indeed,  this  in  many  ways  makes  the  text  of  their  mutilation--in 
such  cases  of  broken  faith  as  that  described  above--particularly  horrific, 
and  simultaneously  particularly  eloquent. 
But  though  such  hostages  were  not  prisoners  kidnapped  for 
ransom  or  political  advantage--as  we  understand  the  term--this  is  not  to 
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engage  in  such  profitable  practices  of  kidnapping.  Indeed,  the  very 
centrality  of  the  wergild  in  Germanic  culture  presupposes  a  mercantile 
understanding  of  the  objective  cash  value  of  a  man  of  any  given  social 
status.  Wergild  was  a  traditional  system  whereby  inter-tribal  feuds  were 
staved  off  through  the  payment  of  blood-money  (quite  literally  "man- 
money")  to  the  kin  of  a  slain  man  for  the  death  of  that  individual.  By  the 
time  of  Alfred  and  Guthrum  the  wergild  system  in  Anglo-Saxon  England 
had  been  codified  and  was  quite  complex,  and  clearly  delineated  the 
appropriate  cash  value  for  men  of  several  different  social  ranks. 
Especially  notable  is  the  fact  that  Danish  and  English  law  both  agree  on 
the  point  of  wergild  in  principle,  and  worked  out  a  compromise  between 
the  specifics  of  their  two  systems  in  the  laws  of  Alfred  and  Guthrum; 
this  illustrates  my  point  that  a  common  social  system  was  involved.  26  It 
is  but  a  short  step  from  acknowledging  the  cash  equivalent  of  a 
particular  category  of  man  to  perceiving  the  potential  cash  value  of  a 
prisoner,  either  through  a  payment  of  tribute  from  his  kinsmen,  or 
through  the  price  which  he  fetches  as  a  slave.  While  the  Vikings  were 
quick  to  grasp  the  economic  opportunities  of  both  the  "cash  hostage" 
and  the  slave  market,  it  is  with  the  former  that  I  am  at  present  primarily 
concerned.  , 
The  Danes  made  the  cash  hostage  a  regular  part  of  their  system  of 
extorting  tribute  from  the  peoples  whom  they  harassed,  and  they  seem  to 
have  taken  on  faith  that  such  a  system  was  sensible  and,  by  their 
reckoning,  honorable.  Indeed,  they  seem  to  have  been  enraged  by  any 
reticence  to  pay  a  demanded  sum,  and  the  results  to  the  victim  were  as 
dire  as  that  inflicted  upon  any  oath-breaker,  whether  or  not  a  promise  to 
pay  in  fact  had  been  extorted.  I  would  argue  that  they  understood  the 
paying  of  such  tribute--in  a  very  real  sense  "man-money"--to  be  only 
just,  and  indeed  the  honorable  course  for  the  kinsmen  of  the  prisoner. Chapter  One  54 
An  inversion  of  the'wergild  system,  to  be  sure,  but  a  rationally 
conceived  and  logically  implemented  one. 
In  the  example  of  Archbishop  Mfheah  we  find  a  good  illustration 
of  how  the  "breaking  of  faith"  in  this  cash  hostage  system  could  lead  to 
the  torture  and  murder  of  the  victim  .  the  torment  and  death  of  whom 
serve  social  and  semiotic  purposes  not  unlike  those  articulated  by  the 
dismembered  bodies  of  the  hostages  tortured  by  Cnut.  We  learn  in  the 
annal  for  the  year  1011  that  the  Northmen  besieged  and  then  entered 
Canterbury  through  the  treachery  of  one.,  Elfmmr,  thereby  capturing  a 
number  of  persons,  including  the  archbishop;  after  wreaking  havoc  they 
left,  taking  Archbishop  AElfheah  with  them.  27  According  to  the  ASC 
account,  the  Vikings  were  enraged  because  the  archbishop  refused  to 
promise  them  money,  or  indeed,  to  allow  others  to  raise  the  sum  which 
the  Danes  demanded  for  him  (some  3,000  pounds).  28  Judging  by  this 
account,  the  bludgeoning  to  death  of  AElfheah  was  not  the  result  of  the 
breaking  of  any  explicit  bargain  struck  for  the  price  of  his  release,  but 
rather  the  result  of  the  violation  of  an  implicit  Germanic  social  contract 
whereby  the  king  and  thegns  and  kinsmen  of  a  man  of  the  archbishop's 
social  standing  were  expected  and  even  morally  obligated  to  redeem  him 
through  tribute.  Here  the  Archbishop's  stubborn  and--to  the  Vikings-- 
inexplicable  refusal  to  adhere  to  the  terms  of  such  a  contract  (or,  more  to 
the  point,  to  allow  others  to  adhere  to  it)  ends  in  his  martyrdom  at  the 
hands  of  his  captors: 
Then  on  the  Saturday  the  army  became  greatly  incensed  against 
the  bishop  because  he  would  not  promise  them  any  money,  but 
forbade  that  anything  should  be  paid  for  him.  They  were  also 
very  drunk,  for  wine  from  the  south  had  been  brought  there.  They 
seized  the  bishop,  and  brought  him  to  their  assembly  on  the  eve  of Chapter  One  55 
the  Sunday  of  the  octave  of  Easter,  which  was  19  April,  and 
shamefully  put  him  to  death  there:  they  pelted  him  with  bones 
and  with  ox-heads,  and  one  of  them  struck  him  on  the  head  with 
the  back  of  an  axe,  that  he  sank  down  with  the  blow,  and  his  holy 
blood  fell  on  the  ground,  and  so  he  sent  his  holy  soul  to  God's 
kingdom.  29 
Though  it  has  been  argued  that  the  raiding  Northmen  were  a  cruel  and 
vicious  people--and  the  description  of  )Elheah's  death  certainly  confirms 
such  a  view--it  must  be  remembered  that,  though  cruel  and  vicious  they 
could  be,  they  were--first  and  foremost--a  people  interested  in  profit. 
Th  ere  is  no  profit  for  th  e  kill  ers  to  bem  ad  e  from  --no  wergild  to  bep  ai  d 
for--a  corpse  (indeed,  traditionally  the  killers  would  pay  such  a  sum), 
and  it  is  only  when  the  Danes  perceive  that  they  will  not  turn  a  profit 
from  the  archbishop  that  they  choose  to  murder  him;  they  have,  after  all, 
kept  him  with  them  and  alive  for  at  least  several  months.  Their  rage  at 
the  time  of  his  death  (and  the  violent  and  ghastly  nature  of  that  death, 
which  was  born  of  that  rage)  stems  from  their  perception  of  the  breaking 
of  a  fundamental  social  contract  bound  up  in  conceptions  of  loyalty  and 
oath,  and  not,  in  some  senses,  very  different  from  that  contract  between 
Swein  and  the  English  which  Cnut  sought  to  avenge. 
An  account  from  another  chronicle,  however,  indicates  that  the 
Danes  were  enraged  because'Mfheah  was  breaking  an  explicit  promise; 
according  to  this  source,  the  archbishop  buys  himself  some  time  by 
promising  a  payment  he  subsequently  does  not  make: 
...  [the  Danes]  ill-treated  them  with  chains  and  hunger  and 
indescribable  torments  after  their  abominable  fashion.  Moved  by 
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a  term  for  obtaining  it,  so  that  if  he  could  not  escape  death  by  an 
acceptable  ransom,  he  might  meanwhile  cleanse  himself  with, 
frequent  groans  as  a  living  sacrifice  to  be  offered  up  to  the  Lord. 
Then',  when  all  the  appointed  period  was  ended,  the  voracious 
Charybdis  of  thieving  magpies  summoned  the  servant  of  God,  and 
quickly  demanded  of  him  with  threats  the  payment  of  promised 
tribute.  And  gentle  as  a  lamb,  he  said:  "I  am  ready  at  once  for 
anything  you  now  dare  to  do  to  me;  but,  by  the  love  of  Christ, 
that  I  may  deserve  to  become'an  example  to  his  servants,  I  am 
untroubled  today.  It  is  not  my  wish,  but  dire  poverty,  that  makes 
me  seem  a  liar  to  you.  30 
In  this  case  the  rage  of  the  Vikings  is  clearly  a  result  of  AElfheah's 
breaking  of  his  word;  he  seems-4o  use  his  own  phrase--a  liar  to  them. 
Here  the  actions  of  the  Danes  are  even  more  clear  and  explicable,  and 
may  be  more  easily  associated  with  those  of  Cnut.  The  word  of  the 
archbishop  was  coerced  by  threats  and  torments,  of  course,  but  just  so 
was  the  treaty  with  the  English  extorted  through  force  of  arms  by  Swein. 
Indeed,  the  wergild  and  tribute  systems  are  both  predicated  on  the 
assumption  that  it  is  desirable  and  honorable  to  buy  off  the  threat  of 
violence  by  means  of  cash;  an  element  of  coercion  is  therefore  a 
necessary  part  of  the  process,  and  in  no  way  mitigates  either  a  sworn 
oath  or  an  implied  promise.  The  understanding  seems  to  be  that  one's 
word--or  any  social  contract--is  inviolate,  regardless  of  volition, 
causality,  or  motive.  As  in  other  cases  of  treason,  oath-breaking,  and 
treaty-abrogation,  the  penalties  are  severe,  and  the  text  of  this 
punishment  is  written  publicly  on  the  body  of  the  victim  for  all  to  read. 
The  abuse  and  subsequent  murder  of  Archbishop  Elfheah  at  the 
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signification  and  an  act  of  impotent  rage,  and  in  this  regard  it  is  similar 
to  (and  refines  our  understanding  of)  Cnut's  ritual  disfigurement  of  his 
father's  hostages.  In  both  cases  the  mutilated  bodies  of  the  victims 
reflect  the  dominance  of  the  perpetrators  over  their  victims,  and  thus 
articulate  for  all  who  saw  these  bodies  a  language  of  personal  power, 
pain,  and  the  consequences  of  faithlessness.  The  mutilation  of  Cnut's 
victims  stood  witness  to  the  broken  oaths  of  loyalty  of  the  English. 
Mfheah's  broken  body  served  as  testament  to  the  faithlessness  of 
kinsmen  who  should  have  redeemed  their  own:  either  by  the  Viking 
standards  of  the  inverted  wergild,  or  through  simple  Germanic  loyalty  to 
kin,  lord  (he  was  a  bishop)  and  thegn  (he  was  an  important  servant  to  the 
king).  In  both  cases  these  texts  of  rent  flesh  served  as  a  warning  to 
others  of  the  consequences  of  breaking  faith,  and  indeed  as  a  simple 
testament  to  the  terror  of  the  Vikings.  Horrific  acts  of  mutilation  and 
murder  might  well'serve  to  intimidate  others  into  surrender,  tribute,  and 
terms.  In  each  case,  however,  the  acts  of  bodily  destruction  also 
illustrate  the  rage  and  impotence  of  the  perpetrators:  Cnut  because  of  his 
lack  of  real  political  power  in  his  situation,  Elfheah's  slayers  because  of 
their  inability  to  convert  their  prisoner  into  the  expected  cash.  But  the 
political  realities  reflected  by  these  acts--and  the  political  messages 
which  they  convey--are  utterly  at  odds.  While  Cnut  exercised  a  power 
over  his  individual  victims  which  was  not  reflected  in  his  political  and 
military  strength--indeed,  his  act  was  a  direct  result  of  his  lack  of  such 
power--.,  Elfheah's  helplessness  at  the  hands  of  the  Danes  accurately 
reflects  the  power  balance  current  at  that  time  in  England.,  The  English 
were  powerless  to  protect  Canterbury,  and  therefore  the  bishop,  from  the 
Viking  army  in  the  first  place,  they  were  unable  subsequently  to  rescue 
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from  ravages  which  were  reflected  in  the  wounds  suffered  by  the  , 
doomed  Elfheah. 
In  the  example  of  AElfheah,  then,  we  may  read  the  nature  of  a 
political  reality  as  it  is  articulated  incidentally  through  the  bishop's 
plight.  In  other  words,  the  body  broken  provides  us  with  a  text  in  this 
case,  but  it  is  a  text  composed  with  only  the  most  rudimentary  self- 
awareness:  although  the  Vikings  who  putElfheah  to  death  did  so  for  a 
number  of  reasons  (and  among  these  was  certainly  a  desire  to  strike  fear 
into  the  hearts  of  the  English,  and  to  remind  them  of  the  terror  and 
power  of  the  Danes)  they  did  not  self-consciously  set  out  to  reflect  the 
political  realities  of  the  England  of  their  day  in  the  bludgeoned  corpse  of 
.,  Elfheah,  although,  from  our  vantage  point,  they  did  achieve  this.  Their 
act  was,  fundamentally,  one  of  frustration,  and  they  certainly  would  have 
preferred  to  have  their  ransom  and  let  the  bishop  go  his  way.  The  text  of 
the  political  reality  composed  through  this  act  of  physical  torment,  then, 
although  quite  valid,  is  nonetheless  incidental  to  the  murder  of  'Elfheah. 
There  are  examples,  however,  of  acts  of  torture,  execution,  and 
dismemberment--most  especially  decapitation--which  seem  self- 
consciously  designed  to  utilize  the  body  broken  as  a  text  which 
broadcasts  a  message  of  political  power  and  status.  Decapitation  and 
castration  provide  particularly  vibrant  texts  for  the  dissemination  of  such 
political  messages,  and  the  removal  of  the  head,  penis,  and  other  tokens 
of  power  from  a  head  of  state,  and  the  presentation  of  these  same 
artifacts  to  his  successor,  provides  an  easily  intelligible  public 
expression  of  the  nature  of  the  political  and  military  power  shift 
involved.  Such  acts--and  the  tokens  which  they  rend  er--articulate  a, 
language  of  political  and/or  spiritual  power,  and  it  is  not  at  all 
anachronistic  to  suggest  that  the  writers  of  the  annals  understood  the 
significance  of  such  acts.  Indeed,  I  use  the  term  "token"  quite Chapter  One  59 
deliberately,  as  it  echoes  the  poet  of  the  Old  English  Judith,  who  uses  the 
same  term  to  discuss  the  significance  of  the  decapitation  of  Holofernes, 
(see  Chapter  Four  for  my  discussion  of  literary  examples  of  such 
languages  of  power  as  they  are  articulated  through  physical  acts  and 
tokens). 
In  the  annals  for  the  years  798  and  799  we  have  two  interesting 
adjacent  passages  both  having  to  do  with  the  relationship  between  bodily 
torture  and  mutilation  and  the  political  power  associated  with  these 
practices;  further,  these  political  and  spiritual  resonances  are 
underscored  in  the  latter  passage,  where  the  spiritual  state  of  the 
"victim"--and  the  nature  of  his  relationship  with  God--assures  that  the 
temporal  power  which  dismembers  him  is  overcome  and  the 
disfigurement  itself  is  undone.  This  manifestation  of  divine  power 
explicates  the  hierarchy  of  power  relationships  which  acts  of  torture, 
dismemberment,  and  execution  articulate  in  these  annals.  The  first 
passage  records  the  subjugation  of  Kent  by  the  Mercians  under  Cenwulf. 
The  mutilation  which  the  king  of  the  people  of  Kent  suffers  at  the  hands 
of  the  Mercians  is  not  merely  an  exercise  in  cruelty  (such  acts  were 
common  enough,  and  hardly  bear  special  mention),  nor  is  it  simply  an 
act  of  political  pragmatism,  designed  to  ensure  that  he  could  never  return 
to  power  (it  would  have  been  simple  enough  to  put  him  to  death).  No, 
this  case  is  significant  enough  to  have  been  recorded  by  a  number  of 
chroniclers,  all  of  whom  agree  on  the  basic  facts  of  the  mutilation,  and  at 
least  one  of  which  seems  aware  of  the  political  implications  of  this  act  of 
dismemberment.  The  disfigurement  which  Prwn  suffers  at  the  order  of 
Cenwulf  clearly  explicates  the  balance  of  power  between  the  two  kings, 
and  the  total  subjugation  of  the  former  by  the  latter.  This  personal 
subjugation,  moreover,  accurately  reflects  the  power  which  Cenwulf 
now  wields  over  the  domains  formerly  in  the  grasp  of  Przen: Chapter  One  60 
In  this  year  Cenwulf,  king  of  the  Mercians,  ravaged  the  people  of 
Kent  and  of  the  Marsh,  and  they  seized  Prwn  their  king  and 
brought  him  in  fetters  into  Mercia.  31 
...  and  they  had  his  eyes  put 
out  and  his  hands  cutoff  . 
32  - 
The  hands  of  a  king  represent  his  strength,  his  power;  it  is  with  these 
hands  that  he  might  grip  his  sword  in  battle,  or  his  scepter  in  peace.  His 
eyes  represent  his  wisdom,  his  ability  to  "  see"  and  understand 
metaphorically  as  well  as  literally,  and  without  which  he  is  dependent 
upon  others  to  lead  him,  he  who  was  accustomed  to  leading.  33  Cenwulf 
has  taken  these  physical  powers  from  Prwn,  and  their  metaphorical 
equivalents  with  them,  and  the  text  of  Prwn's  broken  body  serves  as  a 
reminder  that  Cenwulf  has  taken  these  powers  unto  himself.  The  second 
passage  records  the  mutilation  and  banishment  of  Pope  Leo  by  his 
enemies,  and  his  subsequent  miraculous  recovery: 
In  thisyear  the  Romans  cut  out  Pope  Leo's  tongue  and  put  out  his 
eyes  and  banished  him  from  his  see;  and  then  immediately 
afterwards  he  could,  with  God's  help,  see  and  speak  and  was 
again  pope  as  he  had  been  before.  34 
Just  as  a  king's  power  rests  in  his  hands,  so  does  a  pope's  power  reside 
in  his  tongue,  in  his  ability  to  speak  and  interpret  God's  law.  Pope  Leo's 
mutilation,  therefore,  provides  an  exact  ecclesiastical  equivalent  to  the 
secular  example  of  Praen,  and  in  each  case  the  physical  disfigurement  of 
the  body  of  the  individual  involved  reflects  their  loss  of  the  analogous 
political  powers  which  their  lost  organs  represent.  In  Leo'  s  case, 
however,  the  power  of  the  divine  asserts  itself  over  that  of  the  temporal, Chapter  One  61 
and  he  is  restored,  physically  and  politically,  literally  and 
metaphorically;  this  restoration  is  itself  an  act  which  signifies  the 
realities  of  a  power  hierarchy,  as  such  a  reversal  reiterates  the  strength  of 
God  over  man,  and  by  extension,  that  of  the  ecclesiastical  over  the 
secular,  and  that  of  the  pope  over  temporal  lords.  Further,  this  incident 
offers  an  interesting  example  of  attitudes  towards  the  relationship 
between  the  nature  of  the  physical  body  and  that  of  the  spirit,  such  as  is 
manifested  temporally  in  the  ritual  of  the  ordeal  (see  below)  and  divinely 
in  the  fire  of  judgment  model  (see  Chapter  Six). 
While  blinding  and  other  forms  of  dismemberment  can  serve  to 
signify  graphically  the  nature  of  power  relationships  and  power 
transfers,  the  act  of  decapitation  is  a  particularly  eloquent  manner 
through  which  such  realities  may  be  articulated.  We  find  a  clearly 
explicated  relationship  between  decapitation  and  the  transfer  of  political 
power  in  the  subjugation  of  Wales  by  Harold  and  Tostig  in  1063.  In  this 
case  the  Welsh  recognize  the  political  and  military  realities  of  their 
situation,  and  they  therefore  turn  on  their  king,  Griffith,  beheading  him 
and  presenting  the  severed  head  to  Harold  as  a  token  of  their  recognition 
of  his  military  power,  and  of  the  transfer  of  political  authority  (this 
account  is  from  the.  "  E"  chronicle): 
In  this  year  Earl  Harold  and  his  brother  Earl  Tosti  went  into  Wales 
with  both  a  land  force  and  a  naval  force  and  subdued  the  country. 
And  that  people  gave  hostages  and  surrendered,  and  then  went  out 
and  killed  their  king,  Griffith,  and  brought  his  head  to  Harold  who 
appointed  another  king  for  them.  35  i 
The  "D"  chronicle  is  even  more  explicit  in  associating  the  severed  head 
of  the  defeated  Welsh  king  with  other  tokens  of  power  which  are  , Chapter  One  62 
presented  to  the  victorious  English  king  in  order  to  represent 
symbolically  the  transfer  of  political  power  from  the  dead  Griffith  to 
Edward,  the  political  figurehead  which  the  act  of  decapitation  was  meant 
to  appease.  -  Of  particular  note  in  this  context  is  the  burning  of  the  royal 
residence  and  the  ships--the  head-place  and  the  signs  of  military  power-- 
which  prefigures  the  two-fold  removal  of  the  head  of  state:  the  literal 
removal  of  King  Griffith  through  his  execution,  and  the  symbolic 
removal  and  presentation  of  his  head  to  Edward;  this  act  signifies  the 
removal  of  one  head  of  state  in  exchange  for  another.  Most  significant 
in  this  passage  is  that  the  head  is  only  one  symbol  of  the  exchange  of 
power,  along  with  the  ship's  head,  and  other  symbols  of  authority  (see 
my  discussion  of  the  linguistic  significance  of  such  tokens,  in  Chapters 
Three  and  Four,  below).  The  fact  that  the  head  is  equated  with  other 
symbols  of  royal  authority  is  particularly  revealing,  as  it  supports  my 
reading  of  the  text  of  this  act:  the  presentation  of  the  head  of  Griffith  to 
Edward--along  with  the  presentation  of  other  tokens  of  authority-- 
represents  the  transfer  of  political  power,  and  therefore  the  act  of 
decapitation  itself,  the  necessary  precursor  to  such  a  ritualistic  act  of 
fealty,  articulates  a  language  of  political  power.  Along  with  the  transfer 
of  authority,  however,  comes  a  concurrent  transfer  of  royal  identity; 
here  an  English  king  is  recognized  as  politically  and  personally 
equivalent  to  his  Welsh  predecessors.  We  might  note  how  the  Welsh 
agree  to  give  Edward  his  due  just  as  it  had  been  rendered  to  "  any  other 
king"  before:  I 
In  this  year  after  Christmas  Earl  Harold  went  from  Gloucester  to 
Rhuddlan,  which  belonged  to  Griffith,  and  there  he  burnt  the 
residence  and  the  ships  and  all  the  equipment  which  belonged  to 
them;  and  he  put  him  to  flight.  And  then  at  Rogationtide  Harold Chapter  One  63 
went  with  ships  from  Bristol  round  Wales,  and  that  people  made 
peace  and  gave  hostages.  And  Tosti  went  against  them  with  a 
land  force  and  they  subdued  the  country.  But  in  the  same  year  in 
autumn  King  Griffith  was  killed  on  5  August  by  his  own  men 
because  of  the  fight  he  fought  against  Earl  Harold.  He  was  king 
over  all  the  Welsh,  and  his  head  was  brought  to  Earl  Harold,  and 
Harold  brought  it  to  the  king,  and  the  figurehead  of  his  ship  and 
the  ornaments  with  it.  And  King  Edward  entrusted  the  country  to 
the  two  brothers  of  Griffith,  Blethgent  and  Rigwatta,  and  they 
swore  oaths  and  gave  hostages  to  the  king  and  the  earl,  promising 
that  they  would  be  faithful  to  him  in  everything,  and  be  - 
everywhere  ready  on  water  and  on  land,  and  likewise  pay  such 
dues  from  that  country  as  before  had  been  given  to  any  other 
king.  36 
Acts  of  blinding,  decapitation,  and  other  forms  of  torture  and 
dismemberment  thus  sometimes  were  utilized  in  order  to  formulate  a 
language  of  political  power  which  articulated  the  nature,  distribution, 
and  transfer  of  authority;  such  articulation  was  often--but  by  no  means 
always--self-conscious.  Torture  is  not  merely  a  means  of  expressing 
political  realities,  however,  and  can  serve  a  number  of  other  functions, 
the  primary  one  of  which  is  fundamentally  practical,  although  it 
certainly  contains  symbolic  elements.  Various  acts  of  torture,  execution, 
and  dismemberment  often  served  as  the  means  by  which  such  political 
realities  were  affected:  for  example,  rivals  or  enemies  could  be  removed 
from  contention,  and  although  the  symbolic  value  of  these  acts  is  similar 
to  that  of  those  which  we  have  discussed,  signification  in  such  cases  is  a 
secondary  function  of  an  act  the  primary  purpose  of  which  is  to  affect  a 
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We  turn  now  to  an  act  of  blinding  which  was  carried  out  as  a 
means  to  gain  power  in  the  1030s.  This  act,  in  conjunction  with  a 
number  of  acts  of  politically-motivated  torture  and  execution--and  later 
associated  and  extremely  symbolic  acts  of  disinternment  and  the 
payment  of  wergild--all  contribute  to  an  on-going  discourse  of  political 
power  which  prefigures  that  of  the  ritual  decapitation  of  Griffith  and  the 
presentation  of  his  head  by  Harold  (Godwineson)  to  Edward  almost 
thirty  years  later.  38  Of  particular  interest  in  the  case  of  this  example  are 
the  politically  significant  variations  of  the  basic  facts  of  the  story  which 
are  implied  by  the  different  versions.  The  acts  involved,  as  far  as  we  can 
reconstruct  them,  both  participate  in  the  appropriation  of  power  by 
Godwine  and  Harold  (Harefoot),  and  simultaneously  articulate  a 
language  of  power  which  is  concerned  with  just  such  political  conflicts. 
In  the  annal  for  1036  we  are  told  of  the  horrible  fate  of  the  young 
prince  Alfred  at  the  hands  of  Earl  Godwine,  who--according  to  this 
annal--was  the  leader  of  a  faction  which  was  determined  that  Harold, 
and  not  Alfred,  should  succeed  the  recently  deceased  King  Cnut.  39 
Although  dastardly  actions  by  Harold's  minions  towards  potential  rivals 
for  the  throne  might  be  understand  able--if  deplorable--this  version 
asserts  that  Alfred's  reason  for  his  journey  to  England  was  one  of  filial 
devotion,  and  not  at  all  politically  motivated,  which  makes  his  reception 
and  his  fate  at  the  hands  of  Godwine  (discussed  below)  seem  as 
senseless  as  it  is  horrific: 
In  this  year  the  innocent  atheling  Alfred,  the  son  of  King  Ethelred, 
came  into  this  country,  wishing  to  go  to  his  mother  who  was  in 
Winchester,  but  Earl  Godwine  did  not  allow  him,  nor  did  the  other 
men  who  had  great  power,  because  feeling  was  veering  much 
towards  Harold,  although  this  was  not  right.  40 Chapter  One  65 
Florence  of  Worcester  is  a  bit  more  forthcoming  about  the  state  of 
Alfred's  affairs  prior  to  his  trip  to  England,  and  his  description  of  the 
many  soldiers  and  multiple  ships  which  accompanied  the  prince  on  his 
journey--as  well  as  the  indignation  and  concern  of  the  English  nobles-- 
suggests  that  there  might  have  been  something  of  a  political  motivation 
behind  Alfred's  visit.  Even  the  phrase  Florence  uses  to  describe  the 
planned  meeting--while  not  overtly  ascribing  to  it  any  political  intent-- 
differs  from  that  of  the  ASC  in  that  it  implies  that  the  meeting  had  some 
planned  agenda:  - 
The  innocent  athelings  Alfred  and  Edward,  sons  of  Ethelred, 
formerly  king  of  the  English,  joining  to  them  many  Norman 
soldiers  and  crossing  with  a  few  ships  from  Normandy,  where 
they  had  dwelt  with  their  uncle  Richard  for  a  long  time,  to 
England  i  came  in  order  to  confer  with  their  mother,  who  was 
living  in  Winchester.  This  some  men  in  power  bore  with 
indignation  and  concern,  because,  though  it  was  not  right,  they 
were  much  more  devoted  to  Harold  than  to  them;  and  especially, 
it  is  said,,  Earl  Godwine.  41 
In  this  version,  the  principal  reason  given  for  the  visit  is  still  that  the 
princes  wished  to  call  upon  their  mother;  but  here  Florence  implies  that 
they  wished  to  visit  their  mother  to  achieve  some  specific  end:  note  that, 
where  the  ASC  version  stated  that  Alfred  wanted  simply  "to  go  to"  his 
mother,  Florence  insists  that  the  princes  desired  "to  confer"  with  her. 
Although  the  implication  of  such  a  familial  moot  is  not  necessarily 
political,  such  a  wording  does  assert  that  the  reason  for  the  meeting  was 
more  than  an  act  of  filial  devotion:  the  sons  were  coming  to  discuss Chapter  One  66 
some  matter  of  importance  with  their  mother  the  queen.  What  that 
matter  might  be  is  not  made  apparent,  but  the  actions  of  Alfred's 
enemies  imply  that--if  it  were  not  political--it  was  perceived  to  be  by 
Harold's  faction.  Other  accounts,  however,  are  much  more  explicit  in 
detailing  the  specifics  of  the  plots  and  counter-plots  surrounding 
Alfred's  demise,  and  in  such  a  context  the  torment,  dismemberment,  and 
execution  of  Alfred  and  his  retainers  begin  to  make  a  kind  of  macabre 
sense.  For  example,  the  version  of  these  events  detailed  in  the 
Encomium  Emmae  Reginae--which  is  substantiated  by  the  major 
Norman  accounts  of  this  episode--goes  much  further  than  Florence, 
ascribes  a  very  explicit  political  intention  to  Alfred's  journey  to 
England,  'and  goes  so  far  as  to  assert  that  the  entire  episode  was  brought 
about  through  a  conspiracy  hatched  by  Harold  in  order  to  do  away  with 
his  Potential  rivals. 
According  to  this  account,  Harold  was  secretly  anxious  to  move 
against  Emma  and  her  sons,  but  was  not  yet  able  to  do  so  openly;  he 
therefore  devised  a  cunning  plan  whereby  he  might  lure  the  unsuspecting 
princes  to  their  deaths.  The  nature  of  this  plan  is  particularly  revealing, 
whether  it  is  based  upon  the  fact  of  Harold's  treachery,  or  was  devised  as 
a  testament  to  the  innocence  of  Alfred:  either  way,  the  plot  hinges  upon 
the  desire  of  the  young  prince  to  seize  the  throne.  Regardless  of  the 
truth  of  other  particulars  of  the  case,  this  desire  seems  to  have  been 
based  in  some  part  upon  fact.  It  is  without  doubt  that  Harold  must  have 
suspected--or  at  the  very  least  strongly  feared--such  a  desire  on  the  part 
of  the  young  princes,  or  he  would  not  have  gone  through  the  trouble  of 
capturing  and  torturing  Alfred  and  his  followers,  a  risky  and  potentially 
politically  disastrous  act.  And,  if  we  are  to  believe  this  account  (and  the 
Norman  ones  like  it),  Harold  had  good  reason  to  suspect  such  a  desire  on 
the  pan  of  Alfred,  who  otherwise  would  not  have  fallen  so  easily  into Chapter  One  67 
Harold's  trap.  The  plot  described  in  this  account  involves  a  forged 
letter,  ostensibly  from  Queen  Emma  to  her  two  sons  in  Normandy;  the 
letter  plays  upon  the  desire  of  the  princes  to  capture  the  throne  of 
England,  and  encourages  them  to  come  to  the  mother  as  quickly  as 
possible  in  order  to  plan  how  this  desire  might  best  be  achieved: 
Emma,  queen  in  name  only,  imparts  motherly  salutation  to  her 
sons,  Edward  and  Alfred.  Since  we  severely  lament  the  death  of 
our  ford,  the  king,  most  dear  sons,  and  since  daily  you  are 
deprived  more  and  more  of  the  kingdom,  your  inheritance,  I 
wonder  what  plan  you  are  adopting,  since  you  are  aware  that  the 
delay  arising  from  your  procrastination  is  becoming  from  day  to 
day  a  support  to  the  usurper  of  your  rule.  For  he  goes  round 
hamlets  and  cities  ceaselessly,  and  makes  the  chief  men  his 
friends  by  gifts,  threats  and  prayers.  But  they  would  prefer  that 
one  of  you  should  rule  over  them,  than  that  they  should  be  held  in 
the  power  of  him  who  now  commands  them.  -  I  entreat,  therefore, 
that  one  of  you  come  to  me  speedily  and  privately,  to  receive  from 
me  wholesome  counsel,  and  to  know  in  what  manner  this  matter, 
which  I  desire,  must  be  brought  to  pass.  Send  back  word  what 
you  are  going  to  do  about  these  matters  by  the  present  messenger, 
whoever  he  may  be.  Farewell,  beloved  ones  of  my  heart.  42 
Having  baited  the  trap,  Harold  and  his  faction  were  prepared  for  Alfred, 
and  he  and  his  men  were  quickly  captured  and  tormented;  the 
destruction  of  Alfred  and  his  followers  had  the  practical  consequence 
that  a  prime  rival  to  Harold's  power  was  removed.  Moreover--in  such 
an  overtly  political  context--their  tortured  bodies  signified  the  power  of 
Harold,  Godwine,  and  their  followers,  the  implausibility  of  Alfred's Chapter  One  68 
claim  to  the  throne,  and  the  futility  of  Emma's  scheming  for  the 
continued  dominance  of  her  line.  Further,  as  Whitelock  points  out,  the 
Norman  sources  saw  these  acts  as  an  overt  warning  to  Edward  (and  in 
fact  the  entire  Norman  aristocracy)  to  forego  any  claim  to  England;  43 
thus  the  broken  bodies  of  Alfred's  troops,  and-ý-most  especially-Alfred's 
own  horrific  blinding,  served  as  visible  tokens  of  political  power  in 
much  the  same  way  that  the  tortured  bodies  of  traitors  and  political  rivals 
described  above  served  to  signify  similar  messages. 
What  is  of  particular  interest  in  the  case  of  this  episode  is  that 
there  are  multiple  accounts  thereof,  that  each  account  differs  in  some 
significant  details,  and  that  each  does  so--as  Whitelock.  has  indicated-- 
because  of  specific  political  realities  surrounding  the  composition  of  that 
particular  account.  We  have  then,  in  this  examplej  three  different, 
politically-motivated  recensions  which  all  describe  varying  perceptions 
of  the  same  politically-charged  acts  of  physical  mutilation.  Godwine  is 
chief  villain  in  the  ASC  account;  Harold  is  not  named  as  a  co- 
conspirator  in  this  annal,  and  indeed  is  merely  alluded  to  as  the  one 
whom  Godwine  and  his  cronies  have  determined  to  support.  The  ASC 
also  offers  the  least  graphic  account  of  the  mutilation  and  torment  of 
Alfred  and  his  men,  and  suggests  that  Alfred  may  have  lived  for  some 
time  amongst  the  monks  of  Ely: 
... 
But  Godwine  then  stopped  him  and  put  him  in  captivity,  and  he 
dispersed  his  companions  and  killed  some  in  various  ways;  some 
were  sold  for  money,  some  were  cruelly  killed,  some  were  put  in 
fetters,  some  were  blinded,  some  were  mutilated,  some  were 
scalped.  ...  The  atheling  still  lived.  He  was  threatened  with  every 
evil,  until  it  was  decided  to  take  him  in  bonds  to  Ely.  As  soon  as Chapter  One  69 
he  arrived  he  was  blinded  on  the  ship,  and  thus  blind  he  was 
brought  to  the  monks,  and  he  dwelt  there  as  long  as  he  lived.  44 
The  Florence  account  agrees  in  many  details  with  that  of  the  ASC, 
and  is  even  more  specific  in  attributing  the  guilt  of  the  matter  to 
Godwine.  Further,  Florence  numbers  the  following  of  Alfred  at  several 
hundred,  which  both  adds  to  the  magnitude  of  the  horror  of  the  act,  and 
also  reinforces  our  conception  that  Alfred  had  come  to  England  in  force 
for  some  political  end.  Florence  is  also  much  more  graphic  in  his 
description  of  the  mutilation  of  Alfred's  followers,  and  indeed 
concerning  the  blinding  of  Alfred  himself.  Finally,  in  this  account  it  is 
made  clear  that  Alfred  does  not  long  survive  in  his  mutilated  state, 
although  it  is  not  explicitly  claimed  that  he  was  put  to  death: 
... 
[Godwine]  placed  him  in  close  confinement;  and  of  his 
companions  some  he  dispersed,  some  he  put  in  fetters  and 
afterwards  blinded,  some  he  tortured  by  scalping  and  punished  by 
cutting  off  their  hands  and  feet;  many  he  also  ordered  to  be  sold, 
and  he  killed  by  various  and  miserable  deaths  600  men  at 
Guildford.  ... 
Then,  by  the  orders  of  Godwine  and  certain  others, 
the  atheling  Alfred  was  taken  tightly  bound  to  the  island  of  Ely; 
but  as  the  ship  touched  land,  immediately,  on  board  ship,  his  eyes 
were  very  cruelly  torn  out;  and  he  was  thus  led  to  the  monastery 
and  given  to  the  custody  of  the  monks.  There  a  short  time 
afterwards  he  departed  from  this  world  .... 
45 
The  account  in  the  Encomium  Emmae  Reginae  is  the  most 
graphic  and  informative  of  the  three,  although  it  does  diverge  from  the 
other  two  accounts  on  more  than  one  important  point.  *Here  Godwine's Chapter  One  70 
role  transforms  from  that  of  a  cruel  enemy--who  makes  no  pretense  of 
the  loyalty  which  he  should  show  to  Alfred--to  that  of  a  Judas  who 
makes  a  false  oath  of  loyalty  and  betrays  Alfred.  It  is  politically 
expedient  here  for  the  author  not  to  implicate  Godwine  overtly,  but  it 
seems  rather  unlikely  that  Harold  could  have  so  easily  found  and 
disarmed  the  sleeping  soldiers  if  not  for  Godwine's  complicity.  Even  if 
he  did  so,  and  his  soldiers  managed  to  disarm  Alfred's  men  and  manacle 
them  without  a  fight,  Godwine  was,  at  this  point,  Alfred's  sworn  man, 
and  was  bound  to  rescue  him  or  avenge  him.  As  a  result  he  is  either  a 
treacherous  false-oath-maker  or  a  cowardly  oath-breaker,  and  either  way 
he  is  at  fault.  It  is  most  suspicious  that  Godwine  comes  away  blameless 
in  this  account;  it  seems  clear  that  he  was  involved,  possible  that  he  was 
an  instigator  from  the  beginning,  and  probable  that  he  was  a  treacherous 
false-oath-maker  who  turned  on  the  young  and  probably  naive  Alfred. 
This  account  is  extremely  specific  and  graphic,  even  down  to  the  details 
of  the  time  frame  involved,  the  method  of  selecting  victims,  and  the 
precise  details  of  the  method  by  which  Alfred  was  blinded.  We  might 
note  most  especially  that  in  this  version  Alfred  is  put  to  death  after  his 
tribulations.  Also  worthy  of  attention  are  the  abusive  terms  with  which 
the  chronicler  derides  the  torturers,  and  the  comparison  between 
Harold's  executioners  and  pagans  killing  Christians: 
...  But  when  he  was  already  near  his  goal,  Earl  Godwine  met  him 
and  took  him  under  his  protection,  and  forthwith  became  his 
soldier  by  averment  under  oath.  Diverting  him  from  London,  he 
led  him  into  the  town  called  Guildford,  and  lodged  his  soldiers 
there  in  separate  billets  by  twenties,  twelves  and  tens,  leaving  a 
few  with  the  young  man,  whose  duty  it  was  to  be  in  attendance 
upon  him.  And  he  gave  them  food  and  drink  in  plenty,  and Chapter  One  71 
withdrew  personally  to  his  own  lodging,  until  he  should  return  in 
the  morning  to  wait  upon  his  lord  with  due  honour.  But  after  they 
had  eaten  and  drunk,  and  being  weary,  had  gladly  ascended  their 
couches,  behold,  men  leagued  with  the  most  abominable  tyrant 
Harold  appeared,  entered  the  various  billets,  secretly  removed  the 
arms  of  the  innocent  men,  confined  them  with  iron  manacles  and 
fetters,  and  kept  them  till  the  morrow  to  be  tortured.  But  when  it 
was  morning,  the  innocent  men  were  led  out,  and  were 
iniquitously  condemned  without  a  hearing.  For  they  were  all 
disarmed  and  delivered  with  their  hands  bound  behind  their  backs 
to  most  vicious  executioners,  who  were  ordered,  furthermore,  to 
spare  no  man  unless  the  tenth  lot  should  reprieve  him.  Then  the 
torturers  made  the  bound  men  sit  in  a  row,  and  reviling  them 
beyond  measure,  followed  the  example  of  that  murderer  of  the 
Theban  legion,  who  first  decimated  guiltless  men,  though  more 
mercifully  than  they  did.  For  that  utterly  pagan  ruler  spared  nine 
of  the  Christians  and  killed  the  tenth,  but  these  most  profane  and 
false  Christians  killed  nine  of  the  good  Christians  and  let  the  tenth 
go.  That  pagan,  though  he  massacred  Christians,  nevertheless 
ordered  that  they  should  be  beheaded  on  an  open  plain  unfettered 
by  bonds,  like  glorious  soldiers.  But  these,  though  they  were  in 
name  Christians,  '  were  nevertheless  in  actions  totally  pagan,  and 
butchered  innocent  heroes  with  blows  from  their  spears  bound  as 
they  were,  like  swine.  Hence  all  ages  will  justly  call  such 
torturers  worse  than  dogs,  since  they  brought  to  condemnation  the 
worthy  persons  of  so  many  soldiers  not  by  soldierly  force  but  by 
their  treacherous  snares.  Some,  as  has  been  said,  they  slew,  some 
they  placed  in  slavery  to  themselves;  others  they  sold,  for  they 
were  in  the  grip  of  blind  greed,  but  they  kept  a  few  loaded  with Chapter  One  72 
bonds  to  be  subjected  to  greater  mockery....  The  royal  youth, 
theni  was  captured  secretly  in  his  lodging,  and  having  been  taken 
to  the  island  called  Ely,  was  first  of  all  mocked  by  the  most 
wicked  soldiery.  Then  still  more  contemptible  persons  were 
selected,  that  the  lamented  youth  might  be  condemned  by  them  in 
their  madness.  When  these  men  had  been  set  up  as  judges,  they 
decreed  that  first  of  all  both  his  eyes  should  be  put  out  as  a  sign  of 
contempt.  After  they  prepared  to  carry  this  out,  two  men  were 
placed  on  his  arms  to  hold  them  meanwhile,  one  on  his  breast,  and 
one  on  his  legs,  in  order  that  the  punishment  might  be  more  easily 
inflicted  on  him-he  was  held  fast,  and  after  his  eyes  had  been  put 
out,  most  wickedly  slain  .... 
46 
Although  the  three  accounts  of  Alfred's  demise  differ  in  some 
important  details  and  in  the  amount  of  development,  in  all  three  it  is 
clear  that  Alfred  and  his  men  were  done  away  with  for  two  primary 
reasons:  to  remove  a  potential  rival  and  thereby  consolidate  Harold's 
power,  and  simultaneously  to  articulate  that  power.  At  the  same  time 
that  the  destruction  of  an  enemy  strengthens  the  position  of  a  leader,  it 
also  serves  as  both  a  warning  to  other  rivals  and  as  an  assurance  to  that 
leader's  subjects.  What  remains,  then,  is  to  discuss  the  reasons  for  the 
particular  methods  of  disposal,  and  to  examine  the  specific  details 
available  from  each  of  the  three  accounts.  The  ASC  account,  with  the 
exception  of  specific  references  to  blinding  and  to  scalping  (discussed 
below),  does  not  offer  us  a  great  deal  of  additional  information  through 
which  we  might  begin  to  reconstruct  the  significance  of  these  particular 
practices. 
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contexts,  and  for  highly  symbolic  reasons;  this  annal  does  little  to 
illuminate  such  agendas,  however.  Florence's  account  offers  much  more 
intriguing  detail,  and  it  is here  that  we  may  be  able  to  extend  our  - 
knowledge  concerning  the  significance  of  practices  of  torture  in  this 
context.  It  is  interesting  that  Florence  relates  binding  and  blinding  in  the 
case  of  Alfred  and  those  of  his  men  who  were  likewise  tortured.  The 
helplessness  wrought  through  both  practices  is  particularly  significant  in 
the  context  of  a  military  and  political  leader.  It  is  also  noteworthy  that 
both  Florence  and  the  ASC  chronicler  refer  to  the  scalping  of  some  of 
the  prisoners;  though  gruelling,  this  practice  is  not  necessarily  life 
threatening,  and  would  provide  horrendous  and  permanent  scarring 
which  would  articulate  the  power  of  Harold  and  the  powerlessness  of 
Alfred  for  many  years  after  the  event.  Although  it  is  doubtful  that  many 
would  survive  the  loss  of  their  hands  and  feet,  and  thereby  provide  such 
a  message  over  a  period  of  time,  it  is  interesting  that  Florence  refers  to 
this  particular  practice  as  "punishment".  The  implication  is  that  it  is  the 
victim  s--Alfre  d's  loyal  retainers--who  have  sinned,  and  not  Harold;  this 
unconscious  allusion  to  guilt  (by  a  chronicler  otherwise  most 
sympathetic  to  the  victims  of  this  massacre)  underscores  the  reality  of 
the  political  situation  wrought  through  Alfred's  removal:  Harold-- 
through  his  consolidation  of  royal  power--is  king,  with  the  right  to  judge 
and  punish. 
Finally,  in  the  Encomium  Emmae  Reginne,  we  may  divine  quite  a 
bit  of  information  which  helps  us  to  understand  the  author's  perspective 
concerning  torture--and,  more  imp  ortantly--c  onc  erning  the  significance 
of  that  torture.  It  is  especially  noteworthy  that  this  author  defines  noble 
and  ignoble  means  of  execution,  as  well  as  providing  us  with  a  possible 
way  of  interpreting  the  act  of  the  blinding  of  Alfred.  The  author  seems 
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unacceptable  means  of  execution.  To  be  decapitated  while 
unencumbered  by  bonds  is--to  this  writer--a  noble  mode  of  death,  while 
to  die  in  chains  "like  swine"  is  utterly  unworthy  of  a  hero.  We  have 
noted  the  significance  of  decapitation  in  a  political  context,  and  these 
sentiments  serve  to  illuminate  somewhat  further  the  nature  of  this 
particular  practice,  which  seems  from  this  example  somehow  related  to 
the  warrior  and/or  ruling  class.  I  have  also  discussed  at  length  the 
potential  significance  of  the  act  of  blinding;  in  this  account  such 
significance  is  further  explicated  through  the  author's  explanation  of  the 
intent  of  Alfred's  judges:  his  eyes  were  put  out  "as  a  sign  of  contempt". 
This  assertion  offers  us  an  important  textual  reference  to  the 
signification  of  acts  of  torment  and  dismemberment;  such  an 
understanding  may  give  us  an  indication--a  template,  as  it  were--of  how 
to  read  other  such  signs  (I  discuss  similar  indicators  in  Judith  in  Chapter 
Four).  These  direct  interpretations  of  the  valence  of  such  signs  are  rare, 
and  therefore  are  notable. 
Interestingly,  just  as  the  acts  of  Alfred's  blinding  and  the  torment 
and  dismemberment  of  his  followers  signify  the  realities  of  the  political 
power  struggle  in  which  they  took  pan,  Godwine's  later  act  of 
atonement  for  his  Part  in  these  atrocities  is  likewise  a  richly  multivalent 
act.  According  to  the  annal  of  Florence  of  Worcester  for  1040,  King 
Hardacnut  "burned  with  great  anger"  at  Godwine  and  others  "because  of 
the  killing  of  his  brother  Alfred";  Godwine,  however,  disavowed  blame, 
claiming  that  he  followed  the  orders  of  "his  lord  King  Harold".  This 
plea  of  loyalty  is  suspect,  of  course,  as  Harold  was  not  yet  king,  and 
Alfred  should  have  been  due  Godwine's  loyalty  before  Harold. 
Maintaining  his  innocence  in  any  case,  Godwine  nevertheless  gives 
Hardacnut  an  elaborate  and  costly  gift--which  seems  wergild  in  fact,  if 
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of  the  slain  prince.  This  gambit  was  successful,  Hardacnut  was 
appeased,  and  Godwine  remained  a  key  player  in  Anglo-Saxon  politics. 
Hardacnut's  acceptance  of  Godwine's  offering  illustrates  the  tension 
between  the  fiction  of  family  ties  and  the  realities  of  power  politics  in 
Anglo-Saxon  England.  Hardacnut  seems  to  have  felt  real  family  loyalty 
towards  his  half-brothers:  he  took  the  assault  on  Alfred  as  that  upon  a 
kinsman,  adopted  Edward  into  his  household,  and  almost  certainly 
named  him  as  his  heir.  47  In  such  a  case  it  seems  paradoxical--and 
perhaps  more  than  a  little  mercantile--that  Hardacnut  allowed  himself  to 
be  appeased  through  the  payment  of  wergild.  He  may  have  done  so 
because  of  the  political  realities  involved;  for  the  practical  reason  that 
Godwine  had  immense  popular  support,  and  was  a  wealthy  and  powerful 
adversary.  This  is  the  point  of  the  wergild  system:  to  allow  practical 
economic  and  political  realities  to  take  precedence  over  the  emotional 
bond  between  kinsman,  the  desire  for  blood-vengeance,  and  the 
assertion  of  personal  and  clan  prestige  and  power  through  acts  of 
revenge.  Often  the  actual  feeling  for  a  kinsman  was  probably  slight,  -  or 
even  hostile;  -but  blood-feud  was  a  way  of  asserting  the  individual's  and 
the  clan's  power.  The  paying  of  wergild  allowed  for  a  public  ceremony 
which  likewise  affirmed  such  power  and  prestige,  and  offered  an 
economic  advantage  which  served  --symbolically  or  practically--to 
replace  the  contribution  of  the  lost  member  of  the  clan  to  the  wealth  and 
well-being  of  the  whole. 
Hardacnut  was  undoubtedly  wise  to  accept  this  tribute  and  to 
dispense  with  further  vengeance;  Godwine  was  a  powerful  figure  (as  his 
gift,  indeed,  was  doubtless  meant  to  suggest),  and  even  Hardacnut'  s 
successor  Edward,  who  harbored  deep-seated  animosity  towards 
Godwine,  was  ultimately  unable  to  wreak  any  lasting  vengeance  upon 
him.  48  Hardacnut  probably  felt  no  such  personal  hatred  towards Chapter  One  76 
Godwine,  but  in  any  case  this  conflict  underscores  the  political  reality  of 
feud  and  wergild  in  Anglo-Saxon  culture:  Power  and  prestige  were  the 
currencies  of  exchange,  not  personal  sentiment,  and  Godwine'  s  gift  to 
Hardacnut  was  designed  to  signify  just  such  issues  of  power  and 
prestige: 
But  Godwine  gave  to  the  king  for  his  friendship  a  skilfully  made 
galley,  having  a  gilded  prow,  and  furnished  with  the  best  tackle, 
handsomely  equipped  with  suitable  weapons  and  80  picked 
soldiers,  each  of  whom  had  on  his  arms  two  gold  armlets, 
weighing  16  ounces,  wore  a  triple  mail-shirt,  a  partly  gilded 
helmet  on  his  head,  and  had  a  sword  with  a  gilded  hilt  fastened 
round  his  loins,  and  a  Danish  battle-axe  rimmed  with  gold  and 
silver  hanging  from  his  left  shoulder,  and  in  his  left  hand  a  shield, 
whose  boss  and  studs  were  gilded,  in  his  right  hand  a  spear  which 
in  the  English  language  is  called  wtgar.  Moreover,  he  swore  to  the 
king,  with  the  ealdormen  and  the  more  important  thegns  of  almost 
the  whole  of  England,  that  it  was  not  by  his  counsel  nor  his  will 
that  his  brother  was  blinded  -'but  that  his  lord  King  Harold  had 
ordered  him  to  do  what  he  did.  49 
The  public,  ceremonial  presentation  of  such  a  lavish  and  valuable  gift  as 
that  which  Godwine  presents  to  Hardacnut  is  symbolic  on  a  number  of 
levels.  First,  its  display  of  material  value  serves  as  a  public  act  of 
penance  and  atonement  on  the  part  of  Godwine.  Second,  it  reinforces 
the  value  of  the  person  of  Alfred;  it  is  an  ornate  ship,  perhaps 
reminiscent  of  and  in  lieu  of  a  burial  ship.  This  ostentatious 
representation  of  Alfred's  worth  is  especially  significant  in  juxtaposition 
to  Harold's  body  pulled  unceremoniously  from  the  grave  and  chucked  in Chapter  One  77 
the  swamp.  Third,  peace  and  forgiveness  at  such  a  great  cost  further 
enhance  the  reputation  of  the  power  and  prestige  of  Hardacnut 
personally,  and  by  extension  that  of  his  family  and  line.  Finally,  the 
ability  to  pay  such  a  price  without  financial  ruin,  while  maintaining  that 
he  is innocent  of  any  crime,  also  serves  implicitly  and  perhaps  quietly 
self-consciously  to  reinforce  Godwine's  reputation  as  a  man  of 
seemingly  boundless  wealth,  power,  and  prestige. 
While  Godwine  thus  escaped  the  wrath  of  Hardacnut,  the  king 
attempted  to  pass  judgment  and  wreak  vengeance  upon  the  body  of  the 
dead  Harold,  whom  he  held  responsible  both  for  the  death  of  Alfred  and 
for  the  usurpation  of  his  own  power  in  England.  50  The  body  of  the  dead 
King  Harold  was  disinterred  and  thrown  into  a  marsh  by  order  of  the 
new  King  Hardacnut.  Just  as  Godwine's  gift  to  Hardacnut  serves  a 
much  more  symbolic  than  practical  purpose,  Hardacnut's  treatment  of 
the  corpse  of  his  predecessor  (and  half-brother!  )  is  a  particularly 
significant  act,  as  the  disinternment  and  defilement  of  the  body  could 
serve  no  practical  purpose:  Harold  could  not  be  rendered  more  dead, 
and  in  any  case  Hardacnut  was,  at  this  point,  firmly  established  as  king. 
The  only  reasons  which  may  be  ascribed  to  such  an  act  are  symbolic, 
and  comprise  messages  of  judgment,  vengeance,  and  power.  The  act  of 
desecrating  the  corpse  of  Hardacnut's  usurper,  who  was  also  the  torturer 
and  slayer  of  his  brother  Alfred,  is  a  politically  significant  act  in  much 
the  same  way  as  the  decapitation  and  presentation  of  the  head  of  a  rival 
king  serves  to  enunciate  clearly  the  power  and  position  of  the  victorious 
king,  as  well  as  the  powerlessness  and  vulnerability  (in  life  or  in  death) 
of  his  hapless  foe.  The  ASC  account  offers  little  detail,  so  I  turn  to  the 
record  of  Florence  of  Worcester,  which  agrees  with  that  of  the  ASC  with 
much  elaboration  (note  especially  the  role  of  the  executioner  in  this 
episode):  51 Chapter  One  78 
...  but  during  the  time  of  his  rule  he  did  nothing  worthy  of  royal 
power.  For,  as  soon  as  he  began  to  reign,  being  not  unmindful  of 
the  injuries  which  his  predecessor  King  Harold,  who  was  reputed 
his  brother,  had  done  either  against  him  or  against  his  mother,  he 
sent  to  London  , Elfric,  archbishop  of  York,  Earl  Godwine,  Stir, 
the  masterof  his  household,  Eadric  his  steward,  Thrond  his 
executioner,  and  other  men  of  high  position,  and  ordered  the  body 
of  this  Harold  to  be  dug  up  and  thrown  into  a  marsh;  and  when  it 
had  been  thrown  there,  he  gave  orders  for  it  to  be  pulled  out  and 
thrown  into  the  River  Thames.  52 
It  seems  notable  that  Hardacnut's  executioner  was  present  at  the 
disinternment,  because  this  suggests  that  this  act  was  meant  to  be  seen  as 
a  posthumous  judgment  and  sentence  upon  the  body  of  Harold.  In  this 
way  the  desecration  of  Harold's  body  might  be  equated  with  forms  of 
public  execution,  ý  and  might  be  seen  to  fulfill  the  same  semiotic 
functions:  just  as  the  tokens  of  justice  might  include  severed  hands  or 
heads,  or  disfigured  bodies,  the  corpse  of  Harold--ripped  from  its 
hallowed  grave  and  cast  into  a  marsh--signifies  his  guilt  and  lawlessness, 
the  justice  of  the  new  regime,  and  the  political  and  personal  power  of  his 
successor,  who  is  able  to  enact  vengeance  upon  his  enemy.  The  fact  that 
the  body  was  then  once  more  removed  from  its  resting  place  and  cast 
into  the  Thames  suggests  that  Hardacnut  was  determined  to  make  this 
act  as  public  as  possible,  and  wished  the  body  to  be  seen  by  as  many 
witnesses  as  possible;  punishment,  dishonor,  and  humiliation  are  not 
enough--in  the  contexts  which  we  have  examined--but  must  be  made 
public  in  order  to  communicate  guilt,  power,  and  vengeance. Chapter  One  79 
It  is  also  of  particular  interest  in  the  context  of  power  politics,  and 
in  that  of  acts  upon  bodies  which  serve  to  signify  the  nature  of  such 
power,  that  Godwine  was  ordered  to  be  present  at  this  ceremony.  In 
Florence's  annal  for  1040,  the  description  of  the  disinternment  and 
desecration  of  Harold's  corpse,  and  the  note  that  Godwine  was  in 
attendance,  precedes  the  description  of  Godwine's  lavish  peace-offering 
to  Hardacnut.  Further,  the  phrasing  with  which  Florence  prefaces  his 
account  of  that  peace-offering  begins  "  Besides  these  things,  he  burned 
with  great  anger  against  Earl  Godwine...  "  (emphasis  mine).  53  This 
wording  implies  that  the  reconciliation  between  Godwine  and  Hardacnut 
brought  about  through  wergild  did  not  take  place  until  afterthe 
disinternment  of  Harold  which  Godwine  was  ordered  to  witness.  The 
relationship  between  these  two  events  may  indicate  a  further  political 
motive  on  the  part  of  Hardacnut  regarding  Godwine,  and  it  is  certainly 
possible  that  we  should  perceive  a  causal  link  between  these  two 
episodes.  It  is  at  the  very  least  noteworthy  that  the  language  of  power 
articulated  through  the  abuse  of  Harold's  rotting  corpse  was  wrought  in 
the  presence  of  (the  soon  to  be  penitent)  Godwine. 
Finally,  although  the  chroniclers  often  seem  aware  of  the  symbolic 
value  of  acts  of  torture  and  execution,  in  this  case  it  is  clear  that  this 
event  met  with  some  measure  of  disapproval.  The  phrasing  indicates 
that,  in  the  course  of  a  reign  of  one  who  wielded  royal  authority  to  no 
good  end,  the  desecration  of  Harold's  body  was  a  particularly  unworthy 
act.  This  disapproval  may  have  stemmed  from  an  aversion  to  the 
violation  of  the  sanctity  and  sanctuary  of  consecrated  ground--and  the 
sacrilege  inherent  in  disinternment--or  it  may  simply  have  reflected  a 
general  disappointment  in  and  disapproval  of  the  reign  of  Hardacnut.  In 
any  case,  it  is  clear  that  this  act  caught  the  attention  of  the  popular 
imagination,  which--considering,  Hardacnut's  apparent  disinclination  to Chapter  One  80 
appease'his  subjects  in  any  manner--might  have  been  at  the  heart  of  its 
symbolic  function.  As  Stenton  has  pointed  out,  Hardacnut  consolidated 
his  own  power  and  systematically  attacked  the  regime  and  memory  of 
his  Predecessor  through  a  series  of  actions  which  culminated  with  the 
disinternment  of  Harold: 
The  prosecution  of  Godwine  and  Lyfing  was  part  of  a  general 
demonstration  against  Harold  and  all  his  works,  of  which  the 
disinternment  and  ignominious  disposal  of  the  king's  corpse  was 
the  supreme  event.  54 
Godwine  was  a  prominent  member  of  Harold's  court,  and  that 
member  most  closely  associated  by  most  chroniclers  with  the  conspiracy 
against  Alfred;  Lyfing  was  bishop  of  Worcester  and,  according  to 
Stenton,  also  held  accountable  by  Hardacnut  for  Alfred's  fate.  55  Most' 
important  of  all,  Hardacnut  felt  that  Harold  was  a  usurper,  had  broken 
faith  when  he  used  the  opportunity  of  his  regency  to  seize  the  throne  of 
England,  and  had  murdered  Alfred  in  cold  blood  to  consolidate  that 
claim.  56  Thus  Hardacnut's  acts  against  these  figures  may  be  seen  as  a 
concerted  effort  both  to  draw  attention  to  and  to  punish  the  crimes 
committed  by  Harold  and  his  regime;  Harold  was--in  Hardacnut's 
estimation--ultimately  responsible  for  these  crimes,  and--being  dead-- 
was  vulnerable  to  this  campaign  against  his  memory.  The  disinternment 
and  desecration  of  Harold's  corpse  thus  served  as  the  final  culmination 
of  this  campaign,  a  climax  which  was  necessarily  a  symbolic  act  of 
judgment,  as  Harold  was  beyond  any  other  temporal  act  of  vengeance.  It 
was  also  the  final  and  culminating  act  of  a  series  of  episodes  in  which  a 
language  of  political  power,  justice,  and  vengeance  was  played  out 
through  physical  actions--the  blinding  of  Alfred,  the  torture  and  , Chapter  One  81 
dismemberment  of  his  retainers,  the  disinternment  of  Harold,  the  act  of 
paying  wergild  performed  by  Godwine--which  individually  might  seem 
to  offer  a  confused  cacophony  of  violence,  greed,  and  bribery,  but  which 
(examined  in  concert)  actually  contribute  to  an  intelligible  narrative 
concerning  the  nature  of  power  in  this  cultural  context,  the  consolidation 
of  such  power,  and  related  issues  concerning  social  mechanisms  for 
exacting  judgment  and  vengeance.  , 
Indeed,  the  desire  for  such  mechanisms  of  justice  and  social 
control  lies  at  the  heart  of  certain  Anglo-Saxon  practices  of  judicial 
torture  and  execution,  and  the  message  of  power  conveyed  through  the 
proper  implementation  of  these  practices  was  meant  to  be  one  of 
assurance  and  stability.  Although  the  annals  often  complain  of  the 
wanton  cruelty  of  individuals  and  rulers,  they  also  lament  those  who  do 
not  strictly  enforce  the  law.  Hence,  those  codes  and  practices  which  we 
see  as  barbaric  and  without  any  positive  value  clearly  were  perceived  of 
as  positive--in  limited  circumstances  and  justly  and  equally  applied  to 
all--by  some  of  the  chroniclers.  Though  such  a  positive  perception  of 
stern  punishment  might  seem  perplexing  to  modem  readers,  this  is  not 
an  isolated  incidence  of  such  a  conception;  see  my  evidence  in  Chapters 
Three,  Four,  and  Five  that  in  an  Old  English  poetic  context  pain  and 
torture  are  perceived  as  good  in  terms  of  the  ends  which  they  attain. 
Here  "  strict  justice"  is  recommended  as  good  (in  opposition  to  the 
weakness  of  a  king  who  is  too  lenient),  and  this  should  not  seem  too  far 
fetched  in  the  cultural  context  of  the  harsh  laws  and  swift  retribution  of  a 
vengeful  God  who  shows  his  love  for  his  children  through  stem 
discipline. 
In  the  annals  for  the  years  1137,1140,  and  1154,  we  are  presented 
with  descriptions  of  good  and  bad  rulers,  weak  and  strict  justice,  and  the 
proper  and  improper  use  of  harsh  physical  treatment.  It  is  especially Chapter  One  82 
interesting  to  note  that,  in  the  first  entry,  it  is  the  very  weakness  and 
inability  to  enforce  harsh  penalties  to  the  full  extent  of  the  law  on  the 
part  of  King  Stephen  which  leads  to  abuses  of  the  law--and  to 
horrendous  abuses  of  judicial  and  penal  torture--on  the  part  of  his 
lawless,  oath-breaking  subordinate  lords.  Once  they  realize  that  they 
have  nothing  to  fear  from  Stephen,  these  evil  men  run  rampant  across 
the  country,  paradoxically  using  to  evil  ends  the  very  practices  of  torture 
and  retribution  which  such  traitors  should  have  feared  at  the  hands  of  a 
just  and  powerful  king.  The  message  of  this  chronicle  is  that  the  threat 
of  stern  punishment  in  the  hands  of  a  good  judge  is  a  powerful  tool  of 
justice,  mercy,  and  compassion  for  the  weak  and  the  poor  who  live  by 
the  law,  and  who  are  entitled  to  expect  protection  from  that  law.  It  is  the 
responsibility  of  a  king  to  utilize  these  tools  of  justice  to  enforce  such 
laws,  else  these  tools  might  be  perverted  to  wicked  uses: 
When  the  traitors  understood  that  he  was  a  mild  man,  and  gentle 
and  good,  and  did  not  exact  the  full  penalties  of  the  law,  they 
perpetrated  every  enormity.  They  had  done  him  homage,  and 
sworn  oaths,  but  they  kept  no  pledge;  all  of  them  were  perjured 
and  their  pledges  nullified....  Then,  both  by  night  and  day  they 
took  those  people  that  they  thought  had  any  goods--men  and 
women--and  put  them  in  prison  and  tortured  them  with 
indescribable  torture  to  exhort  gold  and  silver--for  no  martyrs 
were  ever  so  tortured  as  they  were.  They  were  hung  by  the 
thumbs  or  by  the  head,  and  corselets  were  hung  on  their  feet. 
Knotted  ropes  were  put  round  their  heads  and  twisted  till  they 
penetrated  to  the  brains.  They  put  them  in  prisons  where  there 
were  adders  and  snakes  and  toads,  and  killed  them  like  that. 
Some  they  put  in  a"  torture-chamb  er"  --that  is  in  a  chest  that  was Chapter  One  83 
short,  narrow  and  shallow,  and  they  put  sharp  stones  in  it  and  -- 
pressed  the  man  in  it  so  that  he  had  all  his  limbs  broken.  In  many 
of  the  castles  was  a  "no  ose-and  -trap"  --consisting  of  chains  of  such 
a  kind  that  two  or  three  men  had  enough  to  do  to  carry  one.  It  was 
so  made  that  it  was  fastened  to  a  beam,  and  they  used  to  put  a 
sharp  iron  around  the  man's  throat  and  his  neck,  so  that  he  could 
not  in  any  direction  either  sit  or  lie  or  sleep,  but  had  to  carry  all 
that  iron.  Many  thousands  they  killed  by  starvation.  I  have 
neither  the  ability  nor  the  power  to  tell  all  the  horrors  nor  all  the 
torments  they  inflicted  upon  wretched  people  in  this  country:  and 
that  lasted  the  nineteen  years  while  Stephen  was  king,  and  it  was 
always  going  from  bad  to  worse  .... 
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Acts  of  torture,  dismemberment,  and  execution  articulate  a  language  of 
power  in  such  a  context,  but  this  language  speaks  of  the  weakness  of  the 
central  governing  structure,  the  powerlessness  of  the  common  people, 
and  the  licentiousness  of  the  bold,  strong,  and  wicked.  Such  a  message 
is  clearly  at  odds  with  that  signified  through  the  acts  (or,  indeed,  the 
mere  implicit  threat  of  acts)  of  justice  under  Stephen's  successor.  It  is 
worthwhile  to  compare  the  desolation  and  despair  described  in  the 
previous  passage,  clearly  related  in  the  minds  of  the  chroniclers  with 
Stephen's  weakness,  with  the  "  strict  justice"  and  "  awe"  associated  with 
Henry,  Stephen's  successor.  In  the  following  passage  Stephen  is 
perceived  of  as  stronger  due  to  his  association  with  Henry,  and  we  might 
note  especially  the  relationship  which  the  chronicler  divines  between 
"love"  and  "strict  justice":  . 
Then  he  went  with  a  big  army  into  England,  and  won  castles,  and 
the  king  went  against  him  with  a  much  bigger  army,  and  all  the Chapter  One  84 
same  they  did  not  fight,  but  the  archbishop  and  the  wise  men  went 
between  them  and  made  an  agreement  that  the  king  should  be 
liege  lord  and  king  as  long  as  he  lived  and  after  his  day  Henry 
should  be  king;  they  should  be  as  father  and  son;  and  there 
should  always  be  peace  and  concord  between  them,  and  in  all 
England.  This,  and  all  the  other  conditions  that  they  made,  the 
king  and  the  count  and  the  bishops  and  the  earls  and  powerful 
men  all  swore  to  keep.  -  Then  the  count  was  received  at 
Winchester  and  in-  London  with  great  honour,  and  all  did  him 
homage,  and  swore  to  keep  the  peace:  and  it  soon  became  a  good 
peace,  such  as  there  never  was  before.  Then  the  king  was  stronger 
than  he  had  been  till  then,  and  the  count  went  overseas  and 
everybody  loved  him  because  he  exacted  strict  justice  and  made 
peace.  58 
This  account  of  the  merits  of  Henry's  stern  discipline  is  continued  in  the 
annal  for  1154,  which  describes  his  ascent  of  the  throne;  of  special  note 
is  the  "great  awe"  in  which  he  was  held,  and  the  power  with  which  such 
awe  imbued  him.  The  chronicler  does  not  mention  any  specific  act  of 
$4  strict  justice"  to  which  we  might  attribute  such  awe  (which  is 
noteworthy  in  juxtaposition  with  the  graphic  descriptions  of  the  abuses 
under  the  weak  Stephen),  and  yet  it  is  clear  in  this  context  that  such  awe 
rest  upon  the  threat  of  just  such  retribution: 
In  this  year  King  Stephen  died,  and  was  buried  where  his  wife  and 
son  were  buried  at  Faversham,  the  monastery  they  had  founded. 
When  the  king  was  dead,  the  count  was  overseas,  and  nobody 
dared  do  anything  but  good  to  another  because  they  were  in  such 
great  awe  of  him  .... 
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The  contrast  between  the  perceptions  of  ruling  illustrated  in  the 
comparison  of  these  passages  is  notable  in  the  context  of  my  larger 
discussion.  The  contrast  between  weak  and  strict  rule--and  between 
proper  and  improper  implementation  of  physical  punishment  in  order  to 
maintain  political  control  and  to  ensure  equal  justice  under  law-- 
underscores  a  tension  which  harkens  back  to  chronicler  of  annal  1087. 
That  writer,  while  implicitly  condemning  that  of  William's  cruelty 
which  seemed  attributable  to  his  avaricious  nature,  remarks  with  no  little 
respect  as  to  the  peaceful  benefits  born  of  William's  strict  justice:,  a  man 
could  walk  anywhere  in  the  kingdom  with  a  bosom  full  of  gold  with  no 
fear,  and  the  violent  settling  of  disputes  and  harassment  and  lawlessness 
of  all  kinds  were  harshly  curtailed.  This  is  a  model  of  king  as  law-giver 
and  dispenser  of  justice  which  is  somewhat  at  odds  with  earlier 
Germanic  models  (both  of  leadership  and  of  dispute  resolution),  but 
which  clearly  resonates  with  a  Christian  conception  of  the  role  of  God  as 
stem  father  and  harsh  judge,  who  shows  his  love  for  his  children  through 
strict  and  fair  justice  and  punishment.  In  addition,  the  notion  of  the 
value  of  properly  applied  physical  punishment  in  the  temporal  realm-- 
and  the  relationship  between  the  body  and  the  soul  of  the  individual 
involved--also  resonates  well  with  the  theological  and  philosophical 
construct  of  spiritual  punishment  in  the  afterlife--which  utilizes  a 
physical  metaphor  to  explicate  this  self-same  relationship  between  the 
body  and  the  soul--which  I  discuss  in  poetic  contexts  at  length  in 
Chapter  Six. 
It  is  with  just  such  a  relationship  between  the  nature  of  the  soul 
and  the  state  of  the  flesh  that  the  Germanic  legal  conception  of  the 
ordeal  is  concerned:  flesh  is  tainted  through  the  sin  of  the  spirit,  while 
an  innocent  soul  is  reflected  through  uncorrupted  flesh.  I  will  discuss Chapter  One  86 
the  legal  and  philosophical  basis  for  this  tradition  at  length  in  the  second 
part  of  this  chapter,  and  will  examine  especially  the  role  of  the  ordeal  in 
Anglo-Saxon  law,  and  how  this  role  brings  together  literary,  legal,  and 
philosophical  traditions.  -  For  the  moment,  however,  I  would  like  to  focus 
upon  a  few  excerpts  from  the  historical  records  which  illustrate  the 
Anglo-Saxon  conception  of  the  relationship  between  physical  state  and 
spiritual  nature.  This  relationship  is  a  commonplace  of  Anglo-Saxon 
theological  and  poetic  writing,  and  it  is  of  particular  interest  that  such  a 
philosophical  construct  is  also  reflected  in  historical  and  legal  works. 
There  are  two  related  forms  of  Anglo-Saxon  historical  records 
which  explicitly  manifest  such  a  conception  of  the  causal  relationship 
between  bodily  appearance  and  spiritual  guilt  or  innocence.  Punitive 
acts  of  torture  and  dismemberment  implicitly  manifest  such  a 
relationship--as  I  have  endeavored  to  explain--but  in  those  cases  the  state 
marks  the  guilt  of  an  individual  upon  the  tablet  of  the  flesh  of  that 
individual.  In  the  cases  to  which  I  now  turn,  the  spiritual  state  of  the 
individual  is  reflected  through  divine  intervention  in  the  mirror  of  the 
flesh.  The  records  in  which  I  am  interested  have  to  do  with  individuals 
the  innocence  of  whom  is  proven  through  their  unblemished  flesh  which 
is  unscathed  by  the  trial  by  ordeal,  and  with  saints,  the  sanctity  of  whom 
is  proven  through  their  uncorrupted  bodies  which  are  unmarked  by 
death.  An  example  from  the  annals  of  Winchester  should  suffice  to 
illustrate  the  Anglo-Saxon  conception  of  the  utility  of  the  trial  by  ordeal 
in  manifesting  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  accused.,  In  this  particular 
case,  Queen  Emma  undergoes  the  ordeal  of  the  red-hot  plowshares  in 
order  to  prove  her  innocence  (the  crime  is  not  recorded)  to  her  son.  It  is 
significant  that  in  this  example  Emma  does  not  seem  to  feel  the  heat,  nor 
does  she  seem  aware  of  undergoing  the  ordeal  at  all;  this  could  hardly 
have  been  the  common  experience,  but  neither  is  it  the  test  of  the  ordeal: Chapter  One  87 
it  must  be  merely  indicative  of  her  extreme  piety.  The  point  of  the 
ordeal  is  the  effect  of  the  torment  upon  the  flesh,  which  then  indicates 
the  state  of  the  soul;  while  in  actual  legal  practice  this  effect  was  looked 
for  after  a  stipulated  period  (and  would  normally  have  to  do  with  the 
presence  or  absence  of  infection;  see  discussion,  below),  here  the 
annalist  has  taken  license  for  the  sake  of  narrative  brevity.  The  purpose 
of  the  ordeal  is  underscored  by  the  fact  that  Emma  demands  to  be  taken 
before  her  son,  so  that  he  may  read  her  innocence  in  the  text  of  her 
unblemished  feet: 
The  queen  was  brought  at  the  king's  command  from  Whewell  to 
Winchester  and  throughout  all  the  night  preceding  her  trial  she 
kept  her  vigil  at  the  shrine  of  St.  Swithin....  On  the  appointed  day 
the  clergy  and  the  people  came  to  the  church  and  the  king  himself 
sat  on  the  tribunal.  The  queen  was  brought  before  her  son  and 
questioned  whether  she  was  willing  to  go  through  with  what  she 
had  undertaken....  Nine  glowing  ploughshares  were  placed  on  the 
carefully  swept  pavement  of  the  church.  After  these  had  been 
consecrated  by  a  short  ceremony  the  queen's  shoes  and  stockings 
weretakenoff;  then  her  robe  was  removed  and  her  cloak  thrown 
aside,  and;  supported  by  two  bishops,  one  on  either  side,  she  was 
led  to  the  torture.  The  bishops  who  led  her  were  weeping  and 
those  who  were  much  more  afraid  than  she  were  encouraging  her 
not  to  fear.  Uncontrollable  weeping  broke  out  all  over  the  church 
and  all  voices  were  united  in  the  cry  "St.  Swithin,  0  St.  Swithin, 
help  her!  "  If  the  thunder  had  pealed  forth  at  this  time  the  people 
could  not  have  heard  it,  with  such  strength,  with  such  a  concourse 
of  voices  did  the  shout  go  up  to  Heaven  that  St.,  Swithin  should 
now  or  never  hasten  to  her  aid.  God  suffers  violence  and  St. Chapter  One  88 
Swithin  is  dragged  by  force  from  Heaven.  In  a  low  voice  the 
queen  offered  this  prayer  as  she  undertook  the  ordeal:  "0  God, 
who  didst  free  Susanna  from  the  wicked  elders  and  the  three 
7ouths  from  th  e  fiery  furnace,  from  the  fire  prepared  for  me  deign 
to  preserve  me  through  the  merits  of  St.  Swithin.  "  [Italics  mine] 
Behold  the  miracle!  With  the  bishops  directing  her  feet,  in  nine 
steps  she  walked  upon  the  nine  ploughshares,  pressing  each  one  of 
them  with  the  full  weight  of  her  whole  body;  and  though  she  thus 
passed  over  them  all,  she  neither  saw  the  iron  nor  felt  the  heat. 
Therefore  she  said  to  the  bishops:  "Am  I  not  to  obtain  that  which 
I  especially  sought?  Why  do  you  lead  me  out  of  the  church  when 
I  ought  to  be  tried  within  it?  "  For  she  was  going  out  and  yet  did 
not  realize  that  she  had  gone  through  the  ordeal.  To  which  the 
bishops  replied  as  well  as  they  could  through  their  sobs:  "0  lady, 
behold,  you  have  already  done  it;  the  deed  is  now  accomplished 
which  you  think  must  yet  be  done.  "  She  gazed  and  her  eyes  were 
opened;  then  for  the  first  time  she  looked  about  and  understood 
the  miracle.  "Lead  me,  "  she  said,  "to  my  son,  that  he  may  see  my 
feet  and  know  that  I  have  suffered  no  ill.  -  60 
Emma's  experience  is  indicative  of  the  purpose  of  the  ordeal:  the 
guilt  or  innocence  of  the  accused  is  made  manifest--through  divine 
intervention--upon  their  flesh.  In  Emma's  case,  her  unblemished  body 
acts  as  a  sign  which  tells  of  the  nature  of  the  innocent  and  pure  soul  of 
the  accused.  Such  signs  are  directly  related  to  the  uncorrupted  relics  of 
saints  sometimes  described  in  the  annals;  the  holiness  of  the  individuals 
involved  is  made  manifest  through  their  spotless  flesh.  (This 
relationship  between  spiritual  purity  and  bodily  integrity  is  related  to  fire 
of  judgment  model  discussed  in  Chapter  Five,  wherein  the  state  of  the Chapter  One  89 
individual  soul  on  doomsday  determines  the  material  effects  of  the 
flames  upon  that  individual.  )  This  relationship  between  the  body  and  the 
soul  is  often  interpreted  metaphorically,  but  the  fact  that  such  examples 
occur  in  Anglo-Saxon  historical  records  as  well  as  ecclesiastical  and 
literary  works  reminds  us  that--in  an  Anglo-Saxon  cultural  context--such 
a  relationship  was  understood  in  practical  as  well  as  metaphorical  terms. 
Indeed,  considering  the  centrality  of  the  trial  by  ordeal  to  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  system  of  jurisprudence,  such  an  understanding  is  to  be  expected. 
I  include  from  the  ASC  two  examples  pertaining  to  the  undecayed  relics 
of  saints;  I  include  further  references  in  the  notes.  It  is  particularly 
revealing  that  the  chronicler  who  recorded  the  first  entry  noted  that 
Oswald's  holiness  was  made  known  in  many  ways;  surely  the 
uncorrupted  state  of  his  relics  was  understood  as  one  of  these  ways: 
In  this  year  Oswald,  king  of  the  Northumbrians,  was  slain  by 
Penda,  the  Southumbrian,  at  Maserfeld  on  5  August,  and  his  body 
was  buried  at  Bardney.  His  holiness  and  miracles  were  afterwards 
made  known  in  manifold  ways  throughout  this  island,  and  his 
hands  are  undecayed  in  Bamburgh.  61 
In  the  same  year  the  body  of  Wihtburh  was  found  all  sound  and 
undecayed  in  Dereham,  55  years  after  she  departed  from  this 
lif  e.  62 
Like  those  records  discussed  earlier  concerned  with  acts  of 
punitive  and  political  torture,  these  examples  clearly  illustrate  an 
understanding  of  the  semiotic  function  of  the  body  as  text  which  is 
closely  related  to  literary  constructions  which  utilize  acts  of  torture  and 
tortured  bodies  as  signs  to  articulate  a  language  of  power  and  spiritual Chapter  One  90 
nature.  These  holy  bodies--like  those  broken  bodies  produced  through 
punitive  and  political  torture--articulate  a  language  of  power;  while  the 
earlier  examples  were  largely  concerned  with  a  language  of  political 
power,  however,  these  examples  are  concerned  with  a  language  of 
spiritual  power.  It  is  with  the  relationship  between  such  spiritual  power 
and  the  temporal  power  of  the  state  to  which  we  now  turn  in  our 
discussion  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  laws  concerning  torture  and  ordeal.  The 
concept  of  the  ordeal--its  philosophical  basis,  the  Germanic  traditions 
from  which  it  evolved,  and  the  judicial  torture  which  replaced  it--is 
intimately  related  to  a  wide  spectrum  of  Old  English  literary  works 
concerned  with  the  nature  of  the  relationship  between  the  body  and  the 
soul,  and  so  it  is  upon  the  ordeal  that  I  will  focus  most  of  my  attention  in 
my  discussion  of  the  laws. Chapter  One  91 
Pmm  II:  Torture  in  Anglo-Saxon  Law 
Many  Anglo-Saxon  laws  involve  mutilation  as  penalties;  such 
acts  serve  to  dissuade  the  offender  against  further  crimes,  of  course,  and 
usually  make  such  relapses  potentially  difficult,  if  not  physically 
impossible.  Further,  such  penalties  render  the  body  of  the  offender  into 
a  sign  which  signifies--not  only  that  offender's  personal  guilt--but  the 
power  of  the  state  and  the  force  of  the  rule  of  law.  Such  examples 
remind  us  of  the  politically-motivated  penalties  of  blinding,  decapitation, 
and  the  like  (examined  in  our  discussion  of  Anglo-Saxon  historical 
records),  and  they  also  are  closely  related  philosophically  to  the  concept 
of  the  trial  by  ordeal,  in  that  the  body  of  the  individual  involved  is  seen 
to  manifest  physically  the  nature  of  a  spiritual  reality.,  Thus,  just  as  the 
wrongly  accused  are  vindicated  through  the  text  of  their  unblemished 
flesh  after  having  successfully  undergone  the  ordeal  and  just  as  the  - 
guilty  are  indicted  through  the  text  of  their  corrupt  flesh,  the  mutilated 
body  of  the  convicted  felon  serves  to  articulate  physically  the  moral 
turpitude  of  that  felon.  These  criminal  codes,  then,  serve  to  bridge  the 
gap  between  the  more  politically-charged  texts  of  the  mutilation  and 
dismemberment  of  traitors  and  political  rivals,  and  the  more  spiritually- 
significant  philosophy  supporting  the  conceptual  framework  of  the  trial 
by  ordeal.  In  all  of  these  cases  the  body  serves  as  a  texti  but  the  nature 
of  that  text  varies  according  to  the  social  functions  and  expectations 
involved  in  the  cultural  constructs  of  pragmatic  political  agendas,  a 
system  of  jurisprudence  which  understands  spiritual  guilt  and  innocence 
to  be  physically  quantifiable,  and  proscriptive  criminal  law  codes. 
Mutilation  and  dismemberment  as  criminal  penalties  appear  in  law 
codes  throughout  the  Anglo-Saxon  period,  and  continue  to  do  so  after 
the  Conquest.  Amongst  the  earliest  of  surviving  examples  are  the  laws Chapter  One  92 
of  Ine,  ca.  688-694.  These  laws  are  of  special  interest,  as  they  provided 
a  basis  for  the  very  important  laws  of  Alfred  which  followed  them. 
Moreover,  these  laws  offer  us  not  only  a  very  early  record  of  the 
codification  of  such  Germanic  traditions  as  the  wergild  and  the  centrality 
of  the  freeman's  oath,  but  also  a  glimpse  into  a  very  complex  system  of 
assessing  the  relationship  between  various  crimes,  their  punishments 
(which  often  comprised  mutilation  or  various  forms  of  execution),  and 
these  same  Germanic  concepts.  Thus,  for  instance,  oaths  and  wergild 
values  sometimes  are  combined  in  complex  formulae  for  the 
determination  of  guilt.  Further,  this  code  offers  an  interesting  insight 
into  the  social  conditions,  such  as  roving  bands  of  marauders,  clearly 
both  foreign  and  domestic,  which  required  such  laws  in  the  first  place.  63 
In  the  context  of  the  laws  which  f  ollow,  it  is  worth  noticing  that 
penalties  of  dismemberment  mentioned  in  this  law  code--while  symbolic 
as  well  as  punitive--are  non-specific  in  their  symbolism.  That  is  to  say, 
that  although  the  criminal  is  punished  for  the  crime  through  the  pain  of 
the  torment,  the  loss  of  the  use  of  the  member  in  question,  and  through 
the  life-long  shame  associated  with  the  badge  of  sin  with  which  that 
missing  member  brands  the  victim,  that  badge  is  only  incidentally 
related  to  the  specific  crime  involved.  Although  the  offender's  body  acts 
as  a  text,  in  such  a  case,  this  text  speaks  generally  about  the  crime  of  that 
offender,  the  punishment  for  that  crime,  and  the  power  of  the  king  who 
affected  that  punishment.  However,  the  text  does  not  indicate  anything 
about  the  specific  crime  in  question,  which--as  we  shaff  see--is  in  stark 
contrast  to  some  of  the  later  law  codes. 
There  are  two  entries  within  this  code  which  specifically  mention 
dismemberment,  and  both  have  to  do  with  the  punishment  of  criminal 
behavior  on  the  part  of  a  ceorl.  The  first  has  to  do  with  infamy--or  bad 
reputation,  which  is  intimately  related  to  the  concept  of  personal  honor Chapter  One  93 
and  the  value  of  one's  oath--and  invokes  a  harsh  sentence  for  an 
unspecified,  but  putatively  habitual,  crime,  when  the  suspected  criminal 
is  finally  caught  in  the  act: 
18.  If  a  ceorl  is  often  accused,  and  if  at  the  last  he  is  taken  [in  the 
act],  his  hand  or  foot  is  to  be  struck  off.  64 
The  second  entry  deals  specifically  with  theft,  and  is  likewise  concerned 
with  the  common  assessment  of  character,  and  with  the  perception  of 
habitual  crime: 
37.  The  ceorl,  who  has  often  been  accused  of  theft,  and  then  at 
last  is  proved  guilty  at  the  ordeal  or  else  in  obvious  guilt,  is  to 
h  ave  ah  and  or  fo  ot  stru  ck  off  . 
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It  is  telling  that  these  entries  are  so  general  in  nature;  not  just  the 
penalties,  but  the  crimes  themselves--and  even  the  methods  of 
ascertaining  guilt--are  somewhat  vague.  The  laws  of  Ine  are  not  only 
non-specific,  however,  but  are  at  times  contradictory;  it  is  especially 
noteworthy  that  elsewhere  within  this  same  code  it  is  made  clear  that  a 
thief  may  be  killed  without  wergild,  or  may--in  fact--be  put  to  death  for 
his  crime,  if  he  cannot  redeem  himself  through  the  payment  of  his 
wergild. 
66  Thus  the  penalties  for  theft  are  somewhat  open-ended,  and 
although  the  acts  of  punishment  signify  issues  of  guilt  and  power,  this 
signification  is  general  and  non-specific. 
With  the  laws  of  Alfred,  which  were  composed  about  a  century 
later  than  those  of  Ine  (ca.  871-899),  we  enter  a  context  within  which 
crime,  penalty,  and  significance  are  all  explicitly  specified.  In  this  code 
we  find  several  examples  of  punitive  mutilation  which  clearly  are  related Chapter  One  94 
to  the  particular  crime  committed,  make  another  offense  of  that  kind 
difficult  or  impossible,  and  signify  through  their  rending  of  the  body  of 
the  offender  the  exact  nature  of  the  crime  for  which  they  were  imposed. 
The  first  two  crimes  deal  with  theft  and  rape,  respectively,  and  the  third 
with  slander;  I  will  discuss  the  first  two  at  this  point,  and  leave  the  third 
until  my  examination  of  the  importance  of  oaths  and  sworn  testimony  in 
Germanic  tradition  and  Anglo-Saxon  law.  The  first  example  concerns 
theft  from  a  church;  in  this  case  the  offender  repays  the  value  of  the' 
theft,  plus  a  fine,  and  is  required,  furthermore,  to  forfeit  a  hand: 
6.  If  anyone  steals  anything  in  church,  he  is  to  pay  the  simple 
compensation  and  the  fine  normally  belonging  to  that  simple 
compensation,  and  the  hand  with  which  he  did  it  is  to  be  struck 
off  . 
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It  is  particularly  telling  that  the  hand  to  be  removed  is  that  with  which 
the  offender  committed  the  crime;  this  fact--in  combination  with  the 
repayment  of  the  theft  and  the  additional  fine,  which  is  a  punitive 
measure  in  and  of  itself--underscores  the  symbolic  nature  of  this  act  of 
dismemberment.  The  pain  of  the  penalty  itself,  combined  with  the 
permanent  loss  of  the  hand  involved--most  likely  the  dominant  one--is 
clearly  a  punishment  which  will  have  an  impact  on  the  victim,  as  well  as 
rendering  that  offender  unlikely  to  be  able  to  so  transgress  again. 
Further,  however,  the  loss  of  the  member  with  which  the  crime  was 
committed  is  a  symbolic  act  which  produces  upon  the  text  of  the  body  of 
the  criminal  a  message  of  personal  guilt  and  judicial  power.  The  penalty 
for  a  slave  who  rapes  another  slave  similarly  conjoins  a  pragmatic 
penalty,  which  renders  the  guilty  man  unable  to  commit  this  crime  again, 
with  a  symbolic  act.  This  act  renders  the  body  of  this  man  into  a  sign, Chapter  One  9S 
both  of  the  nature  of  his  own  guilt,  and'of  the  penalty  imposed  by  the 
law  upon  transgressors:  ' 
25.1  If  a  slave  rape  a  slave-woman,  he  is  to  pay  by  suffering 
castration.  68  - 
In  both  of  these  cases,  then,  it  is  of  particular  and  self-conscious 
significance  that  the  punishment  for  each  crime  involves  the  removal  of 
the  offending  member  from  the  body  of  the  transgressor. 
We  find  a  similarly  eloquent  example  of  how  the  language  of 
mutilation  may  be  articulated  upon  the  flesh  of  the  transgressor  in  the 
laws  of  Athelstan  issued  at  Grately,  Hampshire  (ca.  924-939).  In  this 
case,  the  physical  member  of  the  accused  represents  his  guilt  or 
innocence  on  a  number  of  levels:  it  serves  to  condemn  or  to  acquit  him 
at  his  trial.  If  he  is  condemned,  the  loss'Of  his  hand  brands  him 
personally  as  a  criminal;  the  condemned  hand  suffers  the  penalty  for  the 
crime  which  it  committed,  and  is  displayed  over  the  mint  for  all  to  see  its 
particular  guilt,  and  for  all  to  read  in  this  text  the  consequences  (more 
generally)  of  such  transgression,  and  also  the  power  and  justice  of  the 
king:  I 
14.1.  And  if  a  moneyer  is  convicted,  the  hand  with  which  he 
committed  the  crime  is  to  be  struck  off,  and  put  up  on  the  mint. 
And  if,  however,  there  is  an  accusation,  and  he  wishes  to  clear 
himself,  he  is  then  to  go  to  [the  ordeal  of]  hot  iron,  and  redeem  the 
hand  with  which  he  is  accused  of  having  committed  the  crime; 
and  if  he  is  convicted  at  the  ordeal,  the  same  is  to  be  done  as  it 
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Once  again,  in  this  case  the  punishment  for  the  crime  is  a  very  specific 
penalty  of  mutilation  which  refers  to  the  exact  crime  committed  by  the 
particular  member  of  the  specific  criminal;  further,  the  token  rendered 
through  this  punishment  is  publicly  displayed  with  the  obvious  intent  to 
broadcast  a  number  of  levels  of  signification.  Finally,  it  is  most 
significant  that  in  this  case  the  ordeal  is  invoked  in  order  to  determine 
guilt  or  innocence,  and  this  spiritual  state  is  made  manifest  by  divine 
power  through  the  same  member  with  which  the  accused  would  have 
committed  the  crime.  Thus  the  guilty  moneyer  is  condemned  through 
that  very  hand  which  subsequently  will  be  displayed  by  the  temporal 
authorities  to  articulate  this  very  same  guilt,  as  well  as  to  make  clear 
these  same  issues  of  divine  and  temporal  power  and  judgment. 
Considering  the  number  of  historical  annals  which  record  acts  of 
symbolic  mutilation  carried  out  by  his  order,  we  might  well  expect  to 
find  penal  dismemberment  and  torture  also  codified  in  the  laws  of  Cnut 
(written  ca.  1020-1023);  in  this  expectation  we  are  not  disappointed.  In 
these  laws  we  find,  for  example,  a  very  similar  penalty  to  that  enacted 
under  Athelstan  for  the  crime  of  counterfeiting,  although  no  mention  is 
made  of  the  ordeal,  nor  of  the  display  of  the  severed  member.  The  basic 
punishment  is  the  same,  however,  and  the  removal  of  the  hand  which 
committed  the  offense  is  designed  to  signify  the  same  truths  concerning 
the  guilt  of  the  offenderi  the  justice  of  the  king,  and  the  power  of  the 
law: 
8.1.  And  he  who  after  this  coins  false  money  is  to  forfeit  the  hand 
with  which  he  coined  the  false  money,  and  he  is  not  to  redeem  it 
at  any  price,  neither  with  gold  nor  with  silver. 
8.2.  And  if  the  reeve  is  accused,  that  it  was  with  his  permission 
that  he  coined  the  false  money,  he  is  to  clear  himself  with  the Chapter  One  97 
three-fold  process  of  exculpation;  and  if  this  exculpation  fails,  he 
is  to  incur  the  same  sentence  as  he  who  coined  the  false  money.  70 
Although  the  ordeal  is  not  mentioned  in  regards  to  counterfeiting,  it  is  an 
important  part  of  jurisprudence  under  Cnut,  and  several  laws  refer  to  its 
use. 
Next  I  turn  to  a  prominent  example  of  mutilation  as  the  prescribed 
penalty  for  those  who  have  been  proven  guilty  through  the  ordeal.  In 
this  case  it  is  worth*attention  that  the  accused  undergoes  a  trial  by  ordeal 
which  we  would  consider  to  be  a  form  of  torture,  and  then,  if  proven 
guilty,  is  tortured  yet  again  as  punishment.  But  however  similar  these 
related  acts  may  seem  to  us,  we  must  recognize  that  the  ordeal  and 
punitive  torment  are  two  distinct  traditions,  with  different  philosophical 
structures  supporting  each.  Still,  it  is  crucial  to  realize  that  each  of  these 
acts  has  to  do  with  utilizing  the  body  as  text:  the  trial  by  ordeal  relies 
upon  the  hand  of  God  to  write  the  spiritual  state  of  the  accused  upon  the 
tablet  of  his  flesh,  while  the  penalty  of  dismemberment--or  other 
disfiguring  torture--written  through  the  agency  of  the  king  upon  those 
thus  proven  guilty  serves  to  mark  this  spiritual  truth  indelibly  upon  this 
same  tablet.  It  is  of  particular  interest  that  such  torment  explicitly  is 
designed  to  be  used  in  place  of  execution  in  order  to  punish  the  crime 
while  still  allowing  the  criminal  to  live  and  be  spiritually  saved.  Further, 
such  punishment  simultaneously  serves  to  preach  the  wages  of  sin  to 
potential  sinners  through  the  text  of  the  convicted  felon's  broken  body: 
30.3a.  And  the  three-f  old  ordeal  is  to  be  set  on  foot  thus:  he  [i.  e. 
the  accuser]  is  to  take  five  men  and  be  himself  the  sixth. 
30.3b.  And  if  he  is  then  convicted,  on  the  first  occasion  he  is  to 
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lord  who  is  entitled  to  his  fine,  and  to  appoint  trustworthy  sureties 
that  he  will  afterwards  cease  from  all  evil-doing. 
30A.  -  And  on  the  second  occasion  there  is  to  be  no  other 
compensation,  if  he  is  convicted,  but  that  his  hands,  or  feet,  or 
both,  in  proportion  to  the  deed,  are  to  be  cut  off. 
30.5.  And  if,  however,  he  has  committed  still  further  crimes,  his 
eyes  are  to  be  put  out  and  his  nose  and  ears  and  upper  lip  cut  off, 
or  his  scalp  removed,  whichever  of  these  is  then  decreed  by  those 
with  whom  the  decision  rests;  thus  one  can  punish  and  at  the 
same  time  preserve  the  soul.  71 
The  penalties  for  slaves  were  similar,  although  they  were  given 
only  one  chance  to  reform.  In  addition,  where  slaves  are  concerned,  the 
penalty  of  branding  is  implemented.  Branding  is  intriguing  because  it  is 
another  particularly  visible  form  of  punishment  which  renders  the  body 
of  the  victim  into  a  text,  without,  however,  reducing  his  capability  for 
labor.  Thus  branding  serves  the  purpose  of  the  penalties  imposed  upon 
freemen,  but  does  so  in  a  pragmatic,  economical  way  which  does  not 
unduly  penalize  the  owner  of  the  slave:  , 
32.  And  if  a  slave  is  convicted  by  the  ordeal,  on  the  first  occasion 
he  is  to  be  branded.  - 
32.1.  And  on  the  second  occasion,  there  is  to  be  no  compensation 
except  his  head.  72 
Some  penalties--although  for  crimes  serious  enough  to  merit  mutilation-- 
might  be  commuted  through  the  payment  of  a  fine.  See,  for  example,,  , 
the  law  concerning  an  offender  who  commits  a  breach  of  the  Lenten  fast 
by  wounding  a  man: Chapter  One  99 
48.1.  And  if  he  wounds  a  man,  he  is  to  pay  compensation  for  it 
and  pay  full  fine  to  the  lord,  and  redeem  his  hand  from  the  bishop 
or  forfeit  it.  73 
The  penalty  for  a  woman  who  commits  adultery  allows  for  no 
such  compensation,  however,  and  the  severity  of  the  punishment  might 
have  to  do  with  the  public  nature  of  the  offense,  which  touches  on 
volatile  issues  (in  Germanic  and  Anglo-Saxon  contexts)  such  as  public 
reputation  and  oaths  of  loyalty.  The  wording  of  the  following  law 
stipulates  that  this  penalty  is  to  be  invoked  only  if  the  crime  becomes 
known,  and  the  reference  to  the  process  through  which  the  wife  incurs 
"public  disgrace"  implies  that  the  body  of  the  punished  woman  serves  to 
document  her  disgrace  publicly,  while  simultaneously  avenging  the 
public  humiliation  of  her  husband: 
53.  If  a  woman  during  her  husband's  lifetime  commits  adultery 
with  another  man,  and  it  becomes  known,  let  her  afterwards 
become  herself  a  public  disgrace  and  her  lawful  husband  is  to 
have  all  that  she  owns,  and  she  is  to  lose  her  nose  and  ears.  74 
This  mutilation  is  clearly  symbolic,  but  this  symbolism  is  not  as 
straightforward  as  that  associated  with  some  other  acts  of  disfigurement 
or  dismemberment.  As  opposed  to  the  penalty  of  castration  imposed 
upon  a  male  rapist  under  some  codes,  for  example,  the  adulteress  does 
not  lose  the  body  part  in  question.  Presumably,  it  is  the  beauty 
represented  in  the  face--the  vanity  in  the  woman  which  it  reflects  and  the 
lust  in  the  man  which  it  incites--which  is  perceived  as  the  culprit  here, 
and  which,  therefore,  is  publicly  dispatched  to  end  this  vanity  and  lusti Chapter  One  100 
to  punish  the  offender,  and  to  symbolize  publicly  the  nature  of  this  sin 
for  all  to  see  and  to  learn  by. 
In  the  laws  of  Cnut,  as  in  those  acts  of  his  which  are  mentioned  in 
the  annals,  we  discern  a  particular  affinity  for  expressive  acts  of  violence 
upon  bodies.  This  is  not  at  all  to  suggest  that  Anglo-Saxon  and  Norman 
kings  did  not  enact  laws  and  perform  acts  which  were  similarly 
expressive,  but  rather  to  note  that  Cnut's  seem  especially  so,  and  seem  to 
be  organized  around  principles  which  are  founded  upon  the  premise  that 
violence  may  be  wrought  upon  bodies  in  such  a  way  as  to  signify  the 
nature  of  spiritual  and  political  realities.  It  is  possible  that  Cnut's 
Scandinavian  heritage  reflected  more  purely  Germanic  influences  than 
did  those  of  his  English  and  French  counterparts,  and  it  is  certainly  true 
that  Stenton  perceives  that  Cnut  reflected  an  older,  outdated  culture  even 
as  he  embraced  Christian  values  and  culture.  75  In  any  case,  Cnut's 
laws  certainly  utilize  the  possibilities  of  the  body  as  text  as  fully  as  did 
those  of  any  Anglo-Saxon  king  before  him,  and  in  his  (Christianity- 
influenced)  attempt  to  substitute  such  expressive  acts  of  mutilation  for 
capital  punishment,  his  laws  prefigure  those  of  William;  thus  the 
Scandinavian-Christian  blend  of  influences  reflected  in  the  laws  of  Cnut 
provides  a  bridge  between  earlier  Anglo-Saxon  concepts  of  the  functions 
of  corporal  punishment  and  the  Norman  conceptions  of  the  late  eleventh 
century. 
The  Norman  laws  which  follow  the  Conquest  are  valuable  to  this 
discussion  as  they  provide  context  for  the  Anglo-Saxon  traditions  in 
which  we  are  most  particularly  interested.  In  general,  it  would  be  fair  to 
Say  that  these  laws  mark  the  beginning  of  a  shift  in  legal  and 
philosophical  concepts  of  the  relationship  between  the  body  andthe 
spirit,  of  the  function  of  the  divine  in  temporal  justice,  and  of  the  role  of 
the  state  in  the  protection  and  the  punishment  of  its  members.  Tocusing Chapter  One  10  1 
on  laws  which  have  to  do  with,  respectively,  the  supplanting  of  the  trial 
by  ordeal  with  the  trial  by  combat,  and  the  replacement  of  capital  -- 
punishment  with  blinding  and  castration,  I  will  note  four  ways  in  which 
these  legal  and  philosophical  shifts  are  made  manifest. 
First,  the  beginning-  of  a  movement  away  from  trial  by  ordeal  to 
trial  by  combat  is  indicative  of  a  general  shift  away  from  the  principles 
of  Germanic  law  (manifested  in  the  ordeal),  which  culminates  in  the 
removal  of  the  ordeal  from  English  jurisprudence  in  1219.  After  this 
change,  God  no  longer  acted  as  judge  and  jury,  but  men  had  to  serve  as 
the  principal  agents  of  justice,  although  presumably  with  divine 
guidance;  Similarly,  in  the  trial  by  combat,  favored  by  Norman  law, 
men  act  as  their  own  advocates,  each  writing  his  suit  upon  the  body  of 
his  opponent,  while  in  the  trial  by  ordeal  God  alone  is  expected  to  mark 
guilt  or  innocence  upon  the  body  of  the  accused.  Second,  the  shift  from 
capital  punishment  to  dismemberment  also  reflects  a  growing  uneasiness 
with  the  right  of  the  state  to  take  life;  as  confidence  in  the  ordeal  ebbed, 
reflecting  a  gradual  shift  both  from  Germanic  to  Roman  law  and  from 
Germanic  to  Christian  models  of  understanding  the  role  of  the  divine  in 
the  enactment  of  justice,  and  as  temporal  justice  replaced  divine 
judgment,  men  felt  less  and  less  confident  about  the  imposition  of  the 
death  penalty.  We  might  note  the  similarity  of  William's  position  to 
laws  enacted  in  1219  after  the  abolishment  of  the  ordeal,  which  did  away 
with  capital  punishment  for  precisely  this  reason.  Third,  the  non- 
specific  punitive  mutilation  prescribed  by  William's  law  also 
undermines  to  a  certain  extent  the  conceptual  framework  of  the  ordeal. 
While  in  the  laws  of  Athelstan  and  Cnut,  for  example,  the  member  of  the 
body  in  question  (often,  although  not  always)  bears  the  guilt  of  the 
transgression,  reflects  this  guilt  in  the  ordeal,  suffers  dismemberment  for 
it,  and  then  serves  as  a  sign  of  this  specific  crime,  in  the  laws  of  William Chapter  One  102 
all  criminals  suffer  the  same  fate.  Although  the  body  still  serves  as  a 
sign  in  a  general  way--and  thus  still  reflects  the  relationship  between 
body  and  soul  which  is  the  basis  of  the  ordeal--William's  laws  are  again 
moving  away  from  a  precise  correlation  between  the  guilty  member  and 
such  signification,  and  thus  this  relationship  becomes  somewhat  more 
blurred.  Finally,  a  shift  from  traditional  Germanic  models  of  kingship  to 
feudal  models  is  marked  by  a  centralization  of  authority  in  the  person  of 
the  king  (a  Christian  hierarchical  model),  and  in  the  notion  that  a  good 
king  imposes  "  strict  justice"  in  the  manner  of  a  stem  but  loving  God  (see 
critique  of  William's  reign  from  the  ASC,  below). 
It  is  in  the  following  law,  from  the  Laws  of  Willi=  the 
Conqueror,  ca.  1066-1087  (earliest  extant  ms.  ca.  1100-1150),  that  the 
trial  by  combat  first  begins  to  supplant  the  trial  by  ordeal  in  English  law; 
at  this  point  the  trial  by  combat  is  an  option  which  may  be  claimed  in 
place  of  the  trial  by  ordeal: 
6.  It  was  also  decreed  there  that  if  a  Frenchman  shall  charge  an 
Englishman  with  perjury  or  murder  or  theft  or  homicide  or  'ran, 
as  the  English  call  open  rapine  which  cannot  be  denied,  the 
Englishman  may  defend  himself,  as  he  shall  prefer,  either  by  the 
ordeal  of  hot  iron  or  by  wager  of  battle.  But  if  the  Englishman  be 
infirm,  let  him  find  another  who  will  take  his  place.  If  one  of 
them  shall  be  vanquished,  he  shall  pay  a  fine  of  40  shillings  to  the 
king.  If  an  Englishman  shall  charge  a  Frenchman  and  be 
unwilling  to  prove  his  accusation  either  by  ordeal  or  by  wager  of 
battle,  I  will,  nevertheless,  that  the  Frenchman  shall  acquit  himself 
by  a  valid  oath.  76 Chapter  One  103 
William's  introduction  of  the  trial  by  battle  is  indicative  of  an  on-going 
process  which  results  in  a  fundamental  change  in  the  English  system  of 
jurisprudence  within  a  century  or  so  of  the  Norman  Conquest.  It  is 
noteworthy  that,  by  a  hundred  years  after  the  death  of  William,  trial  by 
combat  had  become  the  standard  manner  through  which  the  accused 
might  deny  an  accuser,  and  trial  by  ordeal  was  utilized  afterguilt  had 
been  established  through  trial  by  jury.  Its  function  had  therefore  shifted 
from  a  judicial,  inquisitive  process  to  a  punitive,  purgative  one;  the 
purpose  of  the  ordeal  in  this  latter  context  is  to  use  a  temporal  process  to 
punish  the  flesh  for  crime  and  to  purge  the  soul  of  sin,  rather  than  to 
invoke  a  divine  process  whereby  the  nature  of  the  soul  is  reflected  in  the 
state  of  the  flesh.  This  move  reflects  a  Europe-wide  shift  back  to  Roman 
law,  which  also  sees  a  concurrent  rise  in  the  doctrine  of  purgatory,  the 
sacrament  of  confession,  and  judicial  torture  (see  discussion,  below).  77 
Under  the  following  law  (also  from  The  Laws  of  William  the 
Conqueror)  dismemberment  categorically  is  to  be  utilized  in  place  of 
execution.  There  is  clearly  a  similarity  between  this  law  and  that  of 
Cnut  mentioned  above.  However,  where  the  law  of  Cnut  manifested  a 
combination  of  physical  signification  of  guilt  and  power  combined  with 
Christian  care  for  the  soul,  William's  law  also  is  indicative  of  a  growing 
concern  with  the  nature  of  jurisprudence  itself.  Cnut  was  not  so 
concerned  with  the  state  of  the  soul  of  slaves  that  he  was  unwilling  to 
put  them  to  death;  indeed,  as  those  to  be  punished  under  his  laws  first 
had  been  proven  guilty  by  the  ordeal,  he  was  assured  of  their  guilt. 
William's  law,  however,  reflects  a  concern  with  such  methods  of 
establishing  guilt: 
10.1  also  forbid  that  anyone  be  slain  or  hanged  for  any  fault,  but 
let  his  eyes  be  put  out  and  let  him  be  castrated.  -And  this Chapter  One  104 
command  shall  not  be  violated  under  pain  of  a  fine  in  full  to 
me.  78 
Finally,  I  turn  to  an  annal  from  the  ASC  which  is  reminiscent  of 
that  which  extolled  the  virtues  of  the  strict  justice  of  King  Henry.  This 
example  is  significant  in  that,  -  although  it  contains  explicit  criticism  of 
William's  excesses,  it  also  remarks  on  the  civil  value  of  his  stem  justice, 
which  is  most  notably  illustrated  in  his  favorite  punishments  of  punitive 
blinding  and  castration.  In  summing  up  William's  career  the  annalist 
notes  both  the  security  and  the  oppression  inherent  in  a  system  of 
precisely  codified  and  strictly  implemented  laws  which  are  constructed 
upon  a  base  of  severe  physical  penalties: 
...  Amongst  other  things  the  good  security  he  made  in  this  country 
is  not  to  be  forgotten--so  that  any  honest  man  could  travel  over  his 
kingdom  without  injury  with  his  bosom  full  of  gold:  and  no  one 
dared  strike  another,  however  much  wrong  he  had  done  him.  And 
if  any  man  had  intercourse  with  a  woman  against  her  will,  he  was 
forthwith  castrated....  Certainly  in  his  time  people  had  much 
oppression  and  very  many  injuries: 
...  He  made  protection  for  the  game 
And  imposed  laws  for  the  same. 
That  who  so  slew  a  hart  or  hind 
Should  be  made  blind  .... 
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The  general  nature  of  much  of  the  bodily  destruction  codified  under 
William--in  conjunction  with  both  the  centralization  of  political  power 
under  the  Norman  system  and  the  shift  fromý  a  more  divine-driven  to  a 
more  temporal-driven  model  of  establishing  personal  guilt  or  innocence- Chapter  One  105 
-reflects  the  power  relationship  which  William  was  interested  in 
expressing.  Earlier  systems  of  Anglo-Saxon  jurisprudence  reflected  first 
and  foremost  an  understanding  of  divine  power  superseding  temporal 
power  in  order  to  manifest  the  spiritual  state  of  the  accused  upon  the 
tablet  of  his  flesh,  and  therefore  reflected  political  realities  concerning 
the  relationship  between  that  individual  and  the  state  more  incidentally 
to  this  central  purpose.  In  contrast  to  such  systems,  William's  laws  of 
punitive  mutilation  were  not  as  concerned  with  the  manifestation  of 
divine  power,  -  and  therefore  served  to  articulate  the  power  of  the  state 
over  the  individual,  in  judicial,  punitive,  and  political  terms. 
Having  examined  Anglo-Saxon  criminal  law  codes,  and  having 
discussed  the  significance  of  the  concept  of  the  ordeal  to  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  system  of  jurisprudence,  I  turn  now  to  examine  in  more  detail  the 
philosophical  basis  of  the  ordeal,  its  relationship  to  oath,  and  the 
underlying  Germanic  understanding  of  the  relationship  between  the 
nature  of  the  soul  and  the  state  of  the  flesh.  These  concepts  are  central 
to  understanding  Anglo-Saxon  attitudes  towards  acts  of  physical  torture, 
and  illuminate,  not  only  our  study  of  related  laws  and  historical 
incidents,  but  also  the  literary,  linguistic,  theological,  and  philosophical 
contexts  which  lie  at  the  heart  of  my  study. 
In  order  to  understand  fully  the  development  of  the  concept  of  the 
ordeal  in  Germanic  culture,  it  is  important  to  understand  the  nature  of 
law  and  the  status  of  the  individual  in  such  a  tribal  and  customary 
context.  The  highly  abstracted  and  codified  Roman  law  with  which  the 
barbarians  came  into  contact  when  they  entered  the  empire  was  an 
entirely  distinct  conceptual  body  unto  itself,  and  was  removed  from  the 
day  to  day  life  of  the  individual.  Traditional  Germanic  law,  on  the  other 
hand,  was  customary,  and  was  part  of  a  unified  system  of  social  control 
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and  through  the  handing  down  of  rituals  and  ceremonies.  Such 
customary  law  is  founded  upon  an  understanding  of  the  individual  as  a 
part  of  a  localized  network  of  kin  and  loyalty  spheres;  such  a  network-- 
within  which  the  individual  is  well  known,  and  by  which'the  individual 
is  motivated  and  influ  enc  ed  --serves  to  ensure  that  the  individual  adheres 
to  the  tenets  of  that  network's  system  of  customary  law: 
In  the  Germanic  society  of  the  pre-invasion  period,  as  in  most 
primitive  societies,  law  was  part  of  a  system  of  "undifferentiated 
social  control  by  religion,  ethical  custom,  and  kin 
discipline.  ".,  '..  Custom,  identified  by  the  elders  of  a  kindred,  tribe, 
or  group,  'Was  transmitted  orally  and,  presumably,  by  all  the  other 
complex  methods  of  teaching  the  young  that  a  primitive  society 
possesses.  80 
In  such  a  context,  where  law  is  an  inalienable  component  of  an 
atmosphere  of  social  control  which  is  dependent  upon  the  efficacy  of 
localized  social  pressure,,  the  reputation  (and  therefore  the  word,  as  I  will 
turn  to  presently)  and  the  rights  of  the*  individual  are  sacred.  In  such  a 
Context,  law  is  not;  therefore,  a  separate  social  construct  which  functions 
independent  of  the  action  of  any  one  individual,  and  which  operates  in 
order  to  secure  the  public  good.  Such  a  concept  as  "public  good"  is  in 
fact  not  a  component  of  this  system  at  all,  except  as  a  rudimentary 
understanding  of  the  value  of  custom  and  ritual  to  the  group.  Rather, 
legal  action  in  such  a  context  is  driven  by  the  rights  and  responsibilities 
of  the  individual,  and  can  only  be  invoked  by  a  particular  individual  who 
asserts  a  claim  to  such  rights,  or  who  claims  that  his  rights  have  been 
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central  to  what  we  would  understand  as  legal  action  in  such  a  customary 
setting,  and  legal  historians  refer  to  such  a  procedure  as  "  accusatorial": 
A  procedure  may  be  accusatorial,  in  which  a  specific  charge  is 
brought  against  an  individual  by  another  individual  and 
determined  by  a  judge,  whether  an  individual  or  an  aggregation; 
or  it  may  be  inquisitorial,  in  which  a  charge  is  initiated  by  the 
judge  without  an  accuser  ... 
in  Germanic  society,  the  accusatorial. 
process  survived  long  after  the  invasions,  and  [judicial]  torture, 
unknown  to  the  society  of  Germanic  freemen,  did  not  appear  in 
European  law  until  after  the  reception  of  Roman  law  in  the  twelfth 
century...  Iegal  historians  have  suggested  that  the  accusatorial 
procedure  is  generally  an  earlier  stage  of  legal  development,  and 
that  the  inquisitorial  process  is  the  product  of  a  relatively  more 
differentiated  idea  of  society,  one  which  contains  a  concept  of 
public  crime  and  potentially  limits  the  role  of  public  status.  81 
Following  the  collapse  of  the  imperial  power  structure,  these 
systems  of  accusatorial  and  inquisitorial  law  came  into  direct  conflict; 
for  a  time,  in  much  of  Europe  Germanic  customary  law  supplanted  some 
aspects  of  Roman  law.  What  is  especially  significant  in  the  context  of 
this  discussion  is  that  judicial  torture,  which  was  at  the  heart  of  Roman 
inquisitorial  law,  was  until  the  thirteenth  century  largely  replaced  by  the 
Germanic  accusatorial  process  of  the  ordeal: 
Another  consequence  of  the  collapse  of  imperial  power  was  the 
disruption  of  the  legal  system  caused  by  the  barbarian  invasions. 
Though  the  conquered  peoples  continued  to  live  under  the  old 
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in  which  torture  had  no  place.  The  Burgundian  and  Salic  laws  of 
the  Visigoths,  assimilating  Roman  tradition,  still  made  provision 
for  the  torture  of  slaves.  But  torture,  as  it  had  been  practiced 
under  Roman  law,  was  out  of  place  in  proceedings  which  were 
mainly  open,  oral  or  based  on  private  accusation.  82 
However,  it  was  not  simply  due  to  a  conflict  in  legal  concepts  that  the 
ordeal  began  to  be  institutionalized  in  European  law;  the  ordeal  also 
found  a  powerful  ally  in  the  form  of  the  Church.  Although  the  ordeal 
was  never  officially  sanctioned  by  the  pope,  and  was  indeed  often 
condemned,  at  a  local  level  the  servants  of  the  Church  found  much  to 
recommend  the  practice.  Its  basic  premise--that  the  hand  of  the  divine 
might  make  manifest  a  spiritual  reality  upon  the  flesh  of  the  accused-- 
was  one  that  lent  itself  to  Christian  interpretation,  and  thus  strengthened 
the  connection  between  popular  conception  and  ritual  and  Christianity. 
Further,  by  enshrining  the  practice  within  the  mystery  and  ritual  of  the 
Church,  its  priests  assumed  a  position  of  political  and  legal  prominence 
and  influence  in  the  most  important  local  circles.  Finally--although 
hardly  incidentally--by  placing  the  Church  at  the  center  of  the  legal 
process,  and  by  institutionalizing  that  process  within  the  framework  of 
the  liturgy,  the  priests  guaranteed  themselves  a  tidy  income  through  the 
fees  payable  for  official  sanction  of  the  solemnities  surrounding  the 
process  of  the  ordeal  itself: 
The  most  efficient  cause  of  the  increased  use  of  the  ordeal  was, 
however,  to  be  found  in  the  Church.  With  her  customary  tact,  in 
converting  the  Barbarians,  she  adopted  such  of  their  practices  as 
she  could  adapt  to  Christian  belief  and  practice;  and  she  accepted 
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regarded  as  unquestionable  ...  [t]he  pagan  ceremonies  were 
moulded  into  Christian  rites,  and  the  most  solemn  forms  of 
religion  were  thrown  around  the  rude  expedients  invented 
thousands  of  years  before  by  the  Bactrian  nomads.  Elaborate 
rituals  were  constructed,  including  celebration  of  the  mass  and 
impressive  prayers,  adjurations  and  exorcisms  of  the  persons  to 
undergo  the  trial  and  of  the  materials  used  in  it,  and  the  most 
implicit  faith  was  inculcated  in  the  interposition  of  God  to  defend 
the  right  and  to  punish  guilt.  The  administration  of  the  ordeal 
being  thus  reserved  for  priestly  hands,  the  Church  acquired  a 
vastly  increased  influence  as  the  minister  of  justice,  to  say  nothing 
of  the  revenues  thence  arising,  and  the  facility  with  which 
ecclesiastics  could  thus  defend  themselves  when  legally  assailed 
by  their  turbulent  flocks.  83 
The  centrality  of  personal  relationships  and  reputation  to  a  system 
of  customary  law,  as  indicated  above,  ensured  that  the  oath  of  the 
individual  freeman  was  held  sacred  under  such  a  system,  and  indeed, 
stood  at  the  heart  of  the  accusatorial  legal  procedure.  As  Germanic 
society  began  to  expand  and  to  evolve,  this  legal  procedure  began  to  be 
outpaced.  While  oath  remained  central  to  the  legal  process  (indeed, 
even  after  the  rise  of  the  ordeal,  oath  was  still  central  to  the  ceremonies 
surrounding  it),  problems  began  to  arise  as  the  possibility  of  perjury 
became  more  and  more  apparent: 
The  status  of  freemen  in  Germanic  society  imparted  to  the 
personal  oath  a  great  weight  in  the  resolution  of  judicial  conflicts. 
So  profound  was  this  faith  in  the  sworn  word  of  a  free  man  (and  in 
the  quantitative  oaths  of  a  designated  nunaber  of  free  men  for  , Chapter  One  I  10 
specific  occasions),  that  it  usually  constituted  the  primary  level  of 
resolution.  The  oath  and  compurgation,  whenever  possible, 
constituted  the  usual  methods  of  resolving  litigation  in  barbarian 
courts  ... 
[however]  the  oath,  for  so  long  the  fundamental  manner  of 
judicial  resolution,  appears  to  have  weakened  in  public  opinion 
after  the  fifth  century,  and  the  texts  reflect  a  concern  for  the 
dangers  of  perjury  ... 
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This  concern  regarding  the  danger  of  perjury--which  was  an  important 
motive  force  behind  the  legal  shift  from  compurgation  to  ordeal--seems 
to  have  been  pan  of  a  larger  process  of  social  change  which  had  as  much 
to  do  with  the  breakdown  of  the  traditional  clan  and  village  structure  as 
it  did  with  any  drastic  philosophical  development.  As  the  Germanic 
peoples  became  pan  of  a  larger  population  of  various  traditions,  and  as 
traditional  customs  and  relationships  became  fractured  through 
migration  and  social  upheaval,  the  social  ties  which  were  at  the  very 
core  of  the  customary  system  began  to  likewise  weaken.  Although  the 
importance  of  the  individual's  sworn  word  did  not  diminish,  the 
concurrent  necessity  of  a  context  within  which  an  individual's  reputation 
might  serve  as  a  viable  measure  of  the  value  of  that  word  became  much 
harder  to  maintain.  As  Germanic  societies  became  larger,  more 
complex,  and  more  urbanized,  the  traditional  kin  and  loyalty  networks 
became  too  diffuse  to  support  a  system  whereby  jurisprudence  was 
based  upon  the  local  community  in  which  each  member  was  intimately 
known  to  every  other  member: 
...  as  the  universal  acceptance  of  the  unsupported  or  supported  oath 
diminished,  men  turned  to  other  forms  of  certainty,  and  from  the 
eighth  to  the  twelfth  centuries,  the  ordeal  came  to  fulfill  that  need. Chapter  One  111 
Next  to  the  purgatio  canonica  [the  sworn  word],  there  developed 
the  purgatio  vulgads,  the  ordeal.  Oath,  judicial  duel,  and  ordeal 
are  all  referred  to  as  the  judicium  Dei,  the  judgment  of  God,  and 
from  the  ninth  century  on,  the  two  kinds  of  purgation--by  oath  or 
by  ordeal--became  an  increasingly  acceptable  form  of  judicial 
resolution  ...  the  ordeal  itself  indicates  a  decreasing  reliance  upon 
kin  and  friends  and  an  increasing  reluctance  to  accept  traditional 
kin  solidarity  on  the  part  of  a  society  in  the  process  of  shaping 
new  and  wider  social  bonds.  85 
This  is  not  at  aft  to  suggest  that  kin  and  loyalty  bonds  did  not  remain 
strong,  that  the  sworn  word  of  the  freeman  did  not  remain  central,  or  that 
small  and  intimate  communities  no  longer  existed;  all  of  these  remain 
important  throughout  the  early  middle  ages,  and  certainly  throughout  the 
course  of  Anglo-Saxon  history.  I  will  turn  momentarily  to  a  discussion 
of  the  significance  of  the  oath  in  Anglo-Saxon  law  and  society;  it  is 
crucial  to  note,  however,  that  the  rise  of  the  ordeal  represents  a  shift  in 
Germanic  law  that  is  a  logical  outgrowth  of  the  diffusion  and  expansion 
of  the  Germanic  peoples.  As  this  society  grew  beyond  the  bounds  of 
small  tightly-knit  clans  and  common  customary  traditions  and  contexts, 
it  became  important  to  find  a  common  measure  by  which  the  oaths  of 
parties  unknown  to  each  other  might  be  fairly  judged.  The  ordeal 
provided  such  a  measure,  and  by  invoking  the  divine  as  arbiter,  such  a 
system  also  removed  the  appearance,  if  not  the  reality,  of  clan  and 
political  rivalries  from  the  proceedings. 
Although  by  the  early  Anglo-Saxon  period  compurgation  was 
replaced  by  ordeal  as  the  primary  method  of  resolving  legal  disputes  in 
which  there  might  be  a  conflict  between  oaths,  the  oath--both  as  a 
component  of  the  formal  legal  system  and  as  a  measure  of  personal Chapter  One  112 
character--remained  one  of  the  most  important  social  contracts  in  Anglo- 
Saxon  culture.  Oath-keeping,  especially,  was  a  primary  barometer  of 
personal  integrity,  and  the  importance  in  this  culture  of  being  faithful  to 
oaths  past  and  present--even  when  oaths  of  loyalty  would  seem  to  be  in 
conflict--caanot  be  over-emphasized.  To  break  one  oath  was  seen  to 
imply  that  to  break  more  would  come  easily.  An  interesting  case  in 
point  is  detailed  in  the  account  of  the  reign  of  Athelstan  recorded  by 
William  of  Malmesbury  in  his  De  Gestis  Regum  Anglorum.  Athelstan's 
father  Edward  largely  had  been  ignored  by  Sihtric,  the  Viking  king  of 
York,  but  in  926  Sihtric  proposed  an  alliance  with  Athelstan,  which  the 
latter  sealed  by  giving  Sihtric  his  sister  in  marriage;  within  a  year  Sihtric 
was  dead,  however,  and  his  young  son  Olaf--by  a  previous  marriage-- 
and  Sihtric's  brother  Guthfrith--the  king  of  the  Irish  Vikings  --challenged 
the  conditions  of  Sihtric's  alliance  with  Athelstan.  86  The  episode  of 
particular  interest  to  my  argument  has  to  do  with  Olaf  slipping  into 
Athelstan's  camp  in  the  dead  of  night  on  the  eve  of  battle;  Olaf 
disguised  himself  as  a  scop;  entertained  the  king  and  his  retainers,  and 
disdaining  to  take  the  reward  given  him  for  his  services,  marked  the 
location  of  the  king's  tent  before  stealing  away  into  the  night: 
This  was  noticed  by  a  certain  person  who  had  once  served  under 
him,  and  immediately  told  to  Athelstan.  When  he  blamed  the  man 
for  not  b  etraying  th  e  enemy  wh  en  he  sto  odb  ef  ore  him,  he 
received  this  reply:  "The  same  oath  which  lately,  0  king,  I  made 
to  you,  I  once  gave  to  Olaf;  and  if  you  had  seen  me  violate  it 
against  him,  you  could  beware  a  similar  act  against  yourself.  But 
condescend  to  take  your  servant's  advice  to  move  away  your  tent; 
and,  if  you  stay  in  another  place  until  the  rest  of  your  forces 
arrive,  you  will  with  a  moderate  delay  crush  the  enemy  who  is Chapter  One  113 
impudently  attacking  you.  "  His  words  were  approved  and  that 
place  was  abandoned.  87 
We  have  examined  the  evolution  of  the  role  of  the  sworn  oath  in 
Germanic  culture;  and  noted  that  this  traditional  system  survived  into 
Anglo-Saxon  England;  the  conflict  of  loyalties  which  is  resolved  in  the 
Athelstan  episode  underscores  just  how  crucial  oath-keeping--and  most 
especially  the  keeping  of  loyalty  oaths--still  remained  in  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  world.  By  the  time  of  Alfred  this  basic  concept--that  of  the 
paramount  importance  of  one's  oath,  and  especially  that  oath  as  it 
pertains  to  one's  loyalty  to  one's  lord--had  been  enshrined  as  the 
primary  directive  in  what  is,  arguably,  the  most  important  of  all  Anglo- 
Saxon  law  Codes: 
1.  *  First  we  direct,  what  is  most  necessary,  that  each  man  keep 
carefully  his  oath  and  pledge. 
I.  I.  If  anyone  is  wrongly  compelled  to  either  of  these,  promising 
treachery  to  his  lord  or  any  illegal  aid,  then  it  is  better  to  leave  it 
unfulfilled  than  to  perform  it. 
1.2.  [If,  however,  he  pledges  what  is  right  for  him  to  performj 
and  leaves  it  unfulfilled,  let  him  with  humility  give  his  weapons 
and  his  possessions  into  his  friends'  keeping  and  be  40  days  in 
prison  at  a  king's  estate,  endure  there  what  penance  the  bishop 
prescribes  for  him,  and  his  kinsmen  are  to  feed  him  if  he  has  no 
food  himself  . 
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Here  the  ancient  Germanic  concepts  of  oath-keeping  and  loyalty  are 
explicitly  marked  out  as  the  two  most  central  legal  principles,  and  the 
penalty  for  the  breach  of  such  principles  is  likewise  made  clear. Chapter  One  114 
It  is  of  particular  interest  that  this  traditional  Germanic  system 
(like  that  of  the  wergild,  discussed  above)  becomes  codified  in  a  highly 
complex  form  as  it  evolves  into  a  cornerstone of  Anglo-Saxon  law. 
Even  as  early  as  the  laws  of  Wihtred,  King  of  Kent  (ca.  695),  for 
example,  a  class  system  has  developed  in  the  weighing  of  oaths  and 
exculpation.  The  sworn  word  of  the  freeman,  which  was  the  foundation 
of  Germanic  jurisprudence,  has  developed  into  a  pyramidal  system  of 
values  with  the  king  and  the  bishop  at  the  uppermost  level,  and  the 
various  social  classes  stratified  below  them  by  ranks.  In  this  system  the 
king's  word  (without  an  oath)  is  equivalent--for  example--to  that  of  a 
priest  sworn  on  an  altar,  or  to  that  of  four  ceorls  sworn  on  an  altar: 
16.  The  word  of  the  bishop  and  the  king  without  an  oath  is  to  be 
incontrovertible. 
17.  The  head  of  a  monastery  is  to  clear  himself  with  a  priest's 
exculpation. 
18.  A  priest  is  to  purge  himself  with  his  own  asseveration  in  his 
holy  vestments  before  the  altar,  saying  thus:  "I  speak  the  truth  in 
Christ,  I  do  not  lie.  "  Similarly  a  deacon  is  to  purge  himself. 
19.  A  cleric  is  to  purge  himself  with  three  of  the  same  order,  and 
he  alone  is  to  have  his  hand  on  the  altar;  the  others  are  to  stand  by 
and  discharge  the  oath. 
20.  A  stranger  is  to  purge  himself  with  his  own  oath  on  the  altar; 
similarly  a  king's  thegn; 
21.  a  ceorl  with  three  of  the  same  class  on  the  altar;  and  the  oath 
of  all  these  is  to  be  incontrovertible. 
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22.  If  anyone  accuses  a  bishop's  servant  or  a  king's,  he  is  to  clear 
himself  by  the  hand  of  the  reeve:  the  reeve  is  either  to  clear  him 
or  deliver  him  to  be  flogged. 
23.  If  anyone  accuses  an  unfree  servant  of  a  community  in  their 
midst,  his  lord  is  to  clear  him  with  his  oath  alone,  if  he  is  a 
communicant;  if  he  is  not  a  communicant  he  is  to  have  in  the  oath 
another  good  oath-helper,  or  pay  for  him  or  deliver  him  to  be 
flogged. 
24.  If  the  servant  of  a  laymazi  accuses  the  servant  of  an 
ecclesiastic  or  the  servant  of  an  ecclesiastic  accuses  the  servant  of 
a  layman,  his  lord  is  to  clear  him  with  his  oath  alone.  89 
It  is  clear  from  such  a  schema  as  this  that  oath--as  a  simple  instrument 
for  proving  the  truth  of  any  freeman's  assertions--is  by  this  period 
rapidly  becoming  simply  one  component  in  the  legal  system.  As  noted 
above,  the  beginning  of  the  rise  of  the  ordeal  paralleled  the  fall  of  the 
oath  as  an  absolutely  incontrovertible  method  of  ascertaining  truth.  This 
is  not,  however,  to  suggest  that  oath  lost  its  prominence  in  Germanic 
tradition  and  in  the  Anglo-Saxon  system  of  jurisprudence  which  derives 
from  this  tradition.  Rather,  the  oath  evolves  into  one  facet  of  a  system 
which  also  relies  upon  the  checks  and  balances  of  such  social  indicators 
as  rank  and  reputation,  and  upon  the  final  arbitration  of  divine 
intervention  through  the  medium  of  the  ordeal. 
Indeed,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  nearly  inviolate  nature  of 
the  oath  of  a  freeman  still  was  held  in  such  esteem  in  Anglo-Saxon 
culture  that  an  accusation  of  slander  was  an  extremely  serious  matter;  in 
the  laws  of  Hlothhere  and  Eadric,  kings  of  Kent,  which  were  drafted 
between  673-685,  we  find  a  code  dealing  with  such  an  offense.  This  law 
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which  weighs  heavily  the  sanctity  of  the  sworn  word,  and  also  goes 
some  distance  towards  explaining  the  necessity  of  the  system  of  checks 
and  balances  alluded  to  above.  An  accusation  of  perjury  necessarily 
implies  that  either  the  accuser  or  the  accused  is  bearing  or  has  borne 
false  witness: 
11.  If  anyone  in  another's  house  calls  a  man  a  perjurer,  or 
shamefully  accosts  him  with  insulting  words,  he  is  to  pay  a 
shilling  to  him  who  owns  the  house,  and  six  shillings  to  him  to 
whom  he  spoke  that  word,  and  to  pay  12  shillings  to  the  king.  90 
It  was  a  concern  with  the  dangers  of  perjury  which  led  to  the  rise  of 
additional  systems,  such  as  the  ordeal,  by  which  truth  could  be 
independently  ascertained;  in  spite  of  such  concerns,  however,  the  fact 
that  the  sworn  oath  was  never  entirely  replaced,  and  that  an  accusation 
of  perjury  was  considered  such  a  serious  matter,  indicates  just  how 
central  oaths  continued  to  be  to  this  culture.  The  ascendance  of  the 
procedure  of  the  ordeal  (which  still  contained  elements  of  oath  and 
compurgation),  the  development  of  complex  legal  systems  for  weighing 
the  value  of  conflicting  testimony,  the  punishment  for  an  accusation  of 
perjury,  and  the  penalties  imposed  for  those  convicted  of  perjury,  all  are 
indicative  of  a  growing  concern  with  the  problems  inherent  in  a  legal 
and  social  system  based  upon  the  value  of  the  sworn  word,  it  is  true.  But 
the  fact  that  such  elaborate  controls  were  set  in  place,  rather  than  the 
abolition  of  the  heart  of  the  very  system  itself,  illustrates  how  difficult  it 
was  to  change  this  system  so  radically.  In  order  to  resolve  to  some 
extent  the  tension  between  a  social  system  which  continued  to  recognize 
the  sanctity  of  the  oath  and  a  legal  system  which  was  attempting  to 
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prescribed  severe  penalties  for  perjury,  while  others  implemented 
complex  systems  of  institutionalized  witnessing. 
In  a  system  which  utilized  oath  as  a  barometer  of  personal 
integrity,  it  would  be  perhaps  entirely  reasonable  to  view  an  oath- 
breaker  or  a  perjurer  as  a  thoroughly  untrustworthy  individual;  indeed, 
such  a  perception  is  the  moral  of  the  story  of  Olaf  and  Athelstan. 
Further,  however,  such  an  unforgivable  transgression  seems  to  have 
been  viewed  as  an  indication  of  an  unredeemable  character.  The 
penalties  for  perjury,  which  ranged  from-fines  to  mutilation,  usually  also 
contained  a  provision  that  the  perjurer's  word  be  ever  after  considered 
invalid.  Thus  perjury  was,  in  a  very  real  sense,  considered  an 
unforgivable  crime;  further,  however,  in  an  accusatorial  legal 
environment  which  was  dependent  upon  the  sworn  word  (even  in  the 
utilization  of  the  ordeal),  such  a  penalty  effectively  placed  the  convicted 
perjurer  outside  of  the  protection  of  the  law,  unless  that  perjurer  had 
kinsmen  or  friends  willing  to  take  an  oath  in  his  stead.  By  appreciating 
the  real  severity  of  such  penalties  we  may  begin  to  understand  the 
importance  of  the  individual's  word  (even  after  the  rise  of  the  ordeal)  in 
an  Anglo-Saxon  context. 
I  include  four  examples  of  laws  which  stipulate  penalties  for  false 
witness,  false  oath,  and  slander.,  The  first  two  stipulate  that  the  oath  of 
the  convicted  perjurer  or  oath-breaker  never  again  be  valued;  the  second 
two  deal  with  slander,  which  appears  to  have  been  considered  a 
particularly  vile  form  of  perjury,  assaulting  as  it  does  the  integrity  and 
public  reputation  of  another  in  conjunction  with  falsehood,  and  call  for 
acts  of  punitive  mutilation.  The  laws  of  King  Athelstan  issued  at 
Grately,  Hampshire,  contain  the  first  two  examples;  one  law  concerns 
the  bearing  of  false  witness  in  the  exchange  of  livestock: Chapter  One  I  18 
10.1.  Concerning  false  witness.  If  it  is  then  discovered  that  any 
of  them  gave  false  witness,  his  witness  is  never  again  to  be  valid; 
and  also  he  is  to  pay  30  shillings  as  a  fine.  91 
The  second  law  concerns  the  bearing  of  false  oath,  and  the  ecclesiastical 
penalty  incurred  in  addition  to  the  sanction  on  future  oaths  underscores 
the  moral  and  spiritual  nature  of  the  crime  involved: 
26.  And  he  who  swears  a  false  oath,  and  it  becomes  known 
against  him,  is  never  afterwards  to  be  entitled  to  an  oath,  nor  is  he 
to  be  buried  in  a  consecrated  cemetery  when  he  dies,  unless  he  has 
the  witness  of  the  bishop  in  whose  diocese  he  is  that  he  has  done 
penance  for  it  as  his  confessor  has  prescribed  for  him.  92 
The  second  pair  of  laws  deals  with  slander,  and  each  one  prescribes  a 
penalty  of  mutilation  for  such  an  offense.  Once  again  (as  in  several  of 
the  cases  of  punitive  mutilation  discussed  above),  here  it  is  of  particular 
interest  that  the  body  part  which  is  to  be  removed  is  that  with  which  the 
slanderer  committed  the  crime.  In  such  cases  the  broken  bodies  of  the 
guilty  parties  produced  through  the  punitive  dismemberment  will  speak 
more  truthfully  concerning  their  spiritual  nature  and  the  fact  of  their 
transgression,  than  their  false  tongues  did  concerning  the  character  of 
those  whom  they  slandered.  The  first  example  is  from  the  laws  of 
Alfred: 
32.  If  anyone  is  guilty  of  public  slander,  and  it  is  proved  against 
him,  it  is  to  be  compensated  for  with  no  lighter  penalty  than  the 
cutting  off  of  his  tongue,  with  the  proviso  that  it  be  redeemed  at 
no  cheaper  rate  than  it  is  valued  in  proportion  to  the  wergild.  93 Chapter  One  It  9 
The  second  example  is  from  the  code  of  King  Edgar  issued  at  Andover 
(ca.  959-963): 
4.  And  he  who  wishes  to  accuse  another  falsely,  so  that  he  suffer 
loss  either  of  property  or  of  life,  if  the  other  can  then  prove  what 
one  would  charge  him  with  to  be  false,  he  [the  accuser]  is  to 
forfeit  his  tongue,  unless  he  redeem  himself  with  his  wergild.  94 
In  the  code  of  laws  of  Edgar  which  were  issued  at  Wihtbordesstan 
(ca.  962-963),  we  find  an  interesting  institutionalization  of  the  Germanic 
tradition  of  the  value  of  oath  and  the  function  of  witnessing.  Under  this 
system  elaborate  trade  rituals  were  developed  which  required  a  standing 
number  of  official  witnesses,  the  function  of  whom  was  to  ensure  that  all 
transactions  were  performed  according  to  the  law.  The  sanctity  of  the 
role  of  these  witnesses--as  well  as  the  inviolate  nature  of  the  individual's 
word--is  underscored  by  the  penalty  to  be  imposed  upon  any  who 
attempt  to  circumvent  this  system: 
11.  If,  however,  he  declares  that  he  bought  it  with  witness,  and 
that  is  false,  he  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  thief  and  to  lose  his  head  and 
all  that  he  owns.  And  the  lord  of  the  estate  is  to  keep  the  stolen 
cattle  or  the  value  of  the  stolen  cattle,  until  the  owner  discovers  it 
and  proves  his  right  to  the  cattle  with  witness.  9-5 
Amongst  the  later  laws,  those  of  King  Cnut  are  interesting  for  a  number 
of  reasons,  and  most  especially  so  in  the  context  of  Cnut's  contradictory 
statements  and  actions  concerning  perjury.  Further,  as  in  some  of  the 
earlier  codes,  here  the  punishment  for  the  giving  of  a  false  oath  is Chapter  One  120 
dismemberment,  and  the  false  oath-maker's  right  to  give  an  oath  is 
likewise  shorn  from  him.  In  addition,  however,  here  we  find  an 
interesting  condition  attached  to  the  oath-giving  process:  in  order  to 
incur  the  penalty,  the  false  oath  must  have  been  sworn  "  on  the  relics". 
This  is  an  unusual  stipulation,  as  most  of  the  codes  imply  that  any  oath 
given  is  valid,  although  acts  of  exculpation  do  often  require  the  use  of  an 
altar.  Here,  however,  relics  are  necessary,  and  this  seems  a  bit  odd  in  the 
context  of  Anglo-Saxon  law,  although  not  necessarily  in  that  of  Norse 
law;  as  I  have  noted  before;  Cnut  displays  an  intriguing  mixture  of 
Germanic  and  Christian  influences,  and  possibly  this  reference  to'Valid 
oaths  sworn  uponrelics  invokes  the  Norse  tradition  of  the  "holy  ring": 
36.  And  if  anyone  swears  a  false  oath  on  the  relics,  and  is  , 
confuted,  he  is  to  forfeit  his  hands  or  half  his  wergild;  'and  it  is  to 
be  divided  by  the  lord  and  the  bishop.  , 
36.1.  -And  from  thenceforth  he  is  not  to  be  entitled  to  an  oath, 
unless  he  atones  for  it  very  deeply  with  God,  and  finds  surety  for 
himself  that  he  will  desist  from  such  ever  afterwards. 
37.  And  if  anyone  notoriously  takes  part  in  false  witness,  and  is 
confuted,  his  testimony  is  afterwards  to  be  worthless,  but  he  is  to 
compensate  the  king  or  the  lord  of  the  estate  with  his  healsfang.  96 
There  are  also  two  important  related--and  contradictory--examples 
concerning  perjury  which  both  involve  King  Cnut.  The  first  is  an  overt 
condemnation  of  the  crime  of  perjury  by  Cnut,  and  the  second  is  a  record 
which  asserts  that,  at  the  same  time  Cnut  disparaged  perjury,  he  was  also 
quick  to  utilize  it  when  it  could  benefit  him.  The  first  example  contains 
references  to  the  sanctity  of  oaths  and  to  the  vileness  of  perjury,  and  is 
found  in  Cnut's  letter  to  the  people  of  England,  dated  10  19-1020.  This Chapter  One  121 
letter  is  valuable  to  this  study  in  that,  like  the  first  of  the  laws  of  Alfred, 
it  overtly  contextualizes  the  place  of  oath  and  the  value  of  the  integrity 
of  the  sworn  word  in  late  Anglo-Saxon  culture.  Not  only  is  the  sanctity 
of  oaths  explicitly  confirmed,  but  perjury  is  listed  amongst  the  vilest  of 
possible  sins: 
13.  And  it  is  my  will  that  all  the  nation,  ecclesiastical  and  lay, 
shall  steadfastly  observe  Edgar's  laws,  which  all  men  have  chosen 
and  sworn  to  at  Oxford. 
14.  For  all  the  bishops  say  that  the  breaking  of  oaths  and  pledge  is 
to  be  very  deeply  atoned  for  with  God. 
15.  And  also  they  teach  us  further  that  we  must  with  all  our 
strength  and  all  our  might  earnestly  seek,  love  and  honour  the 
eternal  merciful  God, 
land 
shun  all  evil-doing,  namely  [the  deeds 
of]  homicides  and  murderers,  and  perjurers  and  wizards  and 
sorceresses,  and  adulterers,  and  incestuous  deeds.  97 
The  second  example  is  of  particular  significance  because  it  illustrates  the 
contempt  in  which  perjurers  were  held,  even  by  those  who  benefited 
from  their  perjury.  In  a  situation  which  is  reminiscent  of  the  moral 
underlying  the  resolution  of  conflict  in  oath-keeping  described  in  the 
episode  concerning  Athelstan  and  Olaf,  here  we  have  an  example  of 
those  who  have  perjured  themselves  in  Cnut's  service,  and  the  moral  this 
time  seems  to  be  that  those  who  once  have  broken  faith  may  be  expected 
to  do  so  again.  Indeed,  Cnut  rather  seems  to  have  thought  that  they 
would,  so  the  prudent  thing  to  do,  from  his  perspective,  was  eliminate 
them  once  they  had  served  their  (faithless)  function.  Cnut  therefore 
removed  the  risk  of  them  recanting  their  perjury  or  otherwise  breaking 
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trust  them,  as'once  a  man  was  an  oath-breaker,  he  was  perceived  always 
to  be  an  oath-breaker.  From  a  modem  perspective  Cnut's  use  of 
perjurers  to  gain  a  political  perspective  may  seem  pragmatic  and 
intelligible,  and  the  cultural  expectation  of  faithfulness  may  seem  naive, 
or  more  to  do  with  hypocriiical  lip-service  than  any  steadfast  belief. 
That  being  the  case,  however,  Cnut's  elimination  of  his  erstwhile 
supporters  seems  somewhat  less  explicable.  I  would  submit  that,  'ho 
matter  how  self-serving  and  pragmatic  Cnut  may  have  been,  he  was 
influenced  by  the'morals  of  his  culture  to  such  an  extent  that  the  concept 
of  oath-breaking  retainers  disturbed  him.  The  passage  concerned  is  from 
the  annals  -of  Florence  for  the  year  10  16;  the  witnesses  described  are 
from  amongst  the  powerful  nobles  of  England: 
And  they  said  that  they  knew  beyond  doubt  that  King  Edmund 
had  entrusted  no  portion  of  his  kingdom  to  his  brothers,  either  in 
this  lif  e  or  at  his  death;  and  they  said  that  they  knew  that  Edmund 
wished  Cnut  to  be  the  supporter  and  protector  of  his  sons,  until 
they  were  old  enough  to  reign.  -  In  truth,  God  is  to  witness,  they 
gave  false  testimony,  and  lied  deceitfully,  imagining  both  that  he 
would  be  more  gracious  to  them  because  of  their  lying,  and  that 
they  would  receive  a  big  reward  from  him.  Some  of  these  false 
witnesses  were  put  to  death  not  long  afterwards  by  that  same 
king.  98 
Perjury  was  a  heinous  crime  in  Germanic  culture  because  the 
possibility  of  perjury  undermined  the  value  of  oath;  although  this 
possibility  resulted  in  the  ascendancy  of  the  ordeal  in  Anglo-Saxon 
jurisprudence,  perjury  remained  amongst  the  vilest  of  sins  because, 
although  the  ordeal  was  meant  as  an  independent  method  by  which  the Chapter  One  123 
comparative  values  of  oaths  might  be  judged,  the  ordeal  fundamentally 
still  rested  upon  the  sanctity  of  the  oath.  Therefore,  although  the  ordeal 
was  construed  as  independent  of  the  oath,  it  could  not  really  be  so.  The 
oath  and  the  ordeal  are  two  distinct  modes  of  proof,  but  the  ordeal  is 
dependent  upon  the  oath.  That  is,  while  not  all  oath-making  must  be 
accompanied  by  ordeal,  all  ordeals  by  necessity  contain  oaths.  Thus  an 
understanding  of  the  centrality  of  the  oath  to  Germanic  culture  generally, 
and  to  Anglo-Saxon  law  specifically,  is  crucial  in  order  to  place  the 
ordeal  in  its  cultural  context.  The  oath  was  the  mode  by  which  the 
accused  asserted  innocence;  the  ordeal,  trial  by  combat,  or  (sometimes) 
unrelated  circumstances,  provided  the  mode  by  which  the  validity  of  the 
oath  was  confirmed:  - 
The  ordeal  involves  or  is  proceeded  by  an  oath;  -  but  even  when 
the  proof  is  to  consist  merely  of  oaths,  a  supernatural  element  is 
present.  The  swearer  satisfies  human  justice  by  taking  the  oath.  If 
he  has  sworn  falsely,  he  is  exposed  to  the  wrath  of  God  and  in 
some  subsequent  proceeding  may  perhaps  be  convicted  of  perjury; 
but  in  the  meantime  he  has  performed  the  task  that  the  law  set 
him;  he  has  given  the  requisite  proof.  99 
The  foregoing  examination  of  the  role  of  compurgation  in  early 
Germanic  law,  and  of  the  continued  importance  of  oath  in  Anglo-Saxon 
law  and  culture,  provides  the  context  for  a  detailed  exploration  of  the 
role  of  the  ordeal  in  this  law  and  culture.  The  ordeal,  as  we  have  seen, 
was  utilized  to  fill  a  legal  void  which  resulted  from  the  decline  in  the 
efficacy  of  compurgation  as  the  sole  foundation  for  a  system  of 
jurisprudence  in  a  complex  and  rapidly  growing  society.  But  more  than 
this,  the  ordeal  also  resonated  with  basic  Anglo-Saxon  philosophical Chapter  One  124 
conceptions  of  the  relationship  between  physical  and  spiritual  matter. 
Such  resonance  will  become  especially  significant  when  we  begin  to 
explore  the  relationship  between  the  philosophical  and  legal  foundations 
of  the  ordeal  and  related  theological  and  literary  constructs  (see 
especially  Chapter  Five).  But  first  we  must  begin  by  examining  the 
ordeal  itself,  and  the  fundamental  question  with  which  a  modern  is 
confronted  in  approaching  the  ordeal  is  its  widespread  appeal.  Why  did 
the  ordeal  appeal  to  the  masses?  The  answer  to  this  question  might  be 
simpler  than  itappears,  and  may  have  to  do  with  the  distinction  to  be 
drawn  between  temporal  and  divine  justice;  God  is  the  judge  in  the 
ordeal,  and  it  might  seem  more  reasonable  to  expect  justice  from  an 
omniscient  and  impartial  God  than  from  a  jury  of  prejudicial  and  short- 
sighted  peers.  John  Langbein  emphasizes  the  nature  of  such  a  belief 
system  in  his  discussion  of  the  disconcerting  vacuum  left  by  the  ordeal 
when  it  was  finally  abolished  in  the  thirteenth  century: 
The  ordeals  were  means  of  provoking  the  judgment  of  God.  God 
revealed  the  innocence  of  an  accused  whose  hand  withstood 
infection  from  the  hot  iron;  God  pronounced  the  guilt  of  one  who 
floated  when  subjected  to  the  water  ordeal.  The  abolition  of  this 
system  meant  not  only  a  fundamental  change  in  the  rules  of  proof, 
but  a  profound  change  in  thinking  about  the  nature  of  government 
and  law.  The  attempt  to  make  God  the  fact  finder  for  human 
disputes  was  being  abandoned.  Henceforth,  humans  were  going 
to  replace  God  in  deciding  guilt  or  innocence,  humans  called 
judges.  It  is  almost  impossible  for  us  to  imagine  how  difficult  it 
must  have  been  for  the'ordinary  people  of  that  age  to  accept  that 
substitution.  The  question  that  springs  to  the  lips  is:  "  You  who Chapter  One  125 
are  merely  another  mortal  like  me,  who  are  you  to  sit  in  judgment 
upon  me?  "  100 
Further,  God  also  seems  to  have  acquitted  most  of  the  accused;  legal 
historians  such  as  Pollock  and  Maitland  have  suggested  that  the  accused 
stood  a  reasonable  chance  of  acquittal  under  the  ordeal.  Lea  maintains 
that  this  chance  was  far  more  than  reasonable: 
...  the  ordeal,  with  its  undoubted  cruelty,  was  not  as  cruel  as  it 
appears  to  us,  and  in  its  practical  results  it  probably  acquitted  the 
guilty  far  more  often  than  it  convicted  the  innocent  ...  in  the  English 
records  from  1201  till  the  abolition  of  the  ordeal  in  1219--a  period 
in  which  ...  it  was  in  constant  use--...  [there  is]  but  one  instance  in 
which  it  failed  to  clear  the  accused.  10  1 
Before  moving  on  to  discuss  the  specific  details  of  procedure 
involved  in  the  ordeal,  and  indeed  the  systems  of  laws  in  which  such 
procedure  is  enshrined,  we  should  first  examine  the  underlying  theory  of 
the  ordeal;  that  is,  the  metaphysical  mechanism  involved  in  the 
determination  of  justice  through  this  model.  As  I  have  noted,  the 
popular  perception  of  the  ordeal  centered  around  the  belief  that  God 
pan.  1cipated  directly  in  the  judicial  process  through  intervening  in  the 
effect  upon  the  body  of  the  accused  of  the  material  consequences 
involved  in  the  particular  ordeal  at  stake.  In  a  very  real  way,  God  was 
expected  to  make  manifest  the  spiritual  reality  of  the  guilt  or  innocence 
of  the  accused  upon  the  body  of  that  defendant.  The  basic  premise  of 
this  construct,  however,  is  independent  of  Christian  theology,  and 
certainly  pre-dates  Christianity  in  Germanic  society;  this  premise 
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to  spiritual  nature,  and  that  this  relationship  may  by  utilized  through 
such  a  procedure  as  the  ordeal  in  order  to  view  a  spiritual  reality  in 
physical  form  (for  a  related  concept, see  my  discussion  of  transmutation 
in  Chapter  Five).  As  this  premise  and  this  procedure  become  subsumed 
within  Christian  ritual,  the  ordeal  takes  on  a  religious  significance: 
The  archaic  concept  of  the  solidarity  of  the  forces  of  nature,  which 
would  reject  the  guilty  party  or  the  liar,  gives  way  to  a  concept 
somewhat  further  evolved,  although  not  yet  specifically  Christian 
(because  it  is  found  among  pagans  as  well,  and  it  seems,  when 
found  among  Christians,  more  pagan  than  Christian),  according  to 
which  God,  all  powerful  and  omniscient,  knowing  the  truthful  and 
the  just,  expresses  that  knowledge  by  signs  and  by  the  elements  of 
material  creation  ...  Thus,  the  judicial  duel,  as  does  the  oath,  takes 
on  a  religious  significance.  A  kind  of  hierarchy  of  proofs  is 
established;  if  the  oath  and  the  judicial  combat  are  impossible, 
one  then  has  recourse  to  the  elements  themselves  (water,  iron,  and 
earth).  That  is  the  ordeal.  102 
Within  the  hierarchy  of  proofs  established  through  this  system, 
ancient  Germanic  attitudes  towards  oath,  reputation,  and  social  status 
reassert  themselves.  Under  Anglo-Saxon  law,  oath  still  provided  the 
first  order  of  proof,  followed  by  varying  forms  of  compurgation,  and 
only  including  the  ordeal  when  a  dispute  could  not  be  resolved  through 
other  means.  The  wager  of  law,  or  compurgation,  was  an  extension  of 
the  oath  of  the  individual,  and  was  itself  directly  dependent  upon  social 
status  and  reputation;  a  powerful  individual  could  undoubtedly  find 
willing  compurgators,  but  barring  that  sort  of  influence,  it  is  doubtful Chapter  One  127 
that  a  man  of  less  than  sound  public  reputation  could  find  help  to  support 
his  oath: 
The  party  who  was  called  upon  to  make  his  law  had  to  find  a 
number  of  people,  twelve  or  some  other  number  fixed  by  the  court 
according  to  the  circumstances,  and  then  take  a  solemn  oath  that 
he  was  innocent.  His  companions,  or  "  compurgators"  as  they 
were  called,  then  swore  that  the  oath  which  he  had  taken  was 
clean.  In  other  words,  the  court  calls  upon  the  accused  to  produce 
a  specified  number  of  people  (occasionally  from  a  particular  class 
or  even  from  the  names  on  a  given  list)  who  are  prepared  to  swear 
that  in  their  opinion  his  oath  is  trustworthy.  They  do  not  swear  to 
the  facts  of  the  case,  but  merely  to  their  judgment  that  the  accused 
is  a  credible  person.  Wager  of  law,  therefore,  reduces  itself  to  a 
character  test;  in  the  earlier  period  when  there  were  strong 
religious  sanctions  surrounding  the  oath  it  is  clear  that  a 
disreputable  person  would  have  difficulty  in  finding 
compurgators.  103  - 
As  I  pointed  out  in  my  discussion  of  the  laws  of  Wihtred  (above),  social 
status  was  crucial  to  this  hierarchy  of  proofs,  and  social  rank  could  be 
said  to  be  bound  together  with  the  public  perception  of  character  in  the 
sort  of  public  reputation  which  determined  the  practical  status  by  which 
one's  word  might  be  measured.  There  is  a  complex  relationship  between 
oath,  wergild  (which  is  of  course  based  on  social  rank,  and  thus 
inIplicitly  includes  such  considerations  as  birth  in  the  formula)', 
reputation,  and  the  buying  off  of  ordeal:  those  of  good  reputation  can 
forego  the  ordeal  through  an  oath;  those  with  money  can  sometimes  buy 
it  off.  The  implication  is  that  those  of  good  reputation  can  be  believed, Chapter  One  128 
that  those  with  rank  and  money  are  deserving  of  the  benefit  of  the  doubt, 
and  that  those  who  are  supported  steadfastly  by  oath-helpers  or  creditors 
have  a  sound  reputation  amongst  that  group,  and  might  be  believed  on 
that  basis.  The  place  of  creditors  in  such  a  scheme,  who  must  remain 
constant  in  their  support  or  else  be  penalized,  is  particularly  revealing. 
The  relationship  between  cash,  credit,  oath-helpers,  and  the 
necessity  of  undergoing  the  ordeal  is indicative  of  attempts  to  reconcile 
the  ancient  legal  system  of  oath  with  later  complexities  such  as  concern 
about  perjury  and  methods  of  evaluating  public  reputation.  The 
following  is  from  the  laws  of  Ine,  and  its  reference  to  credit  illuminates 
such  a  relationship: 
62.  When  a  charge  is  brought  against  a  man,  and  he  is  driven  to 
the  ordeal,  and  he  himself  possesses  nothing  to  give,  in  order  to 
avoid  the  ordeal;  and  another  man  comes  forward  and  gives  his 
goods  instead,  on  what  terms  he  can  obtain,  on  condition  that  he 
becomes  subject  to  him  until  he  can  restore  his  property  to  him; 
and  then  he  is  again  a  second  time  accused  and  driven  to  the 
ordeal;  if  he  who  before  gave  goods  on  his  behalf  will  not  support 
him  further,  and  he  [the  accuser]  takes  him,  he  [the  creditor]  is  to 
lose  his  goods,  which  before  he  paid  on  his  behalf.  104 
The  following  examples  from  the  laws  of  Cnut  do  not  mention 
complexities  involving  creditors,  but  certainly  are  interested  with  issues 
of  public  reputation,  oath,  and  compurgation.  Further,  it  is  clear  that 
these  laws  also  are  designed  to  try  to  avoid  the  necessity  of  ordeal  if  at 
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30.  And  if  any  man  is  so  regarded  with  suspicion  by  the  hundred 
and  so  frequently  accused,  and  three  men  together  then  accuse 
him,  there  is  then  to  be  nothing  for  it  but  that  he  is  to  go  to  the 
three-fold  ordeal.  1 
30.1.  If  the  lord  then  says  that  he  has  failed  neither  at  the  oath  nor 
at  the  ordeal  since  the  assembly  was  held  at  Winchester,  the  lord 
is  to  take  with  him  two  trustworthy  men  from  within  the  hundred 
and  swear  that  he  failed  neither  at  oath  nor  at  ordeal,  nor  did  he 
pay  any  compensation  for  theft,  unless  the  lord  have  a  reeve  who 
is  entitled  to  do  this  on  his  behalf. 
30.2.  And  if  the  oath  is  then  forthcoming,  the  man  who  is  there 
accused  is  to  choose  which  he  will  have,  whether  simple  ordeal  or 
an  oath  worth  a  pound  within  the  three  hundreds,  in  a  case  of 
[stolen  goods  of]  over  30  pence. 
30.3.  And  if,  however,  they  dare  not  give  that  oath,  he  is  to  go  to 
the  three-fold  ordeal.  105 
It  is  obvious  from  such  examples  as  these--with  their  complex  concerns 
regarding  the  alternatives  of  pecuniary  surety,  oath,  and  compurgation-_ 
that  the  ordeal  was  to  be  avoided  unless  absolutely  necessary.  If  no 
other  method  was  feasible  or  satisfactory,  however,  the  ordeal  comprised 
a  definitive  method  of  proof.  The  laws  of  Athelstan  provide  us  with  a 
number  of  extremely  detailed  examples  of  the  specifics  involved  in  the 
various  ordeals.  The  religious  ritual  which  had  been  established  around 
the  basic  procedure  is  of  interest,  as  it  indicates  how  the  Church 
transformed  the  tradition  and  made  it  its  own.  Also  of  special  interest 
are  the  rules  governing  the  oaths  which  were  part  and  parcel  of  the 
ordeal.  The  following  example  is  primarily  concerned  with  matters  of 
oath  and  religious  detail,  in  fact,  and  this  concern  is  indicative  of  the  fact Chapter  One  130 
that  such  preliminaries  were  seen  as  integral,  and  not  simply  auxiliary,  to 
the  ordeal: 
If  anyone  gives  pledge  for  an  ordeal,  then  let  him  come  three  days 
before  to  the  mass-priest  who  is  to  hallow  it;  and  let  him  feed 
himself  with  bread  and  water,  and  salt,  and  herbs,  before  he  shall 
go  to  it;  and  let  him  attend  mass  each  of  the  three  days,  and  make 
an  oblation,  and  go  to  communion  on  the  day  that  he  shall  go  to 
the  ordeal:  and  then  swear  the  oath  that  he  is,  according  to  folk- 
right,  guiltless  of  the  charge,  before  he  goes  to  the  ordeal.  And  if 
it  be  water,  that  he  dive  an  ell  and  a  half  by  the  rope;  if  it  be  iron 
ordeal,  let  it  be  three  days  before  the  hand  be  undone.  And  let 
every  man  begin  his  charge  with  a  fore-oath,  as  we  before 
ordained:  and  be  each  of  those  fasting,  on  either  hand,  who  may 
be  there  together,  by  God's  command  and  the  archbishop's;  and 
let  there  not  be  on  either  side  more  than  twelve  men.  If  the 
accused  man  be  with  a  larger  company  than  some  twelve,  then  the 
ordeal  be  void,  unless  they  will  go  from  him.  106 
The  next  example,  also  from  the  laws  of  Athelstan,  offers  precise 
instructions  as  to  the  methods  by  which  the  ordeals  of  water  and  of  the 
hot  iron  were  to  be  affected.  The  importance  of  witnesses  to  the  ordeal 
is  interesting,  as  is  the  ritual  purgation  of  the  accused  and  the  witnesses. 
Of  particular  note  is  the  attention  to  every  detail  of  the  ceremony,  from 
the  physical  preparations  of  the  instruments  to  the  materials  which  are 
suitable  for  the  cauldron.  In  the  context  of  such  legalistic  jargon,  it  is 
entirely  possible  to  lose  sight  of  the  excruciating  torment  around  which 
all  of  this  ritual  is  constructed.  This  paradox  is  important  because  in  the 
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the  pain  to  which  the  victim  is  subjected  during  the  course  of  the 
procedure,  but  the  sign  written  upon  the  body  of  that  victim  as  a  result  of 
that  procedure.  Hence,  though  we  might  claim  that  immediate  pain  is  a 
primary  aim  of  judicial  or  punitive  torture  (although  these  can  and  do 
have  other  aims,  as  well),  in  the  case  of  the  ordeal  the  immediate  pain  to 
the  victim  is  incidental  to  the  primary  purpose,  which  is  a  manifestation 
of  the  spiritual  in  bodily  terms: 
Concerning  the  ordeal  we  enjoin  by  command  of  God,  and  of  the 
archbishop,  and  of  all  the  bishops:  that  no  man  come  within  the 
church  after  the  fire  is  borne  in  with  which  the  ordeal  is  to  be 
heated  except  the  priest  and  him  who  is  to  undergo  judgment. 
And  let  nine  feet  be  measured  from  the  stake  to  the  mark,  by  the 
feet  of  him  who  is  to  be  tried.  But  if  [the  ordeal]  be  water,  let  it  be 
heated  till  it  comes  to  boiling.  And  be  the  kettle  of  iron  or  of 
brass,  of  lead,  or  of  clay.  And  if  it  be  a  single  accusation,  let  the 
hand  dive  for  the  stone  up  to  the  wrist;  and  if  it  be  threefold,  up  to 
the  elbow.  And  when  the  ordeal  is  ready  let  two  men  from  each 
side  go  in  and  certify  that  it  is  as  hot  as  we  have  directed  it  to  be. 
Then  let  an  equal  number  from  both  sides  enter  and  stand  on  - 
either  side  of  the  judgment  place  along  the  church,  and  let  them  all 
be  fasting  and  abstinent  from  their  wives  on  the  preceding  night. 
And  let  the  priest  sprinkle  them  all  with  water  and  let  them  bow 
themselves  every  one  to  the  holy  water  and  let  the  holy  Gospel 
and  the  cross  be  given  them  all  to  kiss.  And  no  one  shall  mend 
the  fire  any  longer  than  the  beginning  of  the  hallowing,  but  let  the 
iron  lie  on  the  coals  until  the  last  collect.  Afterwards  let  it  be 
placed  on  a  frame,  and  let  no  one  speak  except  to  pray  diligently 
to  God,  the  Father  Omnipotent,  to  deign  to  manifest  His  truth  in Chapter  One  132 
the  matter;  And  let  the  accused  drink  of  the  holy  water  and  then 
let  the  hand  with  which  he  is  about  to  carry  the  iron  be  sprinkled, 
and  so  let  him  go  [to  the  ordeal].  Let  the  nine  feet  that  were 
measured  off  be  divided  into  three  sections.  In  the  first  division 
let  him  hold  his  right  foot,  close  to  the  stake.  Then  let  him  move 
his  right  foot  across  the  second  into  the  third  division,  where  he 
shall  cast  the  iron  in  front  of  him  and  hasten  to  the  holy  altar. 
Then  let  his  hand  be  sealed  up,  and  on  the  third  day  let 
examination  be  made  whether  it  is  clean  or  foul  within  the 
wrapper.  And  whosoever  shall  transgress  these  laws,  be  the 
ordeal  of  no  worth  in  his  case,  but  let  him  pay  the  king  a  fine  of 
twenty  shillings.  107 
The  ordeal  was  not  abolished  until  after  1215,  and  was  a 
cornerstone  of  English  jurisprudence  throughout  the  Anglo-Saxon 
period;  directly  after  the  Norman  Conquest,  however,  (as  I  noted  above) 
some  changes  to  English  law  occurred  which  are  suggestive  of  the 
European  theological  and  legal  trends  which  resulted  in  the  demise  of 
the  ordeal.  As  this  demise  was  particularly  quick  and  thorough  in 
England  108--where,  paradoxically,  the  practice  of  the  ordeal  had  been 
particularly  popular  and  widespread--it  might  be  beneficial  to  examine 
briefly  the  major  motive  forces  behind  it.  Broadly  speaking,  there  were 
two  trends  involved:  one  legal,  which  had  to  do  with  the  reemergence  of 
Roman  law  throughout  the  course  of  the  twelfth  century,  and  one 
theological,  which  had  to  do  both  with  the  weak  theological  basis  for  the 
ordeal  and  the  rise  of  confession  to  the  level  of  a  sacrament.  The 
theological  weakness  had  been  noted  since  the  inception  of  Church- 
condoned  ordeal,  and,  as  I  noted  above,  papal  opposition  to  this  practice 
had  been  vocal  almost  since  the  beginning.  Although  the  Germanic Chapter  One  133 
conception  of  the  relationship  between  spirit  and  matter  does  not  seem, 
on  the  surface,  anathema  to  Christian  conceptions,  the  expectation  of 
Divine  intervention  at  the  command  and  convenience  of  man  is--as  Peter 
the  Chanter  and  others  pointed  out--presumptuous  and  blasphemous: 
With  the  general  rationalization  and  extension  of  Roman-Canon 
law  in  the  twelfth  century,  influenced  by  the  great  school  of 
Bologna,  the  ordeals  came  under  increasing  attack--not  just  from 
lawyers  but  from  theologians.  The  most  influential  critic  was 
Peter  the  Chanter  (d.  1197)  who  pointed  out  that  the  ordeals,  by 
demanding  miracles,  violated  the  scriptural  injunction  'Thou  shall 
not  tempt  the  Lord  thy  God'.  (Had  not  Christ  himself,  on  the 
Mount  of  Temptation,  refused  to  perform  miracles  upon 
demand?  ).  109 
As  has  been  indicated,  the  theological  controversy  surrounding  the 
ordeal  which  came  to  a  head  in  the  late  twelfth  century  was  concurrent 
with--and  indeed  influenced  by--a  reascendance  of  Roman  law  during 
this  same  period.  This  rise  of  Roman  law  stemmed  from  a  number  of 
sources,  but  in  the  context  of  the  relationship  between  cultural 
development  and  legal  philosophy,  this  ascendancy  primarily  was 
indicative  of  a  growing  consciousness  of  the  concept  of  public  welfare, 
and  of  the  role  of  government  in  utilizing  law  as  a  means  towards  this 
common  good.  In  general  terms,  legal  procedure  became  less  dependent 
upon  an  individual  pursuing  an  accusation  in  order  to  remedy  an 
infringement  of  rights,  and  more  dependent  upon  governing  agents  of 
justice  pursuing  an  investigation  in  order  to  gather  written  and  oral 
proofs  concerning  the  facts  of  a  case.  Concurrently  ordeal,  the  function 
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intervention,,  waned,  while  judicial  torture,  the  function  of  which  was  to 
retrieve  facts  directly  through  physical  intervention,  waxed: 
Torture  belongs  to  the  world  of  inquisitorial  procedure  and  the 
differentiated  concept  of  public  order,  and  reflects  the  society's 
confidence  that  the  powers  of  the  public  order  are  sufficient  to 
establish  legal  fact,  whether  through  testimony  and  interrogation 
or  torture  itself.  The  ordeal,  on  the  other  hand,  belongs  to  the 
world  of  accusatorial  procedure  and  a  limited  concept  of  public 
order,  and  to  a  worldview  that  places  less  faith  in  purely  human 
methods  of  inquiry  than  in  the  belief  in  supernatural  intervention 
to  remedy  injustice.  I  10 
Confession  became  a  sacrament  after  the  Fourth  Lateran  Council 
in  1215,  and  the  rise  of  the  importance  of  judicial  confession  seems 
concurrent;  this  added  another  dimension  to  the  function  of  judicial 
torture,  which  had  always  played  a  role  in  Roman  law.  It  is  important  to 
note  that,  like  the  ordeal,  despite  widespread  popular  perception  and  use 
torture  was  never  a  doctrinally  sound  method  of  procuring 
confession. 
111  The  direct  legal  ramifications  of  the  Fourth  Lateran 
Council  were  far  more  far-reaching  than  that,  however,  and  the  abolition 
of  the  ordeals  left  a  vacuum  in  the  legal  system,  destroying  as  it  did  the 
most  widely  recognized  system  of  producing  proofs.  112  A  legal  system 
such  as  that  of  England,  which  never  assimilated  judicial  torture  into  its 
structure,  had  a  particularly  tough  time  finding  procedures  to  fill  this 
vacuum,  and  did  so  only  slowly  and  piecemeal,  over  time  and  by 
consulting  the  growing  body  of  precedents.  1  13  A  particularly  thorny 
issue  was  that  of  capital  punishment: Chapter  One  135 
The  abolition  of  the  ordeal  had  disturbed  all  its  [the  law's] 
arrangements.  We  take  it  that  under  the  old  procedure  a  man  who 
refused  to  go  to  the  ordeal  might  have  been  put  to  death,  though 
rather  perhaps  as  an  outlaw  than  as  a  convict....  It  was  a  different 
thing  to  sentence  a  man  who  had  been  allowed  no  chance  of 
proving  his  innocence  by  any  of  the  world-old  sacral  processes. 
'No  one  is  to  be  convicted  of  a  capital  crime  by  testimony,  '  said 
the  author  of  the  Leges  Hentici.  These  words  represent  a  strong 
feeling:  mere  human  testimony  is  not  enough  to  send  a  man  to  the 
gallows.  114 
The  immediate  result  of  this  void  in  the  system  of  English  jurisprudence, 
then,  was  a  series  of  stop-gap  measures,  and--most  notably--a 
moratorium  on  capital  punishment  which  reflected  a  concern  with 
condemning  the  accused  without  recourse  to  divine  ratification.  Such  a 
concern  is  reminiscent  of  the  stipulation  in  the  laws  of  William  that 
death  sentences  were  to  be  uniformly  replaced  by  punitive 
dismemberment;  as  I  mentioned  above,  William  may  also  have  been 
concerned  with  the  efficacy  of  the  ordeal  in  providing  such  divine 
judgment. 
As  I  have  attempted  to  illustrate,  it  is  notable  in  the  context  of  my 
argument  that  legal  historians  generally  are  quite  concerned  with 
drawing  a  clear  distinction  between  what  I  term  judicial  torture  and  that 
which  is  known  as  the  ordeal;  this  concern  stems  from  the  fact  that  these 
historians  are  invested  in  drawing  distinctions  between  philosophies  of 
jurisprudence,  rather  than  comparing  those  points  which  are  common  to 
two  systems  which  both  utilize  forms  of  systematic  and  deliberate 
applied  pain  (albeit  to  somewhat  different  ends).  What  is  of  particular 
interest,  then,  in  the  hazy  period  during  which  the  ordeal  was  coming Chapter  One  136 
under  attack  and  judicial  torture  was  on  the  rise,  is  that  the  clear 
semantic  distinction  between  "torture"  and  "  ordeal"  breaks  down  when 
procedural  shifts  allow  the  form  of  the  latter  to  be  used  to  affect  the 
function  of  the  former: 
In  medieval  Europe  the  replacement  by  torture  of  trial  by  ordeal 
resulted  in  some  cases  from  changes  in  criminal  procedure,  rather 
than  changes  in  the  mode  of  applying  pain.  It  is  therefore  possible 
to  envisage  a  transitional  stage  between  the  trial  by  ordeal  and 
investigative  torture,  which  shares  some  of  the  features  of 
both.  115  , 
I  would  submit  that  the  dual  shifts  (from  trial  by  ordeal  to  trial  by 
combat,  and  from,  capital  punishment  to  punitive  dismemberment)  in 
Norman  law  mark  the  beginning  of  this  period  of  transition  in  England. 
Not  only  do  both  shifts  underscore  a  growing  discomfort  with  a  system 
of  justice  predicated  upon  the  supernatural,  but  further--in  a  country 
which  never  formally  adopted  judicial  torture  as  a  method  by  which  to 
gather  evidence--it  is  significant  that  the  Anglo-Norman  laws  equate 
punitive  dismemberment  with  the  ordeal:  both  are  used  as  forms  of 
punishment.  The  ordeal  is  punitive  and  is  not  involved  in  adjudication 
by  the  late  Norman  period.  116  That  the  Normans  utilized  the  ordeal  as  a 
form  of  punitive  torture  equivalent  to  other  corporal  penalties  highlights 
the  fact  that  the  distinction  between  the  functions  of  what  historians  term 
'.  'torture"  and  "ordeal"  had  become  blurred. 
It  is  most  important,  therefore,  that  we  not  confuse  "torture"  as  a 
medieval  legal  procedure  (or  as  legal  historians  define  it)  with  the  term 
!  'torture"  as  I  define  it:  that  is,  any  deliberate  and  systematic  application 
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achieve  some  specific  end.  In  this  context  "ordeal"  becomes  a  most 
interesting  complementary--and  not  contradictory--concept  in  relation 
to  torture.  117  "Ordeal",  in  this  context,  is  a  means  of  ascertaining  or 
asserting  the  valence  (good  or  evil,  saint  or  sinner,  innocent  or  guilty)  of 
the  accused's  spiritual  identity:  the  ordeal--and  especially  those  of  the 
boiling  water  and  the  red-hot  plowshares--seems  to  have  much  in 
common  with,  say,  the  episode  describing  Juliana  in  the  cauldron  of 
lead,  or  that  concerning  the  youths  in  the  furnace  in  Daniel,  or  any  other 
similar  episode.  This  idea  also  is  extremely  relevant  in  the  context  of  the 
fire  of  judgment,  where  the  condition  of  one's  soul  determines  the  effect 
of  the  flames  upon  one.  (See  my  discussion  in  Chapter  Five). 
In  this  chapter  I  have  attempted  to  describe  the  reality  of  practices 
of  torture,  dismemberment,  and  bodily  destruction  in  Anglo-Saxon 
England.  I  have  concerned  myself  with  the  various  kinds  of  mutilation 
involved,  and  with  specific  examples  which  exemplify  the  nature  and 
purpose  of  such  mutilation.  Further,  I  have  explored  the  legal  history 
which  illuminates,  and  the  philosophical  understructure  which  informed, 
such  purposes.  Thus  we  have  examined  how  torture  was  a  language  of 
political,  legal,  and  moral  power  in  Anglo-Saxon  England,  and  how  this 
language  both  reflected  political  and  social  realities  and  articulated  a 
binary  understanding  of  the  body  both  as  a  potential  text  for  inscribing 
such  exterior  political  and  social  realities,  and  as  a  gloss  for  interpreting 
the  interior  spiritual  nature  of  the  individual  involved.  Before  moving 
on  to  a  discussion  of  the  nature  and  purpose  of  torture  in  an  Old  English 
poetic  context,  I  turn  now  to  an  examination  of  Anglo-Saxon  perceptions 
of  the  nature  of  pain;  pain  is  at  the  heart  of  torture,  and  it  is  only  with  an 
understanding  of  what  "pain"  is--and  what  our  forebears  thought  it  was-- 
that  we  can  begin  to  appreciate  what  "torture"  is,  and  how  it  functions  in 
Old  English  literary  culture. Chapter  One  138 
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people  of  Kent,  was  captured,  and  the  king  of  the  Mercians; 
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the  sceptre  in  his  hand.  (Whitelock,  page  249;  Histozia  Regum 
798) 
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incident  in  which  an  act  of  decapitation  is  equated  with  the  consolidation 
of  political  power  is  to  be  found  in  the  annals  of  Florence  of  Worcester. 
In  this  episode,  Cnut  has  already  claimed  the  throne  of  England,  but  is 
anxious  to  do  away  with  Eadwig,  the  brother  of  Cnut's  predecessor 
Edmund,  in  order  to  stave  off  any  potential  rebellion.  Cnut  attempts  to 
bribe  one  Ethelweard--whom  he  has  reason  to  believe  might  have 
influence  over  Eadwig--into  betraying  the  prince;  Cnut  says  generally 
that  he  wants  Eadwig  killed,  but  he  specifically  asks  for  the  prince's 
head: 
Now  one  of  the  aforesaid  athelings  was  Eadwig,  the  illustrious 
and  much  honoured  brother  of  King  Edmund,  and  by  most  evil 
counsel  they  there  resolved  that  he  should  be  exiled.  And  when 
King  Cnut  had  heard  the  servile  flattery  of  the  above-mentioned 
persons,  and  the  contempt  which  they  expressed  for  Eadwig,  he 
entered  his  chamber  rejoicing,  and,  calling  to  him  the  perfidious 
ealdorman  Eadric,  he  inquired  of  him  how  he  might  entrap 
Eadwig,  to  endanger  his  life.  And  he  said  in  reply  that  he  knew 
another  man,,  Ethelweard  by  name,  who  would  be  able  to  betray 
him  to  death  more  easily  than  he;  he  could  have  a  talk  with  him 
and  promise  him  a  great  reward.  When  he  learnt  the  man's  name, 
the  king  called  to  him,  saying  craftily:  "Thus  and  thus  has 
Ealdorman  Eadric  spoken  to  me,  saying  that  you  can  lay  a  trap  for 
the  atheling  Eadwig  in  order  to  kill  him.  Agree  now  to  our 
counsels,  and  you  shall  possess  all  the  honours  and  dignities  of 
your  ancestors;  and  get  me  his  head,  and  you  will  be  dearer  to  me 
than  my  own  brother.  "  He  indeed  said  that  he  would  seek  him  out Chapter  One  145 
and  kill  him;  if  he  could  by  any  means.  Nevertheless,  he  did  not 
intend  to  kill  him,  but  promised  this  way  out  of  pretense;  for  he 
was  sprung  from  a  most  noble  English  family.  (Whitelock,  page 
285;  Florence  1016) 
Eadwig  was  to  escape  Cnut's  wiles  for  another  year;  but  considering 
Cnut's  penchant  for  politically  significant  acts  of  bodily  destruction  (see 
his  disfigurement  of  hostages,  above,  and  his  treatment  of  the  corpse  of 
Eadric,  below),  it  does  not  seem  unreasonable  to  assert  that  his  desire  for 
the  head  of  his  rival  illustrates  his  knowledge  that  such  a  trophy  would 
have  a  symbolic,  as  well  as  a  practical,  value. 
36  Douglas  and  Greenaway,  pages  138-139;  ASC  1063  (D).  We  find  a 
tantalizing  record  of  decapitation  in  the  annal  for  1053  which  might 
seem  related  to  the  Anglo-Welsh  political  struggles  of  the  next  decade. 
In  this  case  the  brother  of  the  Welsh  king  is  put  to  death  due  to  the  - 
"injuries"  (presumably  to  the  English)  for  which  he  was  responsible.  No 
mention  is  made  as  to  whether  he  was  killed  by  some  of  his  own  people 
to  placate  the  wrath  of  the  English,  or  whether  he  was  taken  in  some  sort 
of  retaliatory  action  by  the  English: 
... 
And  it  was  decided  that  Rhys,  the  Welsh  king's  brother,  should 
be  killed,  because  he  was  causing  injuries  and  his  head  was 
brought  to  Gloucester  on  the  eve  of  the  Epiphany. 
(Douglas  and  Greenaway,  page  130;  ASC  1053  (D)) 
It  is  impossible  to  tell  in  this  context  whether  Rhys  was  killed  for 
politically  reconciliatory  reasons  as  Griffith  later  was,  or  whether  he  was 
killed  by  the  English  much  as  a  Dane  or  other  raider  might  be.  We  learn 
from  other  sources  that  Rhys  was  put  to  death  by  order  of  Edward 
(Douglas  and  Greenaway,  page  209).  In  any-case,  it  is  significant  that  he 
was  decapitated,  and  that  his  head  was  taken  to  Gloucester  as  a  sign  of Chapter  One  146 
his  actions,  their  consequences,  and  the  power  structures  involved.  Such 
a  case  exemplifies  the  power  of  the  English  and  the  weakness  of  the 
Welsh:  either  the  Welsh  turned  on  one  of  their  own  in  order  to  appease 
their  neighbors,  as  in  the  case  of  Griffith,  or  the  English  were  able  with 
impunity  to  capture,  kill,  and  dismember  the  brother  of  the  king  of  the 
Welsh,  taking  his  head  as  a  trophy. 
37  This  is  precisely  the  opposite  structure  as  that  examined  in  the 
description  of  punitive  torture,  in  the  first  section  of  this  chapter.  In  the 
case  of  punitive  dismemberment,  for  example,  (say  the  moneyer's  loss 
of  a  hand)  the  authority  structure  is  not  much  concerned  with  the 
particular  individual  involved,  nor  indeed,  with  the  particular  offense; 
rather,  it  is  the  purpose  of  punitive  torture  to  use  the  broken  body  of  the 
victim  (any  victim)  in  order  to  publicly  announce  the  power  of  the  state, 
and  (more  incidentally)  the  crime  of  the  victim.  It  is  not  that  the  state 
does  not  consider  the  actions  of  the  victim  to  be  criminal,  or  that  the 
state  does  not  wish  to  punish  these  actions;  these  the  state  indeed  does 
want,  but  most  of  all  the  state  is interested  in  a  public  display  which  will 
serve  as  a  lesson  (a  text  to  be  read)  for  the  community  at  large,  a  lesson 
which  has  more  to  do  with  power  and  authority  than  with  crime  and 
punishment.  This  is  a  means  of  social  control.  In  the  case  of  torture 
utilized  as  a  means  of  gaining  political  control,  however,  the  values  are 
reversed:  the  primary  goal  is  to  remove  rivals  and  consolidate  control, 
and  the  symbolic  nature  of  the  act  (although  present)  is  more  incidental 
to  the  function  of  the  act  of  torture. 
38  It  is  of  most  particular  significance  that  this  Edward  (the  Confessor) 
was  the  half-brother  (through  Emma,.  their  mother)  and  heir  of 
Hardacnut,  and  the  full  brother  (both  Edward  and  Alfred  being  the  sons 
ýEthelred  and  Emma)  of  the  Alfred  blinded  at  the  hands  of  Earl Chapter  One  147 
Godwine.  -  This  Godwine  was  father  to  the  Harold  (called 
"Godwineson")  who  became  Harold  II  upon  the  death  of  the  Confessor, 
and  who  died  at  Hastings.  The  blinding  of  Alfred  was  on  the  orders  of 
Harold  I  (called  "  Harefoot")  who  was  half-brother  (through  Cnut,  their 
father)  with  the  same  Hardacnut  who  later  desecrated  Haref  oot's  corpse. 
Harefoot'sm.  other  was.  AElfgifu,  the  first  wife  (never  consecrated)  of 
Cnut;  Cnut  later  married  Emma  (tEthelred's  widow).  It  is  all  a  bit  - 
confusing,  but  the  point'is  that  these  two  episodes  are  very  closely  inter-, 
woven  in  terms  of  political  symbolism  and  family  relationship. 
39  Whitelock,  page  233.  See  especially  notes  numbers  1,2,  and  4.  The 
account  which  I  have  recorded  here  is  primarily  from  the  "  C"  chronicle; 
the  "D"  version  evidently  omits  mention  of  Godwine,  and  pins  the  blame 
for  Alfred's  treatment  on  Harold  himself  and  his  popular  support. 
40  Whitelock,  pages  232-233;  ASC  C  (D). 
41  Whitelock,  page  289.  This  reference  is  from  the  entry  for  the  year 
1036  in  The  reigns  of  the  Danish  kings  of  England,  from  Florence  of 
Worcester. 
42  Whitelock,  page  322.  This  entry  is  from  the  Encomium  Emmae 
Reginae.  Concerning  the  import  of  this  forgery  and  the  plot  which 
brought  it  into  being,  see  Whitelock's  preface  to  this  selection.  She 
underscores  the  political  motivation  implied  by  this  version,  and  also 
offers  a  comparative  critical  summary  of  the  various  accounts  of 
Alfred's  sorry  fate: 
By  making  Alfred's  visit  one  of  political  intention,  it  supplies  a 
motive  for  his  molestation  in  England,  which  is  lacking  from  the 
account  in  the  Chronicle,  where  his  sole  purpose  is  to  visit  his 
mother.  It  is  possible  that  the  English  writer  considered  it 
impolitic  to  state  in  the  reign  of  the  Confessor  that  his  brother's Chapter  One  148 
murderers  had  any  sort  of  provocation.  Norman  traditions,  best 
represented  by  William  of  Poitiers  and  William  of  Jumi6ges,  are 
in  agreement  with  the  Encomium  on  this  matter,  though  differing 
in  detail.  They  describe  an  earlier  attempt  by  Edward  to  recover 
his  throne,  in  which  he  came  with  40  ships  to  Southampton,  was 
met  by  an  English  force,  and,  though  victorious,  retired  to 
Normandy  with  his  booty,  because  of  the  superiority  of  the  forces 
opposed  to  him.  Harold's  cruel  treatment  of  Alfred,  who  is  said  to 
have  made  better  preparations  for  attack,  and,  sailing  from  the  port 
of  Icius  (Wissant?  ),  to  have  come  to  Canterbury,  is  explained  as 
an  attempt  to  frighten  Edward  from  making  any  further  effort. 
Like  the  'D'  version  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  Chronicle,  the  author  of 
the  Encomium  seems  anxious  to  avoid  laying  the  crime  on  Earl 
Godwine.  He  may  have  been  unwilling  to  make  an  enemy  of  a 
man  who  was  in  power  at  the  time  of  his  writing,  whereas  Harold 
was  dead  and  could  safely  be  vilified.  The  Norman  versions  lay 
great  stress  on  the  deliberate  treachery  of  Godwine,  who 
pretended  to  receive  Alfred  as  a  friend,  in  order  to  hand  him  over 
to  his  enemies.  They  are,  however,  obviously  actuated  by  a  wish 
to  justify  William  the  Conqueror's  attack  on  England  by  all 
possible  means,  and  seize  this  opportunity  of  making  it  an  act  of 
vengeance  for  the  murder  of  Alfred  by  the  machinations  of,. 
Godwine,  King  Harold  Il's  father.  (Whitelock,  pages  321-322) 
43  See  Whitelock's  commentary  from  page  322,  cited  above. 
44  Whitelock,  page  233;  ASC  C  (D).  The  Encomium  Emmse  Reginae 
offers  some  additional  graphic  detail  (see  below);  Florence  of  Worcester 
gives  substantially  the  same  account  as  that  in  the  ASC,  except  for  the 
few  additional  details  which  I've  noted  below.  This  is  not  by  any  means Chapter  One  149 
an  isolated  incident  of  the  blinding  of  heirs  of  defeated  enemies  (as 
potential  claimants  to  power)  as  a  means  of  consolidating  and  protecting 
political  gains.  See,  for  example,  the  fate  of  the  sons  of  Dunmail,  king 
of  Cumbria,  at  the  hands  of  Edmund  of  Wessex,  described  in  the  Flores 
Histoziarum  of  Roger  of  Wendover:  - 
...  King  Edmund,  relying  on  the  help  of  Leolin,  king  of  Dyfed, 
despoiled  the  whole  of  Cumbria  of  all  its  property,  and  having 
deprived  the  two  sons  of  Dunmail,  king  of  that  province,  of  their 
sight,  he  gave  the  kingdom  to  Malcom,  king  of  the  Scots,  to  hold 
of  him,  that  he  might  defend  the  northern  parts  of  England  from 
incursions  of  enemy  raiders  by  land  and  sea....  (Whitelock,  page 
257;  Flores  Histoziarum  946) 
45  Whitelock,  page  289;  Florence  1036. 
46  Whitelock,  pages  323-324.  This  entry  is  from  the  Encomium 
Emmae  Reginae. 
47  See  Stenton,  pages  422-423. 
48  See  Stenton,  pages  566-569. 
49  Whitelock,  page  291;  Florence  1040.  See  also  Stenton,  page  423, 
for  further  discussion  of  the  number  and  importance  of  Godwine's  "  oath 
helpers",  who  are  only  obliquely  mentioned  here. 
50  Note  Whitelock,  page  233;  ASC  1037  C  (D):  "In  this  year  Harold 
was  chosen  as  king  everywhere,  and  Hardacnut  was  deserted  because  he 
stayed  too  long  in  Denmark...  ".  - 
51 
-1  include  the  ASC  annal  for  comparison: 
... 
And  also  he  did  nothing  worthy  of  a  king  as  long  as  he  ruled. 
He  had  the  dead  Harold  dug  up  and  thrown  into  the  fen. 
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52  Whitelock,  page  290;  Florence  1040.  Nor  is  this  a  singular 
illustration  in  which  the  treatment  of  a  corpse  is  as  much  a  politically- 
significant  language  act  as  the  mutilation  of  a  living  body.  Florence  of 
Worcester  offers  a  similar  example  in  the  entry  for  the  year  1017.  In  an 
episode  occurring  not  long  after  the  elimination  of  Eadwig  by  Cnut 
(discussed  above),  the  king  orders  the  execution  of  Eadric,  a  character 
even  more  disparaged  than  Godwine  in  the  annals;  Eadric  had  served 
Cnut  quite  well,  it  seems,  but--unlike  Godwine--he  was  not  in  a  position 
to  protect  himself  when  Cnut  judged  it  was  time  to  dispense  with  such  a 
dangerous  servant: 
And  at  the  Lord's  Nativity,  when  he  was  in  London,  he  gave 
orders  for  the  perfidious  ealdorman  Eadric  to  be  killed  in  the 
palace  because  he  feared  to  be  at  some  time  deceived  by  his 
treachery,  as  his  former  lords  Ethelred  and  Edmund  had  frequently 
been  deceived;  and  he  ordered  his  body  to  be  thrown  over  the 
wall  of  the  city  and  left  unburied  ....  (Whitelock,  page  286; 
Florence  1017) 
Eadwig  had  been  of  use  to  Cnut,  but  he  was  an  oath-breaker,  a  liar,  a 
man  whose  pragmatic  cunning  outweighed  his  sense  of  honor.  The 
loyalty  of  such  a  man  is  suspect  because  he  has  given  false  pledges 
before.  He  can  not  be  trusted,  perhaps  especially  by  those  who  have 
made  good  use  of  his  capacity  for  treachery.  Cnut  is  an  interesting  study 
in  contrasts,  as  he  clearly  valued  the  utility  of  such  oath-breakers  when  it 
was  convenient,  and  yet  seemed  especially  conscientious  about  ridding 
himself  of  such  villains--the  lowest  form  of  life  in  the  Germanic 
conception--at  the  earliest  convenience.  His  treatment  of  the  perjurers 
who  supported  his  claim  to  the  throne  of  England  in  1016  discussed 
below,  is  another  case  in  point.  The  value  of  the  personal  integrity  and Chapter  One  15  1 
sworn  word  of  an  individual  in  this  cultural  context  can  not  be  over- 
emphasized,  even  though  political  figures  in  that  world  were  often  as 
faithless  as  in  our  own;  perhaps  this  very  emphasis  on  the  value  of  oath- 
keeping  hinged  -upon  a  knowledge  of  this  very  (perhaps  necessary) 
character  weakness  in  many  men  of  power  (see  discussion  of  oath- 
keeping  above,  and  especially  how  these  cultural  values  are  reflected  in 
Germanic  and  Anglo-Saxon  law,  below).  For  an  example  of  a  thane 
whose  faithfulness  to  a  number  of  seemingly  conflicting  oaths  of  loyalty 
provides  a  striking  contrast  to  the  feckless  Eadric,  see  the  episode  from 
the  account  of  the  life  of  Athelstan  from  William  of  Malmesbury 
discussed  below.  Cnut  was  a  man  who  used  the  text  of  the  body  broken 
to  articulate  a  number  of  levels  of  meaning,  and  this  is  not  the  only 
example  of  particular  note;  see  his  treatment  of  the  hostages  of  the 
faithless  English  subjects  of  his  father,  discussed  above.  In  this  case,  the 
rotting  corpse  of  Eadric--visible  for  all  to  see  for  an  extended  period  of 
time  and  over  the  course  of  its  decomposition  through  exposure  to  the 
elements,  animal  scavengers,  and  decay--stands  as  a  graphic  testament  to 
the  wages  of  deceit  and  faithlessness,  to  Eadric's  personal  villainy,  and-- 
most  importantly--to  the  consolidation  of  political  power  by  Cnut,  who 
could  at  this  point  afford  to  do  away  with  a  powerful  noble  who  had 
been  amongst  his  prime  supporters;  that  he  did  so  in  such  a  way  as  to 
emphasize  Eadric's  faithlessness  (remarked  upon  by  the  chronicler) 
without  drawing  undue  attention  to  his  own  complicity  in  these  crimes  is 
of  particular  note,  and  draws  attention  to  the  political  acumen  reflected 
in,  Cnut's  use  of  acts  to  articulate  a4anguage  of  personal  and  political 
power. 
53  Whitelock,  page  29  1;  Florence  1040. 
54,  Stenton,  page  423. Chapter  One  152 
55  Stenton,  page  422. 
56  Harold  was  technically  the  illegitimate  son  of  Cnut.  See  Stenton, 
pages  3  97-3  98,  for  a  brief  summary  of  Cnut's  unconventional  and 
opportunistic  private  life.  For  all  intents  and  purposes  Cnut  was  a 
bigamist;  although  he  was  never  (in  the  eyes  of  the  church)  married  to 
Harold's  mother  AElfgifu,  she  was  his  first  partner,  she  bore  his  eldest 
son,  and  he  encouraged  her  to  behave  in  Scandinavia  as  his  queen,  even 
appointing  her  regent  in  Norway  for  their  son  Swein.  During  the 
English  succession  crisis  after  the  death  of  Cnut,  Harold  was  merely 
named  regent  until  Hardacnut  could  resolve  the  difficulties  facing  him 
from  Norway  in  the  person  of  Magnus;  during  the  three  years  which 
Hardacnut  was  forced  to  remain  in  Denmark,  however,  Harold  saw  his 
opportunity  and  took  it.  See  Stenton,  pages  419-421,  for  details  of  the 
events  involved.  Harold  was  therefore  both  illegitimate  and  inconstant, 
and  Hardacnut  clearly  could  not  forgive  his  half-brother's  opportunistic 
gain  at  his  expense. 
57  Douglas  and  Greenaway,  pages  199-200;  ASC  1137  E. 
58  Douglas  and  Greenaway,  page  203;  ASC  1140  E.  This  annal  seems 
to  be  an  amalgam  of  various  events  which  occurred  during  Stephen's 
reign,  and  the  chronology  is  inaccurate.  See  the  editors'  notes,  pages 
201-203.  Note  especially  that  the  events  having  to  do  with  the  conflict 
between  Stephen  and  Henry  occurred  in  1153. 
59  Douglas  and  Greenaway,  page  203;  ASC  1154  E.  King  Stephen 
died  on  25  October  1154,  and  Henry  was  crowned  on  11  December 
1154;  this  is  the  last  entryin  the  ASC. 
60.  Henry  Charles  Lea,  The  Ordeal.  With  additional  original  documents 
in  translation  by  Arthur  E.  Howland.  Edited,  with  Introduction  and 
Bibliography  by  Edward  Peters.  From  Sources  of  Medieval  Histor7. Chapter  One  153 
Edward  Peters,  ed.  Philadelphia:  U  of  Pennsylvania  P,  1973.  Pages 
192-193.  This  excerpt  is  drawn  from  the  appendix  which  Peters  adds  to 
Lea's  work;  this  material  originally  appeared  in  a  pamphlet  by  Howland 
entitled  Ordeals,  Compurgation,  Excommunication,  and  Interdict. 
Howland  includes  the  following  information  with  his  translation  of  this 
episode: 
THE  ORDEAL  OF  GLOWING  PLOWSHARES  UNDERGONE 
BY  QUEEN  EMMA.  Source:  H.  R.  Luard,  ed.,  Annales 
Monastici,  Rerum  Britannicarum  medii  aevi  scriptores  (Rolls 
Series),  No.  36,  Vol.  II  (London,  1864),  pp.  23-4.  This  selection 
is  taken  from  the  Annals  of  Winchester,  which  themselves  are 
attributed  to  Richard  of  Devizes,  for  the  early  period  up  to  the 
Norman  Conquest.  The  ordeal  of  Queen  Emma,  under  the  entry 
for  the  year  1043,  is  probably  apocryphal,  but  illustrates  the 
twelfth-century  writer's  conception  of  the  ceremony. 
It  is  interesting  that  Howland  feels  it  necessary  to  comment  upon  what 
he  perceives  to  be  the  veracity  of  his  source;  it  is  indeed  true  that 
Anglo-Saxon  conceptions  of  what  we  would  term  "historiography"  (see 
my  note,  above)  are  often  quite  different  from  our  own.  My  purpose, 
however,  is  not  to  attempt  to  force  these  documents  into  a  modem  mold, 
discounting  or  discarding  those  which  do  not  fit;  rather,  I  am  attempting 
to  conceive  of  a  model  for  understanding  Anglo-Saxon  historical 
attitudes  as  these  pertain  to  torture,  ordeal,  dismemberment,  etc. 
Relationships  between  the  nature  of  the  spirit  and  that  of  the  body  seem 
to  have  been  important  to  some  aspects  of  these  attitudes,  and  to  me  this 
is  more  significant  than  whether  or  not  any  particular  episode  from  the 
annals  need  be  deemed  "apocryphal".  Further,  in  the  context  of  a  culture 
that  relied  upon  the  ordeal  as  a  basis  for  its  legal  system  (see  discussion, Chapter  One  154 
below),  it  is  not  exceptional  to  find  occasional  historical  references 
which  attest  to  the  utility  of  this  system. 
61  Whitelock,  page  151;  ASC  640  (639  E).  See  also  the  account  of 
Oswald's  relics  recorded  in  Bede's  Ecclesiastical  Histor7  (Book  III, 
Chapter  VI);  this  version  offers  the  context  for  this  particular  miracle, 
which  underscores  the  semiotic  function  of  these  relics  as  specific  signs 
of  piety: 
When  raised  to  that  height  of  power,  nevertheless,  wonderful  to 
relate,  he  was  always  humble,  kind  and  generous  to  poor  men  and 
strangers.  It  is  said,  in  fact,  that  on  one  occasion,  when  he  was 
sitting  at  dinner  with  the  aforesaid  bishop  on  the  holy  Easter  Day, 
and  there  was  placed  on  the  table  before  him  a  silver  dish  filled 
with  royal  delicacies,  and  they  were  already  about  to  put  forth 
their  hands  to  bless  the  bread,  there  entered  suddenly  his  thegn  to 
whom  was  committed  the  charge  of  receiving  the  poor,  and  he 
informed  the  king  that  a  great  multitude  of  poor  people,  come 
from  all  quarters,  was  sitting  in  the  streets  begging  some  alms  of 
the  king.  He  at  once  ordered  that  the  food  placed  in  front  of  him 
should  be  carried  to  the  poor,  and  also  that  the  dish  should  be 
broken  up  and  divided  in  portions  among  them.  At  which  sight 
the  bishop  who  sat  by  him,  delighted  at  such  an  act  of  piety, 
seized  his  right  hand  and  said:  "  May  this  hand  never  decay.  " 
And  it  happened  according  to  his  prayer.  For  when  he  had  been 
killed  in  battle,  and  his  hands  and  arms  were  cut  off  from  his 
body,  it  happens  that  they  remain  incorrupt  until  this  day;  and 
they  are  kept  enclosed  in  a  silver  coffer  in  the  church  of  St.  Peter 
in  the  king's  town  which  is  called  after  a  certain  former  queen, Chapter  One  155 
Bebbe  by  name,  and  they  are  venerated  with  due  honour  by  all. 
(Whitelock,  page  626) 
It  is  clear  from  this  account  that  Oswald's  hands  do  not  decay  because  of 
the  pious  actions  which  he  performed  with  those  hands,  and  because  of 
the  blessing  which  those  hands  received  from  the  bishop  as  a  result  of 
those  actions.  In  this  context,  Oswald's  hands  serve  as  signs  in  much  the 
same  way  as  the  severed  hands  of  corrupt  moneyers  serve  as  signs, 
although  they  are  meant  to  reflect  very  different  spiritual  realities;  the 
moneyer's  hands  are  meant  to  articulate  the  sin  of  the  criminal  and  the 
power  of  the  state,  while  Oswald's  hands  articulate  the  holiness  of  the 
saint  and  the  power  of  the  divine. 
62  Whitelock,  page  169;  ASC  798  (F).  For  similar  reports  of 
undecayed  bodies  representing  spiritual  innocence  and  piety,  see  (for 
example),  the  accounts  of  Fursa,  Queen  AEthelthryth,  St.  Cuthbert,  and 
St.  Guthlac  (Whitelock  633,658-659  &  694,669,  and  712,  respectively). 
63  See  Whitelock,  page  366.  -Note  especially  the  distinction  between 
"thieves"  (up  to  seven  men),  "a  band"  (seven  to  thirty-five  men),  and  "  an 
army"  (over  thirty-five  men),  and  the  respective  penalties  for  complicity 
with  each  (laws  13.1  and  14-15,  respectively).  Note  also  that  a  stranger 
or  foreigner  who  travels  off  the  regular  track  must  shout  or  blow  a  horn, 
or  be  considered  a  thief  (law  20,  which  is  almost  identical  with  law  28  of 
Wihtred  (Whitelock,  page  364)). 
64  Whitelock,  page  366. 
65  Whitelock,  page  368.  Note  that  here  not  only  is  public  reputation--or 
renown--a  primary  factor,  but  the  ordeal--to  which  I  will  turn  presently-- 
is  the  first  method  which  the  law  mentions  by  which  the  accused  may  be 
found  guilty.  It  is  interesting  that  the  writer  did  not  emulate  the  above 
entry  and  place  obvious  guilt  ahead  of  the  ordeal. Chapter  One  156 
66  See  Whitelock,  pages  364-372.  See  especially  laws  12  (death 
sentence  for  thievery,  if  not  redeemed  through  wergild),  16  (slayer  of 
thief  may  swear  to  thief's  guilt),  21  (slayer  of  an  announced  foreigner 
may  swear  that  he  slew  him  as  a  thief  (if  deed  is  not  concealed)  and  thus 
avoid  paying  wergild),  and  35  (kinsmen  of  openly  slain  thief  have  no 
right  to  feud). 
67  Whitelock,  page  375.  Note  that  the  thief  may  redeem  his  hand 
through  the  payment  of  wergild;  this  is  also  true  of  the  slanderer 
(discussed  below): 
6.1.  And  if  he  wishes  to  redeem  the  hand,  and  that  is  allowed  to 
him,  he  is  to  pay  in  proportion  to  his  wergild.  (Whitelock,  page 
375) 
68  Whitelock,  page  377.  Note  that  in  this  case  the  slave  may  not 
redeem  his  member  through  the  payment  of  wergild;  according  to  this 
code,  a  freeman  would  have  paid  a  fine.  William's  justice  concerning 
rape  was  as  harsh  as  this,  but  more  equitably  dispensed  (see  discussion 
thereof). 
69  Whitelock,  page  384. 
70  Whitelock,  page  420.  Whitelock  points  out  that  8.1  is  derived  from 
Athelstan  14.1,  cited  above. 
71  Whitelock,  page  423.  See  especially  Whitelock's  note  1,  which 
compares  these  laws  with  those  of  Ethelred  upon  which  they  are  based; 
it  is  of  considerable  significance  that  where  the  earlier  codes  called  for 
execution,  Cnut  has  substituted  mutilation. 
7ý 
. 
Whitelock,  page  424. 
73  Whitelock,  page  426. 
74  Whitelock,  page  426.  Note  that  the  penalties  for  men  are  far  lighter, 
and  involve  spiritual  atonement  rather  than  physical  mutilation.  . Chapter  One  157 
Presumably  women  are  to  atone  spiritually,  as  well,  but  the  emphasis  on 
marking  their  bodies  with  public  guilt  is  particularly  significant 
considering  that  men  suffer  their  atonement  much  more  privately.  See 
laws  54-55,  Whitelock,  page  427. 
75  See  especially  Stenton,  page  397.  Stenton  suggests  that,  although 
Cnut  was  the  first  Viking  king  to  be  embraced  by  the  "  civilized 
fraternity  of  Christian  kings",  and  was  sincere  in  his  commitment  to 
Christianity,  his  fundamentally  "barbarian"  (Germanic)  nature  was 
reflected  in  both  his  political  and  his  personal  affairs.  I  suggest  that  this 
Germanic  influence  also  might  be  reflected  in  his  legal  reasoning 
(regarding  the  utilization  of  the  body  as  sign)  on  the  basis  of  such 
arguments  as  Gaudemet's  (cited  below),  that  concepts  of  the  physical 
manifestation  of  divine  revelation  concerning  spiritual  nature  are  pre- 
Christian,  and,  when  they  occur  in  a  Christian  context,  are  "more  pagan 
than  Christian" 
76  Douglas  and  Greenaway,  pages  399-400.  See  especially  the  preface 
to  this  extract,  which  also  notes  the  shift  in  the  system  of  jurisprudence 
applied  to  the  Normans  from  the  traditional  Anglo-Saxon  one: 
Note  may  be  made  of  the  introduction  of  trial  by  battle,  in  cases 
where  Normans  were  concerned,  as  an  alternative  to  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  system  of  wager-at-law  and  ordeal.  -(Douglas  and 
Greenaway,  page  399) 
Although  trial  by  comb  at  is  related  to  other  forms  of  trial  by  ordeal  (see 
my  discussion  of  an  example  of  Norman  trial  by  combat,  above),  it  is  not 
precisely  the  same,  and  diverges  most  apparently  in  that  it  is  bilateral, 
while  the  other  ordeals  are  unilateral.  See  Lea,  The  Ordeal,  page  3: 
Although  the  wager  of  battle  and  the  other  ordeals  have  much  in 
common,  there  is  sufficient  distinction  between  them  to  render Chapter  One  158 
convenient  their  separate  consideration,  even  at  the  risk  of  a  little 
occasional  repetition.  The  development  and  career  of  these  forms 
of  the  judgment  of  God  were  not  in  all  respects  similar,  nor  was 
their  employment  in  all  cases  the  same.  The  mere  fact  that  the 
duel  was  necessarily  a  bilateral  ordeal,  to  which  both  sides  had  to 
submit,  in  itself  establishes  a  limit  as  to  the  cases  fitted  for  its 
employment  ... 
[m]oreover,  in  its  origin  it  was  simply  a  device  for 
regulating  under  conditions  of  comparative  fairness  the  primitive 
law  of  force,  and  the  conception  of  the  intervention  of  a  Divine 
Power,  whereby  victory  would  enure  to  the  right,  probably  was  a 
belief  subsequently  engrafted  on  it.  In  the  other  ordeals  this  is  the 
fundamental  idea  on  which  theywere  based.... 
77  Douglas  and  Greenaway,  pages  476-477.  See  especially  page  476, 
note  4,  and  page  477,  note  1. 
78  Douglas  and  Greenaway,  page  400. 
79  Douglas  and  Greenaway,  page  164;  ASC  1087  E. 
80  Lea,  The  Ordeal,  pages  xiv-xv.  From  Peters'  introduction;  internal 
citation  from  Roscoe  Pound,  Jutisprudence  (St.  Paul,  MN,  1959),  page 
369. 
81  Lea,  The  Ordeal,  page  xvii.  From  Peters'  introduction. 
82  Malise  Ruthven,  Torture:,  The  Grand  Conspiraq7.  London: 
Weidenfeld  and  Nicolson,  1978.  Page  44. 
83,  Lea,  The  Ordeal,  page  30,  Note  also  Lea's  comment  that  papal 
approval  or  disapproval  of  the  ordeal  was  utterly  unimportant  in  the  day- 
to-day  functioning  of  the  Church  at  large  (page  163),  and  his  discussion 
of  various  examples  of  the  institutionalization  of  practices  of  the  ordeal 
(pages  163-168). 
84.  Lea,  The  Ordeal,  page  xxv.  From  Peters'  introduction. Chapter  One  159 
85  Lea,  The  Ordeal,  page  xxvi.  From  Peters'  introduction.  See  also 
Ruthven,  page  45: 
It  gradually  became  apparent,  however,  that  the  Almighty  did  not 
exercise  such  a  direct  and  immediate  control  over  human  affairs 
and  th  at  punishm  ent  for  p  erjury  w  as,  likely  as  not,  to  bed  eferre  d 
to  the  next  world.  In  secular  law  the  various  trials  by  ordeal 
generally  replaced  compurgation  as  a  means  of  determining  guilt 
in  criminal  prosecutions.  Broadly  speaking  they  were  of  two 
kinds:  the  bilateral  ordeals,  in  which  the  contending  parties 
submitted  themselves  to  a  form  of  contest  such  as  the  judicial  duel 
or  the  ordeal  of  the  cross  (in  which  they  had  to  stand  with  uplifted 
arms  before  the  crucifix  while  masses  were  said,  victory  going  to 
whoever  kept  up  this  position  for  longest);  and  the  unilateral 
ordeals,  such  as  the  hot  iron  or  boiling  water,  in  which  God  was 
expected  to  indicate  his  judgement  directly,  by  preventing  injury 
to  the  innocent. 
86  See  Stenton,  pages  339-340. 
87  Whitelock,  page  278.  This  entry  is  taken  from  De  Gestis  Regum 
Anglorum,  section  13  1. 
M  Whitelock,  pages  373-374. 
89  Whitelock,  page  363.  By  this  time  there  are  systems  even  more 
complex  than  this  one  which  utilize  a  series  of  wergild  equivalents  in 
01  rder  to  determine  how  many  oath-helpers  are  necessary  to  exculpate  an 
individual  who  stands  accused  of  a  particular  crime.  These  complexities 
are  not  of  immediate  importance  to  my  argument,  except  as  examples  of 
attempts  to  reconcile  the  Germanic  tradition  of  the  sanctity  of  the  sworn 
oath  with  the  realities  of  a  culture  which  is  no  longer  structured  around 
the  small  village  and  clan  community.  In  these  earlier,  more  insular Chapter  One  160 
environments,  reputation  would  have  offered  a  reasonable  barometer  for 
measuring  the  value  of  any  particular  individual's  testimony,  and  social 
pressure  reasonably  could  have  been  assumed  to  deter  most  individuals 
from  departing  from  socially  accepted  norms  (such  as  oath-keeping). 
See  Lea's  comment  concerning  "undifferentiated"  systems  of  social 
control  in  primitive  societies,  cited  above.  For  examples  of  such 
complex,  wergild-based  systems  of  weighing  oaths,  see  the  laws  of  Ine 
(in  Whitelock),  -and  particularly  note  3  on  page  369,  and  note  3  on  page 
370.  It  is  especially  significant  that  the  right  to  swear  an  oath  is  forfeited 
through  previous  convictions--particularly  convictions  for  perjury--and 
that  the  fine  for  each  crime  represents  the  amount  of  the  aggregate 
wergild  (expressed  in  hides)  necessary  for  the  oath  to  be  sworn.  In  other 
words,  the  wargild  value  of  the  accused  must  equal  the  value  assigned  to 
the  fine  for  the  crime  in  question,  or  else  the  accused  must  engage  oath- 
helpers,  the  combined  wergild  of  whom  brings  the  value  up  to  the 
assigned  level.  Thus  social  status  plays  a  vital  role  in  determining  the 
value  of  one's  word,  as  higher  castes  receive  higher  wergilds.  Note  that 
the  values  attributed  to  fines  and  oaths  according  to  this  system  are 
derived  from  relative  wergild  values,  but  are  not  necessarily  identical  in 
amount  to  those  values. 
90  Whitelock,  page  361. 
91  Whitelock,  page  383. 
92  Whitelock,  page  386. 
93  Whitelock,  page  378. 
94  Whitelock,  pages  396-397. 
9.5  Whitelock,  page  400.  As  this  entire  system  has  bearing  on  issues 
concerning  the  place  of  oath  and  witness  in  Anglo-Saxon  England,  I Chapter  One  161 
include  the  other  laws  relating  to  this  institutionalization  of  witnessing  in 
order  to  provide  context: 
3.  Namely,  then,  it  is  my  will  that  every  man  is  to  be  under  surety 
both  within  the  boroughs  and  outside  the  boroughs.  1 
3.1.  And  witness  is  to  be  aPpointed  for  each  borough  and  for  each 
hundred. 
4.  Thirty-six  are  to  be  chosen  as  witness  for  each  borough; 
S.  twelve  for  small  boroughs  and  for  each  hundred,  unless  you 
wish  for  more.  I 
6.  And  every  man  is  with  their  witness  to  buy  and  sell  all  goods 
that  he  buys  and  sells,  in  either  a  borough  or  a  wapentake. 
6.1.  And  each  of  them,  when  he  is  first  chosen  as  a  witness,  is  to 
take  an  oath  that  never;  for  money  or  love  or  fear,  will  he  deny 
any  of  the  things  for  which  he  was  a  witness  -  and  will  never 
declare  anything  in  his  testimony  but  that  alone  which  he  saw  and 
heard. 
6.2.  --.  And  two  or  three  of  the  men  thus  sworn  in  are  to  be  witness 
at  every  transaction. 
7.  And  he  who  rides  out  to  make  any  purchase  is  to  inform  his 
neighbours  what  he  is  going  for;  and  when  he  comes  home  he  is 
also  to  announce  in  whose  witness  he  bought  the  goods. 
8.  If,  however,  when  out  on  any  journey,  he  unexpectedly  makes 
a  purchase,  without  having  announced  it  when  he  set  out,  he  is  to 
ý;,  ,  announce  it  when  he  comes  home;  and  if  it  is  livestock,  he  is  to 
bring  it  on  to  the  common  pasture  with  the  witness  of  his  village. 
8.1.  If  he  does  not  do  so  within  five  days,  the  villagers  are  to 
inform  the  man  in  charge  of  the  hundred,  and  both  themselves  and 
.  --  their  herdsmen  are  to  be  immune  from  penalty;  and  he  who Chapter  One  162 
brought  it  there  is  to  forfeit  the  cattle,  because  he  would  not 
announce  it  to  his  neighbours;  and  the  lord  of  the  estate  is  to 
succeed  to  half,  and  the  hundred  to  half. 
9.  If,  however,  it  remains  on  the  common  pasture  more  than  five 
days  unannounced,  he  is  to  forfeit  the  cattle,  and  each  of  the 
herdsmen  is  to  be  flogged;  and  there  is  to  be  no  remission  of  that, 
no  matter  what  refuge  they  reach;  and  he  is  nevertheless  to 
declare  in-whose  witness  he  bought  that  cattle. 
10.  If  then  he  declares  that  he  bought  it  with  the  witness  of  the 
men  who  are  nominated  as  witnesses,  either  in  a  borough  or  in  a 
hundred,  and  the  man  in  charge  of  the  hundred  discovers  that  it  is 
true,  he  is  nevertheless  to  forfeit  the  cattle,  because  he  would  not 
announce  it  to  his  neighbours;  nor  to  the  man  in  charge  of  his 
hundred;  and  he  is  to  suffer  no  more  loss  in  this  matter. 
It  is  clear  that  in  this  system  the  word  of  the  individual  involved  is 
judged  to  be  (potentially)  self-serving,  so  the  oath  of  a  (presumably) 
objective  official  witness  is  to  stand  in  its  stead;  thus  the  weight  of  this 
system  --although  still  resting;  in  the  end,  upon  the  trustworthiness  of  the 
witness  involved  (and  therefore,  ultimately,  upon  the  value  of  oaths:  in 
this  regard  note  especially  6.  I)--is  shifting  from  the  uncorrob  orated  oath 
of  the  freeman  to  the  corroborating  balance  of  the  oath  of  his  impartial 
peers.  Note  also  the  attempt  to  engage  the  community  in  the  act  of 
witnessing,  and  therefore  to  reinstate  the  traditional  element  of  peer 
control  present  in  earlier  Germanic  social  structures  (laws  7-9, 
especially);  in  this  regard  see  my  discussion  of  Lea's  comment 
concerning  "undifferentiated"  social  control  in  early  Germanic  societies 
(discussed  above  in  the  text),  and  my  analysis  of  complex  systems 
combining  wergild  values  and  oaths  in  order  to  attempt  to  reconcile  a Chapter  One  163 
traditional  Germanic  legal  system  with  a  much  more  complex  Anglo- 
Saxon  social  context  (discussed  above  in  the  notes). 
96  Whitelock,  page  424.  -  Healsfang  refers  to  a  portion  of  the  wergild; 
see  Whitelock,  page  363,  note  3. 
97  Whitelock,  page  416. 
98  Whitelock,  pages  284-285;  Florence  10  16. 
99  Frederick  Pollock  and  Frederic  William  Maitland,  The  History  of 
English  Law  before  the  Time  of  Edward  L  Vol.  11.2nd  ed.  London:  C. 
I  Clay  and  Sons,  1898.  Page  600.  - 
100  Langbein,  page  6.  Lea  agrees  with  Langbein's  general  analysis  of 
the  popular  basis  for  the  ordeal.  See  The  Ordeal,  page  30,  and  most 
especially  see  page  158: 
...  the  ordeal  sometimes  was  regarded  as  the  most  satisfactory  kind 
of  proof,  entitled  to  respect  beyond  any  other  species  of  evidence. 
The  age  was  not  logical,  men  acted  more  from  impulse  than  from 
reason,  and  the  forms  of  jurisprudence  were  still  in  a  state  too 
chaotic  for  regular  and  invariable  rules  to  be  laid  down. 
However,  Lea  also  suggests  that,  while  the  ordeal  was  popularly 
perceived  as  the  judgment  of  God,  it  was  not  without  its  shortcomings, 
and  critics  might  be  found  even  amongst  its  supporters.  See  The  Ordeal, 
pages  153-162.  In  particular,  Lea  points  out  that  popular  sentiment  and 
the  dictates  of  common  sense  were  probably  not  altered  by  the  results  of 
a  trial  by  ordeal,  any  more  than  they  are  amongst  our  contemporaries  by 
a  trial  by  jury  (page  153).  He  goes  on  to  note  that  "the  result  depended 
mostly  upon  those  who  administered  the  ordeal"  (page  IS8),  and  that 
contemporaries  were  aware  of  the  potential  abuses  of  the  system  (pages 
158-159).  It  is  particularly  noteworthy  that  ordeal  could  be  overridden 
by  confession  or  public  opinion  (pages  154-155).  In  such  a  context  of Chapter  One  164 
seeming  paradox  and  ambivalent  justice,  elaborate  rationalizations  were 
required  to  validate  the  system.  See  Lea's  discussion  of  this 
phenomenon  on  page  155: 
The  manifest  injustice  of  the  decisions  thus  rendered  by  the  ordeal 
put  a  severe  strain  on  the  faith  of  believers,  and  led  them  to  the 
most  ingenious  sophistry  for  an  explanation.  (Page  155) 
Lea  discusses  several  of  such  paradoxical  cases  and  the  elaborate 
explanations  constructed  to  reconcile  the  outcome  of  the  ordeal  with 
contradictory  public  perceptions  of  guilt  (pages  155-157).  Finally,  Lea 
notes  that  laws  were  enacted  to  try  to  curtail  such  abuses  (pages  159- 
160). 
101  Lea,  The  Ordeal,  page  160.  The  statistics  which  Lea  cites  are  from 
Maitland;  although  the  period  of  Maitland's  study  is  somewhat  later 
than  that  of  my  primary  concern,  it  is  a  period  from  which  many  records 
survive,  and--as  Lea  notes--it  is  also  a  period  in  which  the  ordeal  was 
frequently  invoked.  It  seems  reasonable  to  assume  that  this  trend  of 
acquittal  extended  throughout  the  imposition  of  the  law  of  the  ordeal, 
and  undoubtedly  contributed  to  its  continuing  popularity.  Lea  also  notes 
that  the  one  case  in  which  the  accused  was  not  acquitted  involved  the 
cold-water  ordeal.  Pollock  and  Maitland  suggest  that  the  chances  in  the 
ordeal  were  about  even. 
102  Lea,  The  Ordeal,  page  xx.  From  Peters'  introduction;  this  is  a 
citation  from  Jean  Gaudemet,  "Les  ordalies  au  moyen  age:  Doctrine, 
legislation,  et  pratique  canoniques,  "  Receuils  de  la  Soci&6  Jean  Bodin, 
Vol.  XVII,  La  Preuve:  Deuxi6me  Panie,  MOYen  age  et  temps  modernes 
(Brussels,  1965),  pages  103-104. 
103  Theodore  F.  T.  Plucknett,  A  Concise  Histor7  of  the  Common  Law. 
5th  ed.  London:  Butterworth  &  Co.,  Ltd.,  1956.  Page  115.  As  I Chapter  One  165 
mentioned  in  the  first  part  of  this  chapter,  the  role  of  the  oath-helper  has 
more  to  do  with  the  public  reputation  (or  indeed  power  and  influence)  of 
the  accused  than  with  the  evidentiary  role  of  the  witness  with  which  we 
are  familiar.  See  also  Pollock  and  Maitland,  page  601: 
...  when  the  witness  was  adduced,  he  came  merely  in  order  that  he 
might  swear  to  a  set  formula.  His  was  no  promissory  oath  to  tell 
the  truth  in  answer  to  questions,  but  an  assertory  oath.  We  shaft 
see  hereafter  that  the  English  procedure  of  the  thirteenth  century 
expects  a  plaintiff  to  be  accompanied  by  a  'suit'  of  witnesses  of 
this  kind,  witnesses  who  are  prepared  to  support  his  oath  in  case 
the  proof  is  awarded  to  him. 
See  also  R.  C.  van  Caenegem,  The  Birth  of  the  English  Common  Law, 
Cambridge:  Cambridge  UP,  1973.  Page  66.  Note  that  Caenegem,  uses 
the  terms  "  oath-helpers"  and  "  compurgators"  interchangeably. 
104  Whitelock,  page  371. 
105  Whitelock,  pages  422-423. 
106  Lea,  The  Ordeal,  page  19  1.  -  This  excerpt  is  drawn  from  the 
Howland  material  in  the  appendix;  Howland  includes  the  following 
information  with  his  translation: 
Aet.  helstanes  Domas,  1,  c.  23:  Of  Him  Who  Gives  Pledge  for  an 
Ordeal. 
For  an  overview  of  the  methods  of  ordeal,  see  Lea,  The  Ordeal,  pages 
32-93;  for  concepts  of  consecrated  foods  used  in  ordeals  see  Lea,  The 
Ordeal,  pages  93-10S.  For  examples  of  ordeal  in  Anglo-Saxon  England, 
and  the  sources  of  the  accounts,  see  the  appendix  to  The  Ordeal,  pages 
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107  Lea,  The  Ordeal,  pages'191-192.  'This  excerpt  is  drawn  from  the 
Howland  material  in  the  appendix;  Howland  includes  the  following 
information  with  his  translation: 
Aethelstanes  Domas,  IV  c.  7:  Doom  Concerning  Hot  Iron  and 
Water. 
108  See  Lea,  The  Ordeal,  page'l  75: 
In  England,  a  rescript  of  Henry  III.,  dated  January  27,1219,  , 
directs  the  judges  then  starting  on  their  circuits  to  employ  other 
modes  of  proof--  "  seeing  that  the  judgment  of  fire  and  water  is 
forbidden  by  the  Church  of  Rome.  " 
For  the  significance  of  this  change,  see  also  S.  F.  C.  Milsom,,  Histofical 
Foundations  of  the  Common  Law.  London:  Butterworth  &  Co.,  Ltd., 
1969.  Page  359: 
It  is  today  impossible  to  imagine  the  practical  and  intellectual 
disarray  caused  by  this  decision.  The  responsibility  for  putting 
men  to  death  could  no  longer  be  rested  comfortably  upon  God, 
and  the  only  known  governmental  decision  did  not  seek  to  rest  it 
anywhere.  The  judges  going  on  eyre  in  1219  were  told  to 
imprison  those  accused  of  grave  crimes  and  thought  dangerous, 
44yet  so  that  they  do  not  incur  danger  of  life  or  limb  by  reason  of 
our  prison";  to  allow  those  accused  of  medium  crimes  to  abjure 
the  realm;  and  to  take  security  for  good  behavior  from  those 
accused  of  lesser  offences.  No  trials  were  contemplated  because 
no  trials  were  now  possible. 
The  emphasis  of  this  directive  on  the  preservation  of  the  life  of  the 
accused  is  especially  noteworthy.  The  shift  from  divine  to  temporal 
judgment  necessitated  by  the  papal  decision  of  12  IS  was  at  the  root  of 
this  perplexity,  and  provides  us  with  a  possible  reason,  not  only  for  the Chapter  One  167 
reticence  of  Henry  III  to  take  responsibility  for  the  death  penalty,  but 
also  for  the  shift  under  the  Conqueror  from  capital  to  mutilative  , 
punishment  which  was  concurrent  with  the  beginning  of  the  Norman 
shift  from  trial  by  ordeal  to  trial  by  combat.  As  the  system  of  trial  by 
ordeal  came  under  question,  -it  is  possible  that  English  monarchs  as  early 
as  William  were  unwilling  to  take  the  responsibility  for  spilling 
(possibly)  innocent  blood.  See  my  discussion  of  William's  law  against 
capital  punishment,  above. 
109  Ruthven,  page  46.  For  a  thorough  overview  of  the  debate  which 
culminated  in  the  abolition  of  the  ordeal  in  Canon  18  of  the  Fourth 
Lateran  Council,  see  John  W.  Baldwin,  "The  Intellectual  Preparation  for 
the  Canon  of  1215  against  Ordeals.  "  Speculum  36  (1961):  613-636. 
For  an  analysis  of  the  legal  (as  opposed  to  theological)  criticism  of  the 
ordeal,  see  R.  C.  van  Caenegem,  "The  Law  of  Evidence  in  the  Twelfth 
Century:  European  Perspective  and  Intellectual  Background.  " 
Proceedings  of  the  Second  International  Congress  of  Medieval  Canon 
Law:  Boston  College,  12-16  August  1963.  Stephen  Kuttner  and  J. 
Joseph  Ryan,  eds.  Institute  of  Medieval  Canon  Law,  Series  C:  Subsidia, 
Vol.  1.  E  Civitate  Vaticana:  S.  Congregatio  de  Seminariis  et  Studiorum 
Universitatibus,  1965.297-3  10.  See  especially  page  297: 
Between  1100  and  1200  the  modes  of  proof  which  had  prevailed 
for  centuries  went  through  a  crisis  which  would  eventually  lead  to 
their  disappearance.  The  old  system,  which  we  might  call 
primitive  or  irrational  or  mystical,  gave  pride  of  place  to  ordeals, 
compurgation  with  oath-helpers  and  the  like  as  means  of  asserting 
who  was  right  or  wrong,  who  was  innocent  or  guilty.  The  appeal 
to  the  supernatural  was  part  and  parcel  of  the  practice  of  the  courts 
secular  and  ecclesiastical  and  these  means  of  proof  were  , Chapter  One  168 
administered  by  the  clergy  as  sacramentaUa  provided  with  the 
appropriate  liturgy.  In  the  twelfth  century  this  practice  came 
under  attack  from  various  quarters  and  began  to  give  way  to 
rational  means  of  proof  based  on  human  enquiry  and  reasoning; 
they  are  mainly  the  hearing  of  evidence  from  witnesses,  the 
analysis  of  various  indications  and  the  inspection  of  written 
documents. 
See  also  Caenegem's  discussion  of  this  period  of  legal  upheavel  in  The 
Birth-,  pages  62-73.  For  other  critics  of  the  ordeal,  see  Lea,  The 
Ordeal,  page  163;  for  a  discussion  of  the  growth  of  papal  opposition  to 
the  ordeal,  beginning  with  the  condemnation  of  the  ordeal  as  a  popular 
invention  by  Alexander  II  (ca.  1070),  and  culminating  in  the  formal 
forbidding  of  ecclesiastical  participation  in  trials  by  ordeal  in  1215,  see 
pages  168-174. 
I  10  Lea,  The  Ordeal,  page  xviii.  From  Peters'  introduction.  Ruthven 
also  discusses  the  role  of  the  reemerging  Roman  law  in  inciting  this 
dawning  consciousness  of  the  relationship  between  law  and  public 
welfare;  see  page  50.  For  a  discussion  of  the  banning  of  the  ordeals  as 
pan  of  a  general  rationalization  of  government  as  well  as  law,  see 
Ruthven,  page  49.  See  also  Ruthven's  discussion  on  page  51  of  the  rise 
of  confession  and  of  written  proofs: 
The  reintroduction  of  torture,  then,  was  less  the  direct 
consequence  of  the  revival  of  Roman  law  than  the  result  of  much 
wider  changes  in  criminal  procedure,  in  particular  the  decline  of 
the  ordeals  and  the  change  from  oral  to  written  proofs.  In  the 
latter  case  the  Roman  law  was  a  decisive  influence.  By  the 
thirteenth  century  the  canon  law,  and  increasingly  the  secular  law, 
were  placing  emphasis  on  the  need  for  written  instruments  and Chapter  One  169 
witnesses  as  the  best  kind  of  proof.  In  the  nature  of  things,  the 
Roman  requirement  that  two  witnesses  were  necessary  in  the  case 
of  serious  crime  must  often  have  been  hard  to  satisfy.  In  earlier 
times,  confession  had  always  been  an  alternative  to  the  archaic 
forms  of  proof--in  fact  some  of  the  ordeals,  such  as  the  holy 
morsel  were,  whether  consciously  or  not,  designed  to  elicit  it. 
There  was  also  a  strong  tradition  in  canon  law,  deriving  no  doubt 
from  the  practice  of  sacramental  confession,  that  a  confession  was 
final  and  incontrovertible--the  'proof  of  proofs'  or  'queen  of 
proofs'  as  it  was  known  to  lawyers.  Confession  could,  therefore, 
under  the  new  and  more  difficult  rules,  obviate  the  requirement 
for  'legal  proof'  in  the  form  of  at  least  two  witnesses.  While  these 
changes  were  happening,  the  painful  ordeals  though  banned,  were 
still  in  recent  memory.  It  is  hardly  surprising,  therefore,  that 
judges  and  lawyers  should  have  found  torture  a  convenient 
substitute  for  the  old  ordeals,  ideally  suited  to  the  requirements  of 
the  new  procedure. 
See  also  Lea,  The  Ordeal,  page  180: 
While  the  prohibitions  uttered  by  the  papacy  had  undoubtedly 
much  to  do  in  influencing  monarchs  to  abolish  the  ordeal,  there 
were  other  causes  of  scarcely  less  weight  working  to  the  same 
end.  The  revival  of  the  Roman  law  in  the  twelfth  and  thirteenth 
centuries  and  the  introduction  of  torture  as  an  unfailing  expedient 
in  doubtful  cases  did  much  to  influence  the  secular  tribunals 
.II  against  all  ordeals. 
III  See,  for  example,  Ruthven,  pages  43-44. 
112  See  Langbein,  pages  5-6: Chapter  One  170 
The  Roman-canon  law  of  proof  was  the  successor  to  the  ordeals, 
the  nonrational  proofs  of  Germanic  antiquity.  When  the  Fourth 
Lateran  Council  of  1215  abolished  the  ordeals,  it  destroyed  an 
entire  system  of  proof. 
113  Ruthven,  page  7.  For  a  discussion  of  why  torture  (as  defined  by 
legal  historians)  as  a  systematic  legal  procedure  did  not  take  root  in 
English  law,  see  Henry  Charles  Lea,  Superstition  and  Force:  Essays  on 
The  Wager  of  Law,  The  Wager  of  Battle,  The  Ordeal,  Torture.  4th  ed., 
rev.  Philadelphia:  Lea  Brothers  &  Co.,  1892.  Pages  563-564.  See  also 
Peters,  pages  58-59.  See  also  Ruthven,  page  7. 
114  Pollock  and  Maitland,  page  650.  For  a  similar  commentary  on  the 
vacuum  of  a  tenable  system  of  jurisprudence  in  the  aftermath  of  the 
abolition  of  the  ordeal,  see  Plucknett,  pages  118-119. 
115  Ruthven,  Page  25.  See  also  Ruthven,  page  47: 
Although  the  ordeals  were  primarily  ways  of  determining 
judgement,  there  is  evidence  that  they  were  sometimes  used  to 
procure  confessions.  A  suspect  might  confess  rather  than  face  the 
ordeal:  from  there  it  was  but  a  short  step  to  applying  the  test,  not 
as  a  way  of  determining  judgement,  but  in  order  to  procure  the 
confession.  The  likelihood  of  the  painful  methods,  such  as  hot 
iron  or  water,  being  used  in  this  way  increased  once  the  procedure 
of  trial  by  ordeal  fell  under  the  papal  ban.  What  followed  was  not, 
in  the  first  instance,  so  much  the  introduction  of  torture  as  the 
continuation  of  the  ordeals  under  a  new  mode  of  procedure. 
116  See  Douglas  and  Greenaway,  page  476.  See  also  my  discussion  of 
this  shift,  above. 
117  See  Lea,  Superstition  and  Force,  page  429.  According  to  the 
technical  definition  of  torture  used  by  legal  historians,  "torture"  is  a  term Chapter  One  171 
which  only  can  be  applied  to-physical  torment  which  is  inflicted  within  a 
system  of  jurisprudence  in  order  to  extract  confession  and  corroborative 
evidence  (see  my  discussion  of  definitions  of  torture  in  my 
Introduction);  in  such  a  context,  ordeal  and  torture--although  not  polar 
opposites--are  fundamentally  different  kinds  of  legal  processes,  which-- 
although  both  may  certainly  involve  the  deliberate  and  systematic 
application  of  pain--are  each  utilized  in  separate  legal  systems  which 
generally  do  not  coexist.  See  page  429: 
The  ordeal  and  torture,  in  fact,  are  virtual  substitutes  for  each 
other.  It  will  be  seen  that  they  have  rarely  coexisted,  and  that,  as  a 
general  rule,  the  legislation  which  depended  on  the  one  rejected 
the  other. 
As  I  make  clear  in  my  Introduction,  I  do  not  define  torture  this  narrowly, 
and  thus  both  a  legal  system  which  depends  upon  divine  intervention 
and  one  which  relies  upon  confession  might  fall  under  the  auspices  of 
my  study,  provided  that  each  utilizes  the  deliberate  and  systematic 
application  of  pain  as  a  regular  pan  of  the  process  involved.  For  me, 
44 
-  ordeal"  is  a  subcategory  of  "torture",  as  the  model  from  which  I  derive 
my  definition  of  the  latter  is  anthropological  and  semiotic,  rather  than 
legal  and  historical.  It  might  be  useful,  however,  to  have  a  working 
knowledge  of  the  distinction  between  the  philosophical  bases  for  each  of 
these  legal  concepts.  On  page  4  of  The  Ordeal,  Lea  offers  a  cross- 
cultural  analysis  of  the  concept  of  the  ordeal: 
...  we  find  in  the  religious  history  of  almost  all  races  that  a  belief  in 
a  Divine  Being  is  accompanied  with  the  expectation  that  special 
manifestations  of  power  will  be  made  on  all  occasions,  and  that 
the  interposition  of  Providence  may  be  had  for  the  asking, 
whenever  man,  in  the  pride  of  his  littleness,  condescends  to  waive Chapter  One  172 
his  own  judgment,  and  undertakes  to  test  the  inscrutable  ways  of 
his  Creator  by  the  touchstone  of  his  own  limited  reason.  Thus 
miracles  come  to  be  expected  as  matters  of  every-day  occurrence, 
and  the  laws  of  nature  are  to  be  suspended  whenever  man  chooses 
to  tempt  his  God  with  the  promise  of  right  and  the  threat  of 
injustice  to  be  committed  in  His  name.  To  this  tendency  of  the 
human  mind  is  attributable  the  almost  universal  adoption  of  the 
so-called  Judgment  of  God,  by  which  men,  oppressed  with  doubt, 
have  essayed  in  all  ages  to  relieve  themselves  from  responsibility 
by  calling  in  the  assistance  of  Heaven.  Nor,  in  so  doing,  have 
they  seemed  to  appreciate  the  self-exaltation  implied  in  the  act 
itself,  but  in  all  humility  have  cast  themselves  and  their  sorrows  at 
the  feet  of  the  Great  Judge,  making  a  merit  of  abnegating  the 
reason  which,  however  limited,  has  been  bestowed  to  be  used  and 
not  rejected. 
See  also  Caenegem,  The  Birth...,  pages  62-63,  for  a  comparison  of 
"irrational"  versus  "rational"  modes  of  proof.  Compare  this  basis  with 
that  of  the  inquisitive  legal  process  which  historians  term  "torture"  (from 
Superstition  and  Force,  pages  429-430): 
In  the  early  stages  of  society,  the  judge  or  the  pleader  whose  faith 
does  not  lead  him  to  rely  upon  an  appeal  to  God  naturally  seeks  to 
extort  from  the  reluctant  witness  a  statement  of  what  he  might 
desire  to  conceal,  or  from  the  presumed  criminal  a  confession  of 
his  guilt.  To  accomplish  this,  the  readiest  means  would  seem  to 
be  the  infliction  of  pain,  to  escape  from  which  the  witness  would 
sacrifice  his  friends,  and  the  accused  would  submit  to  the  penalty 
of  his  crime.  The  means  of  administering  graduated  and  effectual 
torment  would  thus  be  sought  for,  and  the  rules  for  its  application Chapter  One  173 
would  in  time  be  developed  into  a  regular  system,  forming  pan  of 
the  recognized  principles  of  jurisprudence. 
See  also  in  Superstition  and  Force  a  geographical  and  chronological 
survey  of  the  history  of  the  evolution,  methods,  and  procedures  of  such 
judicial  torture  (pages  429-479),  the  reemergence  of  judicial  torture  in 
Europe  after  the  mid-twelfth  century  (pages  479-511),  and  a  detailed 
analysis  of  the  final  form  of  this  judicial  process  in  post-medieval 
Europe  (pages  512-561).  For  a  more  up  to  date  discussion  of  the 
evolution  of  judicial  torture,  see  Peters.  Particularly  relevant  to  this  - 
examination  are  Peters'  analysis  of  the  roots  of  judicial  torture  in  Greek 
law  (pages  11-18).  Also  of  special  interest  are  the  similarities  between 
early  Greek  customary  systems  of  dispute  settlement  and  later  Germanic 
systems:  the  oath  of  the  freeman  was  as  sacrosanct  in  Ancient  Greece  as 
it  was  in  the  Germanic  world  (see  page  13),  and  Peters  finds  this  sanctity 
to  be  related  to  the  growth  of  judicial  torture  in  the  legal  system  of  the 
Greeks.  See  pages  36  and  37  for  related  observations.  Note  also  the 
evolution  of  the  concept  of  torture  under  Roman  law  (pages  18-36);  the 
conflict  between  Roman  and  Germanic  legal  systems,  and  the  resulting 
decline  of  judicial  torture  (pages  36-39);  and  the  rise  of  Roman  law  in 
the  twelfth  century,  which  was  concurrent  with  the  reemergence  of 
judicial  torture  (pages  40-62). Chapter  Two  174 
CHAPTER  TWO:  Perceptions  of  Pain  and  the  Language  of  Wounds 
and  Weapons  in  the  Old  English  The  Dream  of  the  Rood 
It  is  always  a  mistake  to  equate  the  literary  world  with  the 
physical  world;  it  is,  however,  likewise  a  mistake  to  deny  the 
relationship  between  these  two.  Such  a  relationship  invariably  exists  at 
some  level,  and  this  was  as  true  for  the  Anglo-Saxons  as  it  is  for  us., 
Chapter  One  provided  a  context  of  historical  and  legal  torture  on  which 
to  ground  my  exploration  of  literary  torture  in  Chapters  Three  through 
Five;  but  it  is  also  necessary  to  ground  our  discussions  of  "torture"  on 
an  understanding  of  "pain",  both  literal  and  literary.  The  purpose  of  this 
chapter,  then,  is  to  define  the  relationship  between literal  Pain  and  its 
metaphorical  representations  in  Old  English  religious  verse.  This 
relationship  is  nowhere  more  clear  than  in  Anglo-Saxon  attitudes 
towards  the  cross,  and  these  attitudes  are  manifested  most  fully,  of 
course,  in  The  Dreatn  of  the  Rood.  2  This  most  important  Old  English 
symbolic  representation  of  the  transformative  force  of  the  crucifixion 
succinctly  illustrates  the  centrality  of  Christ's  passion--and  symbolically, 
of  the  cross--to  Anglo-Saxon  spirituality,  as  well  as  illuminates  the 
relationship  between  "real"  pain  and  its  metaphorical  counterparts  in  Old 
English  literature. 
David  Bakan  has  discussed  extensively  the  relationship  between 
"real"  and  "  symbolic"  pain  in  the  context  of  Christianity,  and  he  has 
paid  special  attention  to  the  central  position  of  the  crucifixion  in  this 
context;  especially  significant  to  this  discussion  is  his  view  of  the 
representation  of  Christ's  pain  on  the  cross  as  a  bonding  social  agent. 
The  universal  nature  of  pain,  and  the  pervasive,  all-consuming  quality  of 
the  pain  experience,  make  representations  of  pain  a  particularly  effective Chapter  Two  175 
bonding  agent,  and  the  cross  is  particularly  well-suited  to  symbolizing 
this  experience: 
Skinner  is  eminently  correct  in  pointing  out  the  great  significance 
of  the  cross  as  a  symbol  of  the  meaning  of  pain,  a  symbol  through 
which  large  segments  of  humanity  could  be  joined  together.  For 
many  centuries  the  cross  has  been  the  way  in  which  many  people 
have  found  meaning  in  pain.  The  cross  and  its  context  of  meaning 
has  pointed  the  way  for  them  to  a  union  with  the  cosmic,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  humanity,  on  the  other.  Indeed,  one  might  well 
argue  that  one  of  the  major  psychological  uses  of  Christianity  has 
been  to  overcome  the  essential  loneliness  and  privacy  of  pain.  3 
This  paradoxical  tension  between  the  universal  and  personal, 
natures  of  pain  seems  to  be  alleviated  to  a  certain  extent  by  theuniversal 
and  personal  applicability  of  Christ's  passion,  and  The  Dream  of  the 
Rood  expresses  this  relationship  between  the  private  and  public  faces  of 
Christ's  suffering  as  clearly  as  any  later  text.  The  dreamer, 
contemplating  the  glory  of  the  cross,  finds  that  its  very  beauty  reminds 
him  of  his  own  spiritual  guilt,  a  very  private  pain  which  is,  significantly, 
referred  to  as  a  "wounding"  force: 
Syllic  wws  se  sigebeam,  ond  ic  synnum  fah, 
forwunded  mid  wommum.  (11.13-14a) 
[Wonderful  was  the  victory-wood,  and  I  was  stained  with  sins, 
badly  wounded  with  sins.  ]4 
The  isolating  effect  of  the  dreamer's  pain  begins  to  subside,  however, 
when  he  perceiyes  that  the  Rood,  too,  has  suffered.  At  first,  of  course, Chapter  Two  176 
this  only  causes  the  dreamer  more  fear  and  dread;  as  the  poem  moves 
on,  however,  it  becomes  apparent  that  it  is  this  very  suffering  of  the 
cross,  and,  by  extension,  of  Christ,  that  gives  the  dreamer's  guilt  any 
meaning.  Further,  the  details  of  the  passion  serve  to  illustrate  the 
universal  nature  of  suffering,  and  the  poem  draws  each  reader  into  this 
community  of  pain  in  two  specific  ways:  first,  the  Rood's  own 
description  of  its  torment,  in  tandem  with  Christ's,  is  graphic  and 
unsettling;  second,  and  perhaps  most  startlingly,  this  narrative  is  related 
in  the  first  person: 
pwt  wws  geara  iu, 
ýwt  ic  wws  aheawen 
(ic  ýwt  gyta  geman), 
holtes  on  ende, 
astyred  of  stefne  minum 
purhdrifan  hi  me  mid  deorcan  nwglum.  On  me  syndon  pa  dolg 
gesiene, 
opene  inwidhlemmas.  Ne  dorste  ic  hira  nwnigum  sce66an. 
Bysmeredon  hie  unc  butu  wtgwdere.  Eall  ic  Wa3s  mid  blode 
bestemed, 
siMan  he  hmfde  his  gast  begoten  of  pas  guman  sidan, 
onsended.  (11.28-30a  &  46-49) 
[That  was  very  long  ago--I  still  remember  it--that  I  was  cut  down 
at  the  edge  of  the  forest,  ripped  from  my  root....  They  pierced  me 
with  dark  nails;  the  wounds  are  visible  upon  me,  open  malicious 
wounds.  I  dared  not  harm  any  of  them.  They  mocked  us  both 
together.  I  was  all  soaked  with  blood,  shed  from  the  side  of  that 
man  after  he  had  sent  forth  his  spirit.  ]S 
Both  the  graphic  details  of  torment  and  the  first-person  nature  of  the 
narrative  serve  to  personalize  the  experience,  to  make  it  real,  and--most Chapter  Two  177 
importantly  in  the  context  of  this  discussion--to  universalize  the 
personal,  to  bridge  the  gap  of  isolation  between  individual  sufferers  of 
pain  (see  my  discussion  of  the  isolating  nature  of  pain,  below).  That  this 
physical  pain  is  a  spiritually  transformative  force  is  suggested  early  on  in 
the  poem,  when  the  dreamer  recounts  the  shifting  nature  of  the  tree's 
appearance;  it  is,  at  first,  bloody  and  wounded,  but  then  seems  to  be 
gilded  and  jeweled: 
Geseah  ic  ýwt  fuse  beacen 
wendan  wwdum  ond  bleom;  hwilum  hit  wws  mid  waotan 
bestemed, 
beswyled  mid  swates  gange,  '  hwilum  mid  since  gegyrwed.  (11. 
2lb-23) 
[I  saw  that  shifting  symbol  change  coverings  and  colors;  at  times 
it  was  soaked  with  moisture--drenched  with  the  flow  of  blood--at 
times  adorned  with  treasure.  ] 
This  transformation  represents,  of  course,  not  only  the  change  wrought 
in  Christ  and  the  Rood  through  the  passion,  but  the  potential 
transmutation  of  each  individual  soul  (see  my  discussion  of 
-,  transmutation"  in  Chapter  Five).  Further,  however,  this  vibrant  and 
graphic  reminder  of  divine  suffering  and  transformation  serves  to  remind 
the  audience  of  the  universal  nature  of  such  pain,  seems  to  give  it 
purpose,  and  binds  the  audience  of  the  poem  together  with  the  powerful 
spiritual  mortar  of  the  common  experience  of  pain.  This  is  a  striking 
example  of  the  use  of  representational  pain  in  the  Anglo-Saxon  tradition. 
The  next  step  is  to  examine  how  such  representational  pain  in  the 
old  English  literary  world  ultimately  is  derived  from--and  at  some  level Chapter  Two  178 
represents--literal  pain  in'the  physical  world.  At  this  point  we  must 
question  a  fundamental  assumption  of  this  study:  is  it  in  fact  appropriate 
to  apply  contemporary  conceptions  of  physical  pain  to  medieval  models 
of  spiritual  transformation  which  utilize  such  physicality  as  a  metaphor? 
I  think  that  the  answer  to  this  question  lies  in  the  manner  in  which  we 
confront  this  physicality.  I  propose  to  confront  and  to  define  "pain"  in 
the  terms  of  an  anatomical  and  anthropological  constant,  related  to  such 
shifting  cultural  constructs  as  subjectivity,  relativity,  and  perceptions  of 
identity,  but  fundamentally  and  intimately  bound  up  with  the  physical 
reality  of  the  human  experience.  In  other  words,  could  the  experience  of 
the  physical  reality  of  pain  endured  by  our  forebears  really  have  been  so 
very  different  from  that  which  we  endure  today?  6  The  constancy  of  pain 
(which  I  will  attempt  to  illustrate)  being  granted,  our  contemporary 
model  of  its  nature  must  Surely  also  be  valid.  What  remains  is  to, 
examine  how  Anglo-Saxon  metaphorical  representations  of  pain  equate 
with  and  differ  from  our  own. 
in  the  context  of  my  larger  study  concerning  the  nature  and 
purpose  of  torture,  it  is  significant  that  the  concepts  of  pain  and  torment 
have  been  linked  for  time  out  of  mind;  in  fact,  the  very  root  of  our  word 




...  the  relationship  between  pain  and  punishment  has  been 
established  for  a  long  time,  as  indicated  by  its  roots  in  Latin 
(.  poena)  and  Greek  (poine),  each  meaning  penalty  or  punishment.  8 
Real  pain  takes  many  forms;  we  must  begin  by  examining  what  physical 
pain  is  (or  rather,  what  it  is  perceived  to  be)  and  by  noting  how  this  - 
physical  manifestation  of  pain  is  related  to  psychological,  emotional,  and Chapter  Two  179 
spiritual  states.  Michael  Bond  provides  a  typical  modem  definition  of 
pain,  which  I  include  here  because  it  is  illustrative  of  the  elusive  and 
"subjective"  (to  use  Bond's  term)  nature  of  pain,  which  is  evident  even 
in  scientific  writing: 
Pain  is  a  subjective  experience  arising  from  activity  within  the 
brain  in  response  to  damage  to  body  tissues,  to  changes  in  the 
function  of  the  brain  itself  either  as  a  result  of  damage  due  to 
injury  or  disease,  or  to  changes  of  a  more  subtle  nature  perhaps 
depending  upon  biochemical  changes  which  also  appear  to  play  a 
role  in  producing  mental  illness.  9 
In  their  discussion  of  "the  puzzle  of  pain",  however,  Melzack  and  Wall 
problematize  the  issue  still  further;  they  point  out  that  the  relationship 
between  injury  and  pain,  although  commonsensical,  is  tenuous  at  best, 
and  often  leads  to  confusion.  Instead  of  offering  a  clinical  definition  of 
pain,  they  instead  offer  a  clinician's  perspective  on  the  many  variables 
which  make  up  the  pain  equation: 
The  link  between  pain  and  injury  seems  so  obvious  that  it  is 
widely  believed  that  pain  is  always  the  result  of  physical  damage 
and  that  the  intensity  of  pain  we  feel  is  proportional  to  the  severity 
of  the  injury.  In  general,  this  relationship  between  injury  and  pain 
holds  true  ... 
however,  there  are  many  instances  in  which  the 
relationship  fails  to  hold  up  ...  some  people  are  born  without  the 
ability  to  feel  pain-and  many  of  us  have  injuries 
...  without  feeling 
any  pain  until  many  minutes  or  hours  later.  In  contrast,  there  are 
severe  pains  that  are  not  associated  with  any  known  tissue  damage 
or  that  persist  for  years  after  an  injury  has  apparently  healed. Chapter  Two  180 
Clearly,  the  link  between  injury  and  pain  is  highly  variable: 
injury  may  occur  without  pain,  and  pain  without  injury.  10 
It  is  clear,  then,  that  there  is  no  easy  answer  to  the  question,  "what  is 
pain?  ",  and  that  even  to  modem  medical  minds  there  are  issues  which 
may  be  illuminated  through  the  examination  of  spiritual  and  emotional 
components  of  pain.  This  is  not  the  forum  for  an  extended  technical 
discussion  of  the  anatomical  basis  of  pain  sensations;  the  body  of 
information  relating  to  the  various  phenomena  involved  is  immense,  but 
here  I  will  attempt  a  very  brief  synopsis  of  pertinent  medical  opinions 
concerning  the  physical  basis  of  pain  sensation,  and  cite  additional 
references  in  the  notes. 
Bond  suggests  that  it  is  standard  to  determine  what  pain  is  by 
charting  what  is  experienced  as  "painful";  this  basic  concept  has  led  to 
the  construction  of  paradigms  for  measuring  pain.  Bond  attempts  to 
provide  a  means  of  determining  levels  of  pain,  or  "noxious  stimuli",  by 
distinguishing  between  that  which  a  subject  finds  "painful",  and  that 
which  a  subject  finds  "unbearable"  (this  thresholds  model  is  a  common 
one): 
Measurement  of  sensitivity  to  a  noxious  stimulus  reveals  the 
presence  of  two  levels  of  response  in  all  human  beings.  The  first, 
known  as  the  pain  perception  threshold,  is  reached  when  the 
quality  of  the  experience  produced  by  applying  stimuli  such  as 
heat  or  pressure  changes  and  pain  is  felt  for  the  first  time.  The 
second,  known  as  the  severe  pain  threshold,  is  reached  when  the 
pain  becomes  unbearable  on  increasing  the  strength  of  the 
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It  is  significant  that  Bond  stresses  that  a  sensation  becomes  painful  when 
"the  quality  of  the  experience  ...  changes";  this  concept  of  "pain  quality" 
is  central  to  many  modem  notions  of  pain.  Unpleasant  stimuli  become 
noxious  stimuli,  and  can  be  grouped  together  as  such,  more  or  less 
simply  on  the  basis  that  subjects  find  them  painful.  Roger  Trigg  offers  a 
typical  analysis  of  pain  quality:  - 
There  must  be  some  similarity  between  various  sensations  which 
is  sufficiently  marked  to  induce  us  to  group  the  sensations 
together  as  the  same  kind  of  sensation  and  give  the  same  name  to 
all.  It  is  this  for  which  we  have  coined  the  term  "pain-quality".  12 
Unfortunately,  of  course,  this  still  begs  the  question  of  what  it  is  that 
comprises  this  elusive  pain  quality,  and,  by  extension,  pain  itself.  13 
At  this  point  a  brief  overview  of  the  history  of  philosophical 
perceptions  of  the  nature  of  pain  is  in  order.  Pain  has  long  been 
considered  to  be  linked  closely  with  emotion,  and  indeed,  among  the 
ancients  it  was  not  grouped  with  the  senses.  14  It  is  only  since  the  time 
of  Descartes  that  a  rational,  physiological  attempt  has  been  made  to 
classify  pain  as  a  sensory  phenomenon;  Descartes'  conception  evolved 
into  what  is  known  now  as"  specificity  theory".  15  Descartes  conceived 
of  the  nervous  system-as  a  series  of  channels  leading  from  various 
receptors  to  the  brain;  when  painful  stimuli  activated  these  receptors, 
messages  to  that  effect  ran  through  the  channels: 
.:  ý 
He  suggested  that  the  system  is  like  the  bell-ringing  mechanism  in 
a  church:  a  man  pulls  the  rope  at  the  bottom  of  the  tower,  and  the 
bell  rings  in  the  belfry.  So,  too  ...  a  flame  sets  particles  in  the  foot 
into  activity  and  the  motion  is  transmitted  up  the  leg  and  back  and Chapter  Two  182 
into  the  head  where,  presumably,  something  like  an  alarm  system 
is  set  off.  The  person  then  feels  pain  and  responds  to  it.  16 
Debates  have  raged  since  Descartes  concerning  whether  it  is  more 
accurate  to  perceive  pain  as  sensory  or  affective,  17  but  it  now  seems  as 
though  the  ancients  were  (at  least  partially)  correct.  18  Inanycase,  the 
traditional  view  in  western  culture  has  been  that  pain  is  an  affective-- 
rather  than  sensory--state,  and  this  position  arose  from  the  common 
observation  that  pain  is  an  interior  sense  only  remotely  related  to  objects 
and  events  outside  of  the  body  (see  my  discussion  of  "interiority", 
below): 
Reflecting  the  integral  role  of  emotions  in  painful  experiences, 
throughout  most  of  recorded  history  pain  was  characterized  as  an 
affective  feeling  state  rather  than  a  sensation.  To  the  ancient 
Greeks,  it  was  an  essential  emotional  component  of  the  human 
spirit--the  negative  counterpart  of  pleasure.  Aristotle  was 
responsible  for  the  enduring  idea  that  pain  is  an  affect,  a  "passion 
of  the  soul",  distinct  from  the  classic  five  senses.  The  enduring 
concept  recognized  pain  as  an  affective  experience,  like  sadness  or 
bitterness,  signaling  something  to  be  avoided  or  terminated,  but 
not  as  a  sense,  because  it  was  not  referable  to  any  specific  quality 
of  external  objects.  19 
It  is  my  assertion  that  pain,  in  the  context  of  Old  English  poetry, 
likewise  was  perceived  as  an  affective,  emotional,  and  spiritual  state. 
Turning  again  to  The  Dream  of  the  Rood  for  evidence,  I  will  examine 
this  spiritual  and  emotive  element  in  the  Anglo-Saxon  conception  of 
pain..  I  then  will  illustrate  how  the  Anglo-Saxons  projected  this  interior Chapter  Two  183 
state  outwards,  giving  public  voice  to  the  personal  silence  of  pain  with 
the  language  of  weapons  and  wounds. 
One  of  the  most  intriguing  literary  devices  employed  in  The 
Dream  of  the  Rood  is  the  marriage  between  the  emotive  state  of  the 
dreamer  and  the  contrasting  physical  manifestations  of  both  pain  and 
glory  displayed  in  turns  by  the  cross;  perhaps  nowhere  in  Old  English 
literature  is  the  relationship  between  pain  and  emotion  made  more  clear. 
As  I  noted  above,  the  dreamer's  initial  reaction  to  perceiving  the  cross  is 
one  of  fear  and  apprehension;  but  his  emotive  links  with  the  experience 
of  the  cross  are  more  deliberately  forged  than  that,  and  in  fact  at  times 
seem  to  be  mirrored  by  the  cross  itself.  When  he  first  notices  that  the 
cross  has  begun  to  bleed  from  one  side,  the  dreamer  exclaims  that  he 
was  "disturbed  by  sorrows",  and  "afraid": 
Eall  ic  wws  mid  sorgum  gedrefed. 
Forhtic  waas  for  ýwre  fmgrangesyh6e.  (11.20b-21a) 
"I  [I  was  completely  disturbed  by  sorrows.  I  was  afraid  because  of 
that  beautiful  sight.  ] 
He  then  refers  to  himself  as  "troubled"  (hreowcearig,  1.25)  as  he 
remains  in  contemplation  of  the  cross.  The  dreamer  clearly  attributes  to 
himself,  then,  a  number  of  emotional  states  throughout  his  experience, 
mcluding  fear,  anxiety,  and  sorrow.  What  is  noteworthy  is  that  the  cross 
attributes  to  itself  analogous  emotional  states  as  it  undergoes  its 
experience.  These  states  include  anxiety  and  sorrow  (11.59  and  79-80), 
as  well  as  humiliation  (11.46-48).  It  is  most  notable,  however,  that,  in 
relating  its  emotional  state  immediately  following  the  death  of  Christ, 
the  rood  mirrors  the  dreamer's  words  of  11.20-21,  and  refers  to  itself  as Chapter  Two  184 
anxious  or  "  disturbed  by  sorrows"  as  Christ  is  pulled  down  from  his 
"heavy  punishment",  and  the  cross  itself  stands  "all  wounded  with 
shafts": 
Sare  ic  wws  mid  sorgum  gedrefed,  hnag  ic  hwware  ýam 
secgum  to  handa, 
ea6mod  elne  mycle.  Genamon  hie  ýwr  wlmihtigne  God, 
ahofon  hine  of  pam  hefian  wite.  Forleton  me  pa  hilderincas 
standan  steame  bedrifenne;  eall  ic  wws  mid  strzolum 
forwundod.  (11.59-62) 
[I  was  sorely  disturbed  with  sorrows,  however  I  bowed  down  to  the 
men  at  hand,  humble  with  great  courage.  They  took  there  almighty 
God,  they  raised  him  from  that  heavy  punishment.  The  warriors 
left  me  to  stand  drenched  with  blood;  I  was  all  wounded  with 
shafts.  ] 
It  is  especially  significant  in  the  context  of  the  evidence  of  the  physical 
wounds  of  both  Christ  and  the  cross  that  the  rood  refers  to  its  emotional 
state  in  order  to  communicate  its  own  inner  pain;  it  is  doubly  significant 
that  the  rood  does  so  in  the  exact  words  used  earlier  by  the  dreamer  to 
express  his  own  emotive  state.  20  More  significant  still  are  the  words 
themselves,  most  especially  sorg,  which  appears  in  very  many  similar 
contexts  to  describe  a  painful  emotional  state,  and  often  one  which  is 
directly  linked  with  physical  affliction.  Sorgum  gedrefed  may  indeed  be 
a  rather  common  stock  phrase  used  to  describe  emotional  anxiety,  but  if 
so  such  a  commonplace--viewed  in  the  context  of  the  association  of  sorg 
with  physical  affliction--proves  even  more  fully  how  closely  connected 
the  concept  of  such  emotional  anxiety  was  to  perceptions  of  physical 
distress.  A  few  examples  of  spiritual  sorg  in  the  context  of  physical Chapter  Two  185 
affliction  should  suffice  to  illustrate  amply  the  close  link  between 
emotional  and  physical  pain  in  the  context  of  Old  English  religious 
verse. 
The  Old  English  Elene  provides  us  with  two  excellent  examples  of 
emotional  and  spiritual  sorrow,  each  of  which  is  bound  up  with 
manifestations  of  physical  torment.  When  Judas,  the  deceitful  leader  of 
the  Jews,  refuses  to  reveal  to  Elene  the  hiding  place  of  the  true  cross,  she 
has  him  cast  into  a"  dry  pit"  for  seven  days  and  nights,  where  his 
spiritual  sorrow  clearly  seems  to  be  a  result  of  his  physical  state  of 
deprivation  and  bondage: 
Heht  pa  swa  cwicne  cori5re  lmdan, 
scufan  scyldigne  --scealcas  ne  gmldon-- 
in  drygne  sea6  peer  he  dugu6a  leas 
siomode  in  sorgum  seofon  nihta  fyrst 
under  hearmlocan  hungre  gepreatod, 
clommum  beclungen...  (11.691-696a) 
[She  commanded  him  then  thus  by  a  band  to  be  led  away,  the 
guilty  one  thrust  into  a  dry  pit--the  servants  did  not  delay--where 
deprived  of  company  he  remained  in  sorrows  a  period  of  seven 
nights  within  his  prison,  tormented  by  hunger,  bound  with 
fetters.  ]21 
This  sorrow,  and  the  physical  torment  associated  with  it,  soon  causes 
Judas  to  see  the  error  of  his  ways,  and  he  unearths  the  cross  for  Elene. 
Not  long  after  the  invention  of  the  cross,  the  devil  rises  up  in  fury  and 
confronts  Judas,  who,  although  formerly  his  servant,  is  now  his  enemy. 
The  Devil's  speech  likewise  links  sPirit'Jal  sOrrow  to  physical Chapter  Two  186 
imprisonment  and  torture,  that  of  the  devils  in  hell,  which--tellingly-- 
mirrors  Judas's  earlier  confinement: 
Hwzet,  se  Hzelend  me 
in  pam.  engan  ham  oft  getynde, 
geomrum  to  sorge.  (11.920b-922a) 
[Lo,  the  Savior  in  that  narrow  dwelling  often  enclosed  me,  as  a 
sorrow  to  miserable  ones.  ] 
it  is  most  significant  that  the  devil  refers  to  his  imprisonment  in  the 
terms  geomrum  to  sorge,  or  "as  a  sorrow  to  miserable  ones",  as  such  a 
"to--"  construction  as  this  (designating  purpose)  usually  marks  both  the 
agency  and  the  object  of  an  action;  in  this  case,  sorg  or  "  sorrow"  is 
clearly  denoted  as  the  direct  result  of  the  aforementioned  imprisonment. 
Spiritual  or  emotional  sorrow,  then,  is  in  both  of  these  cases  clearly  the 
result  of,  and  therefore  to  be  associated  with,  physical  manifestations  of 
distress. 
The  Old  English  version  of  Judith  offers  another  example  of 
spiritual  sorg  linked  directly  with  physical  affliction;  indeed,  although 
sorg,  is  traditionally  glossed  as  "  care"  or  "  anxiety",  or  alternatively  as 
"  sorrow",  44  grief  ",  "  affliction",  or  "  trouble"  (clearly  denoting  an  abstract 
and  spiritual/emotional,  rather  than  a  concrete  and  physical,  state)ý2  in 
this  case  the  reading  implies  a  kind  of  "grief",  "affliction",  or  "trouble" 
which  might  well  be  perceived  as  a  euphemism  for  some  sort  of  physical 
attack.  In  this  speech  Judith  is  displaying  the  severed  head  of 
Holofernes  to  the  Bethulians,  and  is  recounting  to  them  the  (mostly 
physical)  evils  which  they  have  suffered  at  his  hands: Chapter  Two  187 
Holofemes  unlyfigendes; 
ýe  us  monna  nimst  mor6ra  gefremede 
sarra  sorga  ond  ýwt  swyi5or  gyt 
ycan  wolde  ... 
(11.180-183a) 
[Lifeless  Holofernes,  who  upon  us  performed  the  most  of  murders 
of  men,  of  grievous  afflictions,  and  who  greater  [afflictions]  yet 
wished  to  add  ... 
]23  ý 
Such  a  phrase  as  "grievous  afflictions",  especially  in  apposition  as  it  is 
with  "the  most  of  murders",  seems  clearly  to  indicate  that  here  the 
abstract  emotional  state  of  sorg,  although  undoubtedly  present,  -  can  also 
be  projected  outward  (in  an  act  of  description)  onto  those  concrete 
physical  acts  of  pain,  torment,  and  murder  which  are  themselves 
responsible  for  the  sorrow. 
It  is  likewise  clear  in  the  Old  English  version  of  Daniel  that  a  term 
such  as  "sorrow"  or  "distress"  may  be  used  euphemistically  to  describe 
physical  torment.  After  the  three  youths  have  been  cast  into  the  furnace, 
the  poet  describes  their  well-being  in  terms  of  their  emotional  as  well  as 
their  physical  states: 
Freobearn  wurdon 
almten  liges  gange,  ne  hie  him  ýwr  la,  )  gedydon. 
Nws  him  se  sweg  to  sorge  6on  ma  ýe  sunnan  scima 
(11.262b-264) 
[The  noble  youths  were  delivered  from  the  attack  of  the  fire;  they 
did  to  them  there  no  harm.  To  them  the  roaring  flame  was  no 
more  distressing  than  this,  namely,  what  sunshine  is  ...  ]24 Chapter  Two  188 
The  fire  did  them  no  harm,  and  neither  were  the  flames  in  any  way 
distressing  to  them;  clearly  here  we  have  an  instance  of  actual  physical 
torment  (or  rather,  the  absence  thereof),  and  the  nature  of  the  physical 
state  of  the  three  putative  victims  is  described  with  reference  to  their 
emotional  or  spiritual  perceptions  of  the  physical  event.  The  flames  did 
them  no  more  damage  than  the  rays  of  the  sun,  and  thus  the  youths  felt 
no  more  "anxiety"  than  if  they  were  walking  about  on  a  summer's  day. 
The  use  of  sorg  here  effectively  underscores  the  perceived  relationship 
between  physical  pain  and  emotional  or  spiritual  state. 
The  Old  English  Andreas  offers  us  two  examples  of  victims  of 
physical  torments  who  beseech  God  (or  his  agent)  to  put  an  end  to  the 
physical  turmoils  which  give  rise  to  their  spiritual  sorg;  in  both  of  these 
cases  it  is  clear  that  the  emotional  anxiety  referred  to  by  sorg  is  the  direct 
result  of  the  physical  afflictions  of  which  the  supplicants  are  victims. 
Early  in  the  poem,  the  apostle  Matthew  has  been  captured,  tortured,  and 
imprisoned  by  the  cannibalistic  Mermedonians;  after  having  his  eyes 
put  out  and  being  forced  to  drink  an  evil  potion  (which  renders  its 
victims  into  cattle-like  brutes  awaiting  the  slaughter),  Matthew  entreats 
God  for  deliverance.  God  responds  to  his  prayer  that  Matthew's  period 
of  torment  and  confinement  will  be  brief,  and  that  Andrew  will  deliver 
him  within  twenty-seven  days: 
Is  to  ýwre  tide  twimet  hwile 
emne  mid  so6e  seofon  ond  twentig 
nihtgerimes,  Owt  6u  of  nede  most; 
sorgum  geswenced,  sigore  gewyr6od, 
hweorfest  of  hen6um  in  gehyld  Godes. 
(11.113-117) Chapter  Two  189 
[There  is  until  that  time  a  measured  period--indeed,  in  truth 
twenty-seven  nights  all  told--until  you  will  be  allowed  out  of 
suffering;  afflicted  by  sorrows,  glorified  by  victory,  you  will 
depart  from  humiliations  into  the  protection  of  God.  ]25  - 
When  God  describes  Matthew  as  "afflicted  by  sorrows",  it  is  clear  in  this 
context  that  he  is  referring  to  physical  as  well  as  emotional  phenomena; 
the  emotional  state  of  the  sufferer  is  here,  as  elsewhere,  largely  the  result 
of  his  physical  tribulations.  Later  in  the  poem  we  see  an  analogous 
(although  inverted)  example  of  sorg  brought  on  by  physical  tribulations. 
Andrew  has  himself  been  a  prisoner  of  the  Mermedonians  for  some 
days,  and  has  suffered  harsh  torments  at  their  hands;  after  reminding 
God  of  his  promise,  however,  Andrew  is  restored  to  health  and  causes  a 
miraculous  flood  which  wreaks  havoc  in  the  city  of  the  cannibals.  The 
fire  of  angels  without,  and  a  rising  flood  within,  cause  a  great  deal  of 
death  and  destruction,  and  the  Mermedonians  question  their  wisdom  in 
keeping  Andrew  prisoner.  Finally,  one  amongst  them  speaks  out,  - 
suggesting  that,  if  they  release  the  holy  man,  their  sorrows  will  come  to 
an  end: 
Nu  ge  magon  sylfe  soö  gecnawan,  , 
pwt  we  mid  unrihte  ellýeodigne 
oncarcerne  clommum  belegdon, 
witebendum.,  Us  seo  wyrd  scy6e,  ) 
heard  ond  hetegrim;  ýmt  is  her  swa  cuo! 
,-,,  is  hit  mycle  selre,  ýws ýe  ic  so  talige, 
pzet  we  hine  alysan  of  leo6obendum 
ealle  anmode  (ofost  is  selost), 
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geoce  ond  frofre; 
sybb  mfter  sorge, 
(11.1558-1568) 
us  bia  gearu  sona 
gif  we  seca6  to  him. 
[Now  you  can  recognize  for  yourselves  the  truth,  that  we  in  sin 
afflicted  the  foreigner  with  fetters,  with  cruel  bonds,  in  prison. 
Fate,  cruel  and  fierce,  injures  us;  that  is  thus  known  here!  It  is 
much  better,  as  I  consider  truth,  that  we  with  one  mind  release  him 
from  limb-fetters  (the  more  quickly  the  better),  and  ask  the  holy 
one  for  help  for  us,  for  comfort  and  relief;  there  will  be  peace 
after  sorrow  for  us  immediately  if  we  go  to  him.  ] 
As  in  the  case  above,  the  sorrow  referred  to  here  is  an  emotional  state,  to 
be  sure,  but  also  is  related  to  and  brought  on  by  the  physical  destruction 
(and  fear  of  such  destruction)  of  the  Mermedonians  by  fire  and  flood. 
As  we  will  see  below,  physical  torment  does  not  always  result  in  pain, 
and  therefore  must  not  in  all  cases  be  equated  with  emotional  or  spiritual 
sorrow  in  the  context  of  these  poems;  what  is  significant  about  these 
examples  is  that  the  Anglo-Saxon  poets  clearly  perceived  a  link--in 
many  cases--between  physical  and  emotional  pain. 
Finally,  the  Old  English  Phoenix  attributes  a  kind  of  "baleful" 
sorrow  to  the  race  of  man  after  the  Fall;  it  seems  clear  in  context  that 
this  sorg  is  not  simply  the  recognition  of  disobedience  to  God  and  a 
concurrent  fall  from  grace  and  communion  with  him,  but  also  that  it  is  a 
deep-rooted  grief  founded  in  the  certain  knowledge  of  the  bitter  trials  of 
mortal  life  and  certain  physical  death  which  await  each  human  being  as  a 
result  of  this  original  sin: 
p  wr  him  bitter  weard 
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sarlic  symbel,  sunum  and  dohtrum; 
wurdon  teonlice  'to  pas  idge 
ageald  aefter  gylte;  hmfdon  Godes  yrre, 
bittre  bealosorge;  pms  pa  byre  sippan 
gyrne  onguldon  pe  hi  pmt  gyff  pegun 
ofer  Eces  word.  Forpon  hi  e6les  wyn 
geomormode  -  ofgiefan  sceoldon 
purh  nmdran  nip;  pa  hio  nearwe  biswac, 
y1dran  usse,  in  mrdagum 
purh  fmcne  ferhi5,  poet  hi  feor  ponan 
in  pas  dea6dene  drohtao  sohton, 
sorgfulran  gesetu.  (11.404b-417a) 
[For  them  and  also  for  their  children  there  was  bitter  woe  after 
eating,  a  banquet  grievous  to  the  sons  and  the  daughters;  busy 
teeth  were  grievously  punished  for  their  guilt;  they  gained  God's 
wrath,  bitter  baleful-sorrow.  Since  then  the  offspring  have  paid 
the  penalty  for  it  with  sorrow,  because  they  ate  that  food  against 
the  Eternal  word.  Consequently,  sorrowful  they  had  to  relinquish 
the  joy  of  their  native  land  through  the  malice  of  the  serpent,  when 
it  grievously  deceived  our  forefathers  in  former  days  through 
guileful  spirit,  so  that  they  far  thence  into  this  valley  of  death 
sought  abode,  more  sorrowful  dwellings.  ]26 
The  "bitter  woe"  and  "bitter  baleful-sorrow"  that  the  sons  of  Adam  must 
face  is  that  they  have  forsaken  paradise  for  the  "More  sorrowful 
dwellings"  of  this  mortal  world,  this  "valley  of  death".  In  this  reference 
the  emotional  and  spiritual  state  of  sorg  is  clearly  associated  with--and, 
in  fact,  the  result  of--the  knowledge  of  that  most  bitter  of  physical 
torments,  death  itself.  In  all  of  these  cases  we  see  direct  links  between Chapter  Two  192 
spiritual  and/or  emotional  states  such  as  anxiety,  care,  and  sorrow,  and 
manifestations  of  physical  torment,  imprisonment,  and  death;  further, 
there  is  often  a  clear  causal  relationship  between  this  physical  affliction 
and  the  ensuing  emotional  state.  Physical  and  spiritual/emotional  pain' 
seem  inextricably  bound  together  in  the  conceptual  framework  of  these 
poems. 
It  is  clear,  'both  specifically  in  the  context  of  The  Dream  of  the 
Rood  and  in  Old  English  poetry  more  generally,  that  the  Anglo-Saxons 
conceived  of  a  link  between  physical  and  emotional  pain;  the  exact 
nature  of  this  relationship  is  somewhat  less  clear,  but  in  the  examples 
which  we  have  examined  it  often  appears  to  be  somewhat  causal  in 
aspect.  Physical  affliction,  imprisonment,  and  bodily  destruction  (or  the 
threat  thereof),  seem  in  many  cases  to  give  rise  to  a  concurrent  state  of 
emotional  anguish,  anxiety,  or  distress.  It  also  is  significant  that  an 
element  of  spirituality  seems  present  in  many  of  these  cases,  and  though 
it  is  by  no  means  fair  always  to  equate  "spiritual"  with  "emotional",  in 
the  context  of  these  poems  it  seems  clear  that  what  we  might  perceive  of 
as  an  emotive  state  was,  for  the  Anglo-Saxons,  often  an  important 
indication  of  spiritual  nature.  This  should  not  be  surprising  when  we 
consider  the  highly  spiritual  nature  of  Old  English  literature  in  general, 
and  this  type  of  material  specifically.  What  is  important  about  all  of  this 
in  the  context  of  my  larger  discussion  is  the  clear  link  between  the 
emotive  and/or  spiritual  and  the  physical  in  Old  English  verse,  and  how 
the  perceptions  of  the  Anglo-Saxons  regarding  the  spiritual  aspects  of 
physical  pain  resonate  with  modem  conceptions  of  this  same 
relationship. 
Perceptions  of  pain  vary  from  culture  to  culture,  and  from  era  to 
era,  as  do  the  models  through  which  various  cultures  understand  the 
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spiritual  with  regard  to  these  self-same  perceptions  of  pain.  Since  the 
time  of  Descartes,  western  medical  thought  has  tended  to  view  these 
links  as  less  and  less  important;  in  recent  years,  however,  it  has  become 
clear  that  these  links  do  exist,  and  valuable  insight  into  them  is  gained  by 
examining  the  perceptions  of  other  cultures: 
The  broadening  constructs  [of  medical  models  of  pain]  are 
consistent  with  nontechnological,  religious  and  philosophical 
world  views  of  pain.  In  a  classic  monograph,  Keele  (1957) 
observed  that  non-Western  cultures  assign  greater  weight  to  the 
emotional  qualities  of  pain.,  For  example,  he  stated:  "Though 
recognizing  pain  as  a  sensation,  Buddha,  and  indeed  Hindu 
thought  in  general,  attached  more  significance  to  the  emotional 
level  of  the  experience.  "  The  cultural-specificity  of  concepts  of 
emotion  in  pain  and  the  importance  of  alternative  orientations 
toward  pain  in  the  traditions  of  non-Western  cultures  have  been 
described  by  Tu  (1980).  In  Western  culture,  unidimensional 
sensory  formulations  of  pain  have  yielded  to  multidimensional 
concepts  that  assign  importance  to  cognitive  and  emotional 
dimensions  as  well  as  sensory  components  (Melzack  &  Casey 
1968).  The  concept  of  suffering  has  also  reemerged  to  encompass 
the  broad  range  of  thoughts  and  feelings  provoked  by  major, 
traumatic  and  ongoing  crises  and  the  meaning  this  has  for  the 
person  (Szasz  1957;  Buytendijk  1961;  Fordyce  1988).  27 
It,  is  now  accepted  by  physicians,  as  well  as  by  psychologists, 
sociologists,  and  anthropologists,  that  the  emotional  component  to 
physical  pain,  although  not  always  clear,  is  always  present;  indeed,  we 
have  had  to  rethink  our  own  cultural  conceptions  of  pain  in  order  to Chapter  Two  194 
explain  the  growing  corpus  of  clinical  data  which  forces  us  to  confront 
the  emotive  element  of  pain.  In  our  examination  of  the  Old  English 
examples  above,  it  became  evident  that  the  Anglo-Saxons  perceived  a 
causal  link  between  physical  distress  and  emotional  anguish;  an 
interesting  modem  conception  is  an  inversion  of  this  model:  it  is  now 
asserted  that  emotional  distress  is  often  a  trigger  for  the  perception  of 
physical  pain: 
...  complaints  of  pain  may  be  precipitated  or  exacerbated  by 
emotional  and  social  crises  rather  than  tissue  insult.  For  example, 
in  the  couvade  syndrome,  the  precipitating  event  for  a  husband's 
complaints  of  aches  and  pains  characteristic  of  pregnancy  and 
labour  appears  to  be  the  wife's  complaints.  Similarly,  injured 
children  occasionally  do  not  become  alarmed  or  display  pain  until. 
they  observe  that  the  injury  has  upset  a  parent.  These  complaints 
appear  to  represent  genuine  distress  rather  than  purposeful 
attempts  to  derive  benefit  or  avoid  activities.  28 
Further,  Roger  Trigg  argues  that  the  emotive  "anguish"  elements  of  the 
pain  experience  are  themselves,  in  fact,  that  elusive  pain-quality  which 
separates  the  experience  of  a  mere  stimulus  from  the  experience  of  a 
painful  stimulus.  Such  a  view  serves  to  explicate  further  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  model  of  anguish  as  a  result  of  physical  pain,  and  underscores  the 
fact  that  the  causal  relationship  implied  by  the  Anglo-Saxon  conception 
of  the  relationship  between  the  emotive  and  physical  aspects  of  pain 
does  seem  to  have  resonance  with  modem  conceptions: 
if  the  "anguish"  components  of  the  pain  experience  are  "hing 
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pain,  they  can  only  be  our  reaction  to  the  pain-quality.  If  they  are 
not  the  components  of  the  "total  pain  experience"  which  give  us 
anguish,  then  they  must  be  that  anguish.  In  that  case,  they  are  not 
very  different  from  the  "suffering",  which  ...  is  one  of  the  "pain 
components".  -  In  connection  with  pain,  "suffering"  implies 
distress  or  a  high  degree  of  dislike.  To  ask  if  someone  suffered 
much  as  a  result  of  the  pain  of  a  disease  is  to  ask  whether  he  was 
distressed  or  whether  be  found  it  exceptionally  unpleasant  ...  within 
the  group  of  the  emotional  components  we  must  distinguish 
between  the  emotions  which  take  the  pain  per  se  as  their  "  object" 
and  those  which  take  its  significance,  but  that  is  the  only  ground 
of  distinction.  29 
P  Modern  conceptions  of  the  link  between  physical  and  emotional  pain, 
however,  suggest  that  such  a  causal  link  is  perhaps  too  reductive; 
though  an  emotional  component  surely  exists,  it  is  not  necessarily  a 
cause  or  a  result,  or  indeed,  need  not  be  perceived  of  as  playing  any 
consistent  role  in  the  nature  of  pain.  Rather,  although  this  emotive 
element  does  certainly  play  some  role,  it  is  a  shifting,  complementary 
one,  which  may  or  may  not  serve  as  a  cause  or  effect  of  a  physical 
manifestation  of  pain: 
Emotional  distress  serves  not  only  as  a  component  of  pain,  but  it 
may  be  a  consequence  of  pain,  a  cause  of  pain,  or  a  concurrent 
problem  with  independent  sources.  30 
it  is  clear  from  recent  medical,  psychological,  and  anthropological 
studies,  that  although  perceptions  vary  from  culture  to  culture,  most 
cultures  do  understand  links  between  the  physical  and  non-physical Chapter  Two  196 
aspects  of  pain  to  exist;  further,  these  same  studies  suggest  that 
perception  of  pain  by  an  individual  is,  at  least  to  some  extent,  affected 
by  that  individual's  culturally-ingrained  preconceptions  concerning  pain. 
Although  every  individual  perceives  a  similar  sensation  within  given 
sensory  parameters,  ingrained  cultural  factors  affect  whether  an 
individual's  perception  of  such  a  sensation  is  or  is  not  painful: 
There  is  now  evidence  that  the  majority  of  people,  regardless  of 
cultural  background,  have  a  uniform  sensation  threshold  ...  the 
sensory  conducting  apparatus,  in  other  words,  appears  to  be 
essentially  similar  in  all  people  so  that  a  given  critical  level  of 
input  always  elicits  a  sensation.  Cultural  background,  however, 
has  a  powerful  effect  on  the  pain  perception  threshold  ..  the  most 
striking  effect  of  cultural  background,  however,  is  on  pain 
tolerance  levels...  [such]  differences  in  pain  tolerance  reflect 
different  ethnic  attitudes  towards  pain.  31 
In  order  to  understand  what  is  and  what  is  not  perceived  of  as  painful  to 
any  given  individual  or  group,  then,  it  is  vital  to  understand  that  culture's 
conception  of  pain;  in  order  to  do  so,  we  must  take  into  account  the 
emotional,  spiritual,  or  psychological  factors  which  shape  that 
conception.  In  the  context  of  Anglo-Saxon  culture,  we  must  expect  that 
conception  to  be  heavily  influenced  by  the  spiritual  and  intellectual 
traditions  of  both  Latin  Christianity  and  Germanic  tribal  relationships. 
]3oth  traditions  place  a  heavy  emphasis  on  such  ideals  as  selfless 
devotion  and  loyalty  to  one's  lord,  the  enthusiastic  embrace  of  hardship, 
deprivation,  and  sacrifice  in  pursuit  of  such  ideals,  and  the  contempt  of 
one's  own  life  and  happiness  if  purchased  at  the  cost  of  such  honor.  In 
such  a  context,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  cult  of  the  cross,  which  is Chapter  Two  197 
founded  upon  an  acknowledgment  of  one's  own  unworthiness  in  the 
light  of  Christ's  ultimate  sacrifice,  should  find  such  fertile  ground; 
neither  is  it  odd  that  a  poem  such  as  The  Dream  of  the  Rood  should 
explicate  so  clearly  conceptions  of  pain  in  which  the  physical  torment  of 
the  savior  is  inextricably  bound  together  with  the  sorrow,  anguish--and 
guilt--of  the  rood,  the  dreamer,  and  the  reader.  32 
The  relationship  between  psychological,  emotional,  and  spiritual 
states  and  the  physical  experience  of  pain  is  particularly  illuminating,  as 
it  would  appear  that  there  are  times  when  pain  is  not  painful  at  all;  33  an 
interesting  example  of  this  paradox  may  touch  upon  modem  perceptions 
of  medieval  metaphors  of  pain.  We  have  been  taught  to  read  saints' 
lives  metaphorically,  denying  the  relationship  between  fanciful 
representations  of  martyrdom  and  the  real  thing  on  the  basis  of  such 
obvious  inconsistencies  as  the  painless--and  indeed,  sometimes 
pl  easureful  --torture  of  some  of  these  holy  victims.  Recent  research, 
however,  has  documented  contemporary  cases  of  self-mutilation  which 
suggest  that  pain  and  "exaltation"  are  often  opposite  sides  of  the  same 
experiential  coin.  I 
There  are  many  documented  examples  of  holy  victims  of  what 
would  seem  to  be  torment  or  mutilation  who  appear  to  achieve  a 
heightened  state  of  spiritual  ecstasy  or  exaltation  instead  of  pain. 
Melzack  and  Wall  cite  instances  of  a  particular  ritual  which  takes  place 
in  remote  villages  in  India.  34  Each  year  a  man  is  chosen  for  the  honor 
of  traveling  from  village  to  village  suspended  from  a  scaffold  built  on 
the  top  of  a  cart.  His  role  is  to  bless  the  children  and  the  crops  in  each 
village.  He  hangs  from  a  rope  suspended  from  the  scaffold  and  attached 
to  two  skewers  which  are  inserted  through  the  muscles  in  his  lower  back. 
As  the  cart  moves  between  villages  he  holds  himself  up  by  the  ropes,  but 
during  the  blessing  he  swings  back  and  forth  over  the  villagers, Chapter  Two  198 
apparently  suffering  from  no  pain,  and,  indeed,  displaying  an  expression 
of  some  exaltation;  numerous  other  such  practices  in  India,  notably 
those  performed  by  religious  leaders,  have  been  documented.  Many  of 
these  have  been  questioned  by  rationalists  seeking  to  break  the  grip  of 
charlatans  in  rural  areas.  In  any  case  these  rituals  are  certainly  reflected 
by  rites  elsewhere  in  the  world,  including  numerous  documented  rites  of 
passage  amongst,  for  instance,  Amerindian  tribes. 
Whether  or  not  these  practitioners  actually  have  their  pain 
transformed  into  exaltation  through  spiritual  preparation  is  beside  the 
point.  There  are  physical  reasons,  such  as  the  release  of  endorphins, 
which  might  answer  just  as  well  in  many  instances.  35  There  are  also 
many  complex  psychological  and  emotional  factors  which  may  come 
into  play  in  some  of  these  situations.  For  example,  any  discussion  of 
such  exaltation  necessarily  gives  rise  to  some  speculation  concerning  the 
possibility  of  finding  pleasure  in  pain,  and  related  psychological  states 
such  as  masochism.  Although  it  would  be  radically  reductive  to  assume 
that  states  of  spiritual  transcendence  of  pain  necessarily  are  related  to 
such  seemingly  self-destructive  behavior  patterns  as  masochism,  a  brief 
analysis  of  some  of  the  driving  psychological  forces  behind  these 
patterns  may  help  to  illuminate  our  discussion  of  such  transcendence. 
David  Bakan  has  argued  that  the  rise  of  masochistic  tendencies  in  an 
individual  really  has  to  do  with  a  subconscious  desire  to  preserve,  rather 
than  to  destroy,  the  self.  What  is  unique  about  such  individuals  is,  to 
Bakan,  their  ability  to  differentiate  between  their  sense  of  ego 
annihilation  and  their  sense  of  the  nature  of  pain: 
I  suggest  that  the  person  who  engages  in  masochistic  behavior  is 
one  in  whom  the  sense  of  annihilation  and  pain  per  se  are 
relatively  strongly  differentiated  and  in  whom,  furthermore,  the Chapter  Two  199 
sense  of  possible  annihilation  itself  is  strong.  In  masochistic 
behavior,  inflicting  pain  upon  oneself  is  an  effort  to  rebind  the 
sense  of  annihilation  to  pain  per  se,  thus  affording  the  ego  the 
sense  of  control  over  sources  of  annihilation.  36 
In  other  words,  while  the  normal  human  perceives  pain  as  a  threat  to  the 
self,  an  alarm,  as  it  were,  signally  possible  encroaching  annihilation,  the 
masochist  perceives,  at  a  sub-conscious  level,  that  this  is  a  false  alarm, 
and  that  the  pain  which  they  perceive  is  in  no  way  a  harbinger  of  the 
overwhelming  sense  of  annihilation  which  threatens  to  engulf  them;  in 
such  a  context,  engaging  in  activities  in  which  the  masochist  controls  the 
self-inflicted  pain  relieves  such  an  individual  of  some  of  the  sense  of 
impotence  he  or  she  feels  concerning  the  omnipresent  annihilation  fear. 
That  such  a  relationship  between  the  perception  of  pain  and  the  fear  of 
ego  annihilation  exists  is  proven  by  some  clinical  examples  which  serve 
to  underscore  the  anxiety  element  so  central  to  our  conceptions  of  pain. 
(Note  my  discussion  of  sorg  and  the  emotional  component  of  pain.  )  A 
striking  illustration  of  this  relationship  is  to  be  found  in  reports 
concerning  patients  who  experience  pain,  but  who,  due  to  surgical  or 
chemical  blocks,  no  longer  associate  their  pain  with  ego  annihilation, 
and  therefore  do  not  suffer  from  their  pain: 
A  characteristic  remark  often  made  by  patients  who  have  been 
treated  for  pain  by  barbiturates  or  morphine,  or  who  have 
undergone  prefrontal  lobotomy,  is,  "My  pain  is  the  same,  but  it 
doesn't  hurt  me  now.  "  Such  a  remark  indicates  that  these  medical 
measures  somehow  result  in  the  separation  of  the  sense  of 
annihilation  from  pain  per  se  and  in  a  reduction  of  the  sense  of 
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Such  reactions  suggest  that  it  is  this  very  annihilation  anxiety  which 
lends  to  a  particular  stimulus  the  elusive  pain  quality.  Such  a  suggestion 
has  important  implications  for  my  discussion  of  spiritual  transcendence 
of  pain;  in  cases  where  the  subject  suffers  no  such  anxiety  (sometimes, 
perhaps,  due  to  spiritual  preparation  or  perspective),  and  indeed,  in  cases 
such  as  that  of  the  Christian  martyrs,  where  the  subject  even  welcomes 
death,  we  could  expect  that  the  perception  of  physical  pain  will  have  an 
entirely  different  character  from  those  cases  in  which  such  anxiety  is 
present  and  strong  (see  my  discussion  of  sacrifice  and  salvation,  below). 
Roger  Trigg,  although  differing  from  Bakan  as  to  the  root  cause  of 
masochism,  calls  into  question  the  semantic  logic  of  defining 
"masochism"  as  "the  enjoyment  of  pain",  38  and  suggests  ways  of 
looking  at  the  pleasure  of  masochism  which  may  prove  to  have  some 
spiritual  valence.  Trigg  argues  that  pain  logically  can  be  enjoyed  by  the 
masochist,  although  there  are  elements  which  make  the  pain  experience 
painful,  and  these  can  not  be  enjoyed;  Trigg  alludes  to  such  anxiety 
components  of  pain  as  "distress".  To  Trigg,  this  distress  is  an  emotional 
complement  to  pain,  both  physical  and  mental,  and  it,  unlike  the  pain 
itself,  cannot  be  enjoyed: 
It  can  be  no  accident  that  every  combination  of  pleasure  and 
distress  turns  out  to  be  different  from  enjoyment  of  distress.  It 
must  be  that  the  total  experience  of  being  distressed  is  not  in  itself 
the  kind  of  thing  which  we  can  find  pleasant.  It  would  indeed  be 
very  strange  if  the  process  of  finding  something  unpleasant  could 
itself  be  pleasant.  There  would  be  a  fundamental  clash  between 
our  view  of  the  situation  as  bad  for  us  in  some  way  and  our  view 
of  the  same  situation  with  a  few  extras  as  good  for  us  in  some Chapter  Two  201 
way.  If  we  are  told  that  it  is  the  extras  which  make  the  difference, 
we  are  probably  being  taken  back  to  the  position  that  what  is 
being  enjoyed  is  the  fact  that  we  are  being  distressed,  our  feelings 
of  distress,  or  our  expression  of  our  emotion.  39 
Whatever  its  root  cause,  this  distress,  anxiety,  or  suffering  is  the 
emotional  element  which  gives  pain  its  peculiar  character;  it  is  that  pain 
quality  which  distinguishes  the  painful  experience  from  the  ordinary 
one,  and,  although  individuals  such  as  masochists  can  be  said  to  enjoy 
pain,  they  cannot  be  said  to  enjoy  suffering.  What  then,  to  Trigg,  is 
significant  about  the  masochist's  experience?  Does  the  masochist  not 
perceive  the  suffering,  although  welcoming  the  pain,  as  Bakan  seems  to 
suggest?  Likewise,  is  it  the  peace  of  mind  of  the  flagellant  or  martyr 
which  allows  such  a  person  to  transcend  the  normal  pain  experience? 
Perhaps.  But  Trigg  offers  an  explanation  which  is  still  more  suggestive 
in  the  context  of  our  spiritual  exploration.  Trigg  suggests  that,  although 
the  suffering  itself  cannot  be  said  to  be  enjoyed  (or  it  could  not  be  called 
suffering),  the  significance  of  the  suffering,  that  which  it  represents  to 
the  sufferer,  might  well  transcend  the  suffering  itself: 
If  all  this  is  correct,  it  is  a  dangerous  simplification  to  talk  as  if 
masochists  enjoy  suffering.  The  word  "suffering"  implies  the 
presence  of  distress,  and  we  have  agreed  that  it  is  logically 
impossible  to  enjoy  this.  The  most  plausible  candidate  to  be  the 
44  object"  of  masochistic  enjoyment  in  a  combination  of  enjoyment 
and  suffering  might  well  be  "the  fact  that  one  is  suffering".  The 
masochist  could  well  enjoy  the  significance  of  the  suffering.  If 
the  suffering  represented  punishment  for  him  and  he  desired 
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once  becomes  more  intelligible.  The  experience  of  suffering 
would  not  itself  be  important.  What  it  meant  to  the  masochist 
might  well  be.  40 
This  concept  is  significant  in  the  larger  context  of  my  discussion  for 
obvious  reasons:  if  (in  the  mind  of  the  victim)  the  significance  of  both 
the  pain  and  the  suffering  outweigh  the  components  themselves,  then  it 
is  possible  to  see  how,  even  to  one  experiencing  both  extreme  pain  and 
its  complementary  emotional  anxiety,  this  physical  experience  might  be 
transcended. 
Certainly  such  psychological  and  emotional  factors  may  be  seen 
as  sometimes  related  to  spiritual  matters,  but  they  are  not  necessarily 
identical;  it  is  clear,  in  any  case,  that  spiritual  concepts  such  as 
purification  through  suffering  and  sacrifice,  -  and  salvation  through 
martyrdom,  'are  cultural  commonplaces,  and  the  critical  objectivity  of  the 
clinical  observer  in  no  way  lessens  the  reality  of  the  spiritual  experience 
to  the  practicing  believer.  Spiritual  matters  are  by  nature  complex  and 
shifting  conflations  of  cultural,  emotional,  and  psychological  valences, 
and  in  the  end  it  may  not  matter  all  that  much  exactly  what  mechanisms 
are  at  work.  The  significance  model  offered  by  Trigg,  however,  does 
offer  intriguing  possibilities,  especially  in  the  spiritu  ally-  ch  arg  ed 
environment  of  Anglo-Saxon  conceptions  of  the  overlapping  natures  of 
pain,  suffering,  sacrifice,  and  salvation.  Shirley  Panken  quite  rightly 
points  out  that,  even  in  our  (relatively)  rational  and  empirical  culture, 
pain  and  suffering  are  valued  spiritual  "commodities",  which  are  often 
seen  as  "the  price  of  the  ticket"  to  salvation: 
The  "pleasure  in  pain"  orientation  may  find  some  degree  of 
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European  culture  on  the  value  of  pain  and  suffering  as  a  necessary 
prelude  to  salvation.  This  indicates,  both  to  the  superego  and  to 
others,  that  we  are  good  or  striving  to  be  good.  Pain  and  suffering 
might  be  all  too  readily  substituted  for  goal-directed  effort  and 
accomplishment.  41 
In  the  context  of  the  Old  English  homiletic  tradition,  it  is  clear  that  what 
is  somewhat  true  today.  must  have  been  much  more  the  case  in  Anglo- 
Saxon  England.  Though  the  suffering  aspects  of  pain  might  sometimes 
be  alleviated  through  various  spiritual,  psychological,  or  physical 
mechanisms,  they  need  not  be  so  in  order  to  tempt  the  martyr  to  the 
passion.  Indeed,  in  the  context  of  the  significance  of  such  a  sacrifice 
(see  my  discussion  of  pain's  relationship  to  issues  of  spiritual  identity, 
below),  agonizing  suffering  (in  emulation  of  the  Divine  made  fully 
human)  is  in  fact  the  ultimate  badge  of  Christ-like  martyrdom.  Though 
the  pain  be  fraught  with  suffering,  the  significance  of  the  experience 
(coupled  with  the  promise  of  eternal  bliss)  is  reward  enough  to  incite  the 
saint  to  embrace  the  most  horrible  fate;  and  again,  such  willingness  to 
sacrifice  oneself  on  the  altar  of  one's  beliefs  is  hardly  unknown  today: 
of  considerable  interest  are  those  personalities  with  intact  ego 
strength,  who,  for  rational  purposes,  embrace  situations  involving 
pain,  danger,  or  uncertainty--for  example,  revolutionary  or  social 
causes--and  experience  satisfaction  in  doing  so.  42 
Granting  that  often  the  suffering  aspects  of  pain,  though  not  at  all 
alleviated,  might  be  willingly  experienced  for  the  sake  of  some  higher 
significance,  it  is  nonetheless  true  that  such  suffering  is,  at  times; 
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"transmutation"  in  Chapter  Five).  Whatever  the  physical,  psychological, 
emotional,  or  spiritual  mechanism(s)  involved,  the  point  here  is  that 
individuals  undergoing  such  ordeals  as  these  Indian  spiritual  rituals 
sometimes  seem  to  experience  exaltation  rather  than  pain,  and  ample 
such  instances  have  been  documented.  This  being  the  case  in  a  late 
twentieth-century  "rational"  culture,  have  we  any  reason  to  doubt  that 
the  Anglo-Saxons  believed  in  such  altered  states?  The  very  existence  of 
the  saints'  cults,  the  popularity  of  hermits  and  flagellants  and  their  ilk, 
along  with  the  culture  of  self-denial--which  later  led  to  anchorites  and 
mysticism--argues  against  this. 
Utilizing  such  real  world  links  between  mental  and  spiritual  states 
and  perceptions  of  physical  pain,  I  will  attempt  to  illustrate  that  pain,  in 
Old  English  literary  terms,  is  a  state  of  mortal  spiritual  experience;  the 
same  sorts  of  physical  stimuli  which  cause  pain  in  some  cause  a 
heightened  spiritual  state--a  state  of  exaltation--in  others.  This 
exaltation  is  a  non-mortal  state  brought  on  by  a  communion  with  the 
divine43.  I  would  argue  that  the  issue  of  spiritual  identity  is  the  key 
determiner  in  these  cases;  in  other  words,  the  spiritual  state  of  the 
subject  sometimes  determines  the  nature  of  pain  reception  (see 
discussion  of  the  painful  nature  of  "transmutation"  in  Chapter  Five). 
pain,  like  death,  is  a  quintessenti  ally  mortal  experience;  so  much 
so,  in  fact,  that  the  divine  can  participate  in  these  uniquely  human  states 
only  by  a  supreme  act  of  will  and  sacrifice.  Likewise,  mortals  can 
transcend  the  human  experience  to  reach  a  divine  state  of  exaltation  only 
by  conjoining  a  particular  state  of  mortal  purity  with  the  largess  of 
divine  grace.  For  an  example  of  the  former  act  of  divine  sacrifice  we 
need  only  turn  back  to  The  Dream  of  the  Rood.  Christ  first  appears  in 
this  poem  as  a  heroic  figure--a  "young  hero"  --determined  to  mount  the 
cross  and  redeem  mankind.  Here  the  poet  adapts  Germanic  conceptions Chapter  Two  205 
of  the  heroic  and  the  divine  to  the  Christian  template  of  the  crucifixion, 
and  the  result  illuminates  a  great  deal  about  Anglo-Saxon  perceptions  of 
the  mortal  nature  of  suffering  and  death.  Christ  mounts  the  cross 
eagerly,  without  the  slightest  sign  of  misgiving  or  trepidation  which  an 
audience  familiar  with  the  gospel  accounts  might  expect: 
Geseah  ic  ýa  Frean  mancynnes 
efstan  elne  mycle  pwt  he  me  wolde  on  gestigan. 
...  Ongyrede  hine  pa  geong  hmle6,  (pmt  wms  God  mlmihtig), 
strang  ond  stii5mod;  gestah  he  on  gealgan  heanne, 
modig  on  manigra  gesyhoe,  ýa  he  wolde  mancyn  lysan. 
(11.33b-34  &-39-41) 
[I  saw  then  the  Lord  of  mankind  hasten  with  great  courage,  in  that 
he  wished  to  mount  upon  me.  ... 
The  young  hero  disrobed  himself 
--that  was  God  almighty--  strong  and  resolute;  he  mounted  the 
high  gallows,  courageous  in  the  sight  of  many,  when  he  wished  to 
redeem  mankind.  ] 
The  rood  then  recounts  the  grisly  nature  of  the  pain  Of  crucifixion  and 
the  ensuing  death  of  Christ;  it  is  only  through  this  ultimate  sacrifice  that 
Christ  may  become  fully  human,  and  it  is  only  through  the  human 
portion  of  his  dual  nature  that  he  can  experience  pain  and  "taste  bitter 
death":  Ir- 
Geseah  ic  weruda  God 
pearle  penian.  pystro  hwfdon 
bewrigen  mid  wolcnum  -.  Wealdendes  hraaw, Chapter  Two  206 
scirne  sciman;  sceadu  fora  eode, 
wann  under  wolcnum.  Weop  eal  gesceaft, 
cwi6don  Cyninges  fyll.  Crist  waas  on  rode. 
(11.5lb-56) 
[I  saw  the  God  of  hosts  violently  racked.  Darkness  had  covered 
with  clouds  the  corpse  of  the  Ruler,  that  clear  radiance;  a  shadow 
went  forth,  -dark  under  the  clouds.  All  creation  wept,  lamented  the 
fall  of  the  King.  Christ  was  on  the  cross.  ] 
It  is  perhaps  most  significant  that  Christ,  after  his  death,  is  referred  to  as 
44weary  of  limb"  (Aledon  hie  pwr1imwezigne...:  "They  laid  down  there 
the  limb-weary  one...  ";  1.63a),  a  particularly  human  designation.  The 
divine  does  not  become  "weary",  it  does  not  require  rest,  and  neither 
does  it  experience  pain  nor  death;  these  are  uniquely  human 
experiences,  and  in  utilizing  vocabulary  such  as  limweligne,  the  poet 
clearly  marks  for  us  the  significance  of  this  inversion. 
The  flip  side  of  this  experiential  coin  is  the  mortal  who,  through 
communing-  with  the  divine,  experiences  exaltation  when  we  would 
expect  such  a  one  to  be  in  pain.  This  state  of  exaltation  is  not  a  common 
one,  and  holy  men  and  women  do,  quite  often,  experience  pain.  There 
are  times,  however,  when  the  most  horrific  of  physical  tortures  seem  to 
elicit  a  state  of  rapturous  ecstasy  instead  of  horrendous  agony  and  death. 
This  may  be  especially  true  in  situations  where  the  painful  plight  of  evil- 
doers  may  be  contrasted  to  advantage  against  the  sublime  exaltation  of 
the  righteous  (this  might  be  most  common  in  the  case  of  fiery  tortures, 
and  this  would  be  significant  in  the  context  of  my  discussion  of  the  fire 
of  judgment,  in  Chapter  Five).  Two  such  studies  in  contrast  may  be 
found  in  Juliana  and  in  Daniel.  In  both  cases  attempts  to  consign  the 
righteous  to  the  torment  of  flames  backfire  (literally!  ),  and  the  heathen Chapter  Two  207 
torturers  are  consumed  by  the  flames  while  the  holy  victims  remain 
"blithe"  and  sing  the  praises  of  God.  Juliana  is  cast  into  a  bubbling 
cauldron  of  lead: 
Het  ýa  ofestlice,  yrre  gebolgen, 
leahtra  lease  in  ýws  leades  wylm 
scufan  butan  scyldum.  Pa  toscaden  wear6 
lig  tolysed;  -,  lead  wide  sprong, 
hat,  heorogifre:  haele6  wurdon  acle, 
arasad  for  ýy  rmse.  p  @or  on  rime  forborn 
Ourh  ýees  fires  fnmst  fif  ond  hundseofontig 
hw6nes  herges.  pa  gen  sio  halge  stod 
ungewemde  wlite;  ,  nzes  hyre  wloh  ne  hrwgl, 
ne  feax  ne  fel  fyre  gemealed, 
ne  lic  ne  leoýu.  Heo  in  lige  stod 
wghwws  onsund,  swgde  ealles  ýonc 
dryhtna  Dryhtne. 
(11.582-594a) 
[Then  he--enraged  with  anger--commanded  the  sin-less  one,  the 
one  without  guilt,  to  be  thrust  speedily  into  the  surge  of  the  lead. 
Then  the  fire  was  scattered  and  set  free;  the  lead  burst  out  far  and 
wide,  hot  and  fiercely  ravenous:  men  were  terrified,  overtaken  by 
the  onslaught.  There  seventy-five  in  number  of  the  heathen  army 
were  consumed  by  burning  through  the  blast  of  the  fire.  Then  the 
holy  one  yet  stood  with  uninjured  beauty:  not  her  hem  nor  robe, 
nor  hair  nor  skin,  nor  body  nor  limb,  was  damaged  by  the  fire. 
She  stood  in  the  flame  completely  uninjured,  and  said  thanks  for 
all  to  the  Lord  of  lords.  ]44 Chapter  Two  208 
She  is  altogether  unharmed,  however,  and  not  in  the  slightest  distress  or 
pain  whatsoever.  Not  her  hair,  skin,  or  robe  are  in  any  way  harmed,  and 
she  seems,  in  fact,  to  be  in  a  sort  of  ecstatic  state  as  the  seventy-five 
heathens  are  consumed,  while  she  sings  her  prayers  of  thanksgiving. 
The  three  youths  in  Daniel  undergo  a  similar  ordeal,  and  the  results  are 
much  the  same:  - 
Hreohmod  wws  se  hw6ena  ýeoden.  Het  hie  hra0e  bwman. 
AEled  was  ungescead  micel,  ýa  wws  se  ofen  onhwted, 
isen  eaff  6urhgleded.  Hine  owr  esnas  mEenige 
wurpon  wudu  on  innan,  swa  him  wws  on  wordum  gedemed. 
Maron  brandas  on  bryne  blacan  fyres, 
(wolde  wulfheort  cyning  wall  on  stealle  iserne, 
ymb  wfwste),  o6ýzet  up  gewat 
lig  ofer  leofum  -  and  purh  lust  gesloh 
micle  mare  ponne  gemet  wwre; 
6a  se  lig  gewand  on  la6e  men, 
hw6ne  of  haigum. 
(11.242-252a)45 
[The  leader  of  the  heathens  was  angry;  he  commanded  them 
readily  to  be  burned.  The  fire  was  unreasonably  great  when  the 
oven  was  heated,  the  iron  was  completely  heated  through.  Into  it 
there  many  servants  threw  wood,  as  to  them  it  had  been  appointed 
in  words.  They  bore  brands  into  the  blaze  of  the  bright  fire,  (the 
wolf-hearted  king  wished  an  iron  wall  in  that  place,  around  those 
faithful  to  the  law),  until  the  flame  went  upward  above  the 
beloved  ones,  and  through  eagerness  it  slew  a  much  greater 
number  than  was  fitting,  when  the  flame  turned  upon  the  hateful 
men,  the  heathens,  and  away  from  the  holy  ones.  ] Chapter  Two  209 
The  youths,  too,  remain  cheerful,  and  sing  their  praises  of  the  Almighty, 
while  outside  the  oven  those  feeding  the  flames  are  consumed.  The 
youths  are  protected  by  their  relationship  with  God,  however,  and  feel 
no  more  pain  within  the  furnace  than  they  might  experience  from  the 
summer  sun  or  the  dawn  breeze: 
Him  ýwr  owiht  ne  derede, 
ac  wws  pwr  inne  ealles  gelicost 
efne  ponne  on  sumera  sunne  scine6, 
and  deawdrias  on  daage  weor6e6, 
winde  geondsawen. 
(11.273b-277a) 
[Nothing  at  all  harmed  them  there,  but  it  was  within  there  of  all 
things  most  just  like  when  in  summer  the  sun  shines  and  dewfall 
comes  in  the  day,  spread  about  by  the  wind.  ] 
In  both  of  these  cases  it  is  the  spiritual  identity  of  the  subject,  their 
relationship  to  the  divine,  that  lifts  them  from  the  realm  of  mortal  pain, 
bodily  destruction,  and  death,  and  grants  them  in  their  place  ecstasy, 
comfort,  and  exaltation. 
Our  understanding  of  torture  by  necessity  must  be  related  to  our 
understanding  of  pain,  and  both  seem  to  be  bound  up  with  issues  of 
identity.  If  spiritual  identity,  or  spiritual  state,  determines  the  nature  of 
pain  reception,  then  we  can  expect  to  see  two  discrete  models  of  pain 
within  the  framework  of  Anglo-Saxon  "transform  ative"  verse.  Just  as 
the  fire  of  judgment  is  a  painful  transformation  for  the  sinful  but  a 
pleasant  warming  for  the  righteous  (see  discussion  of  the  fire  of Chapter  Two  2  10 
judgment  in  Chapter  Five),  the  spiritual  transformation  wrought  through 
the  application  of  torture  in  an  Old  English  literary  context  can  be  either 
coercive  or  voluntary.  In  the  terms  of  our  definition  of  pain  it  is  vital 
that  we  distinguish  between  these  two  perceptive  states:  that  is,  between 
pain  and  exaltation.  Both  occur  as  a  result  of  stimuli  which  we  would 
expect  to  produce  pain,  and  both  seem  related  to  spiritual  identity  and 
transformation  in  the  Old  English  literary  tradition.  They  are,  however, 
two  discrete  metaphorical  models,  as  sure  as  their  literal  counterparts  in 
the  real  world  are  entirely  different  experiences. 
Pain,  according  to  David  Bakan,  "is  ultimately  private  in  that  it  is 
lodged  in  the  individual  persOll",  46  and  indeed,  can  exist  only  within  the 
body  and  consciousness  of  each  of  its  individual  victims;  pain  can  never 
be  experienced  collectively  by  unindividuated  subjects.  47  Pain  is,  then, 
fundamentally  and  necessarily  a  personal  and  intensely  isolating 
experience;  the  reasons  for  this  are  linguistic  and  conceptual  as  well  as 
physical,  and  they  seem  to  feed  off  one  another  in  a  repetitious  cycle  of 
the  alienation  of  the  subject  of  the  pain.  The  central  reason  for  the 
isolating  nature  of  pain  is  its  interiority;  48  pain  exists  within  the 
individual  subject,  49  and  no  external  referent  exists  which  may  be 
utilized  to  express  the  nature  of  this  experience5O.  Try  as  the  subject 
, might  to  describe  the  experience,  the  language  available  is  simply 
inadequate  to  the  task: 
We  may  use  descriptors  such  as  splitting,  shooting,  gnawing, 
wrenching  or  stinging,  but  there  are  no  "outside,  "  objective 
references  for  these  words.  If  we  talk  about  a  blue  pen  or  a  yellow 
pencil  we  can  point  to  an  object  and  say  "that  is  what  I  mean  by 
yellow"  or  "the  colour  of  the  pen  is  blue.  "  But  what  can  we  point 
to  to  tell  another  person  precisely  what  we  mean  by  smarting, Chapter  Two  211 
tingling,  or  rasping?  A  person  who  suffers  terrible  pain  may  say 
that  the  pain  is burning  and  add  that  "it  feels  as  if  someone  is 
shoving  a  red-hot  poker  through  my  toes  and  slowly  twisting  it 
around.  "  These  "as  if"  statements  are  often  essential  to  convey 
the  qualities  of  the  experience.  51 
Elaine  Scarry  has  suggested  that  this  interiority  of  pain  acts,  not 
just  to  diminish  the  utility  of  language,  but  to  "  actively  destroy  it", 
rendering  the  victim  (at  first)  unable  to  communicate  the  experience,  and 
then  (in  cases  of  intense  pain)  actually  depriving  the  victim  of  the 
capacity  of  speech,  leaving  its  subject  only  a  subarticulate  vocabulary  of 
moans  and  cries  with  which  to  describe  the  pain: 
physical  pain  does  not  simply  resist  language  but  actively  destroys 
it,  bringing  about  an  immediate  reversion  to  a  state  anterior  to 
language  '  ,  to  the  sounds  and  cries  a  human  being  makes  before 
language  is  learned.  52 
The  interiority  of  this  experience  and  the  linguistic  barrier  associated 
with  it  makes  pain  at  once  both  linguistically  inexpressible  and 
emotively  unsharable.  53  Pain,  then,  can  be  seen  to  isolate  and  to 
alienate  the  individual  from  the  group,  and  thus  necessarily  such 
personal  experiences  of  pain  must  be  seen  to  be  linked  to  the  identity  of 
each  of  its  individual  subjects. 
Pain  has  no  external  referent,  and  therefore  lacks  the  objects 
necessary  to  give  voice  to  the  experience.  54  Weapons  and  wounds, 
however,  although  in  reality  the  agents  and  symptoms  of  pain  and  not 
the  thing  itselfi  sometimes  act  as  referents  by  association,  thereby  giving 
--voice"  to  the  "voiceless": Chapter  Two  212 
As  an  actual  physical  fact,  a  weapon  is  an  object  that  goes  into  the 
body  and  produces  pain;  as  a  perceptual  fact,  it  can  lift  pain  and 
its  attributes  out  of  the  body  and  make  them  visible.  The  mental 
habit  of  recognizing  pain  in  the  weapon  (despite  the  fact  that  an 
inanimate  object  cannot  "have  pain"  or  any  other  sentient 
experience)  is  both  an  ancient  and  an  enduring  one.  ...  The  point 
here  is  not  just  that  pain  can  be  apprehended  in  the  image  of  the 
weapon  (or  wound)  but  that  it  almost  cannot  be  apprehended 
without  it:  few  people  would  have  difficulty  understanding 
Michael  Walzer's  troubled  statement,  "I  cannot  conceptualize 
infinite  pain  without  thinking  of  whips  and  scorpions,  hot  irons 
and  other  people.  "55 
Such  a  language  of  weapons  and  wounds  is  utilized  extensively  in  The 
Dream  of  the  Rood.  Here  the  poet  conveys  the  intensely  private  and 
largely  inexpressible  horrors  of  the  torment  of  the  crucifixion  through 
graphic  and  even  loving  attention  to  detail.  These  details  include 
descriptions  of  weapons  (such  as  the  cross  itself,  nails,  and  arrows  or 
spears),  mention  of  related  acts  of  violence  which  suggest  the  use  of 
weapons  (such  as  axes  and  the  rack),  and  numerous  references  to 
wounds  and  physical  consequences  thereof  (such  as  recurring 
descriptions  of  blood  and  bleeding--always  significant  in  any  discussion 
of  Christ). 
There  are  several  striking  descriptions  of  wounds  in  The  Dream  of 
the  Rood,  but  the  most  significant  recurring  theme  is  that  of  blood  and 
bleeding,  both  the  bleeding  of  Christ  and--perhaps  still  more  tellingly-- 
that  of  the  Rood  itself.  The  first  such  description  is,  in  fact,  one  of  the 
Rood,  which  the  Dreamer  early  on  perceives  bleeds  from  its  right  side: Chapter  Two  213 
Hww6re  ic  ýurh  ýmt  gold  ongytan  meahte 
earma  wrgewin,  ýmt  hit  wrest  ongan 
swootan  on  pa  swi6ran  healfe. 
(11.18-20a) 
[However,  I  through  that  gold  could  perceive  the  ancient  agony  of 
wretched  ones,  when  it  first  began  to  bleed  upon  the  right-hand 
side.  ] 
it  is  significant,  of  course,  that  the  Rood  bleeds  "on  the  right-hand  side", 
in  that  this  bleeding  is  therefore  clearly  marked  as  representative  of 
Christ's  own  wounds,  and  by  extension  representative  of  his  pain.  56 
But  bleeding  does  not  always  necessarily  signify  pain,  and  so  the  poet 
makes  a  point  of  illuminating  the  relationship  between  the  two  in  the 
context  of  this  poem.  This  association  between  blood  and  pain  is 
explicated  clearly  by  the  description  of  the  origin  of  the  wounds  which 
caused  the  bleeding  in  the  first  place;  the  phrase  with  which  this 
relationship  is  explicated,  "ancient  agony  of  wretched  ones",  is  a 
powerful  verbal  statement  of  pain,  to  be  sure,  but  it  is  a  bit  pallid  in 
contrast  with  some  of  the  descriptions  of  bleeding  and  wounding  which 
follow.  on  the  one  hand,  I  think  that  this  is  a  good  example  of  how 
ordinary  language  fails  in  the  attempt  to  describe  the  horrors  of  pain;  an 
the  other,  used  in  conjunction  with  the  language  of  bleeding  wounds 
which  the  poet  constructs,  this  phrase--which  occurs  in  the  narrator's 
first  description  of  blood  and  wounds--helps  to  place  the  later 
descriptions  of  blood  in  their  proper  context  of  violent  torture  and 
struggle. 
.  The  Dreamer  mentions  bleeding  once  more,  when  he  describes  the 
shifting  dual  nature  of  the  Rood: Chapter  Two  214 
hwilum  hit  waas  mid  waetan  bestemed, 
beswyled  mid  swates  gange 
(11.22b-23a) 
[  at  times  it  was  soaked  with  moisture,  drenched  with  the  flow  of 
blood  ] 
The  Rood  itself  mentions  blood  on  two  occasions,  the  first  of  which  is 
significant  because  it  follows  a  phrase  which  establishes  that  the 
suffering  on  Calvary  was  a  joint  experience  shared  by  Christ  and  the 
cross;  this  relationship  firmly  establishes  the  Rood's  position  as  a 
rightful  representative  of  the  passion  and  pain  of  Christ: 
Bysmeredon  hie  unc  butu  wtgaadere.  Eall  ic  waas  mid  blode 
bestemed, 
begoten  of  peas  guman  sidan,  si66an  he  hwfde  his  gast 
.  41  onsended. 
(11.48-49) 
[They  mocked  us  both  together.  I  was  all  soaked  with  blood,  shed 
from  the  side  of  that  man  after  he  had  sent  forth  his  spirit.  ] 
Further,  it  is  significant  that  the  Rood  describes  itself  as  "soaked  with 
blood";  this  again  underscores  the  mutual  suffering  of  Christ  and  the 
cross.  Although  the  Rood  informs  the  Dreamer  that  it  was  covered  by 
the  blood  of  Christ  ("shed  from  the  side  of  that  man"),  in  the  context  of 
this  particular  poem,  where  the  Rood  is  a  sentient  being  and  has  already 
been  described  as  "bleeding"  and  "wounded",  we  may  safely  assume 
that  the  Rood  itself  is  bleeding  as  well,  and  that  its  blood  is  commingled Chapter  Two  215 
with  that  of  the  Savior.  In  this  powerful  symbolic  context  of  blood,  this 
commingling  confirms  the  Rood's  status  as  a  symbol  of  the  suffering  of 
Christ,  and,  most  importantly,  validates  the  "voice"  of  the  Rood  which 
gives  witness  to  the  pain  of  Christ.  The  Rood  mentions  bleeding  once 
more,  and  this  reference  is  significant  because  it  leads  me  from  my 
discussion  of  blood  to  that  of  weapons  and  the  specific  wounds  wrought 
thereby. 
After  Christ  has  b  een  "  lifted  "  from  his  "  heavy  torment"  and 
removed  from  the  cross,  the  Rood  stands  bereft  of  its  burden,  naked  as  it 
were,  but  for  the  flowing  blood  and  scarring  wounds  which  mar  its 
surface  and  bespeak  the  horrific  death  which  Christ  has  just  suffered: 
Genamon  hie  ýwr  wlmihtigne  God, 
ahofon  hine  of  6am  hefian  wite.  Forleton  me  ýa  hilderincas 




[They  took  there  almighty  God,  they  raised  him  from  that  heavy 
II  punishment.  The  warriors  left  me  to  stand  drenched  with  blood;  I 
was  all  wounded  with  shafts.  ] 
once  again,  the  words  which  the  poet  has  to  describe  the  pain  of  Christ, 
or  indeed,  pain  in  general,  are  pale  and  unreal  in  the  context  of  the 
enormity  of  the  crucifixion;  a  phrase  such  as  beflan  wite  --"heavy 
torment"  or  "grievous  punishment"  --is  an  abstraction,  an  intellectual 
attempt  to  describe  torment  which  in  practice  distances  still  further  an 
already  alienated  audience  from  the  reality  of  Christ's  pain.  However, 
the  language  of  blood,  weapons,  and  wounds  which  follows  this  passage Chapter  Two  216 
(a  description  of  wood  dark  and  glistening  with  blood,  pitted  with  gaping 
holes  where  it  has  been  pierced  by  shafts)  vividly  reasserts  the  reality  of 
the  crucifixion,  and  shocks  the  audience  out  of  its  complacency. 
Further,  in  its  vibrant  and  colorful  detail,  this  language'provides  the 
visual  and  almost  tactile  image  necessary  to  attempt  to  bridge  the  gulf  of 
unreality  and  silence  which  separates  the  sufferer  of  pain  from  those  who 
do  not  share  that  suffering.  An  earlier  example,  describing  how  the 
Rood  received  its  wounds,  is  perhaps  still  more  disturbing. 
purhdrifan  hi  me  mid  deorcan  naeglum;  on  me  syndon  ýa  dolg 
gesiene, 
opene  inwidhlemmas. 
(11.46-47a) 
[They  pierced  me  with  dark  nails;  the  wounds  are  visible  upon 
me,  open  malicious  wounds.  ] 
"Dark  nails"  have  been  "driven  through"  the  flesh  of  both  Christ  and 
Rood,  leaving  the  horrendous,  open  wounds  and  blood  which  later 
bespeak  the  pain  of  Christ.  This  image,  of  sharp,  ugly  spikes  biting  into 
soft,  bloody  tissue,  can  cause  an  almost  visceral  reaction  in  the  most 
disinterested  of  readers.  Here,  where  abstractions  of  pain  and  torture 
have  failed,  visualizations  of  wounds  and  their  agents  succeed  in 
communicating  to  some  extent  the  horrible  nature  of  the  pain  of  the 
crucifixion;  it  is  not  a  communication  that  is  possible  through  words 
alone,  however.  We  must,  to  a  certain  extent,  be  44  shown"  the  pain. 
Like  Doubting  Thomas,  we  must  be  shown  the  wounds  of  Christ--feel 
the  gaping  ridges  with  our  fingers,  as  it  were--in  order  to  reach  even  an 
approximation  of  understanding  of  their  significance  to  the  victim  of 
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The  most  notable  weapon  invoked  by  the  poet  to  describe  the  pain 
of  the  crucifixion  is,  not  surprisingly,  the  cross  itself.  It  is  telling  that  the 
poet  seems  to  distinguish  between  the  s 
, 
Yllicre  treow  (L  4)  or  sigebeam  (I. 
13)--the  Rood  which  represents  the  victory  of  the  sacrifice  of  Christ--and 
the  gealga  or  gealgtreow--the  "gallows"  which  was  the  instrument  of  his 
sacrificial  torment  and  death.  These  two  "trees"  are,  of  course,  one  and 
the  same,  but  at  first  the  poet  is  careful  to  distinguish  between  the  two 
natures  of  the  Rood.  Early  on,  in  fact,  we  are  informed  that  the  Dreamer 
beheld  a  "glorious  creation"  which  was  not  at  all  the  "gallows  of  a 
criminal": 
Ne  wws  i5mr  huru  fracodes  gealga.  (I.  10b) 
",  I 
[There  was  not,  indeed,  the  gallows  of  a  criminal.  ] 
The  implication  is  that  the  Rood  is  a  far  more  wondrous  creation  than 
any  common  gallows,  and  that  Christ,  the  living  God,  could  not  suffer 
death  through  such  a  contemptible  means.  This  position  is  justified  to  a 
certain  extent  through  our  knowledge  of  the  Rood  itself,  which,  unlike 
any  other  instrument  of  torture,  is  given  both  consciousness  and 
conscience,  along  with  a  voice  to  make  its  story  intelligible.  It  is  of 
considerable  significance,  however,  that  this  self-same  sigebeam  --which 
is  not  to  be  confused  with  a  gallows--is,  in  fact,  later  referred  to  as  just 
that;  the  first  such  reference  occurs  in  the  Rood's  own  description  of 
Christ  mounting  the  cross: 
gestah  he  on  gealgan  heanne, 
,,  modig  on  manigra  gesyh6e,  pa  he  wolde  mancyn  lysan. Chapter  Two  218 
(11.40b-41) 
he  mounted  the  high  gallows,  courageous  in  the  sight  of  many, 
when  he  wished  to  redeem  mankind.  ] 
Though  the  Dreamer  took  care  to  make  a  distinction  between  the  Rood 
and  a  more  common  instrument  of  torment  and  execution,  the  Rood  has 
no  such  delicate  sensibilities  concerning  itself,  and  describes  its  role  in 
straightforward  and  uneuphemistic  language.  It  is  of  great  significance 
that  the  Dreamer  himself,  after  having  heard  the  Rood's  story  from  its 
own  lips,  modifies  his  own  conception  of  the  cross,  and  acknowledges 
its  dual  nature;  it  is both  instrument  of  death  and  agency  of  life,  and, 
granted  its  own  voice  in  the  vision  of  the  Dreamer,  it  is  witness  to 
destruction,  death,  resurrection,  and  redemption.  The  Dreamer  makes 
reference  to  the  dual  nature  of  the  Rood  in  his  final  mention  of  it, 
directly  before  he  closes  with  a  description  of  the  victorious 
homecoming  of  Christ  made  possible  through  his  death  on  the  cross: 
Si  me  Dryhten  freond, 
se  6e  her  on  eorpan  wr  ýrowode 
on  pam  gealgtreowe  for  gum  an  synnum. 
(11.144b-146) 
[May  the  Lord  be  a  friend  tome,  he  who  hereon  earth  previously 
-tree  for  the  sins  of  mankind.  ]  suffered  upon  the  gallows 
Here  the  Rood  is  described  as  "gallows-tree",  a  conflation  of  the  two 
earlier  forms  which  had  been  in  opposition  to  one  another;  with  such  a 
conflation  the  Dreamer  recognizes  that  the  Rood,  though  worthy  of 
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redemption  which  it  represents,  and  though  transformed  itself  through 
that  process,  must  first  and  foremost  be  recognized  as  the  agency  of 
Christ's  torture  and  death;  without  such  agency,  no  such  redemption 
would  have  been  possible.  The  Rood,  then,  must  be  acknowledged  as  a 
', 4gallows"  before  a  "victory-wood".  Such  an  acknowledgment  is  of  the 
first  importance  to  my  discussion,  because  the  Rood,  which  then  must  be 
seen  as  an  instrument  of  torture  as  well  as  a  symbol  of  salvation,  is  given 
a  voice  in  this  poem,  and  is  in  fact  the  primary  narrator  of  the  most 
important  aspects  of  the  story.  Such  a  literary  device  takes  Scarry's 
concept  of  the  language  of  weapons  and  wounds  a  step  further;  here  the 
most  important  symbolic  representation  of  physical  and  spiritual  pain 
available  in  the  western  world  is  given  a  voice  with  which  to  articulate 
its  own  nature.  Here  a  weapon--the  very  instrument  of  Christ's  torture 
and  death--is  given  not  just  a  metaphorical  or  representational  voice 
value  (as  Scarry  suggests),  but  is  provided  with  an  actual  literary  voice 
with  which  to  articulate  the  suffering  of  the  Savior.  It  is  clear  that  our 
Anglo-Saxon  poet  understood  the  difficulties  in  expressing  the  interior 
experience  of  pain,  and--with  this  attempt  to  resolve  these  difficulties-- 
he  anticipates  modem  philosophical  conceptions  of  giving  voice  to  the 
voiceless  nature  of  pain. 
pain,  then,  as  far  as  we  have  been  able  to  define  it,  is  primarily  an 
interior  and  intensely  private  state;  this  interiority  of  pain  at  first  seems 
paradoxical,  as  all  normal  humans  participate,  to  some  degree  or 
another,  in  the  suffering  of  pain.  We  have  established,  however,  that  as 
universal  as  pain  may  be,  it  exists  within  the  body,  has  no  real  external 
referent,  and  so  defies  description  and  even  tends  to  break  down 
language  itself  -  Such  resistance  to  communication  offers  rich  areas  of 
exploration  for  linguists,  just  as  the  very  nature  of  pain  itself  has  been 
the  subject  of  controversy  amongst  philosophers,  theologians,  and Chapter  Two  220 
medical  practitioners  from  time  immemorial  right  down  to  the  present 
day.  Pain  seems  to  be  a  complex  phenomenon  which  varies  to  some 
extent  or  other  within  individuals,  cultures,  and  circumstances,  and 
which  is  made  up  of  a  varying  and  synergistic  combination  of 
physiological,  psychological,  emotional,  and  spiritual  factors.  All  of  this 
seems  to  have  been  understood,  to  one  degree  or  another,  from  the  time 
of  classical  thought  on,  and  although  our  knowledge  of  the  physiological 
and  psychological  factors  involved  has  improved  drastically  within  the 
last  few  centuries,  it  now  seems  as  though  our  rational  approach  offers 
only  a  partial  answer  to  the  "puzzle  of  pain". 
It  seems,  at  least  in  the  context  of  poetry,  that  the  Anglo-Saxons 
understood  pain  to  be  a  largely  affective  state,  closely  related  to  spiritual 
matters.  The  Dream  of  the  Rood  offers  us  fascinating  insights  into  the 
Anglo-Saxon  perception  of  these  matters,  and  indeed,  in  its  use  of  the 
Rood  as  narrator  and  explicator  of  pain,  this  poem  is  a  profound 
statement  an  the  link  between  language  and  pain.  Born.  out  of  the 
Anglo-Saxon  fascination  with  the  nature  of  the  cross,  and  from  the  larger 
context  of  the  cult  of  the  cross,  The  Dream  of  the  Rood  takes  the  pain  of 
Christ--and  the  significance  of  that  pain--as  its  central  theme,  and 
develops  this  theme  in  a  number  of  significant  ways.  First  of  all,  the 
poem  utilizes  the  cross's  symbolic  value  as  a  universal  touchstone  of 
pain  to  overcome  the  almost  insurmountable  alienation  and  isolation 
which  individual  victims  of  pain  suffer.  The  poet  does  this  both  through 
a  first-person  narration  of  the  passion  and  a  graphic  description  of  the 
torments  thereof;  both  of  these  techniques  serve  to  make  the  passion 
real,  bridge  the  gap  of  isolation  between  individual  sufferers,  and  reflect 
the  universal  nature  of  the  gift  of  salvation.  Secondly,  through  his 
unique  portrayal  of  the  shifting  dual  nature  of  the  Rood  itself  and  by 
extension  that  of  Christ,  the  poet  underscores  the  necessity  and  indeed Chapter  Two  221 
centrality  of  the  suffering  of  Christ  to  the  salvation  of  mankind.  Christ 
had  to  suffer  and  die  to  ensure  that  what  was  once  fully  divine  also  could 
become  fully  human,  and  therefore  likewise  ensure  that  humans  might 
have  a  bridge  to  the  divine.  Further,  this  shifting  nature  highlights  the 
individual  state  of  transmutation  that  can  and  must  take  place  in  the  soul 
of  every  believer.  Pain  then  becomes,  not  an  isolating  agent,  but  a 
means  through  which  every  member  of  the  audience  of  the  poem  is 
brought  together  through  the  powerful  spiritual  binding  agent  of 
common  experience  of  pain,  and  the  common  hope  of  salvation  which  is 
bound  up  with  such  an  understanding  of  the  spiritual  nature  of  pain. 
Finally,  the  poet  utilizes  a  language  of  weapons  and  wounds  to  bring 
pain  out  of  the  body,  and  to  give  it  the  external  referents  necessary  in 
order  to  be  able  to  communicate  its  nature.  Pain,  in  an  Anglo-Saxon 
literary  context,  is  a  spiritually  significant  state,  as  well  as  a  potentially 
transformative  force;  this  conception  of  the  dual  nature  of  pain--as 
register  of  spiritual  identity  and  agent  of  spiritual  change--is  one  which  I 
turn  to  now,  in  my  discussion  of  torture,  the  systematic  and  deliberate 
application  of  the  powerful  force  which  is  it  painso. Chapter  Two  222 
CHAPTER  TWO  NOTES 
The  relationship  between  metaphoric  and  literal  pain  is  especially 
volatile  in  the  context  of  Western  Christianity;  see  David  Bakan, 
ych  ol  qg7  of  Suffeling.  Disease,  Pain,  and  Saciiflce:  Toward  a  Ps 
Chicago:  U  of  Chicago  P,  1968.  Note  especiafty  pages  58-59: 
Pain  has  played  a  central  role  in  the  religious  thought  of  Western 
civilization.  For  her  disobedience  in  the  Garden  of  Eden,  Eve  is 
condemned  to  bring  forth  children  in  sorrow  (Gen.  3:  16);  and  the 
central  image  in  the  history  of  the  Western  world  has  been  that  of 
a  crucifixion,  undoubtedly  one  of  the  most  painful  forms  of 
execution  ever  devised.  I  regard  it  as  indicative  of  something 
important  in  both  the  mind  of  man  and  the  nature  of  our  culture 
that  the  dominant  image  in  the  history  of  Western  civilization  has 
been  that  of  one  obviously  suffering  pain.  Pain  must,  in  some 
sense,  be  a  touchstone  for  ultimate  concern.  It  is  also  noteworthy 
that  in  spite  of  all  other  differences  many  of  our  secular 
philosophies  and  our  religious  tradition  should  converge  in  giving 
pain  a  central  place. 
That  the  Anglo-Saxons  embraced  this  tradition  of  holy  suffering  is  self- 
evi 
I 
dent;  that  they  perceived  a  relationship  between  real  and  symbolic 
pain  seems  likewise  clear.  In  fact,  in  the  context  of  the  Old  English 
p  enitential  and  homiletic  traditions,  it  might  well  be  argued  that  the 
Anglo-Saxons  perceived  this  relationship  far  more  clearly  than  we  do. 
For  a  treatment  of  such  a  subject,  see  my  discussion  of  Graham  D. 
Caie's  concept  of  an  "  eschatological.  present"  in  Chapter  Five. 
2  For  a  succinct  introduction  to  the  cult  of  the  cross  and  the  uniquely 
Anglo-Saxon  manifestations  thereof,  see  Michael  Swanton,  ed.  The 
D,  ream  of  the  Rood.  Old  and  Middle  English  Texts,  G.  L.  Brook,  gen. Chapter  Two  223 
ed.  Manchester:  Manchester  UP,  1970.  Pages  42-52.  Before  the 
conversion  of  Constantine,  the  cross  was  widely  considered  to  be  a 
shameful  representation  of  the  death  of  Christ,  symbolizing  as  it  did  the 
ignoble  gallows  of  a  criminal.  After  Constantine's  conversion  (effected 
by  his  famous  vision  of  the  cross),  the  cross  became  an  important 
imperial  symbol  and  was  eventually  adopted  by  the  church  (Swanton, 
page  42).  The  cross  quickly  became  a  popular  symbol  of  veneration  in 
the  east,  and  various  ceremonies,  cults,  traditions,  and  relics  sprang  up 
around  it;  this  popularity  was  widespread  in  the  west  by  the  end  of  the 
seventh  century  (Swanton,  page  45).  Before  the  middle  of  that  century 
we  have  records  of  various  cross  stories  extant  in  Britain,  and  in  633 
Oswald  of  Northumbria  erected  a  giant  wooden  cross  before  the  battle  of 
Heavenfield,  thereby  attempting  to  reenact  Constantine's  strategy 
(Swanton,  page  45).,  The  most  significant  and  peculiarly  Anglo-Saxon 
outgrowth  of  this  cult  was  the  widespread  popularity  of  large  standing 
stone  crosses,  which  became  objects  and  locations  of  worship;  by  744 
these  icons  had  reached  such  ascendancy  that  Boniface  complained  that 
they  were  taking  the  place  of  the  regular  churches  (Swanton,  page  47). 
Over  1,500  of  these  stone  crosses  survive,  and  there  is  reason  to  believe 
that  many  others  of  wood  have  been  lost  to  us  (Swanton,  page  47).  The 
most  famous  of  these  standing  stone  crosses  is  the  Ruthwell  Cross,  upon 
which  appears  a  considerable  passage  from  The  Dream  of  the  Rood. 
The  link  between  this  poem,  the  Ruthwell  Cross,  and  the  cult  of  the 
cross  more  generally,  is  a  telling  one;  the  cross  was  an  extremely 
important  and  emotionally  and  spiritually  charged  symbol  in  early 
England,  and  Anglo-Saxon  perceptions  of  the  cross  stressed  its  dual 
nature  as  representative  of  both  the  death  and  the  triumph  of  Christ 
(Swanton,  pages  51-52).  1  will  explore  the  significance  of  this Chapter  Two  224 
perception  of  duality  further  in  my  discussion  of  the  dual  nature  of  the 
Rood,  below.  What  is  still  more  telling  in  the  context  of  my  argument  is 
that  The  Ruthwell  Cross,  in  both  the  words  and  the  pictures  inscribed  in 
its  surface,  gives  voice  to  the  suffering  of  Christ  in  a  way  analogous  to 
that  of  the  textual  voice  of  the  speaking  cross  in  The  Dream  of  the  Rood 
(see  my  discussion  of  the  "voice  of  weapons  and  wounds",  below). 
3  Bakan,  page  67. 
4  All  citations  from  The  Dream  of  the  Rood  are  from  Swanton;  all 
translations  are  the  author's.  For  related  examples  of  sin  or  guilt  as  a 
wounding  force,  see  also:  Chiist  &  Satan,  If.  155-156;  Andreas,  1.407; 
Chfist,  1.1313  and  1.1321;  see  most  especially  the  discourse  on  sin  as 
the  wounding  weapon  of  the  enemy  in  Chtist,  If.  759b-777a. 
5  Note  that  particular  graphic  force  is  lent  to  this  passage  through 
onomatopoeia;  Swanton  points  out  that  the  combination  inwid-hiemm 
occurs  only  in  this  one  instance,  and  the  second  element  usually 
represents  the  crashing  sound  of  a  blow  (for  his  discussion,  see  page 
116). 
6  In  the  words  of  John  J.  Bonica,  "As  the  records  of  every  race  and 
civilization  are  examined,  one  finds  ubiquitous  testimonials  to  the 
omnipresence  of  pain";  cited  from  Michael  Bond,  Pain:  Its  Nature, 
A.  gaj7sis  and  Treatment.  New  York:  Churchill  Livingstone,  1984.  Page 
v.  See  also  B  akan,  page  58: 
Pain  has  a  significant  place  in  a  number  of  world  views  which 
attempt  to  give  meaning  to  our  experiences.  In  the  hedonistic 
world  views,  pain,  together  with  what  is  sometimes  regarded  as  its 
counterpart,  pleasure,  has  been  taken  as  a  basic  human  experience, 
as  a  phenomenon  from  which  other  experiences  and  phenomena 
derive.  In  the  thought  of  a  number  of  classical  social  theorists- Chapter  Two  225 
Bentham,  Adam  Smith,  and  others--pain  is  a  given  and  constitutes 
the  basis  for  explaining  the  complex  interactions  of  men  and  their 
arrangements.  - 
My  point  is  that  pain  is,  at  some  level,  a  constant  of  the  human 
experience,  and  that  it  has  been  recognized  as  such  across  a  broad  range 
of  cultures,  eras,  and  disciplines.  ý 
7  See  Elaine  Scarry,  The  Bodyin  Pain:  The  MaEng  and  UnmaEng  of 
the  World.  Oxford:  Oxford  UP,  1985.  Scarry  discusses  the  linguistic 
and  conceptual  necessity  of  such  an  association.  By  conceiving  of 
"pain"  as  inextricably  linked  with  "punishment",  it  becomes  possible  to 
provide  the  internal  and  inexpressible  with  external  referents  and,  hence, 
44voice".  See  my  discussion  of  the  language  of  weapons  and  wounds  in 
The  Dream  of  the  Rood.  See  also  Scarry,  page  16: 
...  the  fact  that  the  very  word"'  pain"  has  its  etymological  home  in 
14poena"  or"  punishment"  reminds  us  that  even  the  elementary  act 
of  naming  this  most  interior  of  events  entails  an  immediate  mental 
somersault  out  of  the  body  into  the  external  social  circumstances 
that  can  be  pictured  as  having  caused  the  hurt. 
8  Bond,  page52.  Bond's  work  is  a  useful  primer  for  medical 
information  concerning  pain. 
9  Bond,  page  3. 
10  Ronald  Melzack  and  Patrick  Wall,  The  Challenge  of'Pain.  2nd  ed. 
Harmondsworth,  Middlesex:  Penguin,  1988.  Page  3. 
11  Bond,  page  34.  'ý 
12  Roger  Trigg,  Pain  and  Emotion.  Oxford:  Clarendon  P,  1970.  Page 
27. 
13  In  any  case,  it  is  clear  that  various  stimuli  may,  in  various  contexts, 
cause  the  exact  same  painful  sensation  to  be  perceived;  this Chapter  Two  226 
phenomenon  has  been  observed  for  time  out  of  mind,  and  Bond 
discusses  the  theories  to  which  it  has  given  birth,  as  well  as  modem 
conclusions  deriving  from  these  schools  of  thought: 
The  means  by  which  noxious  stimuli  eventually  give  rise  to  pain 
has  been  a  subject  of  discussion  for  centuries.  Stimuli,  such  as 
heat,  cold,  touch  and  pressure,  however  produced,  always  give 
rise  to  the  same  sensation  and  it  is  well  known  that  if  the  same 
stimuli  are  increased  above  a  certain  threshold  pain  occurs.  These 
observations  led  to  two  of  the  early  theories  about  the  generation 
of  pain  ...  In  summary,  the  two  theories  are:  1.  A  sensory  theory 
which  proposes  that  pain  is  a  sensory  phenomenon  in  its  own  right 
with  specific  receptors,  routes  of  transmission  through  the  central 
nervous  system,  and  centres  of  registration,  appreciation  and 
interpretation  in  the  brain.  2.  An  intensity  theory  which  takes  the 
view  that  specific  receptors  for  pain  do  not  exist  and  that  pain 
arises  as  a  result  of  stimulation  by  any  means  so  long  as  the 
intensity  of  that  stimulation  passes  a  certain  threshold.  Nowadays 
it  is  generally  accepted  that  elements  of  both  theories  are 
necessary  to  a  general  theory  of  pain.  For  example,  there  are 
nerve  fibres  which  are  specific  for  pain,  and  again,  stimulation  of 
non-specific  fibres  may  give  rise  to  pain,  and  also  to  other  forms 
of  sensation  too,  dependent  upon  the  strength  of  the  stimulus 
supplied  and  the  pattern  or  coding  of  neural  impulses  that  results. 
(Bond,  pages  21-22) 
In  1965  a  revolutionary  new  theory  was  postulated  by  Melzack  and 
Wall;  called  "gate  control"  theory,  it  combined  some  elements  of  earlier 
theories,  and  answered  some  of  the  inadequacies  thereof.  Bond  supplies 
an  approachable  synopsis  of  gate  control  theory: Chapter  Two  227 
In  general  terms,  the  theory  proposed  by  Melzack  and  Wall  stated 
that  information  arising  as  a  result  of  noxious  stimulation  is 
modified  in  its  passage  from  peripheral  nerve  fibres  to  those  in  the 
spinal  cord  by  the  action  of  a  specialised  "gating"  mechanism 
situated  in  the  region  of  the  dorsal  horns  of  the  cord.  Put  simply, 
they  said  if  the  gate  is  in  an  "open"  position  information  is 
transmitted  to  the  brain,  but  if  partially  open  or  closed  lesser 
amounts  of  information,  or  none  at  all,  reach  the  brain.  The 
cc  setting"  of  the  gate  and  therefore  the  ease  with  which  information 
leading  to  pain  generation  passes  through  it  depends  upon  the 
balance  of  activity  in  large  and  small  afferent  nerve  fibres,  and  in 
fibres  descending  from  higher  centres.  (Bond,  page  23) 
Though  gate  control  theory  certainly  may  illuminate  some  of  the 
physical  mechanisms  involved  in  transmitting  painful  impulses,  it  still 
leaves  us  without  a  satisfactory  notion  of  just  what  "pain"  and  "pain 
quality"  are;  we  are  left  in  the  compromising  semantic  position  of 
defining  a  term  reflexively:  "pain"  is  a  sensation  which  is  "painful", 
which  includes  some  peculiar  "pain  quality".  For  a  more  thorough 
grounding  in  the  technical  aspects  of  pain  (accessible  to  the  layman),  see 
Melzack  and  Wall,  Challenge;  see  especially  the  following  sections: 
"Peripheral  Nerve  and  Spinal  Mechanisms"  (pages  81-99),  and  "  Brain 
Mechanisms"  (pages  122-145);  for  more  specific  information  relating  to 
gate  control  theory,  see  "Gate  Control  and  Other  Mechanisms"  (pages 
165-193).  For  further  discussion  of  the  nature  and  import  of  pain 
quality,  see  Trigg  (pages  26-34  and  146-147);  see  also  Trigg's 
discussion  of  "pain  intensity"  and  its  relationship  to  attention  (pages 
150-151),  which  is  particularly  well-suited  to  my  discussion  of  the 
-,  annihilation"  of  identity,  below. Chapter  Two  228 
14  See  Bakan,  page  63. 
1 
15  See  Melzack  and  Wall,  Challenge,  pages  149-150:  "The  traditional 
iheory  of  pain  is  known  as  'specificity  theory'...  [which]  proposes  that  a 
specific  pain  system  carries  messages  from  pain  receptors  in  the  skin  to  a 
1  1,  pain  centre  in  the  brain.  " 
16  Melzack  and  Wall,  Challenge,  page  150. 
17  See  Melzack  and  Wall  Challenge,  pages  151-164,  and  also  Melzack 
and  Wall,  eds.  The  Textbook  of  Pain.  3rd  ed.  New  York:  Churchill 
Livingstone,  1994.  Pages  261-262. 
18  See  Melzack  and  Wall,  Textbook,  page  262: 
Fortunately,  alternative,  comprehensive  theoretical  models  have 
emerged  which  recognize  affective  qualities  as  integral  and 
-  essential  to  the  experience.  They  not  only  may  be  a  consequence 
of  pain,  but  also  may  have  been  instigated  in  advance  of  the 
experience  and  always  arise  as  a  component  of  the  experience. 
Melzack  and  Wall  (1965)  and  Melzack  and  Casey  (1968) 
developed  a  model  of  pain  in  which  tissue  damage  concurrently 
activates  affective--motivational  and  sensory--discriminative 
components  of  pain.  The  nature  and  severity  of  pain  then  become 
consequences  of  affective  and  cognitive  mechanisms  as  well  as 
sensory  events  deriving  from  tissue  damage. 
19  Melzack  and  Wall,  Textbook,  page  26  1. 
, gum  is  missing  in  the  ms.,  but  is  supplied  from  the  Ruthwell  text;  20Sor 
it  also  is  to  be  expected  in  this  context  in  conjunction  with  gedrefed,  as 
the  phrase  is  a  stock  one  (see  discussion  thereof,  below),  and  a  dative 
object  must  be  supplied  to  mid. 
21  All  citations  from  Elene  are  from  P.  O.  E.  Gradon,  ed.  Cynewulf's 
Flene.  Methuen's  Old  English  Library,  A.  H.  Smith  and  F.  Norman, Chapter  Two  229 
gen.  eds.  London:  Methuen  &  Co.,  Ltd.,  1958.  All  translations  are  the 
author's. 
22  Joseph  Bosworth  and  T.  Northcote  Toller,  An  Anglo-Saxon 
Dictionary.  Oxford:  Oxford  UP,  1988.  Page  895. 
23  All  citations  from  Judith  are  from  B.  J.  Timmer,  ed.  Judith. 
Methuen's  Old  English  Library,  A.  H.  Smith  and  F.  Norman,  gen.  eds. 
New  York:  Appleton-Century-Crofts,  1966.  All  translations  are  the 
author's. 
24  All  citations  from  Daniel  are  from  R.  T.  Farrell,  ed.  Daniel  and 
Azarias.  Methuen's  Old  English  Library,  A.  J.  Bliss  and  A.  Brown,  gen. 
eds.  London:  Methuen  &  Co.,  Ltd.,  1974.  All  translations  are  the 
author's.  - 
25  All  citations  from  Andreas  are  from  Kenneth  R.  Brooks,  ed. 
A.  ndreas  and  the  Fates  of  the  Apostles.  Oxford:  Oxford  UP,  1961.  All 
translations  are  the  author's. 
26  All  citations  from  Phoenix  are  from  N.  F.  Blake,  ed.  The  Phoenix. 
old  and  Middle  English  Texts,  G.  L.  Brook,  gen.  ed.  Manchester: 
Manchester  UP,  1964.  All  translations  are  the  author's. 
27,  Melzack  and  Wall,  Textbook,  page  262. 
28  Melzack  and  Wall,  Textbook,  page  267. 
29  Trigg,  page  149. 
30-  Melzack  and  Wall,  Textbook,  page  264. 
31  Melzack  and  Wall,  Challenge,  pages  17-18.  Idiosyncratic  factors, 
both  psychological  and  physical,  also  must  play  a  role.  See  Bakan's 
discussion  of  the  statistical  difference  in  results  of  tests  of  pain  threshold 
between  "experienced"  and  "naive"  subjects,  pages  88-90. 
32  See  Michael  Bond's  discussion  of  the  link  between  pain  and  guilt, 
page  51: Chapter  Two  230 
...  pain  may  develop  as  a  means  of  causing  the  person  concerned  to 
suffer,  not  because  physical  damage  is  present,  but  because  the 
suffering  seems  necessary  to  relieve  guilt  about  some  earlier  event 
in  life,  or  even  about  thoughts  which  have  raised  guilty 
feelings  ... 
Therefore  the  significance  of  pain  varies,  that  is,  it  may 
be  symbolic  of  problems  of  both  a  physical  and  emotional  kind. 
Three  types  of  symbolisation  have  been  identified  and  they  are  as 
follows:  1.  Pain  as  evidence  of  physical  damage.  2.  Pain  as  a 
means  of  communication.  3.  Pain  as  a  means  of  manipulating 
others,  expressing  hostility,  or  relieving  guilt. 
See  also  Bond's  discussion,  on  page  S  1,  of  individuals  for  whom  such 
44  guilt  pain"  is  chronic: 
...  there  are  certain  individuals  for  whom  the  presence  of  pain  is 
essential  for  the  prevention  or  relief  of  emotional  turmoil.  They 
are  called  "pain-prone  people".  The  pain  of  which  they  complain 
is  usually  without  an  obvious  organic  cause  and  is  therefore 
known  as  "psychogenic  pain". 
"Homo  dolorosus"  isT.  Szasz's  term  for  such  individuals;  Bondcites 
him  on  page  52. 
33  Roger  Trigg  discusses  the  apparent  paradox  of  such  a  position,  and 
describes  an  important  semantic  distinction  between  "pain"  and 
t4painful";  see  page  144: 
Certainly  the  phrase  "non-painful  pain"  is  needlessly  confusing, 
but  it  need  not  be  regarded  as  self-contradictory,  if  it  is  realized 
that  while  the  noun  refers  to  the  sensation  the  adjective  refers  to 
our  reaction  to  it.  If  sensation  and  reaction  are  clearly 
differentiated  we  shall  not  be  tempted  to  apply  to  the  one  a  word 
which  is  more  appropriate  to  the  other. Chapter  Two  231 
See  also  Bond,  pages  40-44: 
...  although  measurements  of  pain  are  helpful  when  following  a 
patient's  progress  under  treatment,  or  when  assessing  the  need  for 
it;  unexpected  variations  occur  frequently  and,  for  this  reason,  the 
many  factors  which  influence  pain  must  be  considered  when 
evaluating  such  measurements.  The  chief  factors  to  be  considered 
are:  1)  The  role  of  learning  upon  pain  behavior.  2)  The  effect  of 
environmental  factors  upon  pain.  3)  Personality.  4)  The 
meaning  of  pain.  - 
34  See  pages  15-17.  See  also  Bond,  page  40:  "We  are  not  entirely 
certain  that  ability  to  experience  pain  and  react  to  it  is  an  inbuilt 
characteristic  of  man  and  animals"  --although  in  practice  it  is  quite  rare  to 
observe  even  very  young  subjects  which  do  not  react  adversely  to 
noxious  stimuli;  see  also  page  42: 
Racial  background  has  a  powerful  influence  upon  pain  behaviour, 
although  the  ability  to  experience  pain  in  response  to  noxious 
stimuli  differs  little  between  races.  The  differences  show  most 
obviously  where  tolerance  of  pain  is  concerned  ...  The  factor 
governing  behaviour  for  all  groups  seems  to  be  the  level  of 
approval  given  for  the  public  expression  of  pain  and 
emotion  ...  External  events  around  us  affect  both  the  severity  of 
pain  and  behaviour  associated  with  it.  Intense  and  prolonged 
focusing  of  activities  associated  with  a  high  level  of  physical  and 
emotional  involvement  may  prevent  the  appearance  of  pain.... 
35  See  Melzack,  and  Wall,  Challenge,  pages  139-140,  for  an 
introduction  to  endorphins  and  enkephalins.  For  further  examples  of 
physiological  reasons  for  the  absence  of  pain,  see  also  their  discussion  of 
congenital  analgesia  and  episodic  analgesia,  pages  3-8: Chapter  Two  232 
People  who  are  born  without  the  ability  to  feel  pain  ...  sustain 
extensive  burns,  bruises  and  lacerations  during  childhood, 
frequently  bite  deep  into  the  tongue  while  chewing  food,  and  learn 
only  with  difficulty  to  avoid  inflicting  severe  wounds  on 
themselves.  -..  most  people  who  are  insensitive  to  pain  learn,  with 
difficulty,  to  avoid  damaging  themselves  severely.  However,  they 
survive  because  they  have  language  to  symbolize  potential  danger 
and  to  communicate.  Animals,  who  have  no  such  verbal 
communication,  would  have  died.  ...  Cases  of  congenital  analgesia 
are  rare.  However,  there  is  a  much  more  common  condition 
which  most  of  us  have  experienced  at  one  time  or  another:  being 
injured  but  not  feeling  pain  until  many  minutes  or  hours 
afterwards.  The  injuries  may  range  from  minor  cuts  and  bruises  to 
broken  bones  and  even  the  loss  of  a  limb  ...  the  condition  has  no 
relation  to  the  severity  or  location  of  the  injury 
...  it  has  no  simple 
relation  to  the  circumstances  ...  the  victim  can  be  fully  aware  of  the 
nature  of  the  injury  but  no  pain  is  felt  ...  the  analgesia  is 
instantaneous  ...  the  analgesia  has  a  limited  time-course  ...  [and]  the 
analgesia  is  localized  to  the  injury. 
See  also  Bakan,  pages  87-88. 
36  Bakan,  page  83. 
37  Bakan,  pages  85-86. 
38  See  Trigg,  pages  157-158: 
There  are  many  philosophers  who  would  cast  doubt  on  the 
intelligibility  of  enjoying  pain,  usually  out  of  a  desire  to  define 
pain  as  a  "sensation  which  is  disliked".  Certainly  enjoyment  of 
pain  must  be  parasitic  on  the  normal  link  between  a  sensation  of 
pain  and  dislike.  Otherwise,  as  we  have  seen,  the  concept  of  pain Chapter  Two  233 
could  never  be  taught.  Someone  who  merely  claims  to  "enjoy 
pain"  would  make  us  suspect  that  he  did  not  really  understand 
what  pain  was,  unless  he  gave  us  evidence  that  he  did  by 
frequently  using  the  word  normally.  Even  if  he  talked  of  pain  in 
circumstances  where  we  would  expect  him  to  feel  it,  it  might  still 
be  open  for  us  to  conclude  that  he  was  not  feeling  pain  at  all  if  he 
showed  no  sign  of  dislike.  He  would  have  had  to  have  given 
proof  that  he  had  learnt  the  concept  properly,  by  using,  at  least  at 
some  period  in  his  life,  the  word  "pain"  of  sensations  he  obviously 
disliked.  It  is  therefore  of  considerable  importance  that  the 
masochist  apparently  only  enjoys  certain  pains  in  certain 
circumstances.  He  usually  uses  the  word  "pain"  perfectly 
normally.  II 
39  Trigg,  page  157. 
40  Trigg,  page  157.  See  also  Shirley  Panken,  The  J67  of  Suffering: 
ps7cboanalytic  Theor7  and  Therap7  of  Masochism.  New  York:  J. 
Aronson,  1983.  Page  139: 
Where  masochistic  suffering  seems  to  be  "enjoyed"  or  to  give 
pleasure,  one  must  question  the  subjective  meaning,  as  well  as  the 
cultural  context  of  such  "pleasure".  The  subjective  feeling  of 
being  "happy",  when  not  a  quality  of  the  state  of  well  being  of  the 
entire  person,  is  illusory.  What  might  be  meant  is  need  for  drama, 
crisis,  sensation,  stimulation,  or  a  high  tension  level,  thereby 
emphasizing  one's  identity  or  acquiring  a  spurious  feeling  of 
aliveness. 
41  Panken,  page  14  1. 
42  panken,  page  14  1. Chapter  Two  234 
43  See  David  Bakan;  Bakan  argues  that,  as  an  ego  becomes 
"individuated",  or  conscious  of  its  unique  "selfhood",  it  becomes 
capable  of  experiencing  pain  (I  discuss  this  concept  more  fully  in  my 
treatment  of  the  isolating  nature  of  pain,  below);  on  this  level,  , 
consciousness  of  pain  is  inextricably  bound  together  with  consciousness 
of  the  ego's  own  mortality.  Further,  Bakan  suggests  that,  as  the  ego 
develops  as  the  central  organizing  force  ("telos";  see  Bakan's  definition 
on  pages  33-34)  of  the  organism,  it  recognizes  that  it  is  itself  just  a  part 
of  a  larger,  and  perhaps  immortal,  organizing  structure.  See  especially 
page  91: 
With  its  emergence  as  the  manifestation  of  the  central  telos  of  the 
organism,  the  conscious  ego  acquired  pain  and  purpose;  and  it 
sometimes  purposes  immortality.  Pain  and  mortality  make  up  the 
tragedy  of  man.  Within  these  he  squirms  around.  That  conscious 
ego,  however,  is  also  capable  of  becoming  identified  with  a  larger 
telos  of  which  the  conscious  ego  is  itself  but  a  part.  That  larger 
telos  appears  to  be  immortal;  and  perhaps  through  its  cultivation 
man  can  overcome  the  many  subtragedies  associated  with  the 
denial  of  his  mortality. 
In  such  an  attempt  to  transcend  the  confines  of  the  mortal,  I  would  argue 
that  the  ego's  attempt  to  communicate  with  the  divine  likewise 
transmutes  "pain"  into  "exaltation";  note,  for  example,  the  experience  of 
Andreas,  ý  discussed  below. 
44  All  citations  from  Juliana  are  from  Rosemary  Woolf,  ed.  Juliana. 
Methuen's  Old  English  Library,  A.  H.  Smith  and  F.  Norman,  gen.  eds. 
London:  Methuen  and  Co.,  Ltd.,  1955.  All  translations  are  the  author's. 
45  See  Farrell's  note  to  lines  243-244a  &  248a-250b,  on  page  61: Chapter  Two  235 
It  is  significant  that  the  fire  kindled  by  those  who  do  not  possess 
rzed  is  unreasonably,  or  immoderately,  large.  The  usual  gloss  for 
ungescead  in  this  context  is  "  exceedingly"...  but  the  prime  reading 
of  "unreasonably",  "immoderately",  suits  the  sense  of  the  passage 
equally  well,  if  not  better  than  "exceedingly".  This  idea  is 
followed  through  in  the  description  of  the  fire's  attack  in  248a- 
50b.  Neither  passage  has  a  source  in  the  Vulgate. 
46  Bakan,  page  61. 
47  See  Bakan,  page  59: 
The  individual  person,  insofar  as  he  is  an  individual,  is  already  to 
a  large  degree  decentralized  from  the  larger  social  telos.  Pain  and 
autonomous  individual  existence  are  linked  in  a  certain  inexorable 
manner.  Pain  does  not  exist  until  there  is  an  organism  which  has 
been  individuated. 
48  Interestingly,  although  pain  is  an  interior  phenomenon,  victims  often 
counteract  the  absence  of  an  external  referent  by  objectifying  their  pain 
as  alien  to  the  ego;  see  Bakan,  pages  73-75: 
Again,  paradoxically,  pain  is  both  psychologically  determined  and 
ego-alien  ...  the  phenomenally  ego-alien  quality  of  pain  is  indicated 
by  White  and  Sweet  in  the  following  manner:  "  In  patients  we 
have  studied  the  pain  has  almost  universally  been  described  as  'it,  ' 
an  objectified  stimulus  which  causes  varying  degrees  of  stress. 
On  the  whole  the  patient  related  this  stimulus  to  the  T  by 
describing  'it'  as  present  in  a  certain  part  of  the  body.  " 
49  See  Bakan,  pages  65-66: 
...  the  normal  person  in  our  society  develops  an  ego  boundary 
which  more  or  less  coincides  with  the  physical  body  as  bounded 
by  the  skin  ...  A  concept  useful  in  understanding  the  nature  of  pain Chapter  Two  236 
is  distality.  Distality  may  be  defined  as  the  phenomenal  distance 
between  an  event  or  an  object  and  "me,  "  or  simply  "how  far  away 
from  me"  something  appears  to  be.  ...  But  consider  the  distality 
associated  with  pain.  If  we  were  to  rank  the  sense  modalities  in 
accordance  with  the  distality  characteristic  of  each  of  them,  and  if 
we  considered  pain  to  be  a  sense  modality,  then  clearly  vision 
would  be  at  the  head  of  the  list  and  pain  at  the  other  extreme,  after 
touch.  If  the  distality  associated  with  touch  is  something  slightly 
greater  than  zero,  the  distality  of  pain  is  less  than  zero  ...  (pain) 
does  not  tell  anything  at  all  about  (the  external)  world's  nature. 
The  information  contributed  by  pain  is  location  within  the  body.... 
50  See  Scarry,  page  5: 
Contemporary  philosophers  have  habituated  us  to  the  recognition 
that  our  interior  states  of  consciousness  are  regularly  accompanied 
by  objects  in  the  external  world,  that  we  do  not  simply  "have 
feelings"  but  have  feelings  for  somebody  or  something,  that  love 
is  love  of  x,  fear  is  fear  of  y,  ambivalence  is  ambivalence  about  z. 
If  one  were  to  move  through  all  the  emotional,  perceptual,  and 
somatic  states  that  take  an  object  ...  the  list  would  become  a  very 
long  one  and...  it  would  be  throughout  its  entirety  a  consistent 
affirmation  of  the  human  being's  capacity  to  move  out  beyond  the 
boundaries  of  his  or  her  own  body  into  the  external,  sharable 
world.  ...  [H]owever  ...  physical  pain--unlike  any  other  state  of 
consciousness--has  no  referential  content.  It  is  not  of  or  for 
anything.  It  is  precisely  because  it  takes  no  object  that  it,  more 
than  any  other  phenomenon,  resists  objectification  in  language. 
51  Melzack  and  Wall,  Challenge,  pages  36-37.  See  also  Bakan,  page 
64: Chapter  Two  237 
In  attempting  to  explain  the  nature  of  pain  one  may  borrow 
language  associated  with  the  other  sense  modalities.  But  the 
actual  experience  of  pain  is  utterly  lonely,  without  words  of  its 
own  to  describe  it.  -  One  may  attempt  to  reach  out  of  the  loneliness 
in  some  way,  to  describe  it  as  "dull"  or  "sharp,  "  or  to  take  it  as  in 
some  way  connected  with  the  redemption  of  mankind.  But  it 
remains  true,  as  Beecher  said,  that  "pain  cannot  be  satisfactorily 
defined,  except  as  every  man  defines  it  introspectively  for 
himself.  " 
52  Scarry,  page  4. 
53  See  Scarry,  page  4: 
Thus,  when  one  speaks  about  "one's  own  physical  pain"  and 
about  "another  person's  physical  pain,  "  one  might  almost  appear 
to  be  speaking  about  two  wholly  distinct  orders  of  events.  For  the 
person  whose  pain  it  is,  it  is  "  effortlessly"  grasped  (that  is,  even 
with  the  most  heroic  effort  it  cannot  not  be  grasped);  whileforthe 
person  outside  the  sufferer's  body,  what  is  "  effortless"  is  not 
grasping  it  (it  is  easy  to  remain  wholly  unaware  of  its  existence; 
even  with  effort,  one  may  remain  in  doubt  about  its  existence  or 
may  retain  the  astonishing  freedom  of  denying  its  existence;  and, 
finally,  if  with  the  best  effort  of  sustained  attention  one 
successfully  apprehends  it,  the  aversiveness  of  the  "it"  one 
apprehends  will  only  be  a  shadowy  fraction  of  the  actual  "it").  So, 
for  the  person  in  pain,  so  incontestably  and  unnegotiably  present 
is  it  that  "having  pain"  may  come  to  be  thought  of  as  the  most 
vibrant  example  of  what  it  is  to  "have  certainty,  "  while  for  the 
other  person  it  is  so  elusive  that  "hearing  about  pain"  may  exist  as 
the  primary  model  of  what  it  is  "to  have  doubt.  "  Thus  pain  comes Chapter  Two  238 
unsharably  into  our  midst  as  at  once  that  which  cannot  be  denied 
and  that  which  cannot  be  confirmed. 
54  Hence  the  necessity  to  associate  pain  with  its  agents  and  its  physical 
symptoms.  See  Scarry,  page  16: 
Both  weapon  (whether  actual  or  imagined)  and  wound  (whether 
actual  or  imagined)  may  be  used  associatively  to  express  pain.  To 
some  extent  the  inner  workings  of  the  two  metaphors,  as  well  as 
the  perceptual  complications  that  attend  their  use,  overlap  because 
the  second  (bodily  damage)  sometimes  occurs  as  a  version  of  the 
first  (agency).  The  feeling  of  pain  entails  the  feeling  of  being 
acted  upon,  and  the  person  may  either  express  this  in  terms  of  the 
world  acting  on  him  ("  It  feels  like  a  knife...  ")  or  in  terms  of  his 
own  body  acting  on  him  ("  It  feels  like  the  bones  are  cutting 
through...  ").,  Thus,  though  the  phrase  "language  of  agency"  refers 
primarily  to  the  image  of  the  weapon,  its  meaning  also  extends  to 
the  language  of  the  wound. 
55  Scarry,  page  16.  - 
56  Though  the  biblical  accounts  do  -not  specify  on  which  side  Christ 
was  speared,  medieval  tradition  assumed  it  was  on  the  right.  See 
Swanton's  note  on  this,  page  109. Chapter  Three  239 
CHAPTER  THREE:  Public  Pain,  the  Body  as  Document,  and  Torture  as 
a  Language  of  Power  and  Identity  in  Old  English  Poetics 
Pain  is  central  to  torture,  and  our  exploration  of  the  perception  of 
the  nature  of  pain  in  Anglo-Saxon  poetics  has  important  repercussions 
regarding  our  understanding  of  the  function  of  torture  in  the  context  of 
Old  English  literary  conventions.  Torture,  as  I  have  defined  it,  is  the 
deliberate  and  systematic  application  of  pain  as  a  means  to  achieve  some 
specific  end;,  further,  within  a  context  in  which  pain  is  perceived  as  a 
spiritually  charged  and  potentially  transformative  force,  the  nature  of 
torture  likewise  must  be  related  to  issues  of  spiritual  identity  and  of 
transformation.  Indeed,  in  our  analysis  in  Chapter  One  of  the  nature  of 
torture  in  Anglo-Saxon  historical  records  and  laws,  such  a  relationship 
suggested  itself  on  a  number  of  occasions. 
In  poetic  contexts,  however,  it  will  become  clear  that  this 
relationship  between  pain,  torture,  and  spiritual  nature  and 
transformation  is  far  more  than  suggestive;  it  is  central.  Anglo-Saxon 
poets  understood  pain  as  an  interior  and  affective  state,  and  although 
they  exploited  the  links  between  pain  and  spiritual  state  and  identity, 
they  also  understood  the  difficulty  in  expressing  the  reality  of  this 
intensely  personal  phenomenon.  However,  this  very  conception  of  the 
paradox  of  pain  may  have  led  them  to  a  deeper  understanding  of  one  of 
the  fundamental  functions  of  torture:  just  as  pain  can  destroy  (external) 
language,  as  it  can  break  down  the  ability  to  share  a  measure  of  self- 
awareness  between  individuals,  pain  also  can  be  utilized  to  destroy 
(internal)  consciousness  of  self,  and  thus  it  can  function  to  break  down 
the  individual's  awareness  of  its  own  identity.  The  primary  function  of 
torture  in  an  Old  English  poetic  context  has  to  do  with  issues  of  spiritual 
identity,  and  is  twofold:  first,  to  make  manifest  the  spiritual  natures  of Chapter  Three  240 
those  individuals  involved  in  the  act  of  torture;  second  (when 
necessary),  to  utilize  pain  to  break  down  and  reformulate  spiritual 
identity.  In  this  sense  the  pain  applied  to  the  body  of  the  victim  during 
torture  is  utilized,  first  to  reduce  the  spiritual  identity  of  that  victim  to  a 
blank  surface,  and  second  to  inscribe  a  new  identity  upon  that  surface. 
In  this  chapter  I  will  begin  my  exploration  of  this  function  of  torture, 
while  in  Chapter  Four  I  will  extend  this  exploration  into  a  detailed 
discussion  of  the  metaphor  of  the  body  as  text  upon  which  torture  is 
utilized  to  write  a  language  of  personal,  political,  and  spiritual  power;  in 
Chapter  Five  I  will  utilize  a  related  metaphor--that  of  transmutation--in 
order  to  explicate  more  fully  these  same  issues  of  spiritual  nature  and 
transformation. 
I  will  begin  this  chapter  with  a  discussion  of  the  public  nature  of 
Anglo-Saxon  torture:  witnessing  is  central  to  the  function  of  such  acts, 
as  it  is  only  through  such  public  nature  that  torture  acts  may  be  seen  to 
signify.  In  other  words,  the  torture  acts  themselves,  and/or  the  bodies 
upon  which  these  acts  are  wrought,  must  be  viewed  in  order  to 
disseminate  information  regarding  these  crucial  issues  of  spiritual 
identity,  transformation,  and  power.  In  the  course  of  this  chapter  I  will 
also  develop  much  more  fully  the  model  of  the  nature  of  torture  as  a 
form  of  language  to  which  I  alluded  in  Chapter  One;  in  certain  contexts 
language  acts  may  serve  the  function  of  physical  acts,  and  I  argue  that 
the  converse  of  this  performative  function  of  language  is  likewise  true: 
that  is,  that  physical  acts  may  serve  the  function  of  language.  I 
illustrated  this  point  at  some  length  in  my  discussion  of  Anglo-Saxon 
historical  and  legal  records  (in  Chapter  One),  where  the  nature  of  these 
language  acts  was  largely  political  and  social.  Refining  this  basic 
premise  in  the  context  of  more  fully  developed  contemporary  semiotic 
and  linguistic  theories  I  find  that,  in  Old  English  religious  verse,  torture Chapter  Three  241 
operates  on  a  level  of  language  concerned  with  issues  of  spiritual  identity 
and  power.  I  conclude  this  chapter  with  a  detailed  theoretical  analysis  of 
the  function  of  torture  as  an  expunging  and  reconstituting  force,  before 
implementing  this  model  in  Old  English  literary  contexts  in  Chapters 
Four  and  Five. 
Witnessing  is  an  important  aspect  of  pain  and  torture  in  Anglo- 
Saxon  literary  culture;  without  this  element,  the  social  purposes  and 
cultural  meanings  of  personal  suffering  and  torture  acts  become  blurred 
and  indistinct.  Such  witnessing  takes  place  on  a  variety  of  levels:  that  of 
the  writer  transmitting  and  transforming  information  concerning  the 
event,  that  of  the  audience  reading  and  interpreting  the  resultant  text,  and 
that  of  the  audience  of  the  event  itself,  who  are  often  described  in  that 
text,  and  the  role  of  whom  may  or  may  not  be  suggested  by  the  author  of 
the  text.  In  this  chapter  I  argue  that  a  primary  literary  role  of  this  last 
group  is  to  underscore  the  importance  of  the  witnessing  of  public  acts  in 
Anglo-Saxon  poetics;  further,  I  will  go  on  to  explain  how  the 
importance  of  witnessing  itself  serves  to  emphasize  the  role  of  public 
acts  in  general--and  public  acts  of  torture  and  suffering  in  particular--as 
texts  in  and  of  themselves.  That  is,  these  acts  serve  as  metatextual  signs 
which  convey  information  concerning  the  relationships  between  personal 
and  political  power  and  autonomy,  spiritual  identity,  and  the  nature  of 
spiritual  transformation  in  the  context  of  Anglo-Saxon  literary  culture.  I 
will  begin  with  a  brief  discussion  of  the  centrality  of  acts  of  witnessing 
to  The  Dream  of  the  Rood,  and  then  discuss  how  the  importance  of 
witnessing  in  such  texts  suggests  that  the  events  witnessed  must  be 
understood  as  performative  language  acts. 
The  Dream  of  the  Rood  is  a  dream  vision,  and  as  such  participates 
in  a  long  tradition  of  such  poems  which  purport  to  record  prophetic 
visions  imparted  to  a  poet  during  sleep.  Such  texts  are,  by  definition, Chapter  Three  242 
concerned  with  what  I  have  termed  witnessing;  that  is,  itis  the  self- 
proclaimed  duty  of  such  dreamers  to  impart  to  others  the  content  of  the 
vision  which  has  been  granted  to  them  through  supernatural  agencies. 
We  learn  in  the  first  line  of  this  poem  that  the  dreamer  wishes  to  share, 
to  recount,  that  which  he  has  dreamed;  further,  the  main  action  of  the 
rood's  own  narrative  is  framed  by  descriptions  of  witnessing  and  an 
exhortation  to  record  and  to  declare  the  substance  of  the  vision  which  the 
dreamer  has  witnessed.  Directly  after  his  first  description  of  the  rood, 
the  poet  pauses  to  note  the  extent  of  the  retinue  gathered  to  gaze  upon 
the  holy  cross: 
Beheoldon  pwr  engel  Dryhtnes  eafle, 
fwgere  ýurh  for6gesceaft.  Ne  wws  6wr  huru  fracodes  gealga. 
Ac  hine  ýcer  beheoldon  halige  gastas, 
men  ofer  moldan  ond  eall  ýeos  mEore  gesceaft. 
(11.9b-12) 
[All  beheld  there  the  angel  of  the  Lord,  fair  throughout  eternal 
creation;  indeed,  that  was  not  the  gallows  of  a  criminal  there,  but 
holy  spirits  gazed  thereon,  men  across  the  earth  and  this  glorious 
creation.  ] 
A  multitude  of  angels  and  men,  from  across  the  earth  and  all  creation, 
join  together  to  behold,  to  gaze  upon,  to  witness  the  spectacle  of  the 
cross.  The  poet  repeats  the  verb  beheoldon  ("to  behold,  gaze  on,  watch 
over")  twice  within  the  space  of  two  lines  here;  it  is  clear  that  the 
function  of  this  audience  is  quite  simply  to  be  an  audience.  While  the 
dreamer  has  been  allowed  this  vision  in  order  to  record  and  to  recount  it 
to  other  men,  the  multitude  of  angels  and  holy  spirits  serve  their  purpose 
simply  by  gazing  upon  the  wondrous  rood.  Over  the  course  of  the  next Chapter  Three  243 
fifteen  lines  the  poet  directly  refers  to  his  own  self-conscious  acts  of 
observation  of  the  cross  four  times:  "  Geseah  ic  wuldres  treow...  "  (I.  l4b) 
[I  beheld  the  tree  of  glory  ...  Hwze6re  ic  purh  pmt  gold  ong 
, 
ytan 
meahte...  "  (1.18)  [However,  through  the  gold  I  could  perceive  ...  ]; 
"  Geseah  ic  pmt  fuse  beacen...  "  (I.  21b)  [I  beheld  the  shifting  symbol... 
"  Hwae6re  ic  ýwr  licgende  lange  hwile  beheold  hreowcearig  Hwlendes 
treow...  "  (11.24-25)  [However,  lying  there  a  long  while,  troubled,  I  gazed 
upon  the  Saviour's  cross  ... 
].  What  the  dreamer  witnesses  here--and 
indeed,  what  is  witnessed  by  the  onlooking  heavenly  host--is  a  constant 
metamorphosis  between  glory  and  suffering,  between  ecstasy  and 
torture.  This  metamorphosis  recalls  and  clarifies  that  of  Christ,  and  thus 
it  is  particularly  significant  that  it  is  witnessed. 
Further,  although  the  rood's  tale  of  its  experiences  comprises  less 
than  seventy  lines  altogether,  no  fewer  than  three  times  it  underscores 
the  importance  of  acts  of  witnessing  to  the  poem.  In  lines  30-31  the  rood 
describes  how  it  came  to  be  wrenched  from  its  root  and  fashioned  into  a 
44  show"  or  a"  spectacle";  the  language  here  implies  that  the  humiliation 
of  the  rood  was  achieved  for  visual  effect,  to  be  witnessed  by  a  crowd: 
Genaman  me  6mr  strange  feondas,  geworhton  him  ýmr  to 
wwfersyne  ... 
2 
[Strong  enemies  seized  me  there  and  wrought  me  there  into  a 
spectacle  for  themselves  ...  ] 
A  few  lines  later  the  rood  describes  how  bravely  Christ  mounted  the 
cross--like  a  young  Germanic  hero--and  here  the  rood  makes  a  point  of 
mentioning  that  this  act  took  place  before  a  multitude  of  witnesses; 
Christ's  passion  and  death  were  public  events,  and  this  public  nature  is 
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gestah  he  on  gealgan  heanne, 
modig  on  manigra  gesyh6e,  ýa  he  wolde  mancyn  lysan. 
(11.40b-41) 
[  ...  he  mounted  onto  the  high  gallows,  courageous  in  the  sight  of 
manyj  when  he  wished  to  redeem  mankind.  ] 
Finally,  the  rood  describes  the  death  of  Christ,  and  the  arrival  of  his 
followers  to  take  away  the  body;  here  the  rood  overtly  proclaims  its  own 
role  as  witness  as  well  as  method  of  execution  and  fellow-sufferer:  "  Ic 
pwt  eall  beheold.  "  (1.58)  [1  witnessed  all  that.  ].  The  rood's  choice  of 
words  here  evokes  the  earlier  description  of  the  multitudes  witnessing  its 
own  state  of  constant  metamorphosis,  and,  indeed,  echoes  the  poet's  own 
experience  of  watching  the  rood.  Further,  in  each  of  these  examples  that 
which  is  witnessed  has  at  its  heart  a  painful  and  humiliating  act  of  public 
torture.  The  dreamer  and  the  multitudes  of  angels  and  holy  men  gaze 
upon  the  spectacle  of  a  rood  which  is  now  gilded  and  bejeweled,  now 
blood-soaked  and  wounded;  this  shifting  nature  represents  the  duality  of 
the  experience  of  a  savior  who  is  at  once  a  divine  immortal  and  a 
suffering  victim.  These  acts  of  witnessing  are  themselves  echoes  of 
those  which  took  place  at  the  crucifixion  itself.  Both  the  humiliation  of 
the  rood  and  Christ's  passion  are  recounted  in  the  rood's  narrative,  and 
acts  of  witnessing  are  especially  noted;  the  centrality  of  the  public 
nature  of  these  experiences  is  constantly  recapitulated.  The  rood's 
narrative  ends  with  an  exhortation  to  the  dreamer  to  recount  his  vision 
and  to  explain  the  significance  of  that  which  he  has  witnessed: 
Nu  ic  Pe  hate,  hwlei5  min  se  leofa, 
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onwreoh  wordum  ýzet  hit  is  wuldres  beam, 
se  6e  wlmihtig  God  on  prowode 
for  mancynnes  manegum  synnum 
ond  Adomes  ealdgewyrhtum. 
D  ea6  he  pwr  byrigde;  hww6ere  eft  Dryhten  aras 
mid  his  miclan  mihte  mannum  to  helpe. 
He  6a  on  heofenas  astag.  Hider  eft  fundap 
on  pysne  middangeard  mancynn  secan 
on  domdwge  Dryhten  sylfa, 
wlmihtig  God,  ond  his  englas  mid, 
pmt  he  ponne  wife  deman,  se  ah  domes  geweald, 
anra  gehwylcum  swa  he  him  aerur  her 
on  pyssum  Imnum  life  geearnap. 
Ne  mwg  pwr  aanig  ,  unforht  wesan 
for  pam  worde  pe  se  Wealdend  cwy6. 
Frine6  he  for  paere  maenige  hwwr  se  man  sie, 
se  6e  for  Dryhtnes  naman  dea6es  wolde 
biteres  onbyrigan,  swa  he  wr  on  6am  beame  dyde. 
Ac  hie  ponne  forhtia6,  ond  fea  pencap 
hweat  hie  to  Criste  cwe6an  onginnen. 
Ne  pearf  6wr  ponne  wnig  unforht  wesan 
pe  him  wr  in  breostum  bere6  beacna  selest. 
Ac  6urh  6a  rode  sceal  rice  gesecen 
of  eor6wege  wghwylc  sawl, 
seo  pe  mid  Wealdende  wunian  pence6. 
(11.95-121) 
[Now  I  command  you,  my  beloved  man,  that  you  should  report 
this  sight  to  men  ,  reveal  through  words  that  it  is  the  tree  of  glory, 
that  which  almighty  God  suffered  upon  for  the  many  sins  of Chapter  Three  246 
mankind  and  for  the  ancient  deeds  of  Adam.  He  tasted  death 
there;  however,  the  Lord  afterwards  arose  with  his  mighty  power, 
as  an  aid  to  men.  He  then  ascended  into  the  heavens.  Hither  again 
will  the  Lord  himself  come  to  this  earth,  almighty  God,  and  his 
angels  with  him,  to  seek  mankind  on  doomsday,  so  that  he--who 
possesses  the  power  of  judgment--then  will  judge  each  of  those  as 
he  earlier  here  in  this  fleeting  life  earns  for  himself.  There  none 
may  be  unafraid  because  of  the  word  which  the  Ruler  will  speak. 
He  will  ask  in  front  of  the  multitude  where  that  man  may  be  who, 
for  the  sake  of  the  name  of  the  Lord,  would  be  willing  to  taste  of 
bitter  death,  just  as  he  previously  did  upon  the  cross.  But  they  will 
be  afraid  then,  and  little  will  think  of  what  they  might  begin  to  say 
to  Christ.  None  there  need  be  terrified  who  previously  bears  in  his 
breast  the  best  of  signs.  But  through  the  cross  each  soul  which 
intends  to  dwell  with  the  Ruler  shall  seek  the  kingdom  from  the 
earthly  wayl 
Here  the  rood  once  again  underscores  the  public  nature  of  the 
crucifixion;  on  doomsday  Christ  himself  will  recall  his  suffering,  to  the 
shame  and  distress  of  the  sinful,  while  those  who  have  properly 
interpreted  and  followed  the  sign  of  salvation  will  have  nothing  to  fear. 
The  judgment  of  mankind  will  take  place  in  public,  and  Christ  the  judge 
will  ask  "in  the  presence  of  the  multitude"  who  will  be  willing  to  suffer 
as  he  himself  did  upon  the  cross.  This  final  exhortation  makes  manifest 
the  purpose  and  meaning  of  the  passion,  and  also  clarifies  the  importance 
of  the  witnessing  of  the  passion  and  the  public  nature  and  function  of 
torture.  Without  a  witness  to  record  and  recount  the  crucifixion,  no  one 
might  be  converted  to  follow  Christ,  all  humanity  would  be  damned,  and 
Christ's  suffering  would  have  been  in  vain.  It  is  only  through  witnessing Chapter  Three  247 
that  an  act.  of  torture  becomes  a  public  document  which  may  be  received 
and  interpreted  as  a  sign  or  symbol  representing  an  abstract  spiritual  or 
political  statement.  The  dreamer's  vision  of  the  rood,  which  underscores 
the  duality  of  Christ's  nature,  helps  to  clarify  exactly  how  such 
interpretation  may  take  place.  It  is  Christ's  own  passion,  however, 
which  serves  as  the  fundamental  template  through  which  we  may  begin 
to  understand  the  significance  of  witnessing  to  torture,  and  it  is  only 
through  recognizing  this  fundamentally  public  nature  that  we  may  begin 
to  examine  torture  acts  as  language  acts,  and  tortured  bodies  as  social 
documents.  I  turn  now  to  a  discussion  of  how  public  violence  may  be 
seen--not  as  incoherent  and  inexplicable  --but  rather  as  a  carefully 
Composed  and  articulated  language  of  power  and  identity. 
"Language"  often  is  defined  as  any  system  of  sounds,  signs,  or 
symbols  which  can  be  used  to  communicate  or  express  information, 
commands,  or  other  meaning.  3  The  term  "language"  is  sometimes 
confined  to  spoken  and  written  communication,  and  is  then  seen  as  a 
subsection  of  semiotics,  which  deals  more  generally  with  any  possible 
sign  system. 
4  Since  I  study  levels  of  communication  which  are 
restricted  to  the  written  word,  such  a  distinction  is  relatively 
unimportant;  I  therefore  will  refer  to  all  such  levels  of  communication 
as,  lianguage",  even  those  which  have  to  do  with  non-logocentric 
communicative  acts.  These  language  acts  take  place  within  texts,  and 
take  the  form  of  narrative  descriptions  of  spoken  or  written  words, 
gestures  j  facial  expressions,  non-articulate  noises,  and  physical  acts. 
What  distinguishes  such  narrative  descriptions  as  language  acts  is  that 
they  conform  to  a  conventional  role  which  allows  them  to  be  understood 
within  a  particular  cultural  context;  language  is  by  definition 
conventional,  in  that  the  members  of  a  particular  community  are  able  to 
communicate  with  each  other  by  means  of  adhering  to  understood  and Chapter  Three  248 
accepted  forms  and  methods  of  language  transmission-5  These  forms 
and  methods  vary  from  culture  to  culture,  and  often  even  within  quite 
small'and  intimate  communities  within  subcultures.  The  point  is  that 
without  proper  cultural  information  these  words,  gestures,  expressions, 
and  acts  cease  to  be  intelligible.  Conversely,  to  those  within  the 
communities  at  stake,  the  cultural  context  is  clear,  and  these  language 
acts  are  instantly  recognizable  as  such;  communication  is  often 
instantaneous,  and  often  may  take  place  on  a  variety  of  levels 
simultaneously. 
I  argue  that  the  narrative  descriptions  of  pain  and  torture  which  I 
examine  are---in  the  particular  cultural  context  from  which  they  are 
drawn--to  be  understood  as  language  acts  in  their  own  right.  By  this  I 
mean  that  they  are  to  be  understood  on  several  levels,  including  but  not 
restricted  to  the  literal  meaning  of  the  words  and  sentences  on  the  page. 
I  maintain  that  torture  in  Anglo-Saxon  England  was  understood  as  a 
performativ'e  act  of  language;  that  is,  the  acts  them  selves--with  or 
without  the  accompaniment  of  commentary--were  understood  to  convey 
specific  political  and  spiritual  meanings.  6  Textual  records  which 
describe  such  acts  of  torture  therefore  must  be  seen  as  invoking  a 
political  and  religious  language  of  "public  pain". 
I  will  explore  just  such  a  multiplicity  of  language  levels  in  Old 
English  religious  poetics.  Pragmatics,  that  particular  area  of  language 
study  which  focuses  upon  how  the  actual  use  of  language  is  governed  by 
social  interaction  and  cultural  context,  is  pertinent  to  my  argument,  and 
thus  a  discussion  of  pragmatics  will  provide  a  foundation  for  an 
exploration  of  torture  as  language.  I  will  move  on  to  a  more  detailed 
examination  of  what  I  will  call  performative  acts  of  language,  that  is, 
those  statements  which  do  not  convey  information  so  much  as  they 
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acts  of  language  are  the  words  spoken  at  weddings,  baptisms,  and  oath- 
takings;  they  tend  to  be  highly  ritualistic  in  nature,  and  I  argue  that  it  is 
no  coincidence  that  many  of  these  acts  of  performative  language  are  part 
and  parcel  of  the  systems  of  secular  law  and  religious  ceremony.  7  I  will 
look  in  some  depth  at  the  public  nature  of  such  language,  and  explore  the 
significance  of  witnesses  to  such  acts.  I  then  will  refer  briefly  to  an 
actual  example  of  the  performative  function  of  texts  in  Anglo-Saxon 
England  (Domsdzeg  Boc),  and  move  into  a  specific  discussion  of  torture 
as  performative  speech  act  in  Old  English  religious  poetics, 
distinguishing  between  the  various  levels  of  personal  and  political  power 
such  language  expresses.  I  will  conclude  with  an  examination  of  how-- 
exactly--these  acts  of  torture  work;  that  is,  if  we  are  to  understand 
torture  as  a  level  of  language  in  this  context,  what  is  the  practical 
message  which  this  language  is  to  convey?  In  other  words,  in  the  first 
part  of  this  chapter  I  will  build  an  argument  proving  that  this  textual 
torture  must  be  understood  within  the  context  of  Anglo-Saxon  literary 
culture,  and  that  within  this  context  it  is  clear  that  pain  and  torture  acts 
comprised  levels  of  language  communicating  information  concerning  the 
nature  of  personal  and  political  power  and  autonomy.  In  the  concluding 
pan  of  this  chapter  I  will  discuss  the  exact  nature  of  the  substance  of  this 
information.  - 
In  order  to  develop  a  working  definition  of  pragmatics,  we  need  to 
consider  briefly  the  relationship(s)  between  what  we  term  "signs"  and 
what  we  understand  by  "meaning".  Volumes  have  been  devoted  to 
semioticsi  and  there  is  no  need  for  an  overview  here;  as  I  will  use  it,  the 
term  "  sign"  refers  to  anything  at  all  used  self-consciously  in  an  attempt 
to  communicate  information.  I  classify  "meaning",  then,  as  any 
information  which  a  user  may  attempt  to  communicate  through  signs, 
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who  is  able  to  encode/decode  meaning  intolout  of  signs  within  the 
communicative  context  of  that  community.  Working  within  the 
parameters  of  these  definitions,  then,  we  are  concerned  with  three 
operational  levels  of  semiotics:  syntactics,  semantics,  and  pragmatics. 
Roughly  speaking,  syntactics  is  the  study  of  how  signs  interact  with  one 
another,  semantics  is  concerned  with  the  relationships  between  signs  and 
meanings,  and  pragmatics  has  to  do  with  how  users  actually  utilize  signs 
to  convey  meaning  within  their  socio-linguistic  context.  That  is, 
pragmatics  is  that  branch  of  linguistics  which  studies  how  language  is 
used  in  real-life  situations  to  communicate  information  in  a  practical 
manner.  8 
What  makes  pragmatics  difficult  to  define  is  that  it  is  so  easily-- 
and  indeed,  so  often--conflated  with  semantics.  Syntactics  has  to  do 
with  relationships  concerned  with  order  and  structure,  and  thus  is 
removed  from  the  level  of  meaning  upon  which  both  semantics  and 
pragmatics  seem  to  operate.  The  fact  that  both  semantics  and  pragmatics 
have  to  do  with  meaning  is  the  source  of  the  confusion.  The  key  to 
conceiving  of  these  levels  as  discrete  from  each  other  is  remembering 
that  semantics  operates  on  the  level  of  abstract  meaning,  and  is  therefore 
not  dependent  upon  context,  while  pragmatics  is  rooted  in  specifics,  and 
is  therefore  context-sensitive: 
In  practice,  the  problem  of  distinguishing  "language"  (langue)  and 
"language  use"  (parole)  has  centered  on  a  boundary  dispute 
between  semantics  and  pragmatics.  Both  fields  are  concerned 
with  meaning,  but  the  difference  between  them  can  be  traced  to 
two  different  uses  of  the  verb  to  mean:  [1]  What  does  Xmean? 
[2]  What  did  you  mean  by  X?  Semantics  traditionally  deals  with 
meaning  as  a  dyadic  relation,  as  in  [1],  while  pragmatics  deals Chapter  Three  2S  I 
with  meaning  as  a  triadic  relation,  as  in  [2].  Thus  meaning  in 
pragmatics  is  defined  relative  to  a  speaker  or  user  of  the  language, 
whereas  meaning  in  semantics  is  defined  purely  as  a  property  of 
expressions  in  a  given  language,  in  abstraction  from  particular 
situations,  speakers,  or  hearers.  9 
It  is  this  very  context-sensitivity  which  makes  pragmatics  important  to 
my  own  study.  I  wish  to  explore  the  relationship  between  cultural 
context  and  communication,  and  to  push  wider  the  parameters  within 
which  we  understand  what  language  is  and  how  it  works  in  the  specific 
cultural  context  of  Anglo-Saxon  literature.  In  these  terms  pragmatics 
can  be  used  as  a  theoretical  construct  for  understanding  a  conventional 
language  of  power  relationships  embedded  within  descriptions  of  torture 
and  pain;  such  an  understanding  depends  upon  reconstructing  as  much 
of  the  pertinent  cultural  context  as  possible,  and  interpreting  these 
descriptions  of  torture  as  signs  in  the  light  of  that  context.  10  This 
understanding'of  pragmatics  brings  us  back  to  the  concept  of  language  as 
convention;  while  meaning  may  exist  on  an  abstract,  personal,  and 
intellectual  level,  communication  can  take  place  only  within  a  structured, 
shared  system  of  public  and  conventional  signs.  Semantics--the  abstract 
level  of  meaning  in  a  user's  mind--acts  in  combination  with  pragmatics-- 
the  practical  level  of  using  signs  to  relate  meaning--and  syntactics--the 
structural  level  of  how  signs  work  together--in  order  to  affect 
communication.  While  semantics  and  syntactics  may  or  may  not  operate 
on  a  conventional  level,  pragmatics  are  by  definition  context-sensitive: 
If  one  accepts  the  definition  of  a  sign  as  something  necessarily 
constituted  by  a  subject  it  is  clear  that  all  signs  stand  in  an 
essentially  pragmatic  relation  to  those  who  use  or  interpret  them. Chapter  Three  252 
The  syntactic  and  semantic  structures  of  a  language  provide  a 
system  that  enables  speakers  to  transcend  the  private  and 
contingent  aspects  of  their  experience  and,  using  signs,  to  express 
specific  referring  intentions...  to  interpret  an  utterance  as  a 
symbolic  expression  of  an  intention  one  must  have  information 
about  the  context  of  use.  - 
II 
This  relationship  between  context  and  language  is  that  aspect  of 
pragmatics  pertinent  to  my  discussion.  Now  I  will  turn  to  describing  and 
defining  some  of  the  context  pertaining  to  this  study;  I  am  specifically 
interested  in  how  instances  of  suffering  and  torture  act  as  signs 
communicating  information  about  power.  I  will  begin,  however,  with  a 
more  general  discussion  concerning  the  relationship  between  physical 
acts  and  linguistic  signs. 
The  communication  of  ideas  is  a  primary  function  of  language,  but 
it  is  not  its  only  one;  although  I  have  argued  that  signs  are  utilized  in 
order  to  communicate  information  between  language  users,  it  would  be 
radically  simplistic  to  assert  that  all  such  language  acts  merely  transmit 
information  concerning  each  individual's  perceptions  and  ideas.  Far 
from  merely  commenting  upon  and  recording  the  context  of  the  user, 
some  uses  of  language  perform  the  tasks  of  physical  acts,  and  transform 
that  very  context.  Such  instances  are  known  as  performative  language 
acts,  and  common  examples  thereof  include  wedding  vows  and 
christenings: 
[M]any  utterances  do  not  communicate  information,  but  are 
equivalent  to  actions.  When  someone  says  "I  apologize...  ", 
promise...  ",  "I  will...  "  (at  a  wedding),  or  "I  name  this  ship...  ",  the 
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reality.  An  apology  takes  place  when  someone  apologizes,  and 
not  before.  A  ship  is  named  only  when  the  act  of  naming  is 
complete.  In  such  cases,  to  say  is  to 
perform  ...  performatives  ..  [are]  very  different  from  statements  that 
convey  information  (constatives).  In  particular,  performatives  are 
not  true  or  false.  If  A  says  "I  name  this  ship...  ",  B  cannot  then  say 
"That's  not  true"!  12 
PerformatiYe  language  acts  are  highly  conventional;  indeed,  they  draw 
their  active  force  from  their  conventional  power  within  the  context  of  a 
particular  cultural  milieu,  and  are  both  meaningless  and  powerless 
outside  of  such  a  context.  Further,  these  acts  tend  to  be  highly  ritualistic 
in  nature,  and  often  are  key  elements  of  religious  sacraments  such  as 
baptisms,  christenings,  weddings,  and  the  like: 
-  At  a  Roman  Catholic  Mass,  the  speaking  of  the  words  This  is  my 
bod7is  believed  to  identify  the  moment  when  the  communion 
bread  is  changed  into  the  body  of  Christ.  Several  other  situations, 
apart  from  the  magical  and  the  religious,  illustrate  this 
44performative"  function  of  language--such  as  the  words  which 
name  a  ship  at  a  launching  ceremony.  13 
The  type  of  performative  which  I  am  describing  is  known  as  a 
"  declarative",  and  the  ritual  power  of  such  statements--especially  in 
religious  and  legal  contexts--is  such  that  they  do  in  an  objective  sense  act 
to  alter  reality.  While  there  are  truisms  that  "talk  is  cheap"  and  44  actions 
speaker  louder  than  words",  there  are  very  many  contexts  in  which 
words  do  have  the  force  of  actions.  These  declarative  speech  acts  do 
convey  meaning,  of  course,  but  that  meaning  is  cultural  and  carries  a Chapter  Three  254 
social--rather  than  linguistic--meaning.  The  social  role  which  they  play 
is  both  the  source  of  their  power  and  the  sense  of  their  meaning: 
...  declarations  do  not  have  an  illocutionary  force  ...  rather, 
declarations  are  conventional  speech  acts,  and  derive  their  force 
from  the  part  they  play  in  a  ritual.  In  any  event,  most  of  the  verbs 
associated  with  declarations  (such  as  adjourn,  veto,  sentence,  and 
baptize)  essentially  describe  social  acts,  rather  than  speech 
acts  ... 
14 
Because  of  the  irreversibility  of  language  in  such  settings,  and  due  to  the 
potential  for  abuse  and  misrepresentation,  the  ritual  conventions 
surrounding  such  language  acts  often  are  quite  elaborate,  and  must  be 
followed  very  closely.  Further,  two  safeguards  against  abuse  are  usually 
built  into  the  system,  the  first  having  to  do  with  institutional  validation, 
and  the  second  having  to  do  with  public  nature.  One  might  refer  to  the 
first  of  these  mechanisms  as  that  of  authorization.  Usually  these  acts 
only  are  valid  if  performed  by,  or  in  the  presence  of,  an  authorized 
official  of  some  sort: 
DECLARATIONS  are  illocutions  whose  "successful 
performance  ...  brings  about  the  correspondence  between  the 
propositional  content  and  reality";  eg  resigning,  dismissing, 
christening,  naming,  excommunicating,  appointing,  sentencing, 
etc.  In  this,  these  actions  are,  as  Searle  says  "a  very  category  of 
speech  acts":  they  are  performed,  normally  speaking,  by  someone 
who  is  especially  authorized  to  do  so  within  some  institutional 
framework.  (Classical  examples  are  judges  sentencing  offenders, 
ministers  of  religion  christening  babies,  dignitaries  naming  ships, Chapter  Three  255 
etc.  )-.  -.  the  person  who  makes  a  declaration  uses  language  as  an 
outward  sign  that  some  institutional  (social,  religious,  legal,  etc.  ) 
action  is  performed.  15 
Generally,  then,  the  safeguard  of  authorization  limits  the  power  to 
perform  most  of  these  acts  to  a  very  select  number  of  authorized 
officials;  such  exclusivity  both  limits  the  potential  for  abuse  and 
increases  the  cultural  power  of  the  ritual  act.  One  might  refer  to  the 
second  of  the  ritual  safeguarding  mechanisms  as  that  of  witnessing;  that 
is,  usually  such  performative  acts  are  recorded  and  acknowledged  as 
valid  only  if  they  take  place  before  a  group  (sometimes  a  prescribed 
number)  of  witnesses.  Such  a  safeguard  both  acts  as  a  check  on  the 
power  of  the  authorized  officials  and  brings  such  rituals  into  the  public 
sphere,  where  they  often  are  imbued  with  tremendous  cultural  power: 
...  on  the  whole  we  can  tell  exactly,  if  we  know  the  conventions, 
when  a  speech  act  such  as  naming  a  ship,  making  a  vow, 
sentencing  a  criminal,  or  of  bidding  at  an  auction  is  performed, 
and  when  it  is  not  ...  in  these  verbal  rituals,  the  performative  is 
often  an  important  ingredient:  Inamethisship 
...  I  bid  ...  I  vow  ...  I 
bequeath....  etc.  This  is  because  on  the  whole  it  is  important  for 
society,  or  some  social  group,  to  know  precisely  when  that 
category  of  speech  act  has  been  performed.  16 
Even  the  terms  "declaration"  and  "perform"  imply  a  public  forum 
and  an  audience.  In  these  cases  the  word  spoken--or  the  word  written--is 
equivalent  to  the  deed  done,  the  judgment  passed,  the  sentence  carried 
out.  But  without  an  audience--hearers,  readers,  members  at  large  of  the 
institution  involved--the  words  are  robbed  of  their  locutionary  force:  no Chapter  Three  256 
act  of  communication  can  take  place,  -and  so  the  word/deed  is  an  empty 
sign.  This  is  not  to  say  that  the  event  does  not  take  place,  but  rather  that 
it  is--without  an  audience--bereft  of  significance,  a  meaningless  symbol. 
Performative  acts'of  language  can  have  meaning  only  within  their 
particular  cultural/institutional  context,  and  in  the  presence  of  an 
audience  able  to  discern  the  meaning  of  that  particular  sign  within  that 
particular  context.  These  are  public  and  institutional  acts;  they  are  part 
of,  record,  and  reflect  public  and  institutional  change.  Without  an 
audience  they  cease  to  have  meaning. 
This  public  aspect  of  the  nature  of  performative  language  acts 
holds  true  across  a  wide  spectrum  of  cultures  and  language  communities; 
I  argue  that  Anglo-Saxon  England  is  a  case  of  particular  note,  however, 
due  to  the  synthesis  in  this  culture  of  Germanic  and  Christian  elements, 
both  of  which  emphasized  the  public  nature  of  performatives  in  certain 
important  ritual  elements.  Germanic  traditions  concerning  the  public 
nature  of  oath-taking,  acknowledgment  of  guilt,  trial  by  ordeal,  etc., 
combined  with  the  centrality  of  performatives  to  several  key  Christian 
sacraments  (baptism,  christening,  the  act  of  transubstantiation  in  the 
Mass,  excommunication,  etc.  )  and  the  growing  importance  of  confession 
to  the  Christian  tradition  to  create  a  culture  in  which  performatives  were 
particularly  important  and  commonplace  (see  my  discussion  of  the 
importance  of  oaths,  ordeal,  etc.,  in  Anglo-Saxon  culture  in  Chapter 
One).  Within  this  culture  many  rituals  centered  around  performative 
language  acts,  and--in  the  context  of  this  culture--these  ritual  words  took 
on  the  significance  of  acts. 
I  wish  to  explore--not  just  how  ritual  language  may  function  as 
action--but  also,  conversely,  how  ritual  acts  may  function  as  language. 
The  ritual  acts  of  torture  which  I  examine  occur,  of  course,  in  texts,  and 
so  we  are  confronted  with  a  written  level  of  language  (the  torture Chapter  Three  2S7 
narrative)  which  represents  a  physical  level  of  language  (an  act  of 
torture)  which,  in  its  turn,  represents  a  semantic  level  of  meaning  (e.  g. 
the  power  relationship  between  two  people,  and  between  at  least  two 
political  levels);  but  I  do  not  wish  to  cloud  the  issue  by  examining  too 
many  levelsat  once.  My  point  is  that  we  are  dealing  with  textual  records 
of  physical  acts,  and  so  we  must  examine  the  written  language  both  as  a 
sign  conveying  narrative  information  and  as  a  sign  conveying  semiotic 
information.  This  directive  takes  as  its  first  principle  that  physical  acts 
may  serve  as  linguistic  signs.  I  base  this  assumption  on  our 
understanding  of  the  nature  and  definition  of  signs,  and--by  analogy--on 
our  understanding  of  the  nature  and  function  of  performative  acts  of 
language.  I  argue  that  language  as  act  is  analogous  to  act  as  language; 
specifically  in  terms  of  this  examination,  the  objects  of  study  are 
physical  acts  recorded  (in  written  language)  in  texts.  These  textual  acts 
are  "language"  acts  not  only  in  terms  of  their  immediate  means  of 
expression  (written  words  on  the  page),  but  also  in  terms  of  the  physical 
acts  which  they  represent:  just  as  the  words  "I  baptize  you"  signify  that 
at  that  precise  moment  a  baptism  has  taken  place,  and  the  ritual  act  of 
sprinkling  water  over  the  head  (a  meaningless  gesture  without  the  proper 
words)  serves  to  echo,  clarify,  and  formalize  this  performative  sign,  so 
the  message  "I  have  power  over  you"  is  encoded  in  an  act  of  physical 
torture,  and  the  words  with  which  this  act  is  witnessed  and  recorded 
serve  to  echo,  clarify,  and  formalize  this  ritual  statement  concerning  a 
hierarchy  of  personal,  political,  or  spiritual  power. 
The  Domesday  Book  offers  an  example  of  the  language  of  power 
articulated  through  physical  symbols  in  eleventh  century  England;  this 
example  is  particularly  relevant  as  it  involves  a  written  record.  Here  we 
can  examine--simultaneously--both  the  performative  power  attributed  to 
the  written  word,  and  the  signifying  power  of  ritual  acts  and  physical Chapter  Three  258 
objects  in  early  England.  It  is  important  that  we  do  not  conflate  these 
two  levels  of  meaning:  the  first  level  has  to  do  with  the  symbolic  value 
of  the  comprehensive  collection  and  compilation  of  property,  legal,  and 
taxation  records;  the  second  level  has  to  do  with  the  symbolic  function 
which  the  physical  objects  which  resulted  from  this  act  of  compilation-- 
the  copies  of  the  Domesday  Book--served.  The  former  level  is 
performative  in  that  the  act  of  writing  down  these  records  in  effect 
causes  the  legal  situations  which  they  describe--which  may  have  been 
fluid--to  become  static  realities.  In  this  way,  William's  statement  that  he 
intended  "to  bring  the  conquered  people  under  the  rule  of  written  law" 
was  very  literally  performative;  and  the  very  act  of  writing  that  law 
made  that  law  take  effect.  17  English  law  was  fundamentally  different 
after  the  Domesday  Book,  and  this  change  also  is  a  direct  result  of 
William's  performative  act: 
Unwritten  customary  law--and  lore--had  been  the  norm  in  the 
eleventh  century  and  earlier  in  England,  as  in  all  communities 
where  literacy  is  restricted  or  unknown.  Nevertheless  two 
centuries  later,  by  Edward  I's  reign,  the  king's  attorneys  were 
arguing  in  many  of  the  quo  Wfiffanto  prosecutions  against  the 
magnates  that  the  only  sufficient  warrant  for  a  privilege  was  a 
written  one  and  that  in  the  form  of  a  specific  statement  in  a 
charter.  Memory,  whether  individual  or  collective,  if  unsupported 
by  clear  written  evidence, was  ruled  out  of  court.  18 
William  introduced  this  concept--that  writing  could  be  comprehensive 
and  unchallengeable--into  English  law;  clearly  such  dependence  on  the 
legal  "book"  stems  from  a  liturgical  analogy,  and  such  an  analogy 
between  temporal  and  divine  authority  is  one  to  which  I  will  turn Chapter  Three  2S9 
momentarily.  -  Further,  William's  conception  of  his  record  as  ý 
comprehensive  and  static  was  mirrored  by  his  unwilling  subjects;  even 
the  name  Domesdwg  Boc  comes  from  the  Anglo-Saxon  perception  that 
these  records--like  the  book  of  judgment  on  the  last  day--were 
permanent  and  not  subject  to  appeal: 
In  a  well  known  passage  the  Anglo-Saxon  Chronicle  says  that 
King  William  had  the  investigation  made  so  narrowly  that  "there 
was  no  single  hide  nor  virgate  of  land,  nor  indeed--it  is  a  shame  to 
relate  but  it  seemed  no  shame  to  him  to  do--one  ox  or  one  cow  nor 
one  pig  which  was  there  left  out  and  not  put  down  in  his  record.  " 
This  description  obviously  exaggerates  in  order  to  emphasize  the 
frightening  --and  sham  eful--thoroughness  of  the  Domesday  survey. 
Similarly  Fitz  Neal  explained  a  century  later  that  the  book  had 
been  called  Domesdei  "by  the  natives"  because  it  seemed  to  them 
like  the  Last  Judgment  described  in  Revelation.  The  tremendous 
image  of  Christ  in  majesty,  seated  as  a  judge  holding  the  book  of 
the  Scriptures  or  laws,  would  have  been  familiar  to  anyone 
entering  a  Romanesque  church,  either  sculpted  over  the  doorway 
or  as  a  mural  painting  within.  Fitz  Neal  is  explaining  that  by  his 
time  Domesday  Book  was  of  symbolic  rather  than  practical 
importance:  "That  is  why  we  have  called  the  book  The  Book  of 
judgment,  not  because  it  contains  decisions  on  difficult  points,  but 
because  its  decisions  like  those  of  the  Last  Judgment  are 
unalterable.  "  For  Fitz  Neal  Domesday  Book  was  a  majestic  and 
unchangeable  memorial  of  the  Norman  Conquest.  19 
The  latter  level  of  meaning  has  to  do  with  recording  and 
manifesting  a  political  statement  concerning  power  through  the  sign  of Chapter  Three  260 
ritual  events  and  objects,  and  the  Domesday  Book  is  fundamentally  a 
ritual  -object;  it  is  this  second  level  with  which  we  are  primarily 
interested  in  the  context  of  this  argument.  The  act  of  compiling  the 
book--which  was  hated  by  the  native  populace--confirms  the  status  of 
the  English  as  a  conquered  people,  subject  to  William,  the  property  of 
which  people  is  catalogued  by  their  conqueror  both  as  a  means  of 
recording  his  new  wealth  and  of  asserting  his  status  as  ruler.  20  Further, 
the  object  itself,  which  was  seldom  "used"--in  the  sense  of  being  opened 
and  consulted  as  a  legal  text--served  as  a  symbolic  object  signifying  the 
new  political  realities  of  William's  reign.  The  completed  Domesday 
Book  was  an  ornate  and  elaborate  sign,  not  a  mundane  and  workaday 
census: 
The  earliest  copies  of  it  likewise  suggest  that  its  function  was 
symbolic  rather  than  practical.  Two  multi-coloured  editions  were 
made:  one  in  the  twelfth  century  (the  manuscript  called 
Herefordshire  Domesday)  and  another  in  the  thirteenth  (the 
Exchequer  Breviate),  the  most  elegant  manuscript  ever  produced 
by  the  royal  administration.  But  the  Breviate  was  of  no  practical 
value  because  it  omitted  all  details  of  land  use.  Herefordshire 
Domesda7  has  some  marginal  notes  updating  it,  making  it  more 
useful  than  the  Breviate,  yet  even  here  the  work  is  left 
uncompleted.  Embellished  like  liturgical  texts,  these  manuscripts 
reinforce  the  idea  that  Domesday  Book  was  seen  as  a  secular  book 
of  judgment.  A  surprising  fact  about  Domesday  Book  is  that  it 
seems  to  have  been  used  so  rarely  in  the  two  centuries  after  it  was 
made.  There  are  only  ten  references  extant  specifically  to  the  use 
of  information  connected  with  Domesday  Book  between  the  time 
it  was  made  and  the  death  of  Henry  I  in  1135.21 Chapter  Three  261 
Whether  carried  through  the  streets  as  part  of  an  official  procession  or 
stored  away  in  an  archive,  the  physical  object  of  such  a  Compilation  was 
a  public  record  of--and  statement  concerning--power  relations  in  early 
Anglo-Norman  England.  22  This  statement  is  not  complex;  it  reads:  "I 
have  power  over  you;  you  are  subject  to  me,  and  all  your  property  and 
rights  flow  from  me;  I  have  written  these  in  my  book  of  judgment.  "  The 
analogy  between  divine  and  temporal  power  expressed  through  this 
statement  cannot  be  over  stressed.  The  Anglo-Saxons  called  this  text 
Domesdieg  Boc  because  they  understood  this  analogy,  and  William 
produced  physical  objects  reminiscent  of  liturgical  manuscripts  in  order 
to  underscore  this  relationship.  This  example  illustrates  that  power 
relationships  were  understood  to  be  conveyed  through  a  language  of  acts 
and  objects  in  early  England;  further,  the  fact  that  the  objects  in  question 
are  books,  and  that  these  books  were  understood  to  convey  information 
on  a  variety  of  levels,  underscores  the  complexity  of  textual  semiotics 
within  this  culture.  The  fact  that  these  signs  were  public  documents 
reiterates  the  importance  of  witnessing  in  this  context,  and  finally,  the 
analogy  between  temporal  and  divine  authority  and  power  provides  a 
framework  for  understanding  the  relationship  between  temporal  and 
divine  torture  and  judgment  in  the  literary  contexts  which  I  wish  to 
discuss. 
Torture,  judgment,  and  execution  tend  to  be  public  acts  within  the 
context  of  Anglo-Saxon  literary  culture;  the  concept  of  witnessing  is 
central  to  this  public  nature,  as  is  a  sense  of  spectacle:  of  the  social 
necessity  for  public  display.  These  acts  quite  often  are  described  as 
taking  place  before  a  multitude,  a  crowd,  or  the  people;  such  phrases  are 
clearly  formulaic,  but  I  argue  that  such  a  rote  sense  of  the  public  nature 
of  these  acts  serves  to  reinforce  my  position  that  such  a  nature  was Chapter  Three  262 
considered  a  commonplace.  Further,  not  just  punitive  acts,  but  ritual 
social  acts  in  general  seem  to  have  been  conceived  of  as  witnessed,  and 
this  conception  may  illuminate  fundamental  cornerstones  of  Anglo- 
Saxon  cultural  expectations  concerning  the  nature  of  public  domain,  law, 
and  social  interaction;  while  my  discussion  focuses  on  the  public  and 
spectacular  nature  of  torture  and  related  applications  of  punishment  and 
pain,  I  will  point  out  instances  of  terms  and  concepts  which  apply  to  a 
variety  of  social,  political,  and  spiritual  acts  and  practices  which  appear 
to  have  been  treated  as  public  in  nature. 
Andreas  offers  a  model  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  cultural  conception  of 
the  centrality  of  public  reputation,  and  therefore  the  concurrent  necessity 
of  public  witnessing  and  attestment  of  glory  and  honor.  Christ 
commands  Andreas  to  be  ever  mindful  of  his  reputation,  and  to  follow 
Christ's  own'example  through  public  suffering  and  torment  which  will 
be  transformed  into  everlasting  glory  and  the  salvation  of  those  who 
properly  interpret  this  sign,  just  as  Christ  turned  death  into  life  and 
damnation  into  salvation  through  his  own  passion: 
Wes  a  domes  geom; 
Imt  ýe  on  gemyndum,  hu  ýwt  manegum  weaM 
fira  gefrege  geond  feala  landa, 
ýaat  me  bysmredon 
weras  wanswlige, 
bennum  fwstne 
wordum  tyrgdon, 
slogon  ond  swungon.  Synnige  ne  mihton 
purh  sarcwide  so6  gecy6an, 
ýa  ic  mid  ludem 
rod  waas  arcered, 
of  minre  sidan 
dreor  to  foldon. 
gealgan  ýehte; 
pmr  rinca  sum 
swat  ut  forlet, 
Ic  adreah  feala Chapter  Three  263 
yrmýa  ofer  eoroan; 
ourh  blione  hige 
swa  on  ellpeode 
(11.959b-972) 
wolde  ic  eow  on  6on 
bysne  onstellan, 
ywed  wyr6e6. 
[Be  ever  eager  for  glory;  let  it  remain  in  your  thoughts  how  it  has 
come  to  be  known  to  many  men  throughout  many  lands  that 
unblessed  men  reviled  me,  tight  bound  in  bonds.  They  taunted  me 
with  words,  they  buffeted  me  and  flogged  me.  The  sinners  could 
not  prove  the  truth  by  sarcasm.  Then  in  the  sight  of  the  Jews  I 
overspread  the  gallows-cross  and  the  rood  was  upreared,  where 
one  of  the  men  spilt  blood  from  my  side,  gore,  on  to  the  ground.  I 
put  up  with  many  miseries  on  earth;,  in  this  I  wanted  out  of  kindly 
intention  to  set  you  an  example  such  as  will  be  demonstrated  in 
this  foreign  nation.  ] 
Here  Christ  describes  his  own  passion  as  a  public  act,  and  defines  and 
interprets  the  importance  of  this  public  nature;  he  offers  his  experience 
as  a  model  to  Andreas,  and  his  exhortation  to  "  be  ever  eager  for  good 
renown"  underscores  the  peculiarly  Anglo-Saxon  values  of  witnessing 
and  reputation  in  this  context.  It  is  impossible  not  to  call  to  mind  the 
concept  of  reputation  in  Beowulf,  and  most  especially  the  often  criticized 
final  half-line  thereof;  it  has  often  been  suggested  that  this  is  a  Germanic 
concept  of  worldly  fame  at,  odds  with  Christian  sensibilities,  but  such  a 
position  may  bear  reexamination  in  the  light  of  the  Christian  conceptions 
of  witnessing  which  I  have  uncovered. 
We  are  presented  with  an  inversion  of  this  model  of  divine 
sacrifice  in  the  actions  of  the  Mermedonians: 
Da  ic  lungre  gefraagn  leode  tosomne Chapter  Three  264 
burgwara  bannan; 
wiggendra  preat, 
beomas  comon, 
wicgum  gengan, 
on  mearum  modige,  mm6elhegende, 
zescum  dealle.  pa  wws  eall  geador 
to  ýam  pingstede  peod  gesamnod, 
leton  him  pa  b  etweonum  taan  wisian 
hwylcne  hira  wrest  o6rum  sceolde 
to  fodduroege  feores  ongyldan; 
hluton  hellcrwftum,  hm6engildum 
teledon  betwinum. 
(11.1093-1103a) 
[I  have  heard  that  the  people,  those  dwelling  in  the  city,  were  then 
quickly  summoned  together.  The  men  came,  a  multitude  of 
warriors  riding  on  horses,  intrepid  upon  their  mounts,  conferring 
together,  proud  of  their  spears.  When  the  people  were  gathered  all 
together  at  the  assembly  place  then  they  let  the  lot  distinguish 
between  them  which  of  them  should  first  forfeit  his  life  as  fodder 
for  the  others.  They  cast  lots  with  hellish  arts;  with  heathen  rites 
they  reckoned  among  themselves.  ] 
This  unholy  act  of  sacrifice  is  a  distorted  reflection  of  Christ's  own;  this 
too  is  a  public  act,  although  here  its  public  nature  has  less  to  do  with  the 
necessity  of  witnessing  and  attesting  to  the  act  itself  than  with  that  of 
Participating  in  the  sacrifice.  M  must  take  their  chance  at  being  chosen, 
and  all  must  witness  that  all  are  equally  at  risk.  The  text  to  be  read  in 
this  act--far  from  being  one  of  life  and  redemption--is  one  concerned 
with  the  loveless  and  deadly  power  of  society  over  the  individual  outside 
of  the  Christian  community.  This  act  of  cannibalistic  sacrifice  must  also 
be  read  as  a  subversion  of  both  the  act  of  divine  sacrifice  itself,  and  the Chapter  Three  265 
sacrament  of  the  eucharist  which  signifies  that  sacrifice  (see  discussion, 
below). 
The  divine  sacrifice  is  properly  replicated  and  explicated  in  the 
martyrdom  of  the  saints,  and  in  The  Fates  of  the  Apostles  we  can  find  a 
template  for  understanding  the  public  nature  of  martyrdom  and  the  need 
for  attesting  to  and  relating  the  nature  of  Christ's  identity  and  sacrifice. 
Fates  begins  with  a  description  of  the  duty  of  the  apostles  to  act  as  public 
witnesses  to  Christ's  divinity: 
Halgan  heape  hlyt  wisode 
pmr  hie  dryhtnes  m  deman  sceoldon, 
reccan  fore  zincum. 
(11.9-11  a) 
[Fate  guided  the  holy  throng  as  to  where  they  should  glorify  the 
law  of  the  Lord,  relate  it  before  men.  ]23 
Fates  overtly  describes  the  role  of  the  apostles  as  public  witnesses,  and 
then  several  times  formulaicly  describes  the  public  nature  of  the 
martyrdoms  of  the  saints  themselves.  Just  as  we  are  told  about  the 
public  nature  of  the  ministry  of  the  apostles,  that  the  apostles  were 
commanded  reccan  fore  zincum,  "to  relate  before  men"  (1.11),  we 
likewise  learn  about  the  public  nature  of  their  martyrdoms.  We  are  told, 
for  instance,  that  Andreas  hetiges  b7rhtme 
...  gealgan  pehte,  "in  the 
clamor  of  the  host 
...  was  stretched  upon  the  gallows"  (11.21-22);  that 
philip  ahangen  wws  hildeqor6re,  "was  hung  by  a  hostile  troop"  (1.4  1); 
and  that  James  fore  sacerdum  swilt  prowode,  "  suffered  death  in  front  of 
the  priests"  (1.71).  The  inference  to  be  drawn  is  that  these  martyrdoms 
serve  as  texts  for  the  conversion  of  the  pagan  witness  and  the  emulation 
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Furthermore,  the  poetic  diction  of  witnessing  reinforces  Thomas's 
role  as  a  type  of  Christ  and  explicates  the  relationship  between  sacrifice 
and  redemption  through  the  repetition  of  the  same  formulaic  phrase  to 
invoke  the  public,  witnessed  nature  of  both  Thomas's  miracle  of  giving 
temporal  life  to  the  dead,  and  the  miracle  of  his  own  translation--through 
manyrdom--into  a  type  of  Christ.  These  two  parallel  events  act  as  texts 
which  are  read  publicly  to  their  witnesses;  both  speak  about  the  glory 
and  power  of  God  almighty,  and  both  offer  the  hope  of  salvation  to  those 
witnesses  wise  enough  to  read  and  to  interpret  these  signs  correctly. 
Further,  the  public  display  of  these  signs  offers  this  hope  to  others  who 
hear  of  these  events  second-hand: 
Syooan  collenfero  ý 
awehte  for  weorodum 
ýurh  Dryhtnes  miht, 
geong  ond  guohwwt 
cyniges  bro6or 
wundorcrwfte 
ýwt  he  of  dea6e  aras 
(ond  him  was  Gad  nama); 
ond  6a  pam  folce  feorg  gesealde 
sin  wt  swcce.  Sweordrws  fornam 
purh  hw6ene  hand,  pwr  se  halga  gecrang, 
wund  for  weorodum 
(11.50-61  a) 
[Then  this  man  of  exalted  spirit  by  miraculous  power,  through  the 
might  of  the  Lord,  revived  the  king's  brother  in  front  of  the 
multitudes  so  that  he  rose  up  from  the  dead,  a  young  man  brave  in 
battle  (and  his  name  was  Gad).  And  then  in  the  strife-Thomas 
gave  up  his  life  to  the  people.  Sword-violence  by  a  heathen  hand 
destroyed  him;  the  saint  fell  there  wounded  in  front  of  the 
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Juliana  off  ers  a  case  study  of  the  role  of  public  witnessing  in  Old 
English  religious  verse.  Each  crucial  point  in  Juliana's  story  is  within 
the  public  domain:  her  rejection  of  her  pagan  suitor's  affections, 
Eleusius's  humiliation  in  the  face  of  her  insults,  her  condemnation  at  his 
hands,  and  finally  Juliana's  passion  and  martyrdom,  which  ends  in  the 
conversion  of  the  very  pagan  witnesses  which  her  death  was  meant  to 
entertain.  Even  the  devil's  temptation  of  Juliana  and  her  rebuke  and 
torment  of  the  demon  contain  references  to  public  witnessing.  Both  the 
forces  of  evil  and  those  of  good  seem  concerned  with  the  importance  of 
public  acts  in  this  poem.  At  the  beginning  of  the  poem  Juliana  publicly-- 
on  wera  mengu,  "in  a  multitude  of  men"  --rebuffs  the  advances  of 
Eleusius  on  the  grounds  that  he  is  a  pagan  (11.44b-57);  Eleusius's  rage 
at  this  rejection  seems  founded  more  on  the  public  nature  of  his 
humiliation  than  on  his  distaste  for  "blasphemy": 
Me  pa  fraceöu  sind 
on  modsefan  mmste  weorce, 
ýwt  heo  mec  swa  tome  twle  gerahte 
fore  ýissum  folce... 
(11.7lb-74a) 
[These  insults  are  most  painful  to  me  in  mind,  in  that  she  so 
grievously  attacked  me  with  blasphemy  before  these  people 
When  Juliana  refuses  to  recant,  Eleusius  sits  in  judgment  for  pam  folce, 
"before  the  people",  and  commands  her  flogging  (11.184-198).  After 
Juliana  has  endured  six  hours  of  savage  beating  while  suspended  from 
her  hair,  Eleusius  orders  her  taken  down  and  cast  into  a  prison  cell.  Here 
a  devil  appears  to  her  in  the  guise  of  an  angel,  and  counsels  Juliana  to 
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therefore  avoid  certain  destruction,  dea6  fore  dug0e,  "death  before  the 
multitude"  (L  256).  Clearly  the  devil  wishes  to  avoid  a  public 
martyrdom,  which  will  translate  Juliana  into  a  type  of  Christ,  and 
therefore  serve  both  as  a  public  testimony  to  the  glory  of  God  and  as  a 
tool  for  the  conversion  of  others.  Juliana  is  not  deceived,  however,  and 
turns  the  tables  on  the  demon,  seizes  him  with  her  hands,  and  forces  him 
to  recount  his  evil  deeds.  Amongst  the  many  sins  he  recounts  is  that  he 
caused  the  soldier  at  Christ's  crucifixion  to  pierce  his  side  with  a  spear  as 
the  crowd  looked  on  (L  291b).  -  After  he  has  been  utterly  humiliated 
Juliana  sets  the  devil  free,  but  he  returns  as  she  is  being  led  to  execution 
and  demands--for  corpre,  "before  the  multitude"  --vengeance  for  this 
persecution  (11.614b-627a).  Juliana  is  led  to  the  border  of  the  country, 
where  she  preaches  to  the  multitude  of  witnesses  sent  to  view  her 
execution;  the  narrative  does  not  inform  us  of  the  exact  point  at  which 
she  succeeds  in  converting  this  crowd,  but  evidently  the  demon's  first 
impulse--to  avoid  a  public  martyrdom--was  the  right  one.  In  his  rage 
and  thirst  for  vengeance  after  his  failure  he  spurs  the  crowd  on,  and  in 
the  long  run  this  seems  to  have  been  contrary  to  his  purposes. 
Immediately  after  she  gives  up  the  ghost,  the  stearcfer6e,  "cruel  crowd", 
which  had  wished  to  destroy  Juliana  purh  cumbolhete,  "through  hateful 
violence"  (11.636-637)  changes  utterly,  venerates  the  saint,  and  returns 
with  her  body  to  the  city.  The  narrator  marks  this  drastic  shift,  which 
can  be  attributed  only  to  the  act  of  witnessing  itself: 
Ungelice  wms 
lmded  lofsongum  lic  haligre 
micle  mwgne  to  moldgrmfe, 
peet  hy  hit  gebrohton  burgum  in  innan, 
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geara  gongum  Godes  lof  hafen 
prymme  micle  op  ýisne  daeg 
mid  peodscipe. 
(11.688b-695a) 
[In  a  different  manner  was  the  body  of  the  saint  escorted  by  a 
great  throng  with  songs  of  praise  to  the  grave,  so  that  they  brought 
it  within  the  city,  a  great  multitude.  There  since  that  time  with  the 
passing  of  the  years  God's  praise  has  been  exalted  among  that 
nation  with  great  splendor  up  to  this  day.  ] 
It  is  clear  in  this  poem--both  through  the  demon's  initial  desire  to 
avoid  Juliana's  public  martyrdom,  and  the  radical  conversion  in  the 
crowd  of  witnesses  following  that  execution--that  witnessing  is  a  key 
element  to  persecution,  torture,  and  execution,  and  that  this  element  is 
volatile  and  potent.  Further,  it  appears  that  both  the  followers  of  God 
and  those  serving  Satan  are  aware  of  this  potency  and  volatility,  and  both 
seek  to  cause  these  forces  to  serve  their  own  ends.  This  particular 
example  reinforces  our  conception  that--in  an  Old  English  literary 
context--the  passion  and  martyrdom  of  saints  are  public  and  witnessed 
acts,  and  the  public  nature  of  the  signs  represented  by  these  acts  serves 
both  as  a  text  for  the  conversion  of  those  witnessing  the  acts  and  as  a 
record  for  the  reader  of  the  relationship  between  torture,  spiritual 
identity,  and  political  power. 
The  inversion  of  witnessing  by  servants  of  Satan  underscores  the 
importance  and  the  moral  necessity  of  public  display  in  the  context  of 
Anglo-Saxon  religious  poetics;  in  Elene  the  hope  and  glory  of  victory 
associated  with  the  sign  of  the  cross--the  symbol  of  Christ's  public 
execution,  his  death  as  a  path  to  life--is  the  central  unifying  theme.  Early 
in  the  poem  the  public  display  of  this  sign--and  the  public  avowal  of  the Chapter  Three  270 
message  which  it  represents  --reaffirms  our  understanding  of  the 
importance  of  public  acts  in  this  spiritual  context.  After  the  sign  of  the 
cross  appears  to  Constantine  in  his  dream,  he  causes  banners  to  be  made 
which  utilize  that  sign;  significantly,  the  poet  focuses  on  the  public 
display  of  these  banners: 
pa  wms  puf  hafen, 
segn  for  sweotum,  sigeleo6  galen. 
(11.123b-124) 
[Then  the  banner  was  raised,  the  standard  before  the  troops,  and  a 
victory-song  was  sung.  ] 
As  soon  as  these  are  raised  "in  the  presence  of  the  troops"  and  before  the 
enemy  Huns,  the  Huns  flee  before  the  Romans,  and  victory  is  assured. 
The  public  display  of  this  sign--which  symbolizes  Christ's  torment,  and 
thus  the  redemption  of  mankind--clearly  is  the  cause  of  the  victory. 
Constantine  summons  wisemen  to  interpret  this  mysterious  emblem,  and 
the  Christians  among  them  assert,  for  pamheremwgene,  "before  the 
assembled  people"  (1.170)  that  the  cross  is  in  fact  the  symbol  of  the  king 
of  heaven,  representing  his  own  act  of  sacrifice  when  he  was  tormented 
on  th  e  ro  od  for  h  argum,  "b  ef  ore  th  e  multitu  des"  (I.  18  0).  Constantine'  s 
desire  to  recover  the  true  cross,  and  Elene's  subsequent  quest  to 
implement  this  desire,  reiterates  the  centrality  of  public  display  and 
avowal  in  this  poetic  context.  There  are  layers  of  signs  at  work  here:  the 
cross  symbolizes  a  public  act  of  torture,  which  in  turn  signifies  a  greater 
truth  concerning  spiritual  identity  and  power,  but  the  driving  force  of  this 
narrative  is  the  need  to  display  and  to  interpret  these  signs  in  public,  and 
the  sinfulness  of  failing  in  this  responsibility.  When  Elene  subsequently 
travels  to  the  holy  land  to  discover--for  the  purpose  of  public  display  and Chapter  Three  271 
veneration--the  actual  rood  which  the  sign  of  the  cross  invokes,  we  are 
offered  an  example  of  one  who  should  have  witnessed  publicly  to  the 
sacrifice  of  Christ,  but  who  instead  sinned  through  his  desire  to  hide  and 
to  obscure  that  which  should  have  been  public  and  manifest.  After  Elene 
has  called  forth  the  wise  men  of  the  Jews  three  times  to  enquire  as  to  the 
whereabouts  of  the  cross,  we  learn  from  Judas's  disclosure  to  the  other 
leaders  that  he  knows  of  this  cross,  and  has  reason  to  want  it  to  remain 
undiscovered: 
Nu  is  pearf  mycel 
p,  ýat  we  fmstlice  ferho  staoelien, 
peat  we  6eas  mor6res  meldan  ne  weor6en, 
hwwr  ýmt  halige  trio 
mfter  wig  ýrmce, 
,,,  frod  fyrngewritu, 
lare  forleten. 
(11.426b-432a) 
beheled  wurde 
ýy  Ims  toworpen  sien 
ond  ýa  fmderlican 
[Now  the  need  is  great  that  we  should  firmly  set  spirit  so  that  we 
do  not  become  betrayers:  of  that  murder,  or  of  where  that  holy  tree 
was  hidden  after  strife,  lest  wise  ancient  scripture  should  be 
abolished,  and  the  patriarchal  lore  abandoned.  ] 
In  the  context  of  this  poem  it  is  clear  that  the  greatest  sin  possible  is  the 
withholding  of  witness  to  the  truth;  Judas  knows  for  what  the  cross 
stands--indeed,  knows  the  truth  of  Christ's  divinity--but  is  blinded  by 
iniquity  and  the  desire  to  conceal  the  sins  of  his  fathers. 
Elene  herself  articulates  the  sin  of  thus  withholding  witness,  first 
by  threatening  and  then  exhorting  the  Jewish  leaders  as  a  group;  here 
she  promises  them  death  and  hellfire  in  payment  for  their  sinful  silence, Chapter  Three  272 
and  then  assures  them  that  they  will  be  unable  to  hide  their  sin,  nor  will 
they  for  long  keep  the  miracle  which  the  cross  represents  hidden: 
Ne  magon  ge  6a  word  gese6an 
wrigon  under  womma  sceatum; 
bemi6an, 
bedyman  ýa  deopan  mihte. 
(II.,  582-584a) 
pe  ge  hwile  nu  on  unriht 
ne  magon  ge  ýa  wyrd 
[Though  you  may  not  verify  those  words--which  you  for  a  while 
now  in  sin  have  concealed  under  a  lurking-place  of  sins--you  may 
,  not  keep  secret  that  event,  nor  may  you  hide  that  profound  power.  ] 
The  other  leaders  quickly  turn  on  Judas,  and  Elene  first  demands  from 
1  him  that  he  reveal  that  truth  which  he  has  for  long  mar  num  d 
, vrn  dun, 
"kept  secret  from  men"  (I.  626b),  and  then  threatens  him  with  his  own 
destruction.  Tellingly,  in  contrast  to  the  secretive  and  duplicitous  nature 
of  the  Jews,  Elene  promises  that  Judas's  execution  will  be  a  public 
testament  to  his  sin,  and  will  take  place  before  his  own  people,  unless 
Judas  repents  of  this  sinful  secrecy  and  reveals  the  truth: 
Ic  pwt  geswerige  ýurh  Sunu  Meotodes, 
ýone  ahangnan  God,  ýwt  i5u  hungre  scealt 
for  cneomagum  cwylmed  weor6an 
butan  ýu  forlwte  ýa  leasunga, 
ond  me  sweotollice  so6  gecy6e. 
(11.686-690) 
[I  swear  that  by  the  Son  of  the  Creator,  by  the  crucified  God,  that 
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unless  you  abandon  these  lies  and  plainly  announce  to  me  the 
truth.  ] 
Finally,  through  a  period  of  torment  and  conversion  which  is  also  a 
public,  witnessed  event,  Judas  recants,  finds  the  cross,  and  verifies  its 
authenticity  before  a  host  of  witnesses.  Immediately  after  his 
conversion,  Judas  prays  to  God  to  lead  him  to  the  buried  cross; 
significantly',  in  the  course  of  this  prayer  he  relates  not  the  public  nature 
of  Christ's  death,  but  instead  he  asserts  that  it  is  the  witnessed  character 
of  the  resurr'ectionwhich  is  proof  positive  of  Christ's  spiritual  identity, 
and  therefore  also  of  the  limitless  power  of  God: 
No  6u  of  dea6e  hine 
swa  ý'rymfice,  peoda  Wealdend, 
aweahte  for  weorodum,  gif  he  in  wuldre  pin 
Purh  6a  beorhtan  mmg6  B  earn  ne  wwre... 
(11.780b-783) 
[By  no  means  would  you  have  awakened  him  from  death  so 
gloriously  before  the  people,  Ruler  of  nations,  if  he  were  not  your 
Son  in  glory  by  that  radiant  maiden  ... 
] 
The  final  miracle  which  determines  which  of  the  three  unearthed  crosses 
is  the  true  one  also  takes  place  for  weorodum,  "before  a  multitude"  (I. 
867a).,  Elene  is  a  prime  example  of  counterpoint  between  righteous 
revelation  through  the  public  display  and  interpretation  of  symbols  of 
Christ's  passion--and  the  importance  of  attesting  to  the  witnessing  of  this 
act--and  the  sinful  withholding  of  such  witnessing. 
InJudith  we  are  offered  an  example  of  how  the  public  display  of 
physical  proof  acts  as  a  key  component  in  testifying  to  the  truth  of  the Chapter  Three  274 
text  of  a  physical  act.  Judith's  beheading  of  Holofernes  is  a  crucial  sign 
which  she  interprets  to  her  listeners,  and  the  public  display  of  his  gory 
head  serves  as  a  witness--after  the  fact--to  the  truth  of  her  testimony: 
pa  seo  gleaw  het 
hyre  6inenne 
ýws  herewaa6an 
ond  hyt  to  beh6e 
pam  burhleodum, 
(11.171-175)  , 
golde  gefrmtewod 
)ancolmode 
heafod  onwrii5an 
blodig  wtywan 
hu  hyre  wt  beaduwe  gespeow. 
[Then  the  prudent  gold-adorned  woman  commanded  her  attentive 
handmaiden  to  disclose  the  head  of  the  warrior,  and  to  display  it-- 
the  bloody  object--as  proof  to  the  citizens  how  for  her  it  fared  in 
battle.  ] 
The  terms  onwti6an  and  wt7wati  are  particularly  significant  here,  as  is 
be-h6e.  -  Judith  wishes  "  to  uncover",  "  to  set  free",  "  to  disclose"  a  hidden 
truth,  and  "to  reveal",  "to  show",  "to  make  manifest"  the  nature  of  that 
truth.  In  the  context  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  cultural  imperative  for  public 
display  this  seems  a  noteworthy  turn  of  phrase,  but  it  is  even  more  so  in 
juxtaposition  with  my  earlier  discussion  of  the  sinful  nature  of 
concealing  truth.  It  is  Judith's  duty--and,  by  analogy,  that  of  all  who 
would  be  righteous--to  testify  to  the  glory  of  God,  and  to  reveal  tokens 
of  his  might.  Here  that  token  is  a  bloody  head  which  Judith  displays  to 
beb6e,  "as  evidence"  of  the  victory  which  she  has  achieved  through  the 
power  of  the  almighty.  Here  we  see  the  themes  of  witnessing  and  public 
display  combined  with  an  act  of  interpretation,  echoing  the  purpose  of 
njost  of  these  passages.  The  point  is  not  that  Judith  displays  a  severed 
head  and  takes  credit  for  a  bold  murder,  but  rather  that  she  discloses  to Chapter  Three  27S 
the  Bethulians  that  this  head  is  a  sign  of  the  victory  which  they  as  a 
group  shall  be  granted  over  their  enemies.  Individual  acts  of  physical 
violence  speak  a  language  of  power  in  these  contexts,  and  witnessing  is 
central  to  that  power.  The  bloody  head  of  Holofernes  can  be  read  simply 
as  evidence  describing  the  individual  power  of  a  holy  woman  over  a 
depraved  man,  but  it  is  also  a  prophetic  text  foretelling  the  coming 
military  and  political  power  of  the  chosen  people  over  their  enemies,  and 
the  spiritual  power  of  God  and  the  church  over  Satan  and  his  dominion. 
Further,  it  is  only  in  the  public  display  and  exegesis  of  such  a  text  that  it 
takes  on  its  spiritual  and  political  power.  Without  such  public 
expression,  the  decapitation  of  Holofernes  has  meaning  only  to  the 
individuals  involved;  with  such  expression,  it  transcends  the  mortal  and 
literal  and  signifies  greater  spiritual  truths. 
Acts  of  interpretation  are  central  to  the  nature  of  witnessing  in 
these  literary  contexts,  and  it  is  only  through  such  interpretation  that  we 
begin  to  see  how  the  public  nature  of  torture  is  related  to  themes  of 
power  and  spiritual  nature  in  Old  English  poetics.  In  Daniel  we  are 
offered  a  model  for  interpreting  the  meaning  of  the  texts  composed  by 
physical  acts,  and  this  model  reaffirms  yet  again  the  centrality  of  the 
public  nature  of  such  acts,  and  the  importance  of  witnessing  to  any 
coherent  interpretation  thereof.  After  Nebuchadnezzar  and  his  followers 
have  witnessed  the  miracle  of  the  three  youths  in  the  furnace,  the  , 
Babylonian  king  calls  together  a  multitude  of  his  people  to  recount  and 
to  explain  this  phenomenon: 
Onhicgao  nu  halige  mihte, 
wise  wundor  Godes.  We  gesawon 
pmt  he  wi6  cwealme  gebearh  cnihtum  on  ofne, 
lacende  lig,  ýý  ýe  his  lof  bmron; Chapter  Three  276 
foqam  he  is  ana 
,  Dema  wimihtig, 
spowende  sped, 
For6on  witiga6 
halgum  gastum 
Swa  wordum  sprzec 
Babilone  weard, 
swutol  tacen  godes. 
ece  Drihten, 
se  i5e  him  dom  forged, 
oam  oe  his  spel  bera6. 
ourh  wundor  monig 
oe  his  hyld  curon... 
werodes  rmswa, 
sii5oan  he  beacen  onget, 
(11.472-480  &  486-488a) 
["  Consider  now  the  holy  power,  the  wise  miracle  of  God.  We 
have  seen  that  he  protected  against  death,  the  leaping  flame,  the 
boys  in  the  oven,  those  who  bore  his  praise;  therefore  he  alone  is 
the  eternal  Lord,  the  almighty  Judge,  he  who  gave  glory  to  them, 
thriving  success,  to  those  who  bear  his  message.  Th  erefore  he 
makes  known  through  many  miracles  to  those  holy  spirits  who 
have  turned  to  his  protection...  "  Thus  in  words  spoke  the  leader  of 
the  host,  guardian  of  Babylon,  when  he  understood  that  symbol, 
the  clear  token  of  God.  ] 
Here  we  are  dealing  with  an  attempt  at  torture  and  execution 
which  is  unsuccessful;  but  the  failure  of  this  act  is  in  itself  an 
illuminating  and  significant  text.  As  Nebuchadnezzar  himself  points  out, 
the  protection  of  the  youths  in  the  furnace  by  the  angel  of  God  reveals 
the  truth  of  the  nature  of  the  power  struggle  between  God  and  Satan, 
between  the  forces  of  good  and  those  of  evil;  further,  his  terminology 
betrays  both  the  importance  of  witnessing  and  of  the  relationship 
between  public  nature  and  revelation  in  such  acts  of  spiritual 
significance.  Wegesawon,  "we  have  seen",  "we  have  witnessed"  and 
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read  the  truth  of  this  power  through  swutol  tacen,  "this  clear  token"; 
there  seems,  especially  through  the  use  of  forpam,  'to  be  an  almost  causal 
relationship  between  the  act  of  witnessing  and  the  objective  reality  of 
those  acts  witnessed.  There  certainly  is  a  direct  relationship  between  the 
public  nature  of  such  acts  and  the  public  interpretation  of  the  power 
hierarchies  involved.  Nebuchadnezzar's  words  offer  to  us  a  template 
both  for  understanding  the  spiritual  significance  of  witnessing  and  for 
interpreting  the  texts  of  acts  of  physical  violence  in  the  context  of  Old 
English  poetics;  these  texts  speak  a  language  of  personal,  political,  and 
spiritual  power,  and  this  language  articulates  Anglo-Saxon  perceptions 
of  spiritual  and  temporal  truths,  and  the  relationships  between  them. 
Thus  far  in  this  chapter  I  have  explored  how  certain  kinds  of 
language  may  be  utilized  to  perform  the  function  of  acts,  and  also  the 
ritual  and  public  nature  of  many  of  these  language  acts;  conversely,  I 
have  utilized  this  linguistic  model  of  performative  language  in  order  to 
examine  how  physical  acts  of  torture  may  speak  a  language  of  power  and 
identity,  and  have  likewise  noted  the  ritual  and  public  nature  of  such 
discourse.  Further,  the  acts  which  I  have  examined  may  be  accessed 
only  through  texts,  and  therefore  serve  a  semiotic  function  upon  a  textual 
level  at  one  remove  from  the  performative  level  of  articulation  which 
they  purport  to  represent.  In  other  words,  each  torture  narrative  is  a 
literary  record  which  represents  the  physical  level  of  language  signified 
by  an  act  of  torture,  which  in  turn  represents  a  semantic  level  of  meaning 
which  has  to  do  with  issues  of  identity  and  power.  Therefore,  in  order  to 
clarify  the  relationship  between  textual  records  of  performative  language 
acts  and  the  semantic  significance  of  the  latter,  I  have  studied  briefly  the 
potential  function  of  texts  as  ritual  objects  used  to  invoke  just  such  a 
language  of  power  and  identity.  In  order  to  do  this  I  illustrated  how  a 
written  text  performed  a  ritual  role  which  was  understood  to  express, Chapter  Three  278 
through  the  performative  language  of  the  ritual  act  and  not  the  written 
records  themselves,  the  reality  of  Norman  political  power  in  early 
Anglo-Norman  England.  At  this  point  I  turn  to  a  more  in-depth 
discussion  of  a  model  for  understanding  the  nature  and  function  of 
torture  within  an  Anglo-Saxon  literary  context.  Torture  may  take  many 
forms  and  serve  many  functions  --often  simultaneously--but  the 
examination  of  textual  acts  of  torture  in  Old  English  poetry  in  the  light  of 
what  one  might  term  the  "transformative"  model  of  torture  may  perhaps 
offer  us  a  unified  and  coherent  vision  of  what  otherwise  seem  to  be 
diverse  and  incoherent  acts  and  traditions  of  literary  violence. 
Torture,  as  I  have  defined  it,  is  the  deliberate  and  systematic 
application  of  pain  for  a  particular  reason  or  reasons.  This  application  of 
pain  isalways  a  manifestation  of  power  relationships:  such  relationships 
are  always  discernible  on  a  personal  level  (i.  e.  the  power  relationship 
between  the  two  persons  involved:  the  torturer  and  the  victim),  and 
often  on  political  and  spiritual  levels.  There  are  many  different  possible 
aims  or  reasons  for  torture  (see  Introduction  for  a  more  detailed  analysis 
of  the  nature  and  aims  of  torture);  these  include  (but  are  not  limited  to): 
evidentiary  aims  (as  in  the  ordeal),  ý  judicial  aims,  punitive  aims,  political 
aims,  coercive  aims,  sadistic  aims,  semiotic  aims,  and  transformative 
aims.  Often  a  particular  act  of  torture  might  comprise  a  whole  range  of 
these  aims  at  the  same  time.  The  model  of  torture  most  clearly  related  to 
Anglo-Saxon  poetic  traditions  is  that  which  is  concerned  with  the 
destruction  and  the  subsequent  reformulation  of  identity,  that  which  we 
might  term  the  transformative  model  of  torture.  Transformative  aims,  in 
conjunction--to  a  somewhat  lesser  extent--with  semiotic  and  other  aims, 
are  central  to  the  models  of  torture  which  I  will  examine  at  length  in 
Chapters  Four  and  Five.  The  utility  of  the  transformative  model  of 
torture  in  an  Old  English  poetic  context  is  due  in  large  measure  to  the Chapter  Three  279 
Anglo-Saxon  traditions  concerning  the  relationship  between  the  soul  and 
the  body  (discussed  in  Chapter  Two),  traditions  which  Anglo-Saxon 
examples  of  literary  torture  exploit  to  much  advantage;  further,  this 
relationship  and  the  literary  models  of  torture  constructed  upon  it,  are 
remarkably  consistent  with  modem  conceptions  of  the  function  and 
utility  of  torture.  Such  transformative  torture,  both  in  contemporary 
political  contexts  and  in  Old  English  literary  contexts,  is  utilized  in  order 
to  affect  a  "turning  away",  a  change,  a  political,  psychological,  religious, 
and/or  spiritual  transformation  of  the  most  profound  nature. 
Pain,  as  we  discussed  in  Chapter  Two,  is  a  nearly  universal  human 
phenomenon.  Pain  is  also  an  interior  and  affective  state,  which--through 
its  bridging  of  the  gap  between  the  objective  physical  reality  experienced 
by  the  body  and  the  subjective  emotional  and  psychological  perceptions 
generated  by  the  mind  (or  soul)--is  uniquely  suited  to  the  exploitation 
(through  torture)  of  the  link  between  body  and  identity.  For  both  of 
these  reasons,  pain  is  a  primary  component  of  torture,  and  the 
transformative  model  of  torture  is  predicated  upon  an  understanding  of 
the  relationship  between  the  body  and  identity,  and  the  effect  of  intense 
pain  upon  such  a  relationship.  Intense  pain  is,  as  Elaine  Scarry  has  put 
it,  "world-destroying";  24  it  "includes  a  relentless  'unmaking'  of  the 
world".  25  Scarry  discusses  the  breakdown,  under  torture,  of  the 
individual's  will,  and  finally,  identity;  under  intense  physical  torment 
the  individual's  entire  being  becomes  focused  on  the  pain.  David  Bakan 
has  discussed  this  same  phenomenon,  a  sort  of  "alienation"  of  the  self  as 
it  were,  which  he  refers  to  as  the  "imperative  of  pain": 
To  attempt  to  understand  the  nature  of  pain,  to  seek  to  find  its 
meaning,  is  already  to  respond  to  an  imperative  of  pain  itself.  No 
experience  demands  and  insists  upon  interpretation  in  the  same Chapter  Three  280 
way.  Pain  forces  the  question  of  its  meaning,  and  especially  of  its 
cause,  insofar  as  cause  is  an  important  part  of  its  meaning.  In 
those  instances  in  which  pain  is  intense  and  intractable  and  in 
which  its  causes  are  obscure,  its  demand  for  interpretation  is  most 
naked,  manifested  in  the  sufferer  asking,  'Why?  '26 
The  "imperative  of  pain",  then,  is  that  it  forces  its  victim  to  think  about 
the  pain,  and  this  imperative  exerts  power  over  such  a  victim  in  direct 
proportion  to  the  severity  of  the  pain  in  question.  There  is,  during  the 
immediacy  of  extreme  pain,  a  vacancy  of  conscious  being  something 
akin  to  a  tabula  rasa.  As  the  identity  of  the  individual  becomes 
subsumed  by  the  totality  of  the  pain,  it  is  not  the  pain  itself,  but  rather  the 
agency  of  that  pain,  which  increases  in  reality  as  the  identity  of  the 
victimrecedes.  Bakan  refers  to  this  "alienation  of  the  self",  to  this 
rendering  of  the  individual  identity  into  a  tabula  rasa,  as  a  "sense  of 
annihilation". 
27, 
-  Some  contemporary  theories  of  torture  suggest  that  systematic  and 
deliberate  applications  of  pain  are  in  reality  overt  manifestations  of 
political  power,  the  projection  of  the  "will"  of  the  state,  regime  or  other 
agency  inflicting  the  pain  into  the  body,  soul,  and  ultimately  the  identity 
of  the  victim  of  that  pain.  Issues  of  power  (and  powerlessness)  are  at  the 
very  core  of  what  torture  is  all  about;  it  is  a  precondition  of  torture  that 
the  torturer's  power--in  the  context  of  the  act  of  torture--is  absolute  and 
all-consuming,  while  the  victim  of  torture  is  (by  definition  and 
necessarily)  completely  powerless  in  relation  to  the  torturer.  According 
to  the  assessment  of  the  fundamental  basis  of  contemporary  torture 
offered  by  Amnesty  International,  all  of  the  various  methods  and 
contexts  of  torture  are  constructed  to  emphasize  and  render  into 
irrefutable  fact--in  the  consciousness  of  the  victim--this  fundamental Chapter  Three  281 
axiom  of  torture;  that  is,  that  the  victim  is  bereft  of  all  power,  and  that 
all  power  (over  the  victim's  body,  mind,  and  identity,  over  the  pain,  over 
the  minutiae  of  life,  in  short,  over  the  world)  rests  firmly  and  irrevocably 
with  the  torturer: 
Essential  to  torture  is  the  sense  that  the  interrogator  controls 
everything,  even  life  itself.  The  pistol  cocked  at  the  temple,  the 
meticulous  procedure  of  mock  execution  by  firing  squad,  burial 
alive  in  a  deserted  area:  each  is  a  means  of  demonstrating  to  the 
victim  that  the  team  of  torturers  has  absolute  power.  ...  the  purpose 
is  to  convince  the  victim  that  he  or  she  is  powerless  in  the  hands  of 
those  with  the  techniques,  the  equipment  and  the  determination  to 
destroy  any  vestige  of  resistance.  28 
Torture  is,  therefore,  at  its  most  basic  level  not  about  bodies  or  even 
about  pain,  but  about  power.  Torture  always  utilizes  pain  (or  the  threat 
of  pain)  on  some  level,  whether  that  be  physical,  spiritual,  emotional, 
psychological,  or  some  combination  thereof,  but  while  torture  uses  pain, 
torture  is  about  power;  it  is  crucial  that  we  do  not  confuse  means  and 
ends  in  our  examination  of  the  functions  and  purposes  of  torture. 
Further,  although  torture  is  undoubtedly  depraved  and  immoral,  and 
many  torturers  are  undoubtedly  sadistic,  it  does  not  follow  that  torture  is 
therefore  illogical  and  capricious;  although  random  acts  of  illogical, 
capricious$  and  even  unintelligible  violence  can  and  do  occur,  these  are 
not,  according  to  our  definition,  torture.  As  Amnesty  International  has 
concluded,  torture  always  has  a  method,  torture  always  has  a  rationale, 
and  torture  always  has  a  goal;  and  this  goal  is,  on  some  level,  always 
concerned  with  power,  whether  that  power  is  personal,  political, 
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Torture  does  not  occur  simply  because  individual  torturers  are 
sadistic,  even  if  testimonies  verify  that  they  often  are.  Torture  is 
usually  part  of  the  state-controlled  machinery  to  suppress  dissent. 
Concentrated  in  the  torturer's  electrode  or  syringe  is  the  power 
and  responsibility  of  the  state.  However  perverse  the  actions  of 
individual  torturers,  torture  itself  has  a  rationale:  isolation, 
humiliation,  psychological  pressure  and  physical  pain  are  means 
to  obtain  information,  to  break  down  the  prisoner  and  to  intimidate 
those  close  to  him  or  her.  The  torturer  may  be  after  something  ý 
specific,  like  a  signature  on  a  confession,  a  renunciation  of  beliefs, 
or  the  denunciation  of  relatives,  colleagues  and  friends,  who  in 
turn  may  be  seized,  tortured  and,  if  possible,  broken.  29 
While  torture  is  about  power,  torture  by  definition  utilizes  pain;  it 
is  the  very  nature  of  torture  that  it  "  aspires  to  the  totality  of  pain".  30  The 
application  of  pain  is,  however,  only  the  first  phase  in  the  process  of 
torture;  its  purpose  is  to  "unmake"  the  individual  during  the  duration  of 
that  pain,  to  destroy  the  consciousness  which  was  the  individual,  and  to 
focus  all  awareness  on  the  all-consuming  pain  itself.  It  is  the  purpose  of 
the  second  phase  of  torture,  then,  to  write  upon  this  blank  slate. 
"Torture",  then,  means  "  change";  torture  utilizes  pain  to  affect 
transformation.  If,  as  I  remarked  above,  torture  is  about  power,  we  must 
understand  this  power  to  be,  fundamentally,  the  power  to  change,  the 
power  not  only  to  bend  the  will  of  the  victim  to  that  of  the  torturer,  but  to 
enter  the  very  soul  of  the  victim  and  to  replace  the  former  will  with  the 
latter.  Contrary  to  the  definition  of  the  term  "torture"  upon  which  legal 
. 
historians  insist--that  is,  as  a  judicial  process  of  utilizing  pain  in  order  to 
reveal  hidden  truth--the  etymology  of  the  word  "torture"  suggests  that  it Chapter  Three  283 
has  always  been  associated  with  a  sort  of  "  change",  a  "turning  away" 
that  resonates  with  the  anthropological  and  sociological  model  of  torture 
which  I  have  explicated.  The  Modem  English  word  "torture"  ultimately 
derives  from  the  Latin  torquere,  meaning  "to  twist"  or  "to  whirl";  31 
according  to  the  OED,  Modem  English  has  retained  this  etymological 
sense  in  the  figurative  meaning  of  the  word  "torture": 
3.  fig.  a.  To  act  upon  violently  in  some  way,  so  as  to  strain, 
twist,  wrench,  distort,  pull  or  knock  about,  etc. 
b.  To  'twist'  (language,  etc.  )  from  the  proper  or  natural  meaning 
or  form;  to  distort,  pervert.  32 
In  the  terms  of  the  transformative  model  of  torture,  this  figurative 
meaning  is  reflected  in  the  actual  process  of  the  production  of  the  desired 
spiritual  identity  through  the  systematic  destruction  of  the  body.  The 
application  of  pain  is  the  motive  force  of  this  "turning",  and  this  change 
seems  to  have  to  do  with  power,  with  notions  of  identity,  and  with 
perceptions  of  reality:  the  pain  which  the  torturer  afflicts  upon  the 
victim  becomes  the  means  by  which  the  reality  of  the  torturer  becomes 
the  all-consuming  perception  of  the  victim: 
...  torture,  in  its  structure,  converts  bodily  pain  into  disembodied, 
political  power.  The  prisoner's  pain,  that  is,  serves  through  its 
unquestionable  and  all-absorbing  physical  reality  to  confer  a 
corresponding  reality  and  objective  existence  upon  whatever 
political  group  or  regime  or  state  authorizes  the  torture.  33 Chapter  Three  284 
Pain  is  the  identifying  characteristic  of  torture,  but  it  is  not  its  object;  the 
object  of  torture  is  to  transfer  the  victim's  perception  of  reality  to  the 
torturer: 
...  for  the  duration  of  this  obscene  and  pathetic  drama,  it  is  not  the 
pain  but  the  regime  that  is  incontestably  real,  not  the  pain  but  the 
regime  that  is  total,  not  the  pain  but  the  regime  that  is  able  to 
eclipse  all  else,  not  the  pain  but  the  regime  that  is  able  to  dissolve 
the  world.  34 
Scarry's  concept  of  "world-destroying"  really  has  to  do  with  the 
destruction  and  transformation,  under  torture,  of  the  individual's  will, 
and,  finally,  identity.  35 
Although  Scarry's  discussion  of  this  world-destroying  function  of 
torture  is  largely  non-literary,  Edward  Peters  discusses  a  modem  literary 
example  which  both  illustrates  this  expunging  and  reformulating  nature 
of  contemporary  political  torture  and  resonates  with  Anglo-Saxon  poetic 
texts  interested  in  issues  of  spiritual  transformation.  In  George  Orwell's 
1984,  the  authorities  who  arrest  and  torture  Winston  Smith  are  already 
well  aware  of  every  facet  of  his  transgression;  the  torture  which  O'Brien 
inflicts  upon  Smith  is  designed,  not  to  produce  a  confession  of  already 
documented  guilt,  but  rather  to  transform  Smith  from  a  social  misfit  with 
deviant  ideology  into  a  model  of  Party  faithfulness.  This  transformation 
is  achieved,  first  by  coercing  Smith  into  greater  and  greater  degrees  of 
cooperation  and  compliance,  and  finally  by  forcing  him  to  choose  to 
betray  his  loyalty  to  his  beloved,  thereby  destroying  the  final  human  link 
to  his  old  self  and  simultaneously  recasting  him  into  a  paragon  of  Party 
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The  information  which  the  device  invariably  extracts,  however,  is 
already  known  to  Smith's  interrogators;  what  the  torture  sessions 
seem  to  be  designed  to  do,  in  fact,  is  simply  to  establish  Smith's 
co-operation.  The  final  and  greatest  torture  is  designed  to 
transform  forced  co-operation  into  broken-willed  assent  to  the 
principles  of  the  party.  In  Room  10  1  each  victim  is  threatened 
with  a  torture  that  consists  of  the  single  thing  in  the  world  which 
he  or  she  fears  most  ...  each  victim  may  avoid  the  actual  torture 
application  only  by  betraying  the  last  remaining  human  ties  and 
assenting  to  the  supremacy  of  party  and  state.  36 
This  literary  conception  of  torture  clearly  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
procuring  of  criminal  evidence,  and  everything  to  do  with  what  Scarry 
terms  the  world  -destroying  function  of  torture.  Smith  is  destroyed  and 
reformulated  in  the  Party's  image,  just  as  the  duplicitous  Jew  Judas,  in 
the  Old  English  verse  Elene,  is  destroyed  and  reformulated  into  the 
model  Christian  bishop  Cyriacus  (see  my  discussion  below  in  Chapters 
Four  and  Five).  ' 
In  the  course  of  the  next  two  chapters  it  is  my  purpose  to  examine 
the  relationship  between  torment,  pain,  and  identity  in  a  number  of  Old 
English  poetic  texts.  In  Elene,  for  example,  Judas's  torment,  and  his 
subsequent  metamorphosis  and  conversion,  have  often  been  perceived  of 
as  central  to  the  poem;  I  am  particularly  interested  in  the  nature  of  that 
conversion,  and  the  period  of  purgation  in  the  pit  which  makes  such  a 
conversion  possible.  This  purgation  is  imposed  upon  Judas  by  Elene 
(who  intentionally  acts  as  God's  agent),  and  hence  the  conversion  which 
follows  it  must  be  seen  as  coercive;  the  coercive,  painful  nature  of 
Judas's  transformative  experience  is  important,  because  it  provides  a 
direct  parallel  to  the  transformative  process  which  the  souls  undergo  in Chapter  Three  286 
the  fire  of  judgment  described  in  the  closing  passage  of  the  same  poem. 
An  inversion  of  this  paradigm  may  be  found  in  the  experience  of 
Andreas  (in  Andreas),  whose  identity  as  a  type  of  Christ  is  written,  as  it 
were,  on  the  page  of  his  body,  through  the  torture  of  the  Mermedonians 
(who,  although  they  incidentally  further  the  Divine  agenda,  do  not  do  so 
through  their  own  volition).  Although  Andreas  does  not  wish  to  be 
tormented,  he  is  a  willing  servant  of  the  Lord,  and  thus  his 
transformation  is,  on  some  level  (and  certainly  in  contrast  to  the  coercive 
conversion  of  Judas)  voluntary.  I  examine  the  relationships  between  a 
number  of  experiences  of  bodily  destruction  and  spiritual  reformulation 
(including  these)  in  the  light  of  the  theoretical  model  concerning  the 
transformative  nature  of  torture  which  I  have  developed  in  the  latter  part 
of  this  chapter.  In  Chapter  Four  I  apply  this  understanding  of  the  nature 
of  pain  and  torture  to  a  discussion  of  the  concepts  of  inscription  and  the 
body  as  text  as  these  notions  manifest  themselves  in  a  number  of  Old 
English  poems,  including  Andreas,  Elene,  and  Judith.  In  Chapter  Five  I 
examine  at  more  length  Anglo-Saxon  perceptions  of  the  relationship 
between  physical  bodies  and  spiritual  natures.  Utilizing  the  concept  of 
transmutation  to  illustrate  this  relationship,  I  examine  the  relationship 
between  physical  models  of  material  purgation  and  Old  English 
Doomsday  accounts  (such  as  those  found  in  Mene,  Christ  III,  and 
judgment  Day  II)  which  are  concerned  with  related  descriptions  of 
spiritual  reduction  and  reformulation.  As  I  shall  illustrate  in  the  next  two 
chapters,  Anglo-Saxon  perceptions  of  the  relationship  between  the  body 
and  the  spirit  (as  exemplified  in  both  the  model  of  inscription  and  that  of 
transmutation)  are  especially  significant  in  the  context  of  a  conception  of 
the  "refashioning"  power  of  torture,  because  the  "remaking"  of  a  soul 
presupposes  the  "unmaking"  of  it  in  the  first  place,  and  the  relationship 
between  flesh  and  spirit  is  the  key  to  understanding  both  the  process  of Chapter  Three  287 
destruction  and  that  of  production.  Further,  in  an  Old  English  poetic 
context,  it  is  only  through  a  process  of  deliberate,  systematic  application 
of  physical  pain  that  this  spiritual  unmaking  and  its  concurrent  remaking 
are  affected;  in  broad  terms,  therefore,  torture  acts,  in  such  examples,  as 
a  spiritually  productive  means  of  physical  destruction. Chapter  Three  288 
CHAPTER  THREE  NOTES 
1  Lines  9a-10b  provide  us  with  a  very  famous  crux  of  translators  and 
editors.  The  manuscript  reading  is  quite  awkward,  and  is  often  emended; 
engel,  ealle,  and  feagere  are  particularly  troublesome.  I  have  stayed  as 
close  as  possible  to  the  manuscript  text,  which  makes  engel  masculine 
accusative  singular  and  the  object  of  the  sentence,  to  be  understood  as 
the  rood,  or  alternatively,  Christ  himself.  Beheoldon  is  clearly  preterit 
plural,  and  therefore  ealle  is  the  only  likely  subject  (masculine 
nominative  plural),  here  denoting  "  all  the  heavenly  host".  According  to 
such  a  reading  fwrgere  would  also  be  masculine  nominative  plural,  and 
would  therefore  refer  to  ealle:  "All  the  beautiful  heavenly  host.  "  Many 
editors  emend  engel  to  engla,  and  there  have  been  other  clever 
alternative  readings  (see  Swanton,  pages  103-105.  )  In  any  case,  the 
basic  sense  as  regards  my  argument  remains  the  same:  a  group  of 
witnesses  gaze  upon  the  cross,  or  perhaps  Christ.  I  offer  the  manuscript 
reading  in  order  to  avoid  possible  confusion  regarding  my  translation, 
but  in  essence  this  crux  does  not  affect  my  argument. 
2  Swanton  argues  that  the  verb-first  structure  of  this  sentence 
emphasizes  the  importance  of  the  action  to  the  sentence,  and  is  used  to 
I 
make-explicit  the  violence  of  that  act  (see  pages  111-112);  this  is 
particularly  relevant  in  the  context  of  my  argument  that  acts  of  torture 
must  be 
i 
witnessed.  The  syntax  of  this  sentence  underscores  the  physical 
violence  which  the  rood  undergoes,  while  the  vocabulary  (specifically 
, Yne)  emphasizes  the  visual  nature  of  this  violence.  wwfers 
3  See,  for  example,  the  definition  provided  in  David  Crystal,  The 
Cambzidge  Enc7clopedia  of  Language.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  UP, 
1987.  Page  424:  "The  systematic,  conventional  use  of  sounds,  signs,  or 
written  symbols  in  a  human  society  for  communication  and  self Chapter  Three  289 
expression.  "  Such  a  definition  is  reductive,  of  course,  as  language  is  an 
open-ended  system,  and  there  are  so  many  exceptions  to  any  rule  applied 
to  it.  See  Crystal's  discussion  of  the  problem  of  defining  "language", 
and  his  attempt  to  "identify  the  various  properties  that  are  thought  to  be 
its  essential  defining  characteristics".  (Pages  396-397) 
4  See  Crystal,  page  399.,  - 
5  For  a  discussion  of  the  conventional  nature  of  language,  see,  for 
example,  R.  A.  Waldron,  Sense  and  Sense  Development.  2nd  ed.  The 
Language  Library,  Eric  Partridge  and  David  Crystal,  gen.  eds.  London: 
Andr6  Deutsch  Limited,  1967.  Pages  16,34,  and  190.  See  also  Carol  A. 
Kates,  Pragmatics  and  Semantics:  An  Empiricist  Theor7.  Ithaca,  NY: 
Cornell  UP,  1980.  Pages  104-105  (partially  cited  below). 
61  should  mention  at  this  point  that  my  use  of  the  term  "performative" 
coincides  roughly  with  that  subdivision  of  performatives  that  linguists 
such  as  Geoffrey  Leech  (who  have  criticized  the  "performative  fallacy") 
would  term  "  declarative",  and  therefore  falls  within  an  area  which  is  not 
nearly  so  controversial  as  some  linguistic  theories  concerned  with 
performatives.  There  is  a  considerable  body  of  literature  contributing  to 
a  debate  concerning  the  relative  merits  of  the  "performative  hypothesis" 
and  an  alternative  "pragmatic  analysis".  See  Geoffrey  Leech, 
Explorations  in  Semantics  and  Pragmatics.  Volume  5  of  Pragmatics  and 
Be7ond:  An  Interdisciplinarv  Series  of  Language  Studies.  Herman 
Parret  and  Jef  Verschueren,  eds.  Amsterdam:  John  Benjamins  B.  V., 
1980.  Pages  59-77.  Leech  begins  his  critique  with  an  overview  of  the 
primary  sources  of  the  performative  theories  (and  their  critics)  of  the 
seventies.  See  also  Leech's  Ptinciples  of  Pragmatics.  From  the 
Longman  Linguistics  Librar7.  R.  H.  Robins  and  Martin  Harris,  eds. 
London:  Longman,  1983.  Pages  174-197.  Declaratives  seem  to  be  the Chapter  Three  290 
one  aspect  of  the  performative  hypothesis  upon  which  there  is  general 
agreement,  and  so  the  more  complex  linguistic  points  which  Leech 
argues  are  of  little  note  to  this  discussion.  Leech  is  useful  to  my 
argument  in  that  he  carefully  delineates  and  defines  those  verbal  acts 
which  form  an  integral  part  of  a  ritual  action  as  declaratives,  and 
confirms  that  they  must  be  seen  as  the  motive  participating  force  of  any 
such  action;  it  is  clear  that  in  these  cases  "to  say  is  to  do".  See  my 
discussion  below.  See  also  Crystal  page  121  for  a  succinct  discussion  of 
the  types  and  effects  of  speech  acts  which  might  be  useful  for 
understanding  how  and  why  declaratives  form  a  unique  subdivision  of 
language  acts: 
In  speech  act  analysis,  we  study  the  effect  of  utterances  on  the 
behavior  of  speaker  and  hearer,  using  a  threefold  distinction. 
First,  we  recognize  the  bare  fact  that  a  communicative  act  takes 
.y  act.  Secondly,  we  look  at  the  act  that  is  place:  the  locutionar 
performed  as  a  result  of  the  speaker  making  an  utterance--the 
cases  where  "saying=doing",  such  as  betting,  promising, 
welcoming,  and  warning:  these,  known  as  fflocutionar7  acts,  are 
the  core  of  any  theory  of  speech  acts.  Thirdly,  we  look  at  the 
particular  effect  the  speaker's  utterance  has  on  the  listener,  who 
may  feel  amused,  persuaded,  warned,  etc.,  as  a  consequence:  the 
bringing  about  of  such  effects  is  known  as  a  perlocutionary  act.  It 
is  important  to  appreciate  that  the  illocutionary  force  of  an 
utterance  and  its  perlocutionary  eff  ect  may  not  coincide.  If  I  warn 
you  against  a  particular  course  of  action,  you  may  or  may  not  heed 
my  warning.  There  are  thousands  of  possible  illocutionary  acts, 
and  several  attempts  have  been  made  to  classify  them  into  a  small 
number  of  types.  Such  classifications  are  difficult,  because  verb Chapter  Three  291 
meanings  are  often  not  easy  to  distinguish,  and  speakers' 
intentions  are  not  always  clear.  One  influential  approach  sets  up 
five  basic  types  (after  J.  R.  Searle,  1976): 
Representatives  The  speaker  is  committed,  in  varying  degrees,  to 
the  truth  of  a  proposition,  e.  g.  affirm,  believe,  conclude,  den7, 
report. 
Directives  The  speaker  tries  to  get  the  hearer  to  do  something, 
e.  g.  ask,  challenge,  command,  insist,  request. 
Commissives  The  speaker  is  committed,  in  varying  degrees,  to  a 
certain  course  of  action,  e.  g.  guarantee,  pledge,  promise,  swear, 
vow.  ý 
Expressives  The  speaker  expresses  an  attitude  about  a  state  of 
affairs,  e.  g.  apologize,  deplore,  congratulate,  thank,  welcome. 
Declarations  The  speaker  alters  the  external  status  or  condition  of 
an  object  or  situation  solely  by  making  an  utterance,  e.  g.  I  resign,  I 
baptize,  You'refired,  War  is  hereb7  declared. 
7  See  especially  Leech's  (Rdnciples)  comments  concerning  the 
necessarily  ritual  nature  of  such  acts;  Only  within  such  a  highly- 
structured  and  conventional  context  can  such  speech  acts  have  the  force 
of  actions  (pages  206  and  216).  See  also  my  further  discussion  of  this 
ritual  nature,  below. 
8  For  a  overview  of  pragmatics  which  distinguishes  between  syntactics, 
semantics,  and  pragmatics--and  which  offers  a  brief  synopsis  of  the 
history  of  the  criticism  of  pragmatics--see  Kates.  See  especially  her 
working  definition  of  pragmatics  on  pages  104-105: 
The  definition  of  pragmatics  most  often  given  by  linguists  and 
psychologists  is  taken  from  the  semiotic  theory  of  Charles  Morris 
(1938)  based  on  the  earlier  work  of  the  philosopher  Charles Chapter  Three  292 
Peirce.  Morris  distinguished  syntactics,  semantics,  and 
pragmatics,  respectively,  as  the  study  of  relations  (1)  among  signs, 
(2)  between  signs  and  the  referents,  and  (3)  between  signs  and 
their  human  users.  Elizabeth  Bates  (1976)  notes  that  Morris's 
definition  of  pragmatics  has  been  criticized  because  it  does  not 
recognize  Peirce's  distinction  between  signs  (or  things  denoting 
something  for  someone)  that  can  be  interpreted  independently  of  a 
referring  situation  (symbols  and  icons)  and  those  that  must  be 
understood  through  the  actual  situation  in  which  they  occur 
(indices).  A  symbol  is  related  to  its  referent  through  an  arbitrary 
conventional  bond,  and  an  icon  is  related  to  its  referent  through  a 
direct  physical  resemblance.  In  contrast,  Peirce  (1897)  defined  an 
index  as  a  "sign  which  refers  to  the  Object  that  it  denotes  by  virtue 
of,  being  really  affected  by  that  Object"  (p.  102).  Concurring  with 
this  criticism,  Bates  (1976)  redefines  pragmatics  as  "the  study  of 
linguistic  indices"  (p.  3).  Despite  this  criticism,  I  shall  continue  to 
use  Morris's  definition  and  treat  pragmatics  very  generally  as  the 
study  of  the  ways  in  which  people  use  signs  to  perform  various 
communicative  functions.  I  would  hold  that  something  becomes  a 
sign  only  insofar  as  it  is  used  or  interpreted  by  a  subject  to  express 
information.  A  sign  is  anything  whatsoever  that  serves  a  semantic 
function--whether  arbitrarily,  iconically,  or  indexically.  Thus 
things  are  not  signs  "in  themselves.  "  Whether  or  not  something  is 
a  sign  will  depend  on  its  use  or  its  function  in  relation  to  a  subject. 
In  this  sense  the  pragmatic  level  would  seem  to  provide  a 
foundation  for  syntactic  and  semantic  relationships. 
9  Leech,  Ptinciples,  pages  5-6. Chapter  Three  293 
10  For  a  definition  of  the  broadest  sense  of  pragmatics  (which  I  am 
taking  here)  see  Crystal,  i  page  120: 
Pragmatics  studies  the  factors  that  govern  our  choice  of  language 
in  social  interaction  and  the  effects  of  our  choice  on  others.  In 
theory,  we  can  say  anything  we  like.  In  practice,  we  follow  a 
large  number  of  social  rules  (most  of  them  unconsciously)  that 
constrain  the  way  we  speak  ..  it  is  not  yet  clear  what  they  all  are, 
how  they  are  best  interrelated,  and  how  best  to  distinguish  them 
from  other  recognized  areas  of  linguistic  enquiry  ...  As  a  result  of 
these  overlapping  areas  of  interest,  several  conflicting  definitions 
of  the  scope  of  pragmatics  have  arisen.  One  approach  focuses  on 
the  factors  formally  encoded  in  the  structure  of  a  language 
(honorific  forms,  tulvous  choice,  and  so  on).  Another  relates  it  to 
a  particular  view  of  semantics:  here,  pragmatics  is  seen  as  the 
study  of  all  aspects  of  meaning  other  than  those  involved  in  the 
analysis  of  sentences  in  terms  of  truth  conditions  ...  [t]he  broadest 
sees  pragmatics  as  the  study  of  the  principles  and  practice 
underlying  all  interactive  linguistic  performance--this  including  all 
aspects  of  language  usage,  understanding,  and  appropriateness. 
II  Kates,  page  105.  See  also  Waldron  pages  37-45,52-75,90,160, 
172,  and  186-200. 
12  Crystal,  page  12  1. 
13  Crystal,  page  12. 
14  Leech,  Pfinciples,  page  206.  See  also  page  216: 
...  we  also  have  to  add  to  the  set  of  verbs  capable  of  acting  as 
performatives  those  verbs,  like  caution,  nominate,  resign,  bid,  and 
baptize,  which  occur  in  declarations.  These  verbs  are  partially 
self-referring  (in  that,  for  example,  patt  of  the  act  of  resigning  may Chapter  Three  294 
consist  in  saying  the  words  I  resign  ...  );  but  essentially  they  denote 
ritual  social  acts  rather  than  speech  acts. 
15  Leech,  Pzinciples,  page  106. 
16  Leech,  Pýdnciples,  page  179. 
17  M.  T.  Clanchy,  From  Memory  to  Wfitten  Record:  England  1066- 
1307.  London:  Edward  Arnold,  1979.  Page  11.  See  also  Crystal,  page 
12. 
18  Clanchy,  page  3. 
19  Clanchy,  page  18. 
20  See  Clanchy,  page  7: 
Making  records  is  initially  a  product  of  distrust  rather  than  social 
progress.  By  making  Domesday  Book  William  the  Conquerer  set 
his  shameful  mark  on  the  humiliated  people,  and  even  on  their 
domestic  animals,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  Chronicle. 
21  Clanchy,  pages  18-19. 
22  For  additional  discussion  of  the  Domesday  Book  as  symbolic  of 
power  "like  the  regalia",  see  especially  Clanchy,  pages  74,  and  121-122. 
23  All  citations  from  The  Fates  of  the  Apostles  are  from  Brooks;  all 
translations  are  the  author's. 
24  Scarry,  page  29. 
25  Mon-is,  page  14  1. 
26  Bakan,  pages  57-58. 
27  See  Bakan,  page  95:  "...  pain  is  simply  too  elusive  to  be  grasped 
without  taking  the  sense  of  annihilation  into  account.  But  the  sense  of 
annihilation  is  precisely  the  existentialist  sense  of  being  becoming  non- 
being.  In  the  discussion  of  the  ego  and  its  management  of  pain  it  became 
evident  that  there  is  an  underlying  process  in  which  the  ego  tends  to 
withdraw  from  the  soma  in  preparation  for  its  sacrifice.  " Chapter  Three  295 
28  Amnesty  International,  Eighties,  page  19. 
29  Amnesty  International,  Eighties,  page  4. 
30  Scarry,  page  55. 
31  For  the  etymology  of  "torture",  see  the  entry  for  this  term  on  page 
655  of  W.  W.  Skeat,  An  Etymological  Dictionar7  of  the  English 
Language.  New  Edition  Revised  and  Enlarged.  Oxford:  Oxford  UP, 
1946.  Note  the  relationship  and  the  common  derivation  Skeat  ascribes  to 
"torture"  and  "tort".  See  also  the  entry  for  "torture"  on  column  1523  of 
Ernest  Weekley,  An  Etymological  Dictionar7  of  Modern  English. 
London:  John  Murray,  1921.  Weekley  cross-references  "torture"  with 
"torment"  for  reason  of  common  sense  development;  his  etymology  of 
"torment",  on  column  1522,  is  therefore  of  some  interest: 
OF.  (tourment),  L.  tormentum,  orig.  warlike  implement  worked 
by  twisting,  for  *  torquementum,  from  torquere,  to  twist. 
ýI 
32  The  Oxford  English  Dictionarv,  Vol.  XI,  T-U.  Oxford:  Oxford  UP, 
1933.  Page  170  (Ti-Tz). 
33  Morris,  page  141. 
34  Scarry,  page  56. 
35  1  am  implying  a  somewhat  more  metaphorical  application  of  this 
breakdown  of  identity. 
36  Peters,  pages  161-162. 
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CHAPTER  FOUR:  Inscription  or  Infliction?  Torture,  Text,  &  Gender 
in  the  Old  English  Andreas,  Judith,  &  Elene 
"Writing  the  Body"  has  become  something  of  a  catch-phrase  in 
recent  years,  as  has  "The  Body  as  Text";  as  clich6d  as  these  concepts 
may  be,  they  are  of  particular  value  to  a  discussion  of  torture  in  Anglo- 
Saxon  texts,  as  they  are  by  no  means  new.  As  medievalists  we  study 
cultures  which  took  for  granted  that  writing  should  take  place  upon 
membrane,  or  skin,  and  which  understood  gendered  metaphors  for  the 
agency  and  the  medium  involved  in  what  has  come  to  be  termed 
"inscription".  These  were  also  cultures  in  which  torture  played  both  a 
literal  and  a  literary  role.  In  such  a  context  it  should  not  be  surprising  to 
discover  a  number  of  works  which  use  models  of  writing  in  conjunction 
with  descriptions  of  torture  and  bodily  destruction;  nor  should  it  seem 
strange  that  the  rending  of  the  flesh  should  often  be  conjoined  with  a 
reformulation  of  the  spirit.  In  this  chapter  I  propose  to  examine  a 
number  of  such  texts,  and,  as  part  of  the  larger  project  in  which  I  attempt 
to  determine  the  role  of  torture  as  a  spiritual  and  political  force,  here  I 
will  examine  how  writing  and  torture  are  similar  gendered  metaphors  in 
the  poetic  and  didactic  contexts  of  such  works  as  the  Old  English 
Andreas,  Elene,  and  Judith.  In  the  first  section  of  this  chapter  I  will 
examine  the  philosophical  tradition--ancient  through  medieval  to 
modem--from  which  conceptions  of  inscription  arise;  in  the  second 
section  I  will  deal  with  examples  of  actual  inscribed  objects  which  also 
have,  through  their  inscription,  metaphorical  significance;  in  the  third 
section  I  will  examine  texts  in  which  a  more  abstract  kind  of  writing-- 
torture--renders  the  human  body  into  a  sign  or  symbol  which  betokens 
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-"  Inscription"  is  an  interesting  term;  its  meaning  in  modem  literary 
criticism--and  indeed,  feminist  thinking  at  large--has  narrowed 
considerably,  and  it  now  carries  largely  socio-political  valence,  referring 
to  social  and  gender  roles  imposed  --written,  if  you  will--by  cultural 
mechanisms  upon  the  yielding  text  of  the  individual.  Further,  this  model 
is  itself  construed  as  gendered;  the  concept  of  inscription,  according  to 
critics  such  as  Carolyn  Dinshaw,  posits  that  writing  is  "a  masculine  act, 
an  act  performed  on  a  body  construed  as  feminine";  this  use  of  the  terms 
"masculine"  and  "feminine"  implies  "sexual  identities  that  are  socially 
constructed  ideas,  "  and  which  may  be  "performed  by  either  sex": 
...  literary  activity  has  a  gendered  structure,  a  structure  that 
associates  acts  of  writing  and  related  acts  of  signifying-with  the 
masculine  and  that  identifies  the  surfaces  on  which  these  acts  are 
performed  ...  the  page,  the  text  ...  with  the  feminine.  I 
It  might  be  useful  at  this  point  to  outline  the  philosophical  basis  for  this 
model,  and  to  note  some  of  the  key  concepts,  none  of  which  should  seem 
too  alien  to  most  medievalists.  Such  concepts  include  the  notion  of  the 
body  acted  upon  as  feminine,  and  the  agency  acting  upon  the  body  as 
masculine.  Further,  contemporary  theorists  tend  to  view  gender  itself  as 
a  cultural  construct  rather  than  a  biological  designation,  and,  as  we  shall 
see,  this  conception  is  not  necessarily  at  odds  with  medieval 
formulations  of  what  has  come  to  be  called  "agency".  2 
Contemporary  theorists  commonly  draw  important  distinctions 
between"'  gender  constructs"  and  "biological  designation".  3,  Sheila 
Delany,  for  instance,  discusses  and  further  refines  the  concept  of  gender 
as  cultural  construct  at  some  length,  both  in  terms  of  woman  in  culture 
and  of  particular  women  in  literary  works.  4  For  Delany,  what  it  means Chapter  Four  298 
to  be  female  is  in  every  way  but  one  not  an  accident  of  nature,  but  rather 
a  conspiracy  of  culture:  .4- 
Socially,  individually,  in  every  way  but  biologically,  woman  is 
made,  not  born.  So,  of  course,  is  man.  Each  is  a  cultural  artifact 
laboriously  worked  up,  pieced  together,  written  and  re-written  as  a 
kind  of  palimpsest.  Inscribed  on  this  document,  layer  by  layer,  are 
other  texts:  scholarly  disciplines,  novels,  poems,  lyrics  to  popular 
songs,  ad  copy,  television  scripts,  children's  books  and  games  and 
rhymes  ("Sugar  and  spice...  "),  expectations,  injunctions, 
permissions,  and  the  English  language  itself.  5  - 
Thomas  Laqueur  points  out  that  gender,  to  the  ancient  and  medieval 
mind,  was--in  a  way  perhaps  surprisingly  similar  to  that  of  Delany--more 
fluid  and  less  constrained  by  empirical  semiotics  than  modem  minds 
tend  to  construe  it;  in  fact,  according  to  the  paradigm  Laqueur  describes, 
we  might  re-render  Delany's  statement  about  the  cultural  construction  of 
gender  in  the  terms  of  the  pre-Enlightenment  one-sex  model:  "  Socially, 
individually,  in  every  way  and  especia117  biologically,  gender  is  made, 
not  natural.  "  Gender,  in  the  early  texts  which  Laqueur  examines,  takes 
precedence  over  sex--that  is,  a  cultural  understanding  concerning  what  it 
means  to  be  male  or  female  plays  a  role  in  determining  how  sexual 
biology  is  interpreted,  and  not  vice-versa.  This  is  not  to  imply  that 
Laqueur  provides  evidence  in  classical  and  medieval  medical  texts  of  the 
sort  of  self-conscious  perceptions  of  gender  which  contemporary  critics 
favor;  clearly  the  writers  of  these  texts  were  attempting  to  define 
physical  reality  as  they  perceived  it,  not  to  achieve  some  sort  of 
understanding  of  the  sociological  mechanisms  of  sexuality  under  which 
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interesting  to  Laqueur  about  these  studies  is  that  the  objective  reality 
which  they  describe  is  so  very  different  from  our  own,  and  provides, 
therefore,  a  valuable  window  into  their  cultural  assumptions  and 
preconceptions  regarding  gender: 
...  it  is  very  difficult  to  read  ancient,  medieval,  and  Renaissance 
texts  about  the  body  with  the  epistemological  lens  of  the 
Enlightenment  through  which  the  physical  world--the  body-- 
appears  as  "real,  "  while  its  cultural  meanings  are  epiphenomenal. 
Bodies  in  these  texts  did  strange,  remarkable,  and  to  modem 
readers  impossible  things.  In  future  generations,  writes  Origen, 
"the  body  would  become  less  'thick,  '  less  'coagulated,  '  less 
'hardened,  "'  as  the  spirit  warmed  to  God;  physical  bodies 
themselves  would  have  been  radically  different  before  the  fall, 
imagines  Gregory  of  Nyssa:  male  and  female  coexisted  with  the 
image  of  God,  and  sexual  differentiation  came  about  only  as  the 
representation  in  the  flesh  of  the  fall  from  grace.  ...  There  are 
numerous  accounts  of  men  who  were  said  to  lactate  and  pictures 
of  the  boy  Jesus  with  breasts.  Girls  could  turn  into  boys,  and  men 
who  associated  too  extensively  with  women  could  lose  the 
hardness  and  definition  of  their  more  perfect  bodies  and  regress 
into  effeminacy.  Culture,  in  short,  suffused  and  changed  the  body 
that  to  the  modem  sensibility  seems  so  closed,  autarchic,  and 
outside  the  realm  of  meaning.  6 
Laqueur  argues  that  what  was  important,  what  was  real,  in  the 
world  of  the  one-sex  model  was  what  we  perceive  of  as  the  cultural 
category  of  gender,  while  what  is  real  to  us,  the  physical,  the  biological- 
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symbolic  level.  7  Socially  constructed  roles,  perceptions  and 
expectations  were  determined  by  sex,  to  be  sure,  but  these  roles  and 
perceptions  were  themselves  influenced  by  cultural  conceptions  of 
gender,  or  "what  it  means"  to  be  a  man  or  a  woman.  Maleness  and 
femaleness  were  construed  according  to  a  hierarchical  social  structure, 
which  then  determined  the  nature  of  bodily  sexuality,  and  not  the  other 
way  around.  8  Further,  it  was  the  male  "sign"  which  served  as  the 
constant,  and  the  female  interpreted  in  this  semiotic  context.  9 
Such  conceptions  of  gender  as  cultural  construct  have  obvious 
resonance  with  my  discussion  of  the  gendered  nature  of  torture,  and  it  is 
equally  obvious  that  the  latter  owes  much  to  the  former.  Delany's  work, 
however,  is  more  far  reaching  than  this;  in  her  series  of  essays  she  takes 
for  granted  that  all  literature  is  concerned  with  sexual  -politics,  and  she  i's 
specifically  interested  in-  the  ways  that  literary  descriptions  of  such 
sexual  politics  reflect  political  realities.  10  In  such  a  context,  masculine 
and  feminine  have  to  do  with  culturally  constructed  roles  and  ' 
expectations,  and  biological  designation  simply  serves  as  a  m-eans  of 
enforcing  these  cultural  preconceptions.  Language,  as  Delany  points 
out,  is  -one  of  the  primary  modes  of  the  cultural  coercio&of  gender,  and 
often  neither-Subtly  nor  subtextually.  Delany  studies  a  series  of  texts 
ranging  from  the  me*dieval  to'the  modern,  and  the  purpose  of  her 
examination  is  to  underscore  the  desire  of  the  author  to  inscribe  woman 
in  two  related  ways.  First,  the  writer  constructs  his  heroine,  not  out  of 
whole  cloth,  but  piecemeal  from  the  selection  of  culturally-encoded' 
feminine  information  available  to  him;  second,  by  constructing  literary 
w  oman  in  this  way,  the  author  attempts  to  provide  an  exemplar  and 
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The  "woman"  in  most  of  these  essays  is  the  one  written  as  literary 
character  in  a  fictional  text.  Usually  "  she"  is  offered  as  an 
exemplary  figure,  whether  a  positive  one  ...  or  a  negative  one.... 
The  fictional  character  represents  an  effort  to  shape  real  woman- 
as-text.  For  me  "she"  also  signifies  a  range  of  conditions-- 
historical,  economic,  biographical,  psych  ological--that  enable 
"her"  literary  existence.  11 
Although  many  aspects  of  Delany's  model  of  the  cultural  construction  of 
gender  seem  to  me  to  be  sound,  I  must  draw  some  distinctions  between 
her  conception  of  woman  as  literary  figure  versus  man  as  literary 
composer,  and  my  own  model  of  female  body  and  male  agent.  12  In  the 
literary  context  of  torture,  as  I  shall  illustrate,  gender  has  little  to  do  with 
man  or  woman,  and  a  great  deal  to  do  with  perceptions  of  body  and 
agency;  further,  the  over-riding  cultural  paradigm  in  the  texts  which  I 
examine  is  not  a  medieval  understanding  of  the  roles  of  men  and  women, 
but  rather  a  Patristic  notion  of  the  Providential  nature  of  all  agency  (see 
my  discussion  of  agency,  and  the  will  of  God,  below).  Moreover,  as 
-the  medieval  understanding  of  body  and  Laqueur  quite  rightly  points  out, 
gender  roles  was  a  logical  extension  of  a  cultural  system  heavily  imbued 
with  such  Patristic  formulations;  in  such  a*context,  it  should  not  be 
surprising  to  find  a  world  in  which  sex--the  body--is  subservient  to 
gender--the  cultural  understanding  of  societal  roles--which  is  itself 
subservient  to  Providence--the  Divine  Will.  The  body  is  what  God  wills 
it  to  be,  and  as  His  Will  is  made  manifest  in  the  temporal  world, 
Mankind's  perceptions  of  the  body  may  shift  and  flow. 
Dinshaw  goes  further  than  Delany  in  describing  the  nature  of 
gender  as  cultural  construct;  as  noted  above,  she  removes  the  decoy  of 
biological  designation  from  the  equation,  and  also  more  fully  extends  the Chapter  Four  302 
gender-metaphor  of  writing.  For  Dinshaw  "language  (signifying 
activity)  is  essentially  structured  in  relation  to  gender,  "  and  she  attempts 
to  provide  "a  fuller  context  for  the  idea 
...  of  th  e  text  as  w  om  an's  bo  dy, 
inscribed,  read,  and  interpreted  by  men".  13  Ann  Rosalind  Jones  argues 
that  language  is  necessarily  gendered  in  such  a  manner,  and  that 
Dinshaw's  "signifying  activity"  is  in  the  end  just  another  mode  through 
which  the  male  attempts  to  objectify  and  possess  the  world  around  him. 
In  the  introduction  to  her  examination  of  Kristeva,  Irigaray,  Cixous,  and 
Wittig,  and  their  attempts  to  break  out  of  phallogocentric  discourse  to 
redefine  the  relationship  between  woman's  body  and  women's  language, 
Jones  reassesses  the  centrality  of  language  to  the  process  of  masculine  , 
acquisition  and  objectification.  Writing,  according  to  Jones,  is  another 
way  to  consume  and  dominate  the  world:  14 
44  1  am  the  unified,  self-controlled  center  of  the  universe,  ",  man  - 
(white,  European,  and  ruling  class)  has  claimed.  "The  rest  of  the 
world,  which  I  define  as  the  Other,  has  meaning  only  in  relation  to 
me,,  as  manlfather,  ý  possessor  of  the  phallus.  "  This  claim  to 
centrality  has  been  supported  not  only  by  religion  and  philosophy 
but  also  by  language.  To  speak  and  especially  to  write  from  such 
a  position  is  to  appropriate  the  world,  to  dominate  it  through 
verbal  mastery.  Symbolic  discourse  (language,  in  various 
contexts)  is  another  means  through  which  man  objectifies  the 
world,  reduces  it  to  his  terms,  speaks  in  place  of  everything  and 
everyone  else,  including  women.  15 
Such  a  desire  to  appropriate,  to  consume,  to  control,  extends  from  the 
world  of  physical  reality  to  that  of  creative  potentiality;  language  can  be 
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us,  -but  also  to  control  and  dominate  the  means  by  which  we  may 
communicate  our  experience  in  the  world.  Susan  Gubar  sees  this  male 
use  of  language,  and  specifically  masculine  conceptions  of  literary 
composition,  as  part  of  a  long  tradition  in  Western  culture  in  which  man 
attempts  to  appropriate  woman's  generative  powers: 
Our  culture  is  steeped  in  such  myths  of  male  primacy  in  , 
theological,  artistic,  and  scientific  creativity.  Christianity,  as 
feminist  theologians  have  shown  us,  is  based  on  the  power  of  God, 
the  Father,  who  creates  the  natural  world  of  generation  out  of 
nothing.  Literary  men  like  Coleridge,  Shelley,  Keats,  and  Ruskin 
describe  the  author  as  priest,  prophet,  warrior,  legislator,  or 
emperor,  reinforcing  the  idea  most  lucidly  articulated  by  Gerald 
Manley  Hopkins  that  "the  male  quality  is  the  creative  gift.  "  The 
example  of  scientific  overreachers  from  the  Faust  of  Marlowe  and 
Goethe  and  Mann  to  the  most  recent  DNA  biologists  implies  that 
scientific  ingenuity  seeks  to  usurp  the  generative  powers  of  the 
womb,  even  as  it  tries  to  re-create  the  female  in  the  male's  image. 
But  if  the  creator  is  a  man,  the  creation  itself  is  a  female,  who,  like 
Pygmalion's  ivory  girl,  has  no  name  or  identity  or  voice  of  her 
own  ...  As  Simone  de  Beauvoir  has  demonstrated  in  The  Second 
Sex,  the  phallus  as  the  transcendent  incarnate  turns  woman's  self 
into  an  object,  an  other.  16 
While  it  is  important  to  acknowledge  and  to  take  into  account 
these  contemporary  visions  of  gender  as  a  cultural  construct,  and 
especially  gender  as  it  pertains  to  the  act  of  writing,  it  is  equally 
important  to  stake  out  exactly  where  and  how  far  such  notions  will  aid  us 
in  our  examination  of  similar  medieval  concepts.  Thus  far  I  have Chapter  Four  304 
attempted  to  flesh  out  models  of  gender  as  cultural  construct  and  literary 
activity  as  gendered,  which  credit  the  contemporary  sources  by  which  I 
tun  informed  while  simultaneously  illustrating  that  these  concepts  are  not 
so  very  different  from  ancient  and  medieval  traditions.  It  remains  for  me 
to  examine  the  concepts  of  "the  body  as  text"  and  "inscription"  in  a 
similar  manner.  As  I  proceed,  then,  the  concept  of  gender,  as  I  take  it, 
refers  not  to  a  biological  designation,  but  rather  to  a  description  of 
socially  constructed  institutions.  Therefore,  although  it  is  clear  that  I 
have  set  aside  some  of  the  gender  implications  of  the  modern  argument,  I 
hope  to  illustrate  that  the  contemporary  models  of  inscription  and  the 
body  as  text  are  appropriate  to  my  discussion  of  Anglo-Saxon  literary 
torture  as  a  process  of  production  through  which,  for  example,  Andreas's 
identity  is"  re-written"  and  Judas's  is"  re-cast". 
Conceptions  of  a  gendered  division  between  body  and  spirit  and 
between  medium  and  agency  were  clear  to  medieval  writers  through 
Patristic  sources;  even  the  idea  of  woman  as  tablet,  written  upon  by  the 
stylus  of  man,  is  an  ancient  one.  17  The  model  of  the  masculine  versus 
feminine  dichotomy  of  spirit  versus  body  has  pre-Christian  roots,  and 
was  certainly  known  to  the  Anglo-Saxons  through  various  Patristic 
permutations.  These  sources  are  diverse,  numerous,  and  well-known, 
and  many  are  ultimately  derived  from  Paul's  epistle  to  the  Ephesians: 
For  the  husband  is  the  head  of  the  wife  as  Christ  is  the  head  of  the 
church,  his  body,  of  which  he  is  the  Saviour.  Now  as  the  church 
submits  to  Christ,  so  also  wives  should  submit  to  their  husbands  in 
everything.  Husbands,  love  your  wives,  just  as  Christ  loved  the 
church  and  gave  himself  up  for  her  to  make  her  holy,  cleansing 
her  by  the  washing  with  water  through  the  word,  and  to  present 
her  to  himself  as  a  radiant  church,  without  stain  or  blemish,  but Chapter  Four  305 
holy  and  blameless.  In  this  same  way,  husbands  ought  to  love 
their  wives  as  their  own  bodies.  He  who  loves  his  wife  loves 
himself.  After  all,  no-one  ever  hated  his  own  body,,  but  he  feeds  it 
and  cares  for  it,  just  as  Christ  does  the  church--for  we  are 
members  of  his  body.  (Ephesians  5:  23-30)  , 
Paul  clearly  describes  what  he  envisages  as  the  acceptable  hierarchy 
within  marriage",  and  he  utilizes  the  analogy  of  the  marriage  between  the 
Church  and  Christ  to  explicate  and  validate  his  position  on  appropriate 
gender  roles  within  temporal  marriage.  He  also  makes  a  point  of 
disavowing  those  beliefs  and  practices  which  condemn  women  and/or 
the  fleshly  as  necessarily  sinful  or  hateful.  As  the  Church  must  submit  to 
Christ,  so  must,  wives  to  their  husbands,  he  says,  and  likewise  must  the 
flesh  submit  to  the  intellect  (he  implies).  But  although  classical 
traditions  dividing  body  from  spirit  along  gender  lines  certainly  existed, 
here  Paul  does  not  go  so  far  as  to  make  a  direct  philosophical  connection 
between  gender  and  what  one  might  term  "physicality". 
'Extrapolating  from  such  unspecific  sources  as  this  epistle,  then, 
the  Church  Fathers  constructed  rather  elaborate  hierarchies  concerning 
the  role  of  the  Church  in  society,  gender  roles  in  marriage,  and  the 
relationship  between  the  senses  and  the  intellect.  '  Although  Paul  does 
not  specifically  equate  feminine  with  body  and  masculine  with  spirit, 
later  moralists  did,  and  it  is  not  difficult  to  see  how  such  arguments 
might  be  mounted  from  the  original  Pauline  position.  D.  W.  Robertson 
has  explained  the  resulting  levels  of  abstraction  construed  from  Paul's 
description  of  gender  roles  as  a  series  of  moral  hierarchies  beginning 
with  the  gendered  duality  within  an  individual,  and  extending  outward 
first  into  family  relationships,  and  then  into  the  relationship  between  the 
body  of  the  Church  and  the  Will  of  the  Divine: Chapter  Four  306 
To  begin  with,  a  moral  hierarchy  was  envisaged  in  man  himself. 
In  its  simplest  terms  this  might  be  expressed  as  the  ascendancy  of 
the  reason  over  the  sensuality,  or,  more  elaborately,  as  the 
ascendancy  of  the  higher  pan  of  the  reason,  whose  function  is 
wisdom,  over  the  lower  part  of  the  reason,  whose  function  is 
knowledge,  and  the  ascendancy  of  the  latter  over  the  motion  of  the 
senses.  The  analogy  between  this  scheme  and  the  hierarchy  of 
Adam,  Eve,  and  the  serpent  in  Genesis  suggested  a  similar 
hierarchy  in  the  family,  where  the  relationship  between husband 
and  wife  is  sacramentally  a  reflection  of  the  relationship  between 
Christ  and  the  Church,  a  relationship  which  St.  Paul  had  compared 
with  that  between  the  spirit  and  the  flesh.  18 
Much  contemporary  critical  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  misogynistic 
philosophical  position  resulting  from  such  a  gendered  understanding  of 
body  and  spirit.,  As  Robertson  quite  rightly  points  out,  the  moral 
hierarchy  suggested  by  such  models  really  has  much  more  to  do  with  an 
abstract  understanding  of  the  proper  authority  structure  within  each 
individual  soul--i.  e.:  the  flesh  should  be  subservient  to  the  intellect;  and 
any  reversal  of  this  order  is  sinful  and  to  be  avoided--than  with  a  literal 
interpretation  of  gender  roles.  Still,  as  many  recent  feminist  readings  of 
Patristic  materials  have  underscored,  abstract  moral  hierarchies  aside,  it 
is  doubtless  true  that  women  were  seen  as  weaker  and  more  fleshly  than 
men;  further,  this  conception  of  the  fleshly  nature  of  women  came  to  be 
the  basis  for  a  gendered  understanding  of  the  division  between  body  and 
spirit: Chapter  Four  307 
Thus  woman  or  the  feminine  symbolizes  the  physical,  lustful, 
material,  appetitive  part  of  human  nature,  whereas  man 
symbolizes  the  spiritual,  or  rational,  or  mental  ...  the  roots  of  this 
idea  were  multiple,  scientific  as  well  as  theological.  Ancient 
scientists  had  argued  frequently  that  at  the  conception,  woman 
contributes  the  stuff  (or  physical  nature)  of  the  foetus,  man  the 
soul  or  form,.  Patristic  exegetes  had  regularly  seen  woman  (or 
Eve)  as  representing  the  appetites,  man  (or  Adam)  as  representing 
soul  or  intellect.  19 
The  contemporary  model  of  the  gendered  nature  of  inscription 
has--like  the  gendered  model  of  the  body  from  whence  it  descends-- 
ancient  origins,  and  likewise  stems  from  misogynistic  conceptions  of  the 
roles  and  the  limitations  of  women.  Page  duBois  has  examined  the  roots 
of  this  tradition  in  the  evolution  of  classical  thought  on  the  nature  of 
gender,  and  it  is  likely  that  Patristic  notions  as  well  as  modem 
conceptions  likewise  stem  in  some  measure  from  these  same  sources: 
The  metaphor  of  the  tablet  ...  emphasizes  the  passivity  and 
receptivity  of  female  interiority  ...  assumes  that  the  mover  of  the 
stylus,  the  inscriber,  the  literate  male  who  carves  and  marks  the 
passive  medium,  alone  has  the  power  to  generate  the  marks  of  the 
text,  which  will  proliferate  not  on  the  tablet  itself,  but  in  the  mind 
of  the  reader,  who  will  again,  himself  alone,  inscribe  a  new  text  on 
the  tablet  that  has  been  erased,  scraped  clean.  20 
, 
According  to  duBois,  the  idea  of  woman's  body  as  object  (in  ancient 
Greek  culture)  underwent  a  gradual  evolution  from  field,  furrow,  and 
oven,  through  stone  to  tablet.  21  She  examines  how,  with  each Chapter  Four  308 
conceptual  and  metaphorical  shift,  the  language  of  man  controlled  more 
of  the  reality  and  the  power  of  woman,  while  simultaneously  moving 
away  from  the  rural  and  agricultural  to  the  urban  and  literary;  she  - 
describes,  as  it  were,  a  double-alienation  of  the  female.  Metaphorically, 
the  reproductive  capacity  of  woman  was,  first,  controlled  by  man  in 
intensifying  degrees,  from  the  farmer  whose  will  is  dependent  upon  the 
generative  power  of  the  soil,  to  the  writer  who  utterly  controls  the 
resources  of  the  tablet.  Finally,  the  generative  powers  of  woman  were 
entirely  appropriated  and  reinvested  in  the  philosopher  by  Plato,  and 
woman  was  reinterpreted  as  defective  and  phallus-less  man  by  ", 
Aristotle:  22 
Aristotle  furthers  the  process  of  establishing  a  logical,  systematic 
instrument  for  thinking  about  the  world,  the  process  which  Plato 
had  begun  ...  although  women  had  long  been  subordinated  to  men 
in  Greek*culture,  Aristotle  rationalizes  and  explains  their  status  in 
terms  of  abstract  principles  ...  women  are  seen  as  human  beings,  not 
'things,  but  beings  deficient  in  value.  They  are  no  longer 
metaphorical  equivalents  to  the  fertile  field,  the  productive  earth; 
they  are  measured  against  the  one,  the  male,  and  discovered  to  be 
lacking  in  value,  deficient,  estranged  metonymically,  as  a  mere 
part  for  the  whole  and  perfected  being,  who  is  male.  Plato  sees 
the  good,  the  sun,  the  father,  the  son,  as  metaphorically 
substitutable  one  for  the  other,  and  the  assimilation  of  female 
power  to  the  philosopher  who  resembles  all  of  these  is  perhaps  an 
-,  attempt  to  represent  the  wholeness,  the  absolute  sufficiency  of  the 
-  good.  Aristotle  abandons  this  attempt  to  integrate  male  and 
female.  He  instead  relies  on  a  metonymic  strategy,  not  by 
representing  the  female  as  a  fertile  field,  as  the  space  of Chapter  Four  309 
reproduction  to  be  integrated  into  the  male,  but  rather  by  claiming 
and  accounting  for  the  defective  and  partial  nature  of  the  female 
body.  The  male  body  is  whole  and  complete,  having  come  to  its 
telos,  having  achieved  perfection;  the  female  body  is  a  part  for  the 
whole,  a  thing  lacking  completion,  lacking  heat,  lacking  soul.  23 
Although  both  her  objectives  and  her  conclusions  differ  from  those  of 
Laqueur,  it  could  be  argued  that  duBois  is  describing  the  foundation  of 
the  "  one-sex"  model  of  gender  which  Laqueur  traces  for  us  from  these 
philosophical  beginnings  to  the  ascendance  of  the  "two-sex"  model  in 
the  Enlightenment.  In  any  case,  these  historians  are  not  at  odds  insofar 
as  both  argue  for  what  only  can  be  described  as  the  cultural  construction 
of  gender.  Laqueur  offered  us  evidence  of  the  fluid  nature  of  ancient  and 
medieval  concepts  of  sex  which-informs  our  understanding  of  gender  as 
a  culturally-driven  concept;  duBois  in  a  like  manner  provides  us  with  a 
description  of  the  evolution  of  a  classical  philosophical  tradition 
concerning  the  female  body  and  gender  roles  which  informs  our 
understanding  of  the  gendered  nature  of  inscription.  - 
Turning  back  to  the  point  at  hand,  however,  I  say  that  the  term 
"inscription"  is  interesting  because  its  contemporary  political  and 
philosophical  meaning  is  largely  indebted  to,  and  indeed  rests  upon,  the 
core  meaning  of  "engraving  symbols  upon  a  surface".  This  kind  of 
duality  of  meaning  is  significant  in  the  context  of  my  discussion,  because 
I  can  think  of  at  least  one  clear  parallel  in  Old  English.  Grafan,  the  Old 
English  source  from  whence  we  get  such  Modem  English  terms  as 
44grave",  carries  in  some  texts  a  multivalence  reminiscent  of  that  of 
"inscription",  and  in  similar  settings  of  philosophical  writing  and 
reading.,  The  primary  meaning  of  grafan  is  "to  dig,  delve,  dig  up",  but  it 
also  carries  a  secondary  meaning  of  "to  grave,  engrave,  carve,  -.  24  - Chapter  Four  3  10 
Grafan  also  has  two  derivatives  which  sometimes  serve  as  antonyms.  In 
agmfan,  ("to  engrave,  inscribe"25),  the  a-  prefix  acts  as  an  intensifier;  in 
the  examples  which  I  will  cite,  agrafan  has  to  do  with  making  manifest 
spiritual  truths  by  "engraving"  them  upon  material  objects.  26  In 
begrafan,  ("to  bury"27),  the  be-  prefix  performs  an  intriguing  double 
function.  This  prefix  can  act  either  as  an  intensifier  or  it  can  have  a 
privative  sense  (as  in  beheaNian--to  deprive  of  a  head);  28  in  the 
contexts  in  which  I  am  interested  I  would  argue  that  this  prefix  both 
intensifies  the  literal  meaning  of  gmfan--burying  involves,  after  all,,  the 
digging  of  a  grave--and  negates  the  metaphorical  meaning  of  grafan, 
which  has  to  do  with  inscribing  truth  or  spiritual  identity. 
For  example,  it  has  often  been  argued  that  the  speaker  in  The 
Husband's  Message  is  the  beam  itself  -and  that  Riddle  60,  which 
immediately  precedes  it  in  The  Exeter  Book,  is  a  prologue  of  sorts.  29 
Since  we  may  read  both  speakers  as  rune-inscribed  pieces  of  wood,  this 
thesis  is  intriguing  in  a  discussion  of  inscription.  In  both  cases  we  may 
argue  that  a  personified  material  object  has  been  utilized  to  convey  a 
meaning  composed  upon  it  by  an  outside  agent.  Even  more  significant  is 
the  beam's  acknowledgment  of  this  act  of  inscription,  and  the  language  it 
uses  to  describe  this  act: 
Hwmt,  pec  ponne  biddan  het,  se  pisne  beam  agrof  (1.13) 
[Lo,  he  who  inscribed  this  wood  commanded  [me]  to  beseech 
you  ... 
]30 
Here  we  have  a  striking  example  of  an  inscribed  surface  which  is  aware 
of  its  own  composition;  the  fact  that  the  beam  is  able  to  speak  for  itself 
lends  a  metaphorical  as  well  as  a  literal  level  of  significance  to  this  act  of 
engraving.  On  the  literal  level,  we  are  presented  with  a  text  which Chapter  Four  311 
delivers  a  husband's  thoughts  to  his  wife;  on  the  metaphorical  level,  we 
have  a  self-aware  entity  which  is  conscious  of  the  extent  to  which  it  has 
been  composed  by  an  agency  outside  of  itself.  Such  consciousness  is 
common  enough  in  Anglo-Saxon  literature,  of  course,  and  is 
reminiscent,  obviously,  of  that  more  famous  beam,  the  Rood  of  The 
Dream  of  the  Rood.  What  is  significant  about  this  example  is  the 
language  of  inscription,  language  which,  as  we  will  see,  underscores  the 
revelatory  nature  of  such  inscription  in  Old  English  texts.  Agrof  is  the 
preterit  third-person  singular  indicative  of  agrafan,  and  is  commonly 
rendered  "inscribed";  here  such  inscription  refers  literally  to  the  runes 
cut  into  the  surface  of  the  wood,  and  figuratively  to  the  deeper  interior 
meaning  made  manifest  through  these  exterior  signs.  As  we  shall  see, 
such  engraving  has  to  do  with  physical  inscriptions  which  reveal  deeper 
spiritual  truths,  while  diametrically-opposed  acts  of  begrafan--"un- 
engraving",  if  you  will--have  literally  to  do  with  burying,  and  refer 
figuratively  to  attempts  to  hide  or  obscure  spiritual  significance. 
But  The  Husband's  Message,  while  illuminating  nicely  this 
dichotomy  between  "interiority"  and  "  exteriority"  in  this  type  of 
inscription,  has  little  to  do  with  issues  of  spiritual  identity  or  spiritual 
truths,  which  are  my  primary  concern.  For  an  excellent  example  which 
does  dealwith  such  issues,  we  may  turn  to  Andreas.  31  When  Andreas  is 
conversing  with  the  ship's  pilot  (the  disguised  Christ)  on  his  voyage, 
Andreas  recounts  a  particular  miracle  of  the  Savior  -which  has  bearing  on 
a  discussion  of  inscription.  While  preaching  in  the  Temple  of  Solomon, 
Christ  is  angered  by  the  willful  blindness  of  the  people  of  Jerusalem; 
noting  the  carven  angels  on  the  walls  of  the  temple,  Christ  calls  upon  one 
to  attest  to  his  divinity: 
Swylce  he  wrmtlice  wundor  agrmfene, Chapter  Four  312 
anlicnesse  engla  sinra 
geseh,  sigora  frea,  on  seles  wage, 
on  twa  healfe  torhte  gefrmtwed, 
wlitige  geworhte;  he  worde  cwmj5: 
"Dis  is  anlicnes  engelcynna 
pws  bremestan  pe  mid  pam  burgwarum 
in  pwre  ceastre  is;  Cheruphim  et  Seraphim 
pa  on  swegeldreamum  syndon  nemned. 
Fore  onsyne  ecan  dryhtnes 
standa6  sti6fer6e,  stefnum  heriga6, 
halgum  hleo6rum,  heofoncyninges  ýrym, 
meotudes  mundbyrd.  Her  amearcod  is 
haligra  hiw  ýurh  handmwgen, 
awriten  on  wealle,  wuldres  Oegnas.  " 
(11.712-726) 
[Thus  he,  Lord  of  victories,  saw  marvelous  objects,  wonders, 
engraved,  images  of  his  angels,  on  the  walls  of  the  hall  on  two 
sides,  splendidly  decorated  and  beautifully  wrought.  He  spoke 
aloud:  "This  is  an  image  of  the  most  glorious  of  the  species  of 
angels  that  there  is  among  the  inhabitants  of  that  city:  these  are 
called  Cherubim  and  Seraphim  amid  the  joys  of  heaven.  They 
stand  unflinching  before  the  face  of  the  eternal  Lord;  with  their 
voices  they  extol  in  holy  tones  the  majesty  of  the  heaven  king  and 
the  tutelage  of  the  ordaining  Lord.  Here,  by  dexterity  of  hand,  is 
marked  down  the  beauty  of  holy  beings  and  engraved  on  the  walls 
are  the  thanes  of  glory.  "] 
"Nu  ic  bebeode  beacen  wtywan, 
wundor  geweori5an  on  wera  gemange, Chapter  Four  313 
i5mt  ýeos  onlicnes 
wlitig  of  wage, 
secge  so6cwidum, 
eorlas  on  cy66e, 
(11.729-734) 
eori5an  sece 
ond  word  sprece, 
ýy  sceolon  sel  gelyfan 
hwaot  min  w6elo  sien.  " 
["Now  I  shall  command  a  sign  to  appear,  a  wonder  to  take  place  in 
the  midst  of  the  people--that  this  image  come  down  from  the  wall 
to  the  ground  and  speak  words,  tell  in  true  words,  whereby  men, 
shall  come  to  believe  in  my  parentage,  what  my  lineage  is.  "] 
This  "graven  image"  dares  not  disregard  the  command  of  Christ,  and 
comes  down  off  of  the  wall  to  preach  to  the  people.  This  example  is  of 
particular  note,  because  the  concept  of  engraving  or  inscription  serves  a 
dual  role  here;  as  Christ  points  out,  these  stone  "wondrous  engraved 
images"  are  "carved  through  dexterity  of  hand",  and  they  represent  the 
'(most  glorious  of  angels";  the  importance  of  the'representational  value 
of  these  carvings  is  emphasized  by  the  repetition  of  such  terms  as 
"likeness"  and  "symbol".  On  a  literal  level  these  carvings  represent  an 
artisan's  act  of  engraving  images  in  stone.  On  a  metaphorical  level, 
however,  this  engraving  signifies  the  "holy  tones"  of  the  voices  of  the 
angels  glorifying  the  majesty  of  God--the  timbre  of  which  is  made 
manifest  as  the  angel  climbs  down  from  the  wall  and  begins  to  sing  those 
very  praises.  This  act  of  inscription,  then,  serves  not  only  to  represent 
the  appearance  and  the  role  of  the  angels  in  heaven,  but  also  to  make 
manifest  the  spiritual  identity  of  Christ  as  the  Son  of  God  and  the  Savior 
of  Mankind  on  earth.  Such  inscription  or  engraving,  then,  while  on  one 
level  simply  referring  to  a  tangible  act  of  artistry  upon  stone,  on  a  deeper 
level  refers  to  the  spiritual  truth  which  this  engraving  serves  to  represent; 
it  takes  the  form  of  writing  as  well  as  that  of  sculpture,  and  this  duality Chapter  Four  314 
of  meaning  is  nowhere  more  clear  than  in  the  Old  English  account  of  the 
Ten  Commandments.  Here  the  writer  uses  the  same  form  of  agrafan  to 
refer  to  God's  words  on  the  tablets  as  the  Andreas  poet  used  to  describe 
the  graven  angels: 
He  sealde  Moise  twa  stwnene  wexbreda  mid  Godes  handa 
agrafene  (Exodus  31:  18)32 
[He  gave  to  Moses  two  stone  tablets  engraved  by  the  hand  of  God] 
In  all  of  these  cases  of  acts  of  literary  inscription,  agrafan  serves  on  one 
level  to  describe  actual  material  objects  which  have  been  engraved, 
while  simultaneously  referring  to  those  spiritual  truths  which  the 
physical  inscription  is  meant  to  represent;  such  engraving,  then, 
comprises  both  the  appearance  of  exterior  inscription  and  the 
manifestation  of  interior  significance. 
An  interesting  counterpoint  to  the  physical  and  spiritual 
inscription  of  agrafan  may  be  found  in  the  use  of  begrafan  in  Elene. 
Forms  of  this  term  appear  twice  in  this  poem,  and  in  both  cases  involve 
both  a  literal  "burying"  and  a  metaphorical  "covering  up"  which  serve  to 
illuminate  further  my  discussion  of  the  spiritual  significance  of 
inscription.  After  his  forcible  conversion  in  the  pit,  Judas  readily 
acquiesces  to  Elene's  command  and  unearths  the  three  crosses  buried  in 
the  earth  where  the  Jews  had  hidden  them: 
Ongan  Oa  wilfwgen  wfter  Oam  wuldres  treo, 
elnes  anhydig,  eoroan  delfan 
under  turfhagan,  Omt  he  on  twentigum 
fotmmlum  feor  funde  behelede, 
under  neolum  nioer  nausse  gehydde Chapter  Four  315 
in  ýeostorcofan;  he  i5mr  ýreo  mette 
-in  ýam  reonigan  hofe  roda  mtsomne, 
greote  begravene,  swa  hio  geardagum 
arleasra  sceolu  eor6an  bqeahton, 
ludea  cynn... 
(11.  -  827-837) 
[He  began  then,  eager  of  will  and  resolute  of  courage,  to  dig  in  the 
earth  for  the  tree  of  glory  beneath  the  turf-covering  until,  within  a 
distance  of  twenty  paces,  he  found  [the  crosses]  concealed,  hidden 
down  in  a  deep  pit,  in  a  dark  chamber;  he  came  upon  three 
crosses  together  there  in  that  gloomy  cell,  buried  in  the  soil  just  as 
that  wicked  host,  the  Jews,  had  covered  them  with  earth  in  days  of 
yore  ] 
Here  begravene  means"  buried"  or"  hidden",  but  it  is  clear  in  the  context 
of  the  rest  of  the  passage  that)  while  the  crosses  were  literally  buried  in 
the  ground,  the  "host  of  wicked  ones"  --the  Jews--had  buried  them 
specifically  in  order  to  keep  the  spiritual  significance  of  the  Cross  secret 
from  the  world.  Aft  of  the  other  terms  used  to  describe  the  buriat 
reinforce  this  duality:  -  behelede  and  bepeahton,  which  both  canmean 
simply  buried  or  covered,  also  can  imply  hidden;  geh7dde,  on  the  other 
hand,  clearly  denotes  secrecy.  The  language  used  to  describe  the 
perpetrators  of  this  crime  also  makes  it  clear  that  this  is  no  innocent 
burial,  but  rather  a  conspiracy  of  silence  in  which  actual  physical 
entombment  of  objects  is  conjoined  with  the  metaphorical  hiding  of  a 
spiritual  secret.  The  second  passage  reinforces  this  relationship.  After 
the  identification  of  the  True  Cross,,  and  Judas's  confrontation  with  the 
Devil,  the  news  of  the  invention  of  the  Cross  is  spread  throughout  the Chapter  Four  316 
world;  here  the  poet  once  again  links  the  burial  of  the  cross  with  the 
secrecy  and  sin  of  those  who  had  hidden  it:, 
Da  wms  gefrege  in  ýmre  folcsceare, 
geond  ýa  werpeode  wide  lmded, 
mmre  morgenspel  manigum  on  andan 
para  pe  Dryhtnes  m  dyman  woldon, 
boden  zefter  burgum  swa  brimo  fm6ma6, 
in  ceastra  gehwmm,  pmt  Cristes  rod, 
fyrn  fold  an  begrmfen,  funden  wmre... 
(11.968-974) 
[Then  the  morning-news  was  reported  among  the  people  and  - 
widely  spread  throughout  the  nation--in  vexation  to  the  many  of 
those  who  would  keep  secret  the  Lord's  law-jit  was]  announced 
through  cities  which  the  ocean  encircles,  in  every  town,  that 
Christ's  cross,  long  buried  in  the  earth,  had  been  found  ...  ]  ., 
Clearly  those  who  "would  have  kept  the  Lord's  law  secret"  were 
invested  in  the  burial  of  the  cross.  Begrat'an,  literally  denoting  "to  bury" 
an  object,  metaphorically  connotes  "to  hide"  a  spiritual  truth;  similarly, 
agmfan,  while  literally  "to  carve"  upon  an  object,  metaphorically  implies 
to  make  manifest  just  such  truth.  In  this  context  it  is  clear  that  the 
Anglo-Saxon  conception  and  language  of  inscription  is  in  some  ways 
analogous  to  our  own.  -It  remains  to  be  seen  how  far  we  fairly  may  assert 
such  a  comparison. 
Having  described  briefly  the  significance  of  the  duality  of  the 
language  of  inscription  in  Old  English  contexts,  I  turn  now  to  models  of 
literary  torture  which  employ  similar  dual  structures;  these  examples  are 
more  abstract  than  those  which  I  haye  just  discussed,  and  the  kind  of Chapter  Four  317 
"writing  the  body"  which  I  will  describe  has  to  do  with  a  language  of 
weapons  and  wounds,  as  it  were,  which  provides  legible  tokens  and  signs 
rather  than  written  words.  33  "Writing  the  body"  is  essential  to  "reading 
the  soul"  in  the  Old  English  Andreas-,  it  is,  after  all,  only  through  the 
destruction  of  his  flesh  that  Andreas's  spiritual  identity  is  transformed, 
and  this  transformation  is  recorded  on  the  parchment  of  his  flesh  by  the 
marks  of  his  passion.  Writing,  in  Andreas,  is  at  once  both  a  productive 
and  a  destructive  activity.  We  first  become  aware  of  the  dangerous 
power  of  the  written  word  quite  early  in  the  poem,  when  we  learn  that 
the  Mermedonians  have  subverted  the  normally  productive  activity  of 
writing  into  a  tool  for  calculating  the  execution  dates  of  their  prisoners. 
Later,  the  words  uttered  by  the  devil  to  incite  the  Mermedonians  against 
Andreas  illuminate  the  lexical  relationship  between  the  destructive 
nature  of  writing  and  the  productive  nature  of  torture  in  the  semiotic 
context  of  the  poem.  Finally,  in  a  sort  of  double-subversion,  these  same 
Mermedonians  are  the  agents  by  which  the  destructive  practice  of  torture 
is  itself  transformed,  as  they  write  upon  Andreas's  body  his  identity  as  a 
type  of  Christ.  It  is  only  through  the  infliction  of  pain  upon  his  body  that 
Andreas's  spiritual  identity  as  a  type  of  Christ  is  inscribed  within  the 
text.  Christ  is,  through  his  passion,  unmade,  so  that  he  who  was  once 
fully  divine  could  become  fully  human.,  Andreas's  identity  is,  in  effect, 
erased  through  his  torment,  erased  to  be  rewritten  as  a  type  of  Christ. 
Writing,  as  a  means  of  reconstituting  and  transmitting  the  Divine 
Word,  is  a  central  and  unifying  activity  in  Andreas.  It  is  of  note  that  the 
central  narrative  of  the  poem  is  framed  between  two  distinct  and  self  - 
conscious  references  to  the  act  of  writing.  At  the  very  onset  of  the  poem 
Matthew  is  described  as  that  one  among  the  Jews  who  first  related  the 
gospel  through  the  miraculous  craft  of  writing: Chapter  Four  318 
woes  hira  Matheus  sum, 
se  mid  ludem  ongan  godspell  wrest 
wordum  writan  wundorcrmfte. 
(11.1  lb-13) 
[  ...  Matthew  was  a  certain  one  of  them  who  first  among  the  Jews 
began  to  write  the  gospel  in  words  through  miraculous  craft.  ] 
This  is  clearly  productive  writing,  the  purpose  of  which  is  to  lead 
mankind  to  the  truth  of  the  Word. 
The  poet's  own  writing  is  likewise  productive  in  that  it  strives  to 
serve  the  same  purpose;  but  this  writing  is  also  productive  in  the 
creative  sense,  in  that  the  poet  has  produced  a  work  which  is  laudable  on 
its  own  artistic  merits.  Protestations  of  incompetence  aside,  the  poet's 
self-conscious  reference  to  his  own  act  of  composition  serves  both  to 
draw  attention  to  the  analogy  between  his  writing  and  that  of  Matthew, 
and  to  underscore  the  unique  nature  of  his  own  act  of  production: 
Hw.  -et,  ic  hwile  nu  haliges  lare 
leo6giddinga,  lof  ýws  pe  worhte, 
wordum  wemde, 
Ofer  min  gemet 
langsum  leornung, 
eall  wfter  orde... 
(11.1478-1489) 
wyrd,  undyme.  , 
mycel  is  to  secganne, 
ýwt  he  in  life  adreag, 
[Lo,  I  for  a  while  now  have  announced  in  words  of  poetry  the 
story  of  the  holy  one,  the  glory  of  that  which  he  did,  a  manifest 
fact  beyond  my  ability.  A  great  feat  is it,  a  challenging  task,  to 
recount  all  that  he  did  in  his  lifetime  from  the  beginning.  ] Chapter  Four  319 
Such  a  framing  device  in  fact  validates  the  author's  own  writing  through 
its  analogy  to  that  of  Matthew. 
That  the  poet  frames  the  narrative  with  such  references  to  writing 
is  significant.  Perhaps  even  more  telling  than  the  analogy  between 
Matthew's  "miraculous"  craft  and  the  literary  efforts  of  the  poet, 
however,  is  the  distinction  between  such  holy  writing  and  its  heathen 
counterpart.  This  contrast  is  underscored  in  the  description  of  the 
Mermedonians'  grisly  death-calendar;  in  what  seems  to  be  a  clear 
inversion-of  Matthew's  writing  of  the-Word'of  Life,  the  cannibals  have 
devised  "  death-words",  a  system  of  writing  and  reckoning  whereby  they 
can  determine  exactly  when  a  victim  is  scheduled  to  be  put  to  death  and 
eaten: 
Hmfdon  hie  on  rune  , 
-  awriten,  wa)lgrmdige, 
hwwnne  hie  to  mose 
on  paore  werpeode 
,-  (11.134-137) 
ond  on  rimcraefte 
wera  endestwf, 
metepearfendum 
weori5an  sceoldon. 
[They  had  written,  in  rune  and  in  reckoning, 
the  slaughter-greedy  ones,  the  end-word34  of  men, 
when  they  should  become  food  to  the  hungry  ones 
in  that  tribe.  ]  ;  -,  I. 
Here  the  Mermedonians  invert  a  normally  productive  activity,  and 
writing  becomes  a  means  of  death;  later,  in  my  discussion  of  the 
transformative  nature  of  pain,  I  will  demonstrate  how  torture  is  likewise 
inverted  (albeit  unwittingly)  in  Mermedonian  hands,  and  becomes  a 
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The  perverse  nature  of  the  Mermedonian  abuse  of  the  act'of 
writing  is  further  emphasized  by  the  poet's  choice  of  words:  while 
Matthew  wordum  wtitan35  wundorcrzefte  (L  13)  [wrote  in  words, 
miraculously],  the  Mermedonians  awiiten  in  "runes"  and  "reckoning"; 
though  both  are  engaged  in  what  would  seem  to  be  analogous  acts,  they 
do  so  to  opposite-ends.  Indeed,  as  the  apposition  of  wordum  with  on 
rune  would  seem  to  imply,  these  acts  spring  from  entirely  different 
traditions:  Matthew's,  "  miraculous"  Christian  writing  is  in  stark 
opposition  to  the  pagan  rune  and  timcrwft  of  the  Mermedonians.  36 
Here,  clearly,  we  have  an  example  of  the  inversion  of  the  normally 
productive  process  of  writing,  an  inversion  which  results  in  death  instead 
of  life. 
Seth  Lerer  has  examined  acts  of  what  he  has  termed  "literacy"  as 
they  are  manifested  in  various  Old  English  texts;  for  Lerer  such  literacy 
comprises  more  than  just  reading  and  writing,  and  includes  related  issues 
of  power,,  causality,  and  intent.  Lerer  discusses  such  literacy  as  he 
perceives  it  in  Andreas,  and  also  has  determined  that  acts  of  writing  are 
central  to  the  poem.  37  Lerer  finds  the  "subversive"  literacy  of  the 
Mermedonians  to  be  of  particular  note  in  the  context  of  the  poet's  sense 
of  the  nature  and  the  purpose  of  his  own  act  of  writing: 
Unlike  that  of  saints,  or  by  implication  of  the  Andreas-poet 
himself,  Mermedonian  writing  attempts  to  bind  and  destroy  rather 
than  release  and  revive.  Their  inscriptions  emblemize  a  pernicious 
kind  of  letter,  one  that  literally  kills  ... 
38 
There  are  many  kinds  and  levels'Of  writing  in  Andress,  and  that  of  the 
poet  is  inextricably  bound  up  with  the  rest.  He  clearly  seems  to  delineate 
the  good  from  the  bad,  the  Christian  from  the  pagan,  the  productive  from Chapter  Four  321 
the  destructive;  it  is  equally  clear  into  which  tradition  he'himself  falls. 
Such  a  dichotomy  is  itself  transformed,  however,  by  the  dynamic  process 
of  the  poet's  own  literacy,  through  means  as  subtle  as  word  choice  and 
as  blatant  as  emendation. 
The  relationship  between  torture  and  writing--between  the 
infliction  of  bodily  wounds  and  the  inscription  of  spiritual  identity--is 
underscored  in  this  poem  soon  after  Andreas  has  come  to  the  city  of  the 
Mermedonians.  The  devil,  in  the  guise  of  an  old  man,  advises  the  -- 
Mermedonians  that  Andreas  is  their  enemy  and  exhorts  them  to  seek  him 
out  and  subdue  him  through  torment: 
Nu  ge  magon  ea6e  -  oncy6dwda 
wrecan  on  gewyrhtum-,  lwta6  wwpnes  spor 
iren  ecgheard,  'ealdorgeard  sceoran, 
fwges  feorhhord.  ,  Ga6  fromlice 
ýwt  ge  wi6erfeohtend  wiges  gehnwgan! 
(11.1179-1183) 
[Now  you  may  readily  for  their  strange  deeds 
, wreak  vengeance  upon  the  doers.  -  Let  the  mark 
of  weapon,  edge-hard  iron,  cut  the  life-dwelling, 
the  body  of  the  fated  one.  '  Go  boldly  so  that  you 
may  subdue  your  adversary  of  strife.  ] 
The  Mermedonians  do  just  that,  and  the  spor  of  their  weapons  upon  his 
body  acts  as  a  vivid  record--a  visible  sign  or  symbol--of  Andreas's 
spiritual  nature.  The  very  words  uttered  by  the  devil  to  incite  the 
Mermedonians  against  Andreas  illuminate  the  productive  nature  of 
torture  and  the  concurrent  destructive  nature  of  Mermedonian  writing  in 
the  semiotic  context  of  the  poem.  In  the  context  of  this  passage,  the Chapter  Four  322 
meanings  of  spor  and  sceoran  seem  fairly  straightforward:  spor  can  best 
be  read  here  as  "mark",  or  perhaps  more  poetically  "wound"  or  "scar"; 
sceoran  clearly  means  "  cut"  in  this  context,  or  in  a  more  general  sense 
"  destroy".  39  The  sense  of  this  passage,  therefore,  seems  on  the  surface 
clearly  to  be  destructive,  -  both  linguistically  and  thematically.  But- 
although  spor  can  certainly  mean  the  mark  of  a  wound,  it  can  also  mean 
a  mark,  or  a  trace,  of  any  kind;  40  further,  sceran  means  to  cut,  shear,  or 
shave,  most  often  used  in  regards  to  the  cutting  or  shaving  of  hair,  but, 
sometimes  t6the  shearing  of  sheep.  41  We  have  then  an  interesting 
paradox  in  the  application  of  these  two  particular  terms  to  the  meaning  at 
hand;  though  the  primary  reading  certainly  seems  destructive,  it  is 
noteworthy  in  the  context  of  my  larger  argument  that  both  of  these  terms 
resonate  with  more  productive  meanings:  spor  certainly  could  suggest 
the  act  of  "marking",  or  "tracing"  upon  a  page,  and  sceran,  in  its  implicit 
sense  of  shearing  sheep',  could  suggest  the  preparation  of  parchment.  42 
Thus  both  words,  while  explicitly  referring  to  an  act  of  torture, 
also  might  implicitly  invoke  an  image  of  writing  and  of  the  preparation 
of  parchment.  This  paradoxical  image  is  of  special  significance  in  the 
context  of  my  discussion  of  Andreas's  body  as  a  page  upon  which  a  new 
spiritual  identity  is  written  through  the  acts  of  torture  invoked  by  the 
devil  through  these  very  words.  43  Here,  then,  in  a  number  of  related 
linguistic  and  thematic  ways  the  body  of  Andreas  acts  as  a  page  upon 
which  his  identity  is  written  through  the  torture  inflicted  upon  him.  It  is, 
after  all,  only  through  undergoing  a  passion  himself  that  Andreas  begins 
spiritually  to  resemble  Christ.  The  infliction  of  wounds  upon  Andreas's 
body,  therefore,  parallels  the  inscription  of  his  identity  in  the  text. 
Tellingly-within  the  context  of  my  discussion  of  the  act  of  writing-- 
Andreas's  identity  is  that  of  a  type  of  Christ,  who  is  "the  Word".  The' Chapter  Four  323 
torture  inflicted  upon  Andreas  is  thereby  written  on  his  body,  just  as  the 
poet's  words  are  written  on  the  page.  i 
The  Old  English  Judith  offers  us  another  example  of  "writing  the 
body",  but  this  time  the  writer  is  an  agent  of  God,  and  a  woman,  a 
significant  fact  in  the  context  of  my  discussion  of  the  gendered  nature  of 
torture.  44  In  the  Vulgate  version  of  the  poem,  the  children  of  Israel 
could  not  possibly  defeat  the  vast  and  mighty  armies  of  the  Assyrians 
without  divine  intervention.  -In  contrast  to  the  Vulgate  heroine,  the  Old 
English  Judith  acts  less  as  a  wily  general  implementing  a  potentially 
risky  plan,  and  more  in  the  capacity  of  a  prophetess  or  seer,  one  who 
provides  tangible  evidence  of  the  future,  thereby  instilling  in  her  warriors 
the  will  to  fight  for  a  victory  which  is  destined  to  be  theirs.  In  this, 
version  it  is  not  her  action  which  ensures  the  victory  of  the  Bethulians, 
but  rather  the  reaction  inspired  by  it;  their  victory  seems  entirely 
possible  long  before  the  Assyrians  discover  the  headless  body,  a 
discovery  which  is  not  made,  in  this  version,  until  the  outcome  of  the 
battle  is  already  a  foregone  conclusion.  In  the  Old  English  poem 
Judith's  role  is  an  active  one,  to  be  sure,  but  it  is  compositional  and 
revelatory  in  nature.  In  this  text  Judith  acts  as  an  author  of  sorts,  the 
agent  by  which  the  Divine  Will  is  made  manifest;  she  writes  the  text  of 
the  fate  of  the  Assyrians  with  Holofernes's  sword  as  her  pen,  his  blood 
as  her  ink,  and  his  flesh  as  her  tablet.  She  publishes  this  meaning  in  the 
twin  revelatory  texts  of  the  gory  head  and  the  headless  body. 
Just  as  Andreas's  body  serves  as  the  page  upon  which  his  spiritual 
identity  is  inscribed,  upon  Holofernes's  decapitated  body  is  written  the 
text  of  the  destruction  of  the  entire  Assyrian  host.  After  Judith  has 
inscribed  this  text  with  the  aid  of  Holofernes's  own  sword  as  her  pen, 
she  returns  within  the  city  gates  to  relate  to  her  people  what  has  passed. 
It  is  during  her  initial  speech  that  we  first  suspect  that  the  bloody  head Chapter  Four  324 
with  which  she  has  returned  betokens  more  than  her  personal  victory  - 
over  the  Assyrian  leader;  before  she  has  even  displayed  this  gory  token 
itself,  Judith  alludes  to  such  a  sign  when  she  announces  that  the 
forthcoming  victory  of  the  Bethulians  already  "has  been  announced": 
"...  IDmt  gecyi5ed  wear6 
geond  woruld  wide,  pmt  eow  ys  wuldorblmd 
torhtlic  toweard  7  tir  gifei5e 
para  ImMa  pe  ge  lange  drugon.  " 
(11.155-158) 
["...  it  has  been  announced  throughout  the  wide  world,  that 
splendid  and  illustrious  success  is  approaching  for  you,  and  glory 
granted  of  those  injuries  which  you  have  long  suffered.  "] 
It  is  significant  that  Judith  refers  to  this  announcement  in  the  past  tense; 
no  one  but  her  handmaid  and  herself  are  yet  aware  of  the  demise  of 
Holofernes,  -but  Judith  clearly  refers  to  such  a  message,  not  as 
impending,  but  as  an  accomplished  fact.  This  seeming  confusion  is 
resolved  when  Judith  displays  the  severed  head:  the  victory  of  the 
Hebrews  has  been  signified  through  Holofernes's  destruction,  which  is 
itself  betokened  through  the  bloody  head.  The  agency  through  which 
this  sign  is  made  manifest  is  crucial: 
"Fynd  syndon  eowere 
gedemed  to  deape  7  ge  dom  agon, 
tir  wt  tohton,  swa  eow  getacnod  hafa6 
mihtig  Dryhten  ýurh  mine  hand.  " 
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["Your  enemies  are  condemned  to  death,  and  you  will  have  glory 
and  honor  in  the  conflict,  as  the  mighty  Lord  has  signified  unto  - 
you  through  my  hand.  "]  ý'-  ý'  ýI 
The  Bethulians  shall  gain  glory  and  the  Assyrians  are  sentenced  to  death, 
as  it  has  been  signified,  by  the  will  of  God  through  Judith's  hand.  Here 
the  text  has  been  composed  by  the  Almighty  and  written  down  by  his 
servant,  who  then  reveals  its  meaning  to  the  principals  involved.  In  this 
context  the  past  tense  of  the  announcement  makes  sense;  the  first 
revelation  was  by  God  to  Judith,  who  then  carved  this  truth  into  the  page 
of  Holofernes's  flesh;  this  is  a  symbolic  text;  to  be  sure,  but  it  is  legible 
none  the  less.  -Through  the  visible  token  of  Holofernes's  broken  body 
the  truth  is  made  manifest-,  first  to  the  Bethulians  through  the  symbol  of 
the  severed  head,  and  next  to  the  Assyrians  through  the  sign  of  the 
headless  body.  This  second  message  is  not  delivered,  as  it  were,  until 
battle  is  already  upon  the  Assyrian  host.  When  one  of  the  generals 
finally  dares  to  enter  the  leader's  tent,  he  is  able  to  assess  quickly  and 
accurately  the  nature  of  the  message  awaiting  him: 
"  Her  ys  geswutelod  ure  sylfra  forwyrd, 
toweard  getacnod,  ,  ýmt  ýmre  tide  ys  f 
mid  ni6um  neah  ge6rungen,  pe  we  sculon  nu  losian, 
somod  wt  smcce  forweori5an.  Her  li6  sweorde  geheawen, 
beheafdod  healdend  ure.  " 
(11.285-289) 
["  Here  is  made  manifest  our  own  destruction;  the  approaching 
[destruction]  is  betokened,  that  the  time  is  drawn  near,  along  with 
afflictions,  when  we  must  perish,  be  destroyed  together  in  the 
strife.  Here  lies  our  lord,  hewn  by  the  sword,  beheaded.  "] Chapter  Four  326 
The  language  of  his  despairing  reading  of  this  text  echoes  that  of  Judith, 
and  in  fact,  in  its  use  of  "betokened"  and  "made  manifest",  it 
underscores  the  role  of  Holofernes's  body  as  text  in  this  poem.  The 
doom  of  the  Assyrians  is  written  so  clearly  in  the  mutilated  flesh  of 
Holofernes  that  there  is  no  hesitation  in  its  reception  by  either  army,  no 
need  for  confirmation,  and  no  room  for  interpretation. 
,  In  the  Old  English  Elenewe  have  once  more  a  woman  who  acts  as 
agent,,  and  a  man  whose  body  provides  the  medium,  the  text  to  be 
inscribed.  In  Elene  the  writing  method  of  inscription  is  replaced  by  a 
material  metaphor  of  goldsmithing;  the  destruction  of  the  body  to  effect 
a  reformulation  of  the  spirit  remains  constant,  however,  as  does  the 
gendered  relationship  between  agent  and  medium.  45  Judas's 
conversion,  or  his  spiritual  re-inscription,  begins  when  he  is  cast  into  a 
dry  cistern"  at  the  command  of  Elene: 
Heht  pa  swa  cwicne  cor6re  lmdan, 
scufan  scyldigne--  scealcas  ne  gwldon-- 
in  drygne  sea6... 
(11.691-693) 
[Then  she  commanded  him  to  be  led  away  by  a  band,  and  cast  into 
a  dry  cistern  for  his  guilt--the  servants  did  not  delay... 
Judas's  confinement  in  the  pit  in  1.693,  and  his  subsequent 
metamorphosis  and  conversion,  have  often  been  perceived  of  as  central 
to  the  poem;  at  this  point  I  will  focus  upon  the  nature  of  this  conversion, 
and  the  agency  involved  in  its  execution.  The  purgation  in  the  pit  is 
imposed  upon  Judas  by  Elene,  and  hence  we  may  say  that  she  inscribes 
his  new  spiritual  identity  upon  the  page  of  his  body;  in  this Chapter  Four  327 
agency/medium  relationship  we  see  a  direct  parallel  to  Andreas's 
experience.  The  coercive,  painful  nature  of  Judas's  transformative 
experience  is  itself  also  important,  because  it  provides  a  direct  parallel  to 
the'transformative  process  which  the  souls  undergo  in  the  fire  of  ' 
judgment  described  in  the  closing'passage.  Such  a  process  of  cleansing 
or  purification  through  pain  also  is  central  to  the  concept  of  the  fire  of 
judgment.  ý-  Just  as  Judas,  after  his  cleansing,  became  leof  gode  (1.1047), 
so  do  the  souls  on  Doomsday  emerge  transformed  by  their  pain;  their  sin 
has  been  burned  away,  and  they  are  then  angelic  in  aspect: 
rýl 
for6an  hie  nu  on  wlite  scina6 
englum  gelice... 
(11.1319-1320)- 
[Henceforth  their  faces  shine  like  unto  angels]. 
Their  spiritual  identity  has  been  reshaped,  and  the  reality  of  this 
transformation  is  revealed  in  a  parallel  change  in  their  outward 
appearance;  as  in  the  cases  of  Andreas  and  Holofernes,  once  again  the 
external  form  acts  as  a  token  or  symbol  of  some  deeper  truth. 
I  have  extended  the  contemporary  critical  argument  concerning 
inscription  in  what  I  see  as  a  logical  direction;  -just  as  there  exists  in 
Andreas  a  relationship  between  the  body  and  the  page,  so  does  there 
exist  a  relationship  between  the  act  of,  writing  and  that  of  torture. 
Further,  just  as  contemporary  critics  construe  writing  as  a  gendered 
activity,  I  would  argue  that  torture  and  bodily  destruction,  in  the  literary 
contexts  of  Andreas,  Elene,  and  Judith,  have  a  similar  gendered 
structure:  the  agency  of  writing  is  construed  as  masculine,  and  the 
medium  upon  which  writing  is  performed  is  feminine;  thus  the  agency 
of  torture  is  masculine,  and  the  body  upon  which  it  is  carried  out  is Chapter  Four  328 
feminine.  Again,  in  my  view  this  assignation  of  gender  refers 
metaphorically  to  social  constructs.  I  would  argue  that  ancient--and 
medieval--philosophers  clearly  understood  conceptions  of  male/spirit 
and  female/body  as  well  as  derivative  constructions  of  agency  and 
medium  to  be  metaphorical  models;  further,  I  would  argue  that  medieval 
constructions  of  agency  have  some  resonance  with  modem  gendered 
conceptions  thereof. 
,  The  Providential  universe  conceived  of  by  the  Church  Fathers  is 
fundamentally  determinist;  that  is,  all  acts,  agents,  and  media  move  or 
are  moved,  consciously  or  unconsciouslyj  according  to  the  immutable 
will  of  God,  and  all  such  movement  is,  then,  foreordained  and 
predetermined  according  to  that  divine  will.  46  God  is  the  primary 
mover,  and  therefore  all  acts  and  actors--however  much  they  may  seem 
evil  or  unjust  from  the  static  perspective  of  temporal  understanding--are 
necessarily  aligned  with  the  beautiful,  the  just,  the  perfect  crystallization 
of  the  transcendent  consciousness  of  God.  47  Although  it  seems  to 
mortals  that  "history"  is  a  series  of  actions  and  actors  played  out  in  a 
seeming  succession  of,  both  good  and  evil  events,  this  is  in  fact  an 
illusion;  alt"time"  unfolds  simultaneously  in  the  unchanging  mind  of 
God,  who  is  outside  of  time,  and  all  actions  are  in  fact  points  on  a 
continuum--a  "wave",  as  it  were--set  in  motion  and  controlled  by  that 
divine  mind.  48  There  is,  then,  no  good  or  evil,  as  we  commonly 
understand  these  terms,  and  no  injustice,  as  God  is  justice.  49 
Since  all  creation  unfolds  according  to  and  by  the  direction  of  the 
one  primary  mover,  a  modern  argument  regarding  the  gender  of  the 
agent  of  a  particular  act  has  limited  relevance.  Gender,  in  such  a, 
context,  has  to  do  with  acts,  actors,  and  those  media  which  are  acted 
-upon,  true,  and  we  can  construe  that  which  acts  as  masculine,  and  that 
which  is  acted  upon  as  feminine;  ultimately,  however,  this  line  of Chapter  Four  329 
reasoning  collapses  upon  itself,  because  all  acts  are  dependent,  in  the 
end,  upon  the  one  primary  actor.  God,  then,  might  be  construed  as 
masculine,  and  creation  as  feminine.  This  indeed,  is  not  an  uncommon 
construction,  and  I  will  return  to  it  momentarily.  In  our  attempt  to 
extend  our  gender  metaphor  we  might  go  further,  however,  and  divide  all 
action  in  a  Providential  universe  into  three  roles:  the  primary  mover, 
which  is  the  divine  will;  all  of  those  individual  instruments  which  the 
divine  will  utilizes  in  its  unfolding;  and  all  of  those  media  which  are 
acted  upon  by  the  divine  with  its  manifold  instruments.  According  to 
this  schema,  we  can  recapitulate  the  writing  metaphor  we  examined 
earlier  and  conceive  of  God  as  the  scribe,  his  instruments  as  the  pen,  and 
his  media  as  the  parchment;  further,  we  can  project  our  gendered 
conception  of  agent/media  upon  this  model,  and  feel  that  we  have 
achieved  some  resolution  of  the  conflict  between  medieval  and  modern 
understandings  of  gender  and  agency. 
Unfortunately,  I  feel  that  this  resolution  is  a  little  too  facile  and 
reductive.  Within  the  confines  Of  Patristic  thought  we  may  certainly 
conceive  of  God  as  agent,  and  absolutely  conceive  of  God  as  masculine; 
further,  we  may  clearly  extend  the  analogy  and  conceive  of  agent  as 
masculine.  It  is  equally  clear  that  creation  may  be  conceived  of  as 
feminine,  and  that  feminine=body=medium.  God  the  creator  as 
masculine  and  His  creation--which  He  wrought  from  nothing  and  moves 
according  to  his  pleasure--as  feminine  is  a  commonplace.  50  Aft  of  these 
conceptions  are  Patristically  sound  and  well-attested.  The  breakdown 
between  our  modern  and  Patristic  models  occurs  when  we  attempt  to 
extend  our  gendered  metaphor  of  agency  onto  the  "middle"  group,  those 
agents  which  act  upon  the  passive  surface  of  the  various  media:  the  pens 
in  the  model  which  I  offered  above.  The  problem  with  this  metaphor  is 
that  these  pens,  although  apparently  acting  upon  the  parchment,  are  in Chapter  Four  330 
fact  simultaneously  being  acted  upon  themselves,  and  might  therefore  be 
construed  as  feminine.  51  Although  we  may,  in  the  end,  reach  some 
accommodation  between  the  two  models,  I  don't  feel  that  it  is  fair  to 
stretch  either  paradigm  too  far,  nor  indeed  do  I  conceive  of  it  as 
necessary.  It  is  probably  more  just  to  acknowledge  that  Patristic 
philosophy  is  too  rigid,  too  monolithic,  and  perhaps  even  (horrors!  )  too 
different  to  fit  neatly  together  with  a  contemporary  theory  of  gender. 
My  interest,  however,  is  primarily  literary  rather  than 
philosophical,  and  it  frequently  has  been  noted  that  good  literature  is 
often  bad  philosophy.  In  this  particular  case,  although  I  want  to 
illuminate  just  where  Patristic  thought  diverges  radically  from  modem 
and  post-modem  ideas,  I  also  think  it  only  fair  to  note  that  Anglo-Saxon 
literary  conventions  are  somewhat  less  rigid  in  their  construction  than 
Patristic  philosophical  conceptions;  I  think  that  this  is  amply  illustrated 
by  the  examples  which  I've  cited  thus  far.  I  think  it  is  appropriate, 
therefore,  to  argue  that  writing  and  torture  are  highly  volatile  metaphors 
of  agency  in  the  context  of  Anglo-Saxon  poetry  specifically,  and  even 
medieval  literaturein  general.  Further,  I  think  that  it  is  correct  to  assert 
that  the  male/spirit  versus  female/body  dichotomy,  and  the  male/agency 
versus  femalelmedium  dichotomy,  were  common  medieval  metaphorical 
models  p  and  indeed  have  some  resonance  with  the  contemporary  critical 
model  of  gender  which  I  have  described.  Finally,  I  think  that  it  is 
important  to  allow  to  a  medieval  audience  some  of  the  metaphorical 
sophistication  with  which  we  are  sometimes  too  willing  to  see  ourselves 
privileged.  Gendered  metaphors  and  metaphors  of  the  body  were 
medieval  commonplaces,  and  clearly  were  often  understood  on  more 
than  just  a  literal  level. 
-  This  is  not  to  imply  that  literal  distinctions  in  what  we  would  term 
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Clearly,  the  roles,  the  social  and  cultural  expectations,  and  the  autonomy 
accorded  to  men  and  to  women  during  the  middle  ages  could  be  vastly 
different.  My  point  is  simply  that  gender  metaphors  were  commonplace 
and  not  always  taken  literally.  Andreas  is,  in  a  very  real  way,  the  page 
upon  which  God's  Word  is  inscribed;  Holofernes's  gory  head--and  his 
headless  body--are  likewise  texts  upon  which  the  Divine  Will  is  written 
and  made  manifest;  just  so  Judas,  and  the  souls  on  Judgment  Day,  are 
recast,  through  their  torment,  to  be  englum  gelice  (11.1320).  In  each  case 
visible  tokens  and  signs  provide  a  legible  record  of  deeper  spiritual 
truths;  in  this  sense  a  gendered  model  of  writing  provides  a  framework 
for  understanding  the  uses  and  the  significance  of  literary  torture. 
,ý  Approaching  such  an  understanding,  in  fact,  is  a  primary  driving 
force  behind  this  study;  torture  scenes,  passion  sequences,  and 
eschatological  descriptions  abound  in  Anglo-Saxon  literature  in  general, 
and  in  Old  English  poetry  specifically.  Their  presence  is  quite  often 
brushed  aside  as  a  logical  and  expected  outgrowth  of  a  repressive  and 
harsh  "  Dark  Age"  Germanic  conception  of  Christianity,  to  which 
criticism  it  is  usually  added  that  the  great  bulk  of  Old  English  literature 
simply  reflects  a  continental  Latin  literary  tradition  which  it  was 
attempting  to  emulate.  Such  assertions  are  not  wholly  without  grounds. 
I  am  seeking  to  argue,  however,  that  such  a  dismissive  understanding  of 
the  Anglo-Saxon  literature  of  suffering  does  not  do  justice  to  rather 
complex  and  interactive  systems  of  thought  which  link  such  disparate 
elements  as  saints'  lives,  doomsday  narratives,  bestiaries,  biblical 
redactions,  and  philosophical  traditions  into  a  coherent  and  unified 
attempt  to  understand  such  mysteries  as  the  nature  and  evolution  of  the 
individual's  self,  identity,  and  soul.  We  tend  to  view  medievals  as 
community-oriented  and  not  much  interested  in,  or  even  aware  of,  the 
nature  of  the  self,  at  least  in  the  way  that  post-Enlightenment  moderns Chapter  Four  332 
are.  I  do  not  argue  that  the  Anglo-Saxon  conception  of  the  self  mirrors 
that  of  present-day  philosophers;  rather  the  opposite.  I  do  argue, 
however,  that'Anglo-Saxons  concerned  themselves  with  some  of  the 
same  questions  about  the  individual's  soul--its  relationship  to  the  body, 
its  origin,  its  development  and  its  fate--that  we  do  today,  and  that  the 
questions  they  asked,  the  logic  they  followed,  and  the  answers  they 
found  are  of  interest  and  value,  not  least  because  they  provide  intelligible 
models  which  are,  in  the  end,  not  so  very  alien  to  our  understanding. 
My  position  seems  to  beg  a  number  of  questions  at  this  point.  To 
begin,  how  exactly  do  these  texts  which  I  have  examined  in  the  course  of 
my  study  of  inscription  and  torture  diverge  from  their  source  texts?  In 
other  words,  what  makes  this  an  Anglo-Saxon  tradition,  and  not  just  an 
insular  Latin  one?  Next,  with  precisely  what  sort  of  framework  for 
-understanding  Anglo-Saxon  literary  torture  does  our  gendered  model  of 
writing  provide  us?  How  may  we  understand  torture  to  work  in  these 
texts?  First,  the  Old  English  Andreas  is  particularly  significant  to  this 
study--and  is  unique  from  its  source  texts--in  that  it  utilizes  a  peculiarly 
Anglo-Saxon  language  of  engraving  which  underscores  the  role  of 
inscription  in  such  torture  sequences  as  these.  I  have  spent  some  time  in 
this  chapter  looking  at  such  language,  and  studying  its  relevance  to  our 
understanding  of  the  paradoxical  nature  of  literary  torture.  Second,  in 
the  Old  English  Judith  I  have  explored  a  fairly  radical  textual 
emendation  by  the  Anglo-Saxon  poet  which  both  emphasizes  the 
semiotic  valence  of  Judith's  own  act,  and  simultaneously  provides  us 
with  a  template  for  reading  similar  messages  in  the  broken  and  bloody 
bodies  in  other  Old  English  texts.  Finally,  in  the  Old  English  Mene,  we 
are  presented  with  a  text  to  which  has  been  added  a  wholly  original  and 
very  Anglo-Saxon  homiletic  passage,  a  passage  which,  examined  in  the 
light  of  a  coherent  language  of  pain  and  the  coercive  reformulation  of Chapter  Four  333 
spiritual  identity,  provides  us'with  a  validation  and  an  explication  of  acts 
of  torture  and  inscription  within  the  main  body  of  the  narrative.  I  will 
examine  this  Doomsday  passage  and  others  akin  to  it  in  more  detail  in 
my  discussion  of  transmutation  in  Chapter  Five.  Viewing  these  texts  in 
juxtaposition,  then,  it  becomes  clear  that  they  have  much  to  say  about 
one  another,  and  that  they  may  inform  and  be  informed  by  our 
understanding  of  inscription  and  a  gendered  model  of  writing:  in  all  of 
these  examples  we  have  bodies  which  are  acted  upon,  feminine  pages,  if 
you  will,  and  we  may  read  the  text  of  these  acts  in  their  spiritual 
significance.  This  second  phase,  the  act  of  inscription,  is  the  point  of  the 
torture  process.  Rather  than  a  haphazard  application  of  pain  for  pain's 
sake,  it  is  a  process  of  altering  reality,  of  expunging  and  reformulating 
identity. Chapter  Four  334 
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family  and  with  the  symbolic  systems  set  into  motion  by  the 
mother-father  pair  as  the  parents  themselves  carry  out  socially 
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Laqueur,  MakingSex:  Body  and  Gender  from-  the  Greeks  to  Freud. 
Cambridge,  MA:  ý  Harvard  UP,  1990.  -  Laqueur  argues  that  it  was  not 
until  the  Enlightenment  that  what  he  terms  a  "two-sex  model"  for 
understanding  and  defining  "difference"  between  genders  became 
preeminent.  See  page  viii  for  a  quick  overview  of  his  basic  thesis: 
It  seems  perfectly  obvious  that  biology  defines  the  sexes--what 
else  could  sex  mean?  Hence  historians  can  have  nothing  much  to 
say  on  the  matter.  To  have  a  penis  or  not  says  it  all  in  most 
circumstances,  and  one  might  for  good  measure  add  as  many  other 
differences  as  one  chooses:  women  menstruate  and  lactate,  men 
do  not;  women  have  a  womb  that  bears  children,  and  men  lack 
'both  this  organ  and  this  capacity.  I  do  not  dispute  these  facts, 
although  if  pushed  very  hard  they  are  not  quite  so  conclusive  as 
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point,  though,  no  particular  understanding  of  sexual  difference 
historically  follows  from  undisputed  facts  about  bodies.  I 
discoveýed  early  on  that  the  erasure  of  female  pleasure  from 
medical  accounts  of  conception  took  place  at  roughly  the  same 
time  as  the  female  body  came  to  be'understood  no  longer  as  a 
lesser  version  of  the  male's  (a  one-sex  model)  but  as  its 
incommensurable  opposite  (a  two-sex  model).  Orgasms  that  had 
been  common  property  were  now  divided.  Organs  that  had  been 
seen  as  interior  versions  of  what  the  male  had  outside--the  vagina 
as  penis,  the  uterus  as  scrotum--were  by  the  eighteenth'century 
construed  as  of  an  entirely  different  nature.  Similarly, Chapter  Four  336 
physiological  processes--menstruation  or  lactation--that  had  been 
seen  as  part  of  a  common  economy  of  fluids  came  to  be 
understood  as  specific  to  women  alone. 
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I  want  to  propose  instead  that  in  these  pre-Enlightenment  texts, 
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of  reading.  Not  only  do  we  experience  gratification  orally  as  we 
"  devour'ý  books  voraciously,  we  also  respond  subliminally  to  the 
"rhythms"  of  the  plot,  looking  forward  to  a  "climax  ...... 
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philosophical  roots  of  western  civilization.  Rejecting  the  unexamined 
ph  aflo  centricity  of  much  psychoanalytic  thought--and  even  that  aspect  of 
feminism  which  defines  itself  in  opposition  to  such  phallocentrism-- 
duBois  argues  for  a  reexamination  of  the  pre-Socratic  notions  of  sexual 
difference,  an  admission  of  Plato's  role  in  reinventing  these  notions,  and 
an  acknowledgment  of  the  cultural  bias  with  which  our  own  conceptions 
are  imbued.  See  page  1: 
In  our  time,  the  psychoanalyzed  female  body  is  represented  as  a 
symbolically  castrated  male  body.  Ancient  Greek  culture  is  here 
unseasonable,  in  Nietzsche's  sense,  in  that  it  offers  us  an 
alternative  figuration:  the  female  body  as  a  fertile  field,  as  the 
earth  ready  for  furrowing.  The  study  of  ancient  history  allows  us 
to  see  the  particularity  of  our  own  culture,  to  be  critical  of  its 
categories,  to  imagine  otherwise. 
21  For  good  synopses  of  these  processes,  see  duBois,  especially  pages 
39  ff.,  64,  and  65  ff. 
22  For  discussion  of  Plato's  thought  on  this  subject,  see  duBois, 
especially  pages  169-170  &  177-178;  for  additional  material  on 
Aristotle,  see  also  pages  172-173. 
23  DuBois,  page  184.  It  is  important  to  acknowledge  that  much  of 
duBois's  argument  has  to  do  with  reexamining  our  own  sense  of 
historicity,  with  distinguishing  historical  incidence  from  cultural 
constant,  and  with  questioning  the  value  of  projecting  our  own  cultural 
systems  back  upon  our  forebears  (an  important  caveat  in  the  context  of 
this  study).  See  also  page  187: Chapter  Four  340 
...  the  erection  of  the  phallus  as  a  privileged  symbol,  as  the 
transcendental  signifier--the  establishment  of  the  male  subject  as 
the  figure  for  wholeness  to  which  the  female  and  her  body  are 
compared--is  not  a  universal  fact  of  culture.  It  rather  occurs  in  the 
philosophical  tradition  at  the  moment  when  women's  humanity  is 
conceded,  when  they  are  named  as  defective,  partial  men.  The 
"symbolic  pre-eminenceof  the  male  organ"  is  a  historical  fact,  not 
a  universal  description'of  culture.  To  historicize  it  is  to  see  , 
differently. 
24  Bosworth-Toiler,  page  487.  Despite  appearances  and  similarities  of 
meaning,  however,  the  Modern  English  form  "engrave"  is  of  Latinate 
(graphicus),  rather  than  Germanic,,  derivation. 
25  Bosworth-Toller,  page  30. 
26  Bosworth-Toller,  page  I  -,  see  note  B.  7  under  "a".  A-  need  not  act  as 
an  intensifier,  and  indeed  can  act  as  a  negating  particle,  but  in  this  case  it 
is  clear  that  it  acts  as  a  slight  intensifier. 
27  Bosworth  -Toiler,  page  79. 
28  Bosworth-Toller,  page  69;  see  note  1.2. 
29  See,  for  example,  Stanley  B.  Greenfield  and  Daniel  G.  Calder,  A 
New  ctitical  History  of  Old  English  Literature;  with  a  Surve7  of  the 
Anglo-Latin  Background  by  Michael  Lapidge.  New  York:  New  York 
Up,  1986.  Pages  294-295. 
30  Citation  from  The  Husband's  Message  is  from  R.  F.  Leslie,  ed. 
Three  Old  English  Elegies:,  The  Wife's  Lament,  The  Husband's, 
Message,  The  Ruin.  Old  and  Middle  English  Texts,  G.  L.  Brook,  gen. 
ed.  Manchester:  Manchester  UP,  1961.  Translation  is  the  author's. Chapter  Four  341 
31  For  a  series  of  related  puns  on  gratan  in  an  elegiac  context,  see  the 
word-play  of  graafep,  grofe,  grxf,  and  grmft  in  the  Old  English  Riming 
Poem,  11.66-71. 
32  Bosworth-Toller,  page  30. 
33  See  my  discussion  of  the  language  of  weapons  and  wounds  in  The 
Dream  of  the  Rood  in  my  discussion  of  literary  attempts  to  express  the 
inexpressible  nature  of  pain  in  Chapter  Two. 
34  Allen  I  Frantzen,  "  Writing  the  Unreadable  Beowulf-  'Wzitan'  and 
'Forwzitan,  '  The  Pen  and  the  Sword.  "  Exemplatia  3.2  (1991):  327-57.1 
am  indebted  to  Frantzen  for  this  apropos  reading  of  endestwf,  page  346. 
35  Though  I  certainly  find  it  significant  that  the  poet  utilizes  wtitan  and 
awtiten  in  a  parallel  manner  in  order  to  emphasize  the  diametrically 
opposed  ends  of  these  two  writing  practices,  it  may  also  be  significant  in 
the  context  of  my  discussion  of  sceoran  that  a  primary  meaning  of  both 
forms  is  to  inscribe,  carve,  or  cut.  See  Frantzen's  discussion  of  the 
sylleptical  nature  of  wiitan  and  forwiitan  in  "  Writing  the  Unreadable 
Beowulf  "  page  333.  See  also  the  discussion  of  the  implication  of 
incision  (specifically  runic)  of  wzitan  in  Seth  Lerer,  Literacy  and  Power 
in  Anglo-Saxon  Literature.  Lincoln,  NE:  U  of  Nebraska  P,  199  1.  Pages 
142,167,232,  and  234. 
36  See  Lerer,  page  17:  "...  runes  stand  for  all  forms  of  an  alien  or  ancient 
form  of  communication.  "  See  also  page  54:  "  Whether  it  be  through  rune 
ond  rimcrmft  or  through  drycrmftum  and  scingelacum,  magic  practice  or 
the  credence  in  its  spells  are  associated  with  the  antitypes  of  Christian 
heroism.  " 
37  Lerer,  page  53:  "From  its  initial  presentation  of  Matthew  as  the 
writer  of  the  Gospel,  Andreas  shapes  its  heroes  and  its  villains  through 
the  kinds  of  literacy  they  practice.  " Chapter  Four  342 
38  Lerer,  page  53. 
39  See  Bosworth-Toller  for  complete  definitions  of  these  terms:  for 
spor,  see  the  entry  thereof  on  page  903;  for  sceoran,  see  the  entry  for 
sceran,  sciran,  sceoran  on  page  830., 
40  All  statistical  and  textual  references  to  appearances  of  terms  in  the 
Old  English  corpus  are  from  Antonette  DiPaolo  Healy  and  Richard  L. 
Venezky,  eds.  A  Microfiche  Concordance  to  Old  English.  Toronto:  U 
of  Toronto  P,  1985.  - 
41  The  form  sceoran  is  attested  to  only  in  this  single  instance,  so  we 
must  look  to  other  forms  of  the  verb  for  information.  Sceran  is  attested 
three  times,  always  in  reference  to  the  cutting  or  shaving  of  one's  hair; 
scere.,  however,  is  used  at  least  once  in  regards  to  sheep:  "ic  scere  scep 
We  hors"  (AEGram.  -,  157.9).  Further,  there  are  several  examples  under 
, Yran.  In  any  case,  it  is  clear  that  the  primary  meaning  has  to  do  with  sc 
the  shaving  or  cutting  of  hair,  and  a  secondary  meaning  evokes  an  image 
of  the  shearing  of  sheep.  Sceoran  in  a  destructive  sense  seems 
something  of  an  anomaly,  therefore,  and  I  do  not  think  it  is  too  radical  to 
assert  that  its  use  here  might  simultaneously  conjure  a  sense  of  its  more 
common  meanings. 
42  Shearing  sheep,  of  course,  is  not  the  same  as  skinning  them;  in  its 
primary  sense,  however,  sceran  implies  a  shaving  of  hair  from  the  skin, 
and  I  would  argue  that  here  it  evokes  a  sense  of  the  shaving  and  scraping 
clean  of  the  flesh  of  an  animal  being  rendered  into  parchment.  Such  an 
animal  need  not  be  a  sheep,  of  course,  but  knowing  that  the  term  could 
be  used  in  reference  to  sheep  and  to  shearing  serves,  in  this  context,  to 
reinforce  the  image  of  Andreas  as  the  page  upon  which  his  passion  will 
be  written.  Also  note  that  sciran  (Bosworth  and  Toller,  pages  836-837), 
a  different  but  equally  punny  form,  means  "to  make  clear"  (especially Chapter  Four  343 
metaphorically,  as  in  "to  make  clear  what  is  hidden  or  obscure",  which  is 
the  primary  meaning);  this  is interesting  both  in  the  sense  of  clearing  the 
hair  from  skin,  and  in  that  of  making  clear  the  spiritual  identity  of 
Andreas.  But,  without  further  corroborating  evidence,  this  is  simply  an 
interesting  and  suggestive  association. 
43  It  might  be  best  to  pause  for  a  moment  to  discuss  why  such  a  paradox 
is  significant.  In  short,  am  I  just  projecting  my  own  arbitrary  "pun"  into 
the  meaning  of  this  passage?  After  all,  nearly  any  word  has  a  variety  of 
possible  meanings  which  may  seem  paradoxical  or  inappropriate  in  any 
number  of  contexts.  The  answer  to  this  question  is  twofold,  having  to  do 
with  the  suppression  of  a  secondary  text  by  the  primary  meaning,  a  text 
which  is  represented  through  a  secondary  sense  of  the  term  which  is 
diametrically  opposed  to  that  primary  meaning.  In  the  simplest  terms,  a 
pun  is  more  than  a  pun  when  it  indicates  the  presence  of  a  syllepsis  (as 
defined  by  Michael  Riffaterre;  see  Frantzen,  pages  332-335).  Frantzen 
explains  that  "...  the  pun  contained  in  the  syllepsis  expresses  the 
relationship  of  a  suppressed  text  or  subtext  to  the  main  text",  but  this  pun 
must  be  absolute,  in  the'sense  that  the  conflicting  meanings  must  be 
s4  polar  opposites":  "Syllepsis  is  created  when  a  word  is  understood  two 
ways  at  once  and  when  those  interpretations  are  opposite"  (Frantzen, 
page  333).  Frantzen's  discussion  of  the  sylleptical  nature  of  wtitan  and 
forwzitan,  dealing  especially  with  how  they  are  used  in  Beowulf,  is  most 
significant:  "...  their  meanings--to  write,  to  kill--are  incompatible" 
(Frantzen,  page  333).  Here  I  am  defining  just  such  incompatible 
meanings,  that  of  production  and  that  of  destruction,  both  in  my 
discussion  of  spor  and  sceoran,  and  in  my  larger  investigation.  In  the 
larger  case  I  identify  the  language  of  torture,  or  destruction,  as  the  literal 
meaning,  and  the  production  of  Andreas  into  a  type  of  Christ  as  the Chapter  Four  344 
figural  meaning  embedded  within  that  primary  one.  See  Frantzen,  page 
332;  see  also  Frantzen's  extensive  notes  and  references  concerning 
intertextuality  and  the  role  played  by  syllepsis,  pages  330-335.  For 
further  evidence  of  syllepsis  in  Old  English  literature,  see  parallels  to 
this  multivalent  use  of  spor  in  Juliana  (1.623)  and  in  Exodus  (1.23  9). 
See  also  the  use  of  slean  (slog:  1.108,  etc.  )  in  Judith;  slean  can  mean  to 
strike  or  to  slay,  but  also  to  mint  a  coin,  to  strike  in  the  forge,  etc.,  which 
in  this  context,  where  the  head  (and  headless  body)  of  Holofernes 
signifies  the  downfall  of  the  Assyrians,  is  an  important  sylleptical 
example  of  the  language  describing  a  productive  text  wrought  through  a 
destructive  act. 
44  The  Old  English  Judith  differs  from  the  Liber  Iudith  of  the  Vulgate  at 
several  crucial  points,  and  in  one  particularly  important  way.  In  the 
Vulgate  version  of  the  story,  Judith  is  a  heroine  in  every  sense  of  the 
word:  she  is  a  tropological  symbol  of  Chastity  at  battle  with 
Licentiousness,  an  allegorical  symbol  of  the  Church  in  its  constant  and 
eventually  triumphant  battle  with  Satan,  and  an  inspirational  figure  who 
infuses  her  warriors  with  much  needed  courage  and  confidence;  but  the 
Vulgate  Judith  is  also,  in  a  very  real  sense,  the  agent  by  which  God's 
will  is  executed  and  the  Hebrews  are  saved.  Judith  is  central  to  the 
victory  of  the  Jews,  not  only  in  a  symbolic  sense,  but  also  in  a  practical 
one:  she  devises  a  plan,  she  implements  it,  and  she,  displaying  the 
severed  head  of  Holofernes  to  her  people,  explains  just  how  they  might 
achieve  the  impossible.  It  is  according  to  her  plan  that  the  Assyrian 
generals  discover  the  headless  body  of  their  leader  before  the  battle,  and 
the  pandemonium  and  disarray  which  ensue  as  a  result  of  this  discovery 
are  central  to  that  plan,  and  to  the  Hebrew  victory.  In  the  Old  English 
Judith,  however,  this  central  role  is,  in  effect,  marginalized  to  the Chapter  Four  34S 
detriment  of  Judith's  personal  importance  to  the  Hebrew  victory,  but  to 
the  benefit  of  the'valor  and  ability  of  her  warriors.  This  is  a  distinct 
alteration  of  the  Vulgate. 
45  Such"  smithing"  -metaphors,  in  which  the  changing  nature  of  the 
spirit  is  made  visible  through  a  transformation  of  the  body  through  fire, 
are  common  in  Old  English  literature.  For  a  further  treatment  of  such 
reinscription  through  fire,  see  my  discussion  of  "transmutation"  in 
Chapter  Five;  there  I  examine  Judas's  experience  more  closely  in  the 
context  of  spiritual  purgation,  and  I  illustrate  more  fully,  in  the  context 
of  other  purgational  scenes  from  Old  English  eschatological  works,  how 
his  experience  serves  to  explicate  and  to  validate  that  of  the  souls  in  the 
fire  on  Doomsday. 
46  Concerning  the  conflict  between  predestination  and  freewill,  see 
Augustine,  The  City  of  God,  Book  V,  Chapter  9;  ý  see  also  B  oethius,  The 
Consolation  of  Philosophy,  Book  V,  Prose  IV.  For  an  explanation  of 
how  true  "freewill"  is  only  possible  without  the  shackles  of  sin,  see  The 
city  of  God,  -Book,  XIV,  Chapter  I  I.,  Concerning  the  nature  of  God's 
universal  providence,  see  The  City  of  God,  Book  V,  Chapter  11,  and 
Book  XXII,  Chapter  2;  see  also  The  Consolation  of  Philosophy,  Book 
IV,  Prose  VI. 
47  For  a  discussion  of  the  illusory  nature  of  "fate",  which  is,  in  reality, 
simply  a  name  for  individual  acts  of  providence  as  they  are  made 
manifest  in  time,  see  The  City  of  God,  Book  V,  Chapter  8;  see  also,  The 
Consolation  of  Philosophy,  Book  IV,  Prose  VI.  For  an  exposition  on 
how  all  acts,  good  and  evil,  serve  as  instruments  of  the  divine  will,  see 
The  City  of  God,  Book  XI,  Chapter  22,  and  Book  XIV,  Chapter  27;  see 
also  The  Consolation  of  Philoscph7,  Book  IV,  Prose  I,  VI,  &  VIL  For Chapter  Four  346 
an  explanation  of  how  the  Fall  of  Man  fits  into  this  schema,  see  The  City 
of  God,  Book  XIV,  Chapters  11-15. 
48  For  an  exposition  of  Providence  as  a  single,  continuously  unfolding 
act  of  the  divine  mind,  see  The  Consolation  of  Philosoph7,  Book  V, 
Prose  VI.  God  created  time,  and  exists  outside  of  it;  for  an  explanation 
of  God's  perception  of  time,  see  The  City  of  God,  Book  11,  Chapter  21. 
49  One  of  the  principle  stumbling  blocks  between  many  modern  readers 
and  the  Patristic  vision  of  justice  is  the  concept  that  God  is justice;  in 
much  the  same  way  that  God,  as  creator  and  motive  force,  exists  outside 
of  creation  and  time,  God  also  stands  outside  of  mortal  conceptions  of 
the  just.  -Providence  is  just  precisely  because  it  is  God's  will,  and  a  good 
working  Patristic  definition  of  justice  is  "according  to  the  will  of  God.  " 
Man  often  interprets  individual  acts  or  circumstances  as  unjust  simply 
because  he  cannot  perceive  the  complex  ways  in  which  all  actions  and 
events  serve  as  instruments  of  divine  Providence,  which  is  the  unfolding 
of  the  will  of  God,  and  therefore  necessarily  good.  Therefore,  although 
God's  ways  and  means  may  be  inscrutable,  they  are  by  definition  just. 
For  discussions  relating  to  the  inscrutable  nature  of  God's  judgment,  see 
The  Cjt7  of  God,  B  ook  V,  Chapter  2  1,  B  ook  XII,  Chapter  28,  and  B  ook 
XX,  Chapters  1&2;  see  also  The  Consolation  of  Philosoph7,  Book  V, 
Prose  IV. 
50  See  my  discussion  of  the  Patristic  vision  of  gender  roles,  above;  see 
especially  the  Pauline  conception  of  Christ  as  husband  and  Church  as 
bride,  etc. 
51  Actually,  this  seems  to  me  to  be  a  problem  with  the  feminist 
metaphor  of  the  pen  in  general;  other  than  its  phallic  resonances,  how  is 
it,  in  effect,  all  that  different  from  the  paper  upon  which  it  is  utilized  to 
write?  I  believe  that  the  answer  may  be  that  the  pen  is  conceived  of  as  a Chapter  Four  347 
substitute  phallus,  and  therefore  as  an  extension  of  the  mate  agent. 
While  this  is  an  ancient  construction  (as  I  illustrated  above--see  my 
discussion  of  duBois),  and  I  am  willing  to  accept  it  in  a  modern 
conception,  it  clearly  does  not  work  in  a  Patristic  setting.  We  are  all 
instruments  of  the  divine  will,  to  be  sure,  but  to  suggest  that  we  are  in 
any  way  to  be  perceived  of  as  extensions  of  God  is  clearly  blasphemous. 
God  the  Trinity  is  one,  indivisible,  and  without  peer.  Therefore,  if  we 
are  to  construct  a  gendered  model  for  understanding  the  Patristic  - 
universe,  God  is  masculine  and  creation  is  feminine;  there  can  be  no 
middle  ground,  and  instrument  and  medium  alike  must  be  lumped  into 
the  latter  group. Chapter  Five  348 
CHAPTER  -  FIVE:  Swa  Smwte  Gold:  Material  Purgation  and  Spiritual 
Refashioning  in  Old  English  Visions  of  Judgment 
Purification  by  fire  is  a  familiar  Christian  allegory,  and 
manifestations  of  this  concept  appear  in  very  many  Old  English  texts; 
what  is  of  particular  relevance  to  this  discussion  is  the  link  between 
physical  purification  by  fire  and  the  coercive,  painful  process  of  spiritual 
transformation.  Eschatological  scenes  such  as  the  Doomsday  fire 
provide  a  spiritual  parallel  to  the  physical  torture  which  I  have  thus  far 
examined;  the  philosophical  notions  underlying  the  process  involved 
echo  the  transformative  model  of  torture  which  I  described  in  Chapter 
Three,  while  the  process  itself  provides  an  eschatological  parallel  to  the 
temporal  examples  of  inscriptive  torture  discussed  in  Chapter  Four. 
Indeed,  within  an  Anglo-Saxon  poetic  context  which  overtly  relates 
physical  pain  with  spiritual  issues,  and  which,  moreover,  finds  both  to  be 
inextricably  related  to  the  nature  of  identity  and  the  twin  processes  of 
destruction  and  reformulation,  such  spiritual  metaphors  as  the  fire  of 
judgment  resonate  thematically  with  accounts  of  physical  torment  which 
concern  themselves  with  similar  issues  of  transformation. 
In  this  chapter  I  will  examine  models  of  spiritual  purgation  which 
employ  the  language  and  the  symbolism  of  metallurgic  purification. 
Such  manifestations  are  part  of  a  long  pre-Christian  and  Christian 
tradition  which  mystically  equates  the  physical  with  the  spiritual,  and 
which  finds,  in  the  practice  of  metallurgy,  a  metaphorical  representation 
of  the  purging  of  sin  from  the  soul.  I  will  begin  this  chapter  with  an 
examination  of  the  root  concepts  of  the  spiritual,  intellectual,  and 
philosophical  tradition  which  such  a  metaphor  represents;  it  may  be 
useful  for  me  to  describe,  for  example,  how  some  facets  of  the 
alchemical  traditions  spring  from  the  same  roots  as  some  Christian Chapter  Five  349 
eschatological  models.  Having  explored  the  well-spring  of  such 
paradigms,  I  will  move  on  to  eschatology  itself,  focusing  on  the  fire  of 
judgment  model.  After  an  initial  examination  of  the  roots  of  this 
tradition,  I  will  discuss  in  general  terms  the  Old  English  appropriation  of 
this  concept.  Drawing  upon  several  such  instances  of  Old  English 
eschatology  for  context,  I  then  will  concern  myself  with  three 
manifestations  of  "  spiritual  metallurgy"  which  appear  in  religious  poems 
which  are  concerned  with  purgation,  purity,  and  related  issues  of 
spiritual  identity  and  transformation. 
It  is  impossible  to  read  far  into  the  literature  concerning  ancient 
metallurgical  practices  and  the  spiritual  significance  attributed  to  then-L 
without  encountering  discussions  of  alchemy.  My  interest,  however, 
does  not  lie  with  alchemy  per  se,  although  an  examination  of  it  and  its 
roots  may  help  to  illuminate  the  related  traditions  in  which  I  am 
interested.  In  anycase,  I  don't  wish  to  become  bogged  down  by 
semantic  divisions,  and  so  it  is  probably  best  to  begin  by  clearly 
delineating  my  object  of  study.  "Alchemy"  is  simply  one  model  for 
understanding  the  relationship  between  the  physical  and  the  spiritual, 
between  the  literal  and  the  metaphorical,  which  I  wish  to  explore.  For 
purposes  of  convenience  and  technical  accuracy,  I  consistently  will  refer 
to  this  rel  ati  onship  --insofar  as  it  is  concerned  with  issues  of  destruction 
and  reformulation--as  "transmutation".  Specifically,  I  will  examine  the 
significance  of  the  intellectual  and  the  philosophical  traditions  of 
transmutation  as  these  traditions  are  manifested  in  the  language  and  the 
literature  of  Old  English  eschatology. 
The  most  common  misconception  about  alchemy--and,  indeed, 
about  the  transmutative  traditions  in  general--is  that  the  end  purpose 
thereof  is  the  physical  transformation  of  a  base  metal  into  gold.  There  is 
a  germ  of  truth  buried  within  this  misconception,  but  it  must  be  stressed Chapter  Five  350 
from  the  onset  that  transmutation  is,  first  and  foremost,  a  spiritual 
practice;  that  is,  it  has  to  do  with  the  nature  of  the  soul.  Transmutation, 
as  a  philosophy,  is  inextricably  bound  up  with  the  actual  practice  of 
metallurgy,  to  be  sure;  but  to  acknowledge  this  relationship  is  not  at  all 
the  same  as  to  admit  that  physical  transmutation  was  the  primary  end  of 
these  practices.  Indeed,  the  very  fact  that  many  of  the  ancient  cultures 
which  adhered  to  tenets  of  transmutation  practiced  sophisticated 
metallurgical  techniques  is  weighty  evidence  to  the  contrary.  As  Mircea 
Eliade  has  astutely  pointed  out,  it  is  an  injustice  to  pre-modem 
metallurgists  to  assert  that  their  knowledge  of  their  craft  was  so  slight 
that  they  would  not  understand  this  distinction  between  literal  and 
metaphorical  metallurgy:  I 
To  what  historical  causes  are  we  to  attribute  the  birth  of  practical 
alchemy?  We  shall  probably  never  know.  But  it  is  doubtful 
whether  prescriptions  for  counterfeiting  or  imitating  gold  were  the 
starting  point  for  alchemy  as  an  autonomous  discipline 
... 
To 
attempt  to  link  up  a  discipline,  which  dominated  the  Western 
world  for  2000  years,  with  attempts  to  counterfeit  gold  is  to  forget 
the  extraordinary  knowledge  of  metals  and  alloys  possessed  by  the 
Ancients.  It  is  also  to  underestimate  their  intellectual  and  spiritual 
capacity.  I 
Eliade's  is  an  interesting  and  significant  point;  transmutation,  as  a 
philosophical  construct,  is  clearly  an  outgrowth  of  metal-working 
cultures,  as  well  as  the  mysticism  and  the  magic  which  surround 
metallurgy  in  primitive  societies.  We  go  too  far,  however;  when  we 
assume  that  the  development  of  this  philosophy  implies  a  lack  of 
practical  knowledge.  2  The  practical  and  the  philosophical  facets  are Chapter  Five  3S  I 
bound  together,  true,  but  it  does  not  follow  that  they  are 
indistinguishable.  Titus  Burckhardt  provides  a  practitioner's  perspective 
on  the  philosophical  basis  of  transmutation:, 
Alchemy  ...  with  its  image  of  the  transmutation  of  base  metals  into 
gold  and  silver,  serves  as  a  highly  evocative  symbol  of  the  inward 
process  referred  to.  In  fact  alchemy  may  be  called  the  art  of  the 
transmutations  of  the  soul.  In  saying  this  I  am  not  seeking  to  deny 
that  the  alchemists  also  knew  and  practiced  metallurgical 
procedures  such  as  the  purification  and  alloying  of  metals;  their 
real  work,  however,  for  which  all  these  procedures  were  merely 
the  outward  supports  or  "operational  symbols",  was  the 
transmutation  of  the  soul.  3 
In  other  words,  -although  the  physical  transmutation  of  metals  was 
thought  to  occur  sometimes,  as  a  sort  of  mirror  of  inward  changeý  the 
metallurgic  metaphor  of  transmutation  is,  for  the  most  part,  just  that:,  a 
symbol  representing  a  process  which,  on  a  spiritual  level,  may  transform 
man  more  completely  than  metal  may  be  transformed  in  the  forge. 
There  is  a  transcendence,  a  "leap",  as  Burckhardt  fashions  it,  which  can 
occur,  in  practical  terms,  only  spiritually;  metallurgic  practices  serve  as 
only  a  pale  reminder  of  this  potentiality: 
The  miraculousness  of  this  process,  effecting  a  "leap"  which, 
according  to  the  alchemists,  nature  by  herself  can  only  accomplish 
in  an  unforeseeably  long  time  highlights  the  difference  between 
corporeal  possibilities  and  those  of  the  soul.  While  a  mineral 
substance,  whose  solutions,  crystallizations,  smeltings,  and 
burnings  can  reflect  up  to  a  point  the  changes  within  the  soul, Chapter  Five  352 
must  remain  confined  within  definite  limits,  the  soul,  for  its  part, 
can  overcome  the  corresponding  "psychic"  limits,  thanks  to  its 
meeting  with  the  Spirit,  which  is  bound  by  no  form.  5 
Metallurgic  transmutation,  then,  is  a  metaphor  for  spiritual 
transcendence;  it  represents  man's  potential  to  achieve  (or  regain)  a 
state  of  spiritual  purity.  6  More  important  to  my  discussion  of  spiritual 
transformation  in  Old  English  eschatology,  this  transcendence  was 
dependent  upon  suffering  and  destruction;  only  that  which  was  reduced 
and  consumed  could  be  remade  in  the  image  of  the  divine,  only  that 
which  was  delivered  from  the  mortal  could  be  made  immortal.  7  It  is,  to 
Eliade,  crucial  that  reduction  and  suffering  are  linked  anthropologically 
to  the  transmutative  process;  this,  indeed,  is  the  facet  of  metallurgic 
philosophy  that  makes  transmutation  so  central  to  my  own  study.  The 
links  among  suffering,  redemption,  and  spiritual  transcendence  are 
mirrored  by  those  among  reduction,  destruction,  and  material  - 
transmutation.  This  philosophical  relationship  clarifies  and  explicates 
the  place  of  metallurgic  imagery  in  Christian  eschatology: 
,y 
[the  alchemists]  projected  onto  matter  the  initiator,  7  function  The 
of  suffadng.  Thanks  to  the  alchemical  operations,  corresponding 
to  the  tortures,  death  and  resurrection  of  the  initiate,  the  substance 
is  transmuted,  that  is,  attains  a  transcendental  mode  of  being:  it 
becomes  gold.  Gold,  we  repeat,  is  the  symbol  of 
immortality  ... 
Alchemical  transmutation  is  therefore  equivalent  to 
the  perfecting  of  matter  or,  in  the  Christian  terminology,  to  its 
redemption. 
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Whether  material  or  spiritual,  literal  or  metaphorical,  9  this  relationship 
between  reduction  and  reformulation  is  the  characteristic  of 
transmutation  vital  to  understanding  Christian  metallurgic  imagery: 
transmutation  is  possible  only  through  destruction;  redemption  can  be 
g  aine  d  only  through  suffering.  10 
The  roots  of  this  tradition  of  transmutation  lie  hidden  in  the  mists 
of  time;  it  might  be  even  more  accurate  to  say  "these  traditions",  as 
there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  all  of  the  various  manifestations 
represent  one  long  and  unbroken  chain  of  knowledge  and  ritual.  Still,  as 
Burckhardt  has  pointed  out  in  his  study  of  the  evolution  of  alchemy, 
where  we  can  detect  in  a  wide  variety  of  divergent  traditions  patterns 
which  converge,  it  is  worth  our  while  to  examine  more  closely  how  and 
why  those  patterns  are  so  similar: 
In  its  essentials,  Indian  alchemy  is  the  same  as  Western,  and 
Chinese  alchemy,  though  set  in  a  completely  different  spiritual 
climate,  can  throw  light  on  both.  If  alchemy  were  nothing  but  a 
sham,  its  form  of  expression  would  betray  arbitrariness  and  folly 
at  every  turn;  but  in  fact  it  can  be  seen  to  possess  all  the  signs  of  a 
genuine  "tradition",  that  is  to  say,  an  organic  and  consistent-- 
though  not  necessarily  system  ati  c--d  o  ctrine,  and  a  clear-cut  corpus 
of  rules,  laid  down  and  persistently  expounded  by  its  adepts.  Thus 
alchemy  is  neither  a  hybrid  nor  a  haphazard  product  of  human 
history,  but  on  the  contrary  represents  a  profound  possibility  of 
the  spirit  and  the  soul.  II 
That  these  many  traditions  do  have  points  of  convergence  seems  certain, 
and  my  discussion  of  the  exact  nature  of  transmutation  should  illustrate 
this  fact  amply;  less  certain,  however,  is  why  so  many  cultures  in  so Chapter  Five  354 
many  epochs  should  draw  such  similar  conclusions  about  the  natures  of 
physical  and  spiritual  transformation,  and  about  the  relationship  of  each 
with  the  other.  There  have  been  many  attempts  to  explain  this 
44  universality"  of  transmutation;  the  two  most  significant  schools  of 
thought  are  the  anthropological,  most  notably  developed  by  Mircea 
Eliade,  and  the  psychological,  which  was  explored  by  C.  G.  Jung. 
Eliade's  view  is  that  this  mystical  relationship  between  the 
physical  and  the  spiritual  common  to  all  metal-working  cultures  is  the 
result  of  the  unique  physical  properties  of  the  metals  themselves,  and  the 
apparently  magical  spiritual  ("living")  qualities  which  these  materials 
seem  to  possess.  Various  cultures  develop  more  or  less  analogous 
philosophical  positions  around  metallurgy,  therefore,  both  because  the 
metals  exhibit  the  same  properties  universally,  and  because  these 
properties,  as  well  as  the  technology  built  around  them,  lend  themselves 
to  mystification: 
To  collaborate  in  the  work  of  Nature,  to  help  her  to  produce  at  an 
ever-increasing  tempo,  to  change  the  modalities  of  matter--here,  in 
our  view,  lies  one  of  the  key  sources  of  alchemical  ideology 
...  what 
the  smelter,  smith  and  alchemist  have  in  common  is  that  all  three 
lay  claim  to  a  particular  m  agico  -religious  experience  in  their 
relations  with  matter;  this  experience  is  their  monopoly  and  its 
secret  is  transmitted  through  the  initiatory  rites  of  their  trades.  All 
three  work  on  a  matter  which  they  hold  to  be  at  once  alive  and 
sacred,  and  in  their  labours  they  pursue  the  transformation  of 
matter,  its  perfection  and  transmutation.  12 
In  other  words,  metals  are  perceived  of  as  magical  and  holy  because  they 
seem  to  belong  to  the  world  of  material  substances  at  the  same  time  that Chapter  Five  355 
they  exhibit  qualities  which  are  thought  to  indicate  a  living  spiritual 
nature;  . 
further,  those  who  are  able  to  master  these  special  elements  are, 
themselves,  thought  to  possess  a  mystical  connection  with  them.  13 
From  an  anthropological  point  of  view,  then,  these  "magico-religious" 
metallurgic  traditions  of  transmutation  common  to  so  many  different 
cultures  spring  from  a  common  perception  of  the  nature  of  these  forms 
of  matter,  as  well  as  a  common  desire  to  participate  in  and  to  some 
extent  control  the  process  by  which  matter  may  be  "made"  and 
"remade";  the  projection  of  this  material  model  into  spiritual  space  is, 
for  Eliade,  the  logical  consummation  of  this  concept.  14 
Jung,  on  the  other  hand,  describes  transmutation  in  rather 
contrasting  terms;  he  sees  the  transformation  of  the  soul  as  a  universal 
psychological  imperative  which,  in  the  practice  Of  transmutation,  is 
projected  outward  into  the  material  world.  15  Transmutation,  then, 
symbolizes  a  universal  human  experience,  an  experience  common  even 
to  those  who  are  unfamiliar  with  metallurgy: 
Jung  has  shown  that  the  symbolism  of  alchemical  processes  is  re- 
enacted  in  the  dreams  and  talk  of  patients  completely  ignorant  of 
alchemy.  Jung's  observations  are  of  interest  not  only  to  depth 
psychology;  they  also  indirectly  confirm  the  soteriological 
function  which  is  one  of  the  main  constituents  of  alchemy.  16 
Material  transmutation  is,  for  Jung,  a  metaphor  for  a  process  of  spiritual 
transformation  through  which  most  adult  humans  must  struggle;  hence 
the  universal  nature  of  the  metaphor.  This  process  Jung  termed 
"individuation",  and  itconcerns  an  actualization  of  "a  drive  for 
wholeness  and  maturity  inherent  in  the  human  psyche.  "  17  According  to 
Jung,  in  order  to  become  fully  whole,  the  outward  face  of  the  individual Chapter  Five  356 
(called  the  "persona"  18)  must  be  reconciled  with  the  secondary, 
suppressed  facets  of  the  personality  (called  the  "shadow"  19);  the 
"psychic  opposites"  --the  dark  traits  hidden  in  the  shadow  and  their 
mirror  images  manifested  outwardly  in  the  persona--must  strike  a 
balance  in  the  mature  being,  known  as  the  "self": 
For  a.  personality  to  become  more  whole,  more  individuated,  it 
must  somehow  accommodate  both  conscious  and  unconscious 
areas  to  each  other  and  form  a  new  center  which  Jung  calls  the 
"self  ".  In  the  "  self  "  many  pairs  of  psychic  opposites  strike  a  new 
balance.  For  Jung  it  was  precisely  this  process  of  individuation 
which  was  being  unconsciously  acted  out  by  the  practitioners  of 
alchemy.  20 
Jung  postulated  that  the  first  step  of  this  process  was  the  destruction  of 
the  "light"  persona  through  its  merging  with  the  "dark"  of  the  shadow; 
this  he  saw  as  a  metaphor  for  death,  since  the  persona  must,  in  a  sense, 
die  in  order  to  be  reborn  as  the  purer,  more  complete  self.  21  This 
44rebirth"  marked  the  second  step  of  the  process,  and  Jung  saw  in  this 
process  of  destruction  and  reformulation  an  analogy  to  material 
transmutation,  which  he  conceived  of  as  an  external  metaphor  for  an 
internal  process  not  totally  comprehended  by  the  subject  thereof.  22 
We  have,  then,  in  these  two  interpretations,  two  opposing  views  as 
to  the  reasons  for  this  "universal"  accidence  of  transmutative 
philosophy.  In  brief,  the  anthropological  school  posits  a  common 
experience  of  the  material  world  which  is  projected  inwards  onto  issues 
of  spiritual  transformation,  while  the  psychological  school  theorizes  a 
universal  drive  for  spiritual  transformation  which  is  projected  outwards 
onto  a  convenient  material  metaphor.  Whatever  the  reasons  for  the Chapter  Five  357 
consistent  nature  of  these  patterns  of  transmutative  philosophy,  it  is 
certain  that  these  traditions  are  both  widespread  and  durable;  their 
durability,  at  least  in  part,  might  be  attributable  to  the  ease  with  which 
transmutation  has  been  assimilated  into  various  systems  of  religious 
thought.  Before  I  turn  to  eschatology  itself,  I  would  like  to  examine 
briefly  those  elements  of  transmutation  which  lent  themselves  most 
readily  to  Christian  use. 
,  Burckhardt  argues  that  there  are  practical  reasons  for  the 
assimilation  into  Christianity  of  philosophical  elements  of  transmutation; 
though  a  philosophy  evolved  from  pagan  roots  might  seem  anathema  to 
Christian  thought,  such  a  process  is  hardly  without  precedent.  Be  that  as 
it  may,  these  philosophical  elements,  bound  up  as  they  were  with 
technical  information,  entered  the  Christian  tradition  as  part  of  a  natural 
science,  and  sought  their  own  level  from  there: 
It  will  no  doubt  be  asked  how  it  was  possible  for  alchemy, 
together  with  its  mythological  ground,  to  be  incorporated  into  the 
monotheistic  religions:  Judaism,  Christianity,  and  Islam.  The 
explanation  of  this  is  that  the  cosmological  perspectives  proper  to 
alchemy,  relating  as  they  do  both  to  the  outward  realm  of  metals 
(and  of  minerals  in  general)  and  to  the  inward  realm  of  the  soul, 
were  organically  bound  up  with  ancient  metallurgy,  so  that  the 
cosmological  background  was  taken  over,  along  with  the  craft, 
simply  as  a  science  of  nature  (ph7sis)  in  the  broadest  sense  of  the 
term,  rather  as  Christianity  and  Islam  appropriated  the 
Pythagorean  tradition  in  music  and  architecture,  and  assimilated 
the  corresponding  spiritual  perspective.  23 Chapter  Five  358 
It  may  be,  then,  that  the  philosophical  tradition  was  assimilated  into 
Christianity  over  time  from  the  body  of  ancient  literature  dealing  with 
metallurgy.  Such  concepts  which  fit  most  easily  with  Christian 
paradigms  would  therefore  be  most  readily  absorbed  into  the  new 
tradition.  Dobbs  has  pointed  out  that  there  are  "religious  qualities 
inherent"  in  transmutation,  and  credits  Jung  with  providing  ample 
evidence  of  the  affinity  between  these  qualities  and  related  concepts  in 
major  world  religions.  24  Such  qualities  which  are  especially  relevant  to 
Christianity  include  the  concepts  of  mystical  revelation  through  divine 
grace  and  spiritual  "rebirth",  or  redemption,  through  death  (both  the 
figurative  death  of  ritual  and  the  literal  sacrificial  death  of  Christ). 
Burckhardt  claims  that  transmutation,  while  not  a  religion  on  its  own, 
exists  in  a  sort  of  symbiotic  relationship  with  Christianity;  the 
revelatory  nature  of  Christian  redemption  is  particularly  well-suited  to 
understanding  the  mysteries  and  the  miracles  of  metallurgy.  25 
Likewise,  the  material  metaphor  of  transmutation  serves  to  underscore 
and  explicate  the  Christian  model  of  redemption  through  death.  This 
latter  relationship,  on  both  literal  and  figurative  levels,  is  worthy  of 
special,  note.  As  I  discussed  above,  one  basic  tenet  of  transmutation  is 
that  physical  transformation  (or  spiritual  redemption)  always  must  be 
preceded  by  a  process  of  destruction;  it  does  not  take  much  imagination 
to  see  the  link  to  the  Christian  metaphor  of  redemption.  Christ's  death 
and  resurrection,  which  both  promises  and  explicates  the  transformation 
of  every  Christian  soul,  also  echoes  and  validates--to  a  Christian  mind-- 
the  spiritual  nature  of  transmutation: 
Western  Alchemists  integrated  their  symbolism  into  Christian 
theology.  The  "death"  of  matter  was  sanctified  by  the  death  of 
Christ  who  assured  its  redemption.  26 Chapter  Five  359 
Further,  the  transformation  of  material  through  the  fire  of  the  forge 
serves  as  a  metaphor  to  underscore  the  spiritual  transformation  of  the 
individual  soul;  just  as  Christ  died  and  was  born  again,  and  as  base 
metal  is  transformed  into  gold,  so  the  soul  of  the  sinner  may  be  "burned" 
clean  and  holy: 
...  the  physical  transmutation  of  metals  was  a  sign  which 
manifested  outwardly  the  inward  holiness  both  of  gold  and  of 
man--of  the  man,  that  is,  who  had  completed  the  inward  work.  27 
This  fire  metaphor,,  which  springs  from  the  fount  of  transmutative 
philosophy,  is  one  that  becomes  deeply  imbedded  in  Christian  imagery; 
I  will  now  turn  to  eschatology  itself,  and  chart  the  evolution  of  this 
concept. 
28 
-,  Purification  by  fire,  as  we  have  seen,  becomes  a  central  Christian 
spiritual  metaphor  early  on,  and  remains  one  throughout  the  middle 
ages;  however,  it  is  not  enshrined  in  actual  Church  doctrine  until  very 
late  indeed,  by  which  time  it  has  become  part  and  parcel  of  the  doctrine 
of  purgatory.  -  Purgatory  is  a  concept  related  to  and  descended  from 
simpler  Christian  manifestations  of  cleansing  fire,  so  it  is  worth  our 
while  to  essay  briefly  this  relationship.  29  "Purgatory",  as  we  understand 
it,  did  not  appear  as  a  concept  until  the  late  twelfth  century,  and  was  not 
acknowledged  as  doctrinally  sound  until  the  council  of  Florence  in 
1439.30  Prior  to  the  development  of  purgatory  as  a  specific  "third 
place"  for  the  purification  of  souls,  two  main  models  prevailed:  the 
binary  idea  of  appendages  to  heaven  and  hell,  in  which  the  condition  of 
one's  soul  would  determine  the  station  at  which  one  would  await  , 
judgment;  31-  and  the  concept  of  the  fire  of  judgment,  according  to  which Chapter  Five  360 
all  mankind  would  walk  through  the  fire  on  judgment  day,  and  the 
condition  of  one's  soul  would  determine  the  effect  of  the  flames  upon 
one.  32  While  the  wholly  wicked  would  be  entirely  consumed  by  the 
flames,  those  who  were  not  destroyed  would  have  the  sin  burned  out  of 
them;  it  is  significant  that  Origen  utilizes  a  metallurgical  metaphor  to 
describe  this  process:  ý'For  the  righteous,  however,  the  trial  by  fire  is  a 
kind  of  baptism,,  which,  by  melting  the  lead  that  weighs  down  the  soul, 
transforms  it  into  pure  gold.  -  33  Itis  this  latter  concept--the  fire  of 
judgment--with  which  we  are  interested,  as  it  is  a  common  image  in 
Anglo-Saxon  eschatology.  Further,  the  fire  of  judgment  often  is 
explicitly  linked  with  the  philosophy  of  transmutation,  frequently  with 
language  and  images  which  resonate  with  metallurgic  processes  of 
purgation. 
The  purification  by  fire  represented  by  the  fire  of  judgment  does, 
indeed,  seem  to  be  related  to  the  philosophical  tradition  of 
transmutation;  at  the  same  time,  it  is important  to  note  that  there  are  Old 
Testament  references  to  destruction  by  fire  which  also  are  influences.  34 
Jacques  Le  Goff  suggests,,  however,  that  it  was  not  these  passages 
themselves,  but  rather  the  exegesis  of  them  by  various  Church  Fathers 
(most  notably  Origen),  who  drew  upon  Classical  Greek  influences,  that 
transformed  the  destructive  fire  of  a  wrathful  Hebrew  god  into  the 
cleansing  flames  of  a  stern  but  caring  one:  , 
Origen,  in  his  Commentar7  on  LeNdticus,  sees  these  passages  as 
exemplifying  God's  concern  to  punish  man  for  his  own  good. 
Similarly,  he  interprets  those  passages  in  which  God  describes 
himself  as  a  fire  not  as  expressions  of  a  God  of  wrath  but  rather  of 
a  God  who,  by  consuming  and  devouring,  acts  as  an  instrument  of 
purification. 
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Origen  felt  that  all  mankind  was  in  need  of  some  level  of  purification 
due  to  unavoidable  contact  with  the  impure  world.  36  Clement  of 
Alexandria  established  a  duality  of  souls  and  of  transmutative  fires, 
distinguishing  between  those  who  can  be  purified  and  those  who  must  be 
consumed;  37  what  is  more,  he  drew  an  analogy  between  spiritual  and 
material  transmutation:  .- 
In  the  other  life  there  will  be  two  fires,  a  "devouring  and 
consuming"  one  for  the  incorrigible,  and  for  the  rest,  a  fire  that 
"  sanctifies"  and  "does  not  consume,  like  the  fire  of  the  forge".  38 
Origen  more  carefully  delineated  the  souls  into  the  three  groups  with 
which  we  are  already  familiar--the  unredeemable,  the  redeemable,  and 
the  righteous--and  extended  a  Pauline  metaphor  in  a  meWlurgic 
direction.  39  The  medieval  world  refined  and  expanded  this  tradition, 
and  also  explicated  various  facets  thereof;  Aquinas,  for  example,  went 
to  lengths  to  explain  how  the  corporeal  and  incorporeal  can  be  equated 
in  this  metaphor.  40  If  this  tradition  owes  nothing  to  classical  notions  of 
transmutation,  it  certainly  provides  an  interesting  parallel;  further,  in 
those  texts  which  draw  upon  the  metallurgical  tradition  it  is  difficult  not 
to  glimpse  residual  facets  of  the  philosophical  tradition,  as  we  shall  see 
in  my  discussion  of  Anglo-Saxon  forge  metaphors. 
The  Old  English  verse  Elene  on  one  level  seems  merely  another 
retelling  of  the  invention  of  the  cross,  and,  for  the  most  part,  it  follows 
the  source  texts  rather  closely.  41  The  closing  passage,  however,  which 
describes  the  purgation  of  all  souls  on  judgment  day,  is  not  from  the 
sources,  and  indeed,  at  first  glance,  does  not  seem  much  related  to  the 
body  of  the  text.  42  It  is,  however,  unquestionably  meant  to  be  seen  as  a Chapter  Five  362 
part  of  the  poem.  43  The  relationship  between  this  final  section  and  the 
body  of  the  poem  never  has  been  adequately  explained,  and  it  is  with 
just  such  a  relationship  that  this  chapter  is  concerned.  I  find  there  to  be  a 
direct  correlation  between  the  experience  of  the  souls  in  the  fire  of 
judgment--described  in  the  final  scene--and  that  of  Judas,  the  duplicitous 
leader  of  the  Jews,  who--in  the  body  of  the  narrative--is  purged  from  sin 
and  recast  into  a  new,  purer  form  through  his  own  temporal  "furnace".  44 
The  burning  away  of  sin  achieved  through  the  heat  of  the  fire  of 
judgment,  the  purification  of  the  soul  which  parallels  the  purification  of 
metal  in  the  furnace--through  which  both  emerge  likewise  untainted  and 
transmuted  into  new,  purer  forms--is  meant  both  to  echo  and  to  explicate 
the  "purification"  of  Judas  in  the  pit.  Just  as  gold  and  silver  are  melted, 
purified,  and  cast  into  the  desired  mold,  Judas,  like  the  souls  in  the  fire 
of  judgment,  is  "refashioned",  or  transmuted,  after  he  has  been  purged  of 
his  impurities  through  his  torment  in  the  pit. 
Drawing  upon  eschatological  material  from  Chtist  III,  Phoenix, 
and  the  Judgment  Day  poems,  I  will  examine  how  spiritual 
refashioning,  or  transmutation,  on  Doomsday  is  a  process  of  production, 
if  you  will,  with  linguistic  and  thematic  resonances  with  actual 
metallurgical  processes  of  purification.  In  order  to  accomplish  this,  I 
will  begin  with  an  examination  of  key  terms  of  spiritual  transformation. 
I  then  will  develop  this  context  by  referring  to  the  large  number  of 
analogous  scenes  in  the  homilies  and  other  sources  which  use  these  and 
related  terms,  and  I  will  discuss  briefly  the  scriptural  bases  for  some  of 
these  references.  Further,  utilizing  some  specific  examples  from  this 
context,  I  will  examine  how  this  analogy  between  the  literal  purification 
of  Metal  in  the  forge  and  the  allegorical  purgation  of  the  soul  in  the  fire 
of  judgment  serves  to  clarify  the  parallel  between  Judas's  spiritual 
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scene.  Finally,  I  will  illustrate  how  the  experience  of  Judas  in  the  pit  is 
that  of  an  "  every-sinner"  whose  purgation  and  rehabilitation  both 
explicate  the  relationship  of  the  homiletic  fragment  to  the  body  of  the 
narrative  and  reiterate  the  personal  and  ongoing  nature  of  such  spiritual 
refashioning  in  the  life  of  every  Christian  reader. 
Central  both  to  Judas's  experience  and  to  the  fire  of  judgment 
episode  is  a  concept  of  purgation,  or  a  sort  of  spiritual  44  cleansing", 
which  is  represented  metaphorically  by  an  image  of  an  actual  physical 
process  of  purification.  In  the  case  of  Judas,  his  spiritual  transformation 
is  marked  as  complete  when  he  is  "cleansed"  through  the  "  bath"  of 
baptism: 
Swylce  -Iudas  onfeng 
wfter  fyrstmearce  fulwihtes  baa6, 
ond  geclwnsod  wear6  Criste  getrywe, 
lifwearde  leof. 
(11.1032-1035) 
[Likewise  Judas  after  due  time  received  baptism  and  was 
cleansed,  faithful  to  Christ,  dear  to  the  lord  of  life.  ] 
Geclwnsod  (the  past  participle  of  geciaansian45),  here  meaning 
44  cleansed"  or  "purified",  is  a  key  term  in  this  context,  because  though 
Judas's  conversion  seems  an  obvious  echo  of  that  of  Constantine,  the 
means  by  which  they  are  converted  differ  radically,  as  does  the  language 
the  poet  uses  to  describe  each  case.  Though  the  poet  just  mentions  that 
Constantine  was  true  to  the  will  of  the  lord  after  his  baptism--"  ond  paDt 
for6  geheold  on  his  dagana  tid,  dryhtne  to  willan"  (11.192-193)-- 
Cynewulf  specifically  mentions  that  Judas  was  geclivnsod,  or  "purified". 
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sense,  Judas  has  literally  had  the  sin  expunged  from  his  soul  through  his 
purgation  in  the  pit. 
Though  it  has  been  argued  that  Judas's  cleansing  in  the  pit  is  a 
figural  representation  of  the  Catechumen's  preparation  for  baptism  46 
we  must  not  be'too  quick  to  equate  a  forced  period  of  confinement  and 
deprivation  with  the  self-imposed  mortification  of  the  faithful.  47 
Although  Judas  becomes  geclzensod  through  a  form  of  baptism,  it  is  a 
baptism  by  fire,  if  you  will,  prefigured  by  Constantine's  baptism  by 
water  and  prefiguring  the  baptism  by  fire  described  in  the  closing 
passage.  48 
As  if  it  weren't  plain  enough  in  the  highly  symbolically  charged 
environment  of  baptism,  the  verb  gecleansian  is  marked  as  a  spiritually 
loaded  term  in  Elene's  last  speech  to  Judas  before  she  has  him  cast  into 
the  pit;  she  needs  to  find  the  cross  in  order  to  44  cleanse"  it,  so  that  it  may 
be  of  use  to  mankind: 
...  ýaat  ic  hie  syMan  mwge 
geclwnsian  Criste  to  willan, 
hmle6uM  to  helpe... 
(11.677-679) 
[So  that  then  I  may  cleanse  it  according  to  the  will  of  Christ,  as  an 
aid  to  men... 
In  this  context  gecleansian,  while  certainly  invoking  a  literal  reference  to 
44  cleaning"  on  one  level,  more  importantly  evokes  a  spiritual  "cleansing" 
(or  transmutation),  as  well.  Though  the  cross  is  undoubtedly  dirty  after 
centuries  in  the  ground,  it,  like  any  holy  relic  or  place,  must  be  cleansed 
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This  same  sense  of  "cleansing"  or  "purification"  is  also  central  to 
the  episode  of  the  fire  of  judgment.  Geclwnsod,  the  term  with  which  the 
poet  explains  the  nature  of  Judas's  spiritual  transformation,  is  also  the 
exact  term  used  to  describe  the  souls  of  the  dead  after  they  have  emerged 
from  the  fire  of  judgment: 
Hie  asodene  beoa, 
asundrod  fram  synnum,  swa  smmte  gold 
pEet  in  wylme  bi6  womma  gehwylces 
purh  ofnes  fyr  eall  geclmnsod, 
amered'ond  gemylted. 
(11.1308-1312) 
[They  shall  be  purified,  set  apart  from  sins,  like  pure  gold,  which 
is  all  purged  of  every  foulness  by  the  fire  of  the  furnace,  purified 
and  melted.  ] 
This  language,  to  be  sure,  seems  to  invoke  an  image  of  transmutation, 
and  recalls--or  at  the  very  least  parallels--that  tradition.  Further,  the  use 
of  geclivnsod  by  the  Elene-  poet  in  this  eschatological  context  seems  to 
suggest  that  the  purgation  undergone  by  the  souls  in  the  fire  of  judgment 
is  a  form  of  transmutation  closely  related  to  Judas's  own  spiritual 
cleansing.  I  can  say  this  with  some  assurance  because,  of  the  literally 
hundreds  of  occurrences  of  geclwnsian  and  its  various  forms  (there  are 
nearly  fifty  occurrences  of  geclmnsod  alone),  all  but  a  relative  handful 
refer  to  a  kind  of  spiritual  cleansing  akin  to  those  which  I've  described 
from  Elene,  including  several  references  both  to  baptismal  and  to 
allegorical  metallurgic  purification;  I  have  included  some  typical 
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Se  man  bi6  geclmnsod  fram  his  uncimnum  synnum  ýurh  ýmt 
halige  fulluht... 
(AýHom  4  242) 
[The  man  is  cleansed  from  his  unclean  sins  through  the  holy 
baptism  ...  ] 
...  beo  geclmnsod  from  ýmm  mmstum  scy1dum... 
(Ps  18.12) 
[.  -..  be  cleansed  of  the  greatest  sins... 
Gyf  we  nu  wilnie6,  Paot  ure  sawlen  syn  geclmnsode  fram  synne 
fulnysse... 
(Alc  (Warn  35)  138) 
[If  we  now  desire,  that  our  souls  should  be  cleansed  from  foulness 
of  sin  ...  ]I 
Se  fullwuht  6one  mon  geclmnsa6  from  his  synnum... 
(CP  54.427.6)  - 
[The  baptism  cleanses  the  man  from  his  sins... 
Durh  swylcne  smi6  ond  ýurh  swylce  tol,  geclmnsa6  ure  Drihten 
pare  halegna  sawlen... 
(Elu  cI  (Warn  45)  45) 
[Through  such  a  smith  and  through  such  a  tool,  our  Lord  cleanses 
the  souls  of  the  saints  ...  ]. 
...  he  mmg  ...  6one  synfullan  fram  his  synnum  gecleansian. 
(,,  EcHom  1.17(App)  187.3) 
[  ...  he  may  cleanse  the  sinfulness  from  his  sins.  ] 
The  use  of  geclamsod,  then,  to  describe  this  sort  of  metaphorical 
purification  in  both  the  case  of  Judas  and  that  of  the  souls  on  judgment 
day,  serves  to  underscore  the  relationship  between  the  two  episodes  in 
the  context  of  the  poem:  in  the  case  of  Judas,  the  purgative  nature  of  his Chapter  Five  367 
spiritual  transmutation  is  explicated;,  in  the  case  of  the  fire  of  judgment 
scene,  its  relationship  to  the  body  of  the  narrative  is  made  manifest. 
Thus,  through  this  relationship,  the  nature  of  Judas's 
transformation  is illuminated  further  by  the  poet's  explanation  of  the 
process  through  which  the  souls  on  judgment  day  become  geclwnsod. 
the  souls  of  men  will  be  purified  through  the  flames,  "melted",  as  it 
were,  in  order  to  be  "recast"  or  "  re-fashioned  "--transmuted  --into  new 
and  more  beautiful  forms.  Here  the  poet  refers  to  an  actual  process  of 
production,  in  terms  that,  unlike  geclivnsian,  are  sometimes  used 
literally:,  asodene  and  amered,  particularly,  help  to  develop  further  this 
spiritual  analogy  to  actual  metallurgic  processes  of  purification  and 
production. 
Asodene,  from,  the  verb  aseo6an,  means  "purified"  or  "refined", 
but  the  implication  is  a  purification  by  seething  or  boiling.  49  There  are 
only  a'handful  (5-10)  of  occurrences  of  the  various  forms  of  this  verb 
throughout  the  corpus,  and  several  of  them,  like  those  of  gecleansian, 
refer  to  a  spiritual  or  metaphorical  "  seething".  A  parallel  can  be  found 
in  the  related  form  seope6,  which  occurs  in  the  description  of  the 
ravaging  earth  -destroying  flame  described  in  Chiist  III;  here  this  term 
is  ambivalent,  referring  as  it  does  both  to  an  act  of  actual  physical 
destruction  on  the  last  day--as  opposed  to  in  the  fire  of  judgment  on 
Doomsday--and  one  of  spiritual  purification.  The  meaning  in  this 
context  is  usually  taken  as  "seethe"  or  "  smelt":  50 
Seope6  swearta  leg 
ond  goldfrwtwe 
eall  cergestreon 
(11.994-996)' 
synne  on  fordonum, 
gleda  forswelga6, 
epelcyninga.  51 Chapter  Five  368 
[The  dark  flame  will  smelt  the  sin  in  the  corrupt  ones,  and 
glowing  coals  consume  gold  ornaments,  all  the  ancient  treasure  of 
kings.  ] 
Aseo6an,  however,  can  also  refer  to  a  literal  process  of  material 
production,  specifically  in  the  context  of  the  refinement  of  metal,  as  in 
this  example  from  the  laws  of  Alfred  and  Guthrum: 
...  eaUe  we  Izeta6  ...  to  VIII  healfmearcum  asodenes  goldes 
(LawAGu  2) 
[  ...  all  we  allow  at  eight  half-marks  of  refined  gold... 
Amered,  which  is  the  past  participle  of  ametian--a  relatively  well- 
attested  verb  (30-50  occurrences  in  various  forms)--also  translates 
"purified"  or  "refined",  and  is  a  term  generally  used  in  regards  to  molten 
metal.  52  Ametian  is  of  key  importance  to  this  examination  for  two 
reasons:  first,  because  it  most  often  (quite  possibly  more  than  25  times) 
appears  in  scenes  of  spiritual  metallurgy  clearly  analogous  to  the  fire  of 
judgment  scene  in  Elene;  second,  because  the  majority  of  these  scenes 
are  renderings  of  one  of  several  scriptural  passages  which  resonate  with 
the  metaphorical  analogy  between  spiritual  transformation  and 
metallurgic  refinement.  Two  of  the  most  common  scriptural  references 
containing  forms  of  amerian  are  Psalms  12:  6  and  66:  10;  53  1  have 
included  an  example  of  each  reference: 
Gesprec  drihtnys  gesprec  clmne  sylfur  fyr  ameryd  eor6an 
geclmnsud  sufunfealdlice... 
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[The  speech  of  the  lord  [is]  clean,  [as]  silver  purified  by  fire  in  the 
earth,  cleansed  seven  times  ...  ] 
Foroon  Ou  acunnudyst  us  god  mid  fyre  us  amerarydyst  swa  swa 
mid  fyre  bi6  ameryd  sylfur... 
(PsGLC  (Wildhagen)  65.10) 
[Therefore  you  test  us  with  fire,  god,  you  purify  us  just  as  silver  is 
purified  with  fire  ...  ] 
It  is  significant  that  the  words  of  God,  like  God  himself,  are  in  and  of 
themselves  "clean";  they  are  compared  to  that  which  has  been 
44  cleansed",  but  they  are  inherently  pure  and  do  not  require  any  process 
of  purification.  ý  The  souls  of  men,  however,  like  raw  silver  or  gold,  must 
be  purged  in  the  heat  of  the  furnace  to  approach  this  divine  level  of 
purity. 
It  would  be  profitable  to  discuss  briefly  two  passages  from  the 
phoenix  -  at  this  point.  The  Phoenix  would  merit  mention  in  any 
discussion  of  spiritual  transmutation  in  Anglo-Saxon  literature,  both 
because  it  is  commonly  accepted  that  the  self-immolation  and  rebirth  of 
the  bird  in  the  poem  is  meant  to  represent  just  that,  and  because  the  fire 
imagery  cannot  but  suggest  some  metaphorical  connection  with  the  fire 
of  judgment.  Moreover,  the  Phoenix  is  particularly  relevant  to  this 
discussion  as  it  contains  two  instances  of  amerede,  both  of  which  are 
exactly  analogous  to  those  which  I  have  just  discussed,  within  the  space 
of  a  hundred  lines;  further,  the  first  instance  of  amerede  occurs  in  a 
passage  which  interprets  the  metaphor  of  the  phoenix  in  the 
eschatological  terms  of  the  fire  of  judgment: 
Dwr  pa  lichoman  leahtra  cimne 
gonga6  glmdmode,  gmstas  hweorfa6 Chapter  Five  370 
in  banfatu  '  ýonne  bryne  stige6 
heah  to  heofonum.,  Hat  W  monegum 
egeslic  mled  ponne  anra  gehwylc 
soofmst  ge  synnig,  sawel  mid  lice 
from  moldgrafum  sece6  Meotudes  dom 
forhtafwred.  Fyr  bi6  on  tihte, 
mle6  uncyste.  OEer  ýa  eadgan  beoo 
wfter  wrmchwile  weorcum  bifongen, 
agnum  dzedum.  ýwt  ýa  mpelan  sind 
wyrta  wynsume  mid  ýam'se  wilda  fugel 
his  selfes  nest  bisete6  utan. 
ýwt  hit  fwringa  fyre  byrne6, 
forswele6  under  sUftnan  ond  he  sylfa  mid, 
ond  ponne  wfter  lige  lif  eft  onfeh6 
edniwinga.  Swa  bi(  )knra  gehwylc 
flmsc  bifongen  fira  cynnes 
mnlic  ond  edgeong,  se  ýe  his  agnum  her 
willum  gewyrce6  pmt  him  Wuldorcyning 
meahtig  wt  ýam  mwýle  milde  geweoroei5. 
ponne  h1eqriao  -  halge  gmstas, 
sawla  so6faeste  song  ahebba6 
chene  ond  gecorene,  herga6  Cyninges  ýrym 
stefn  wfter  stefne,  stiga6  to  wuldre 
wlitige  gewyrtad  mid  hyra  weldwdum. 
Beo6  ponne  ameredeS4  monna  gmstas, 
beorhte  abywdeSS  ýurh  bryne  fyres. 
(11.  S18-S4S) 
[There  the  bodies  clean  of  sins  shall  go  glad-hearted,  the  souls 
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heavens.  The  dreadful  fire  will  be  hot  for  many,  when  each  of 
those,  righteous  and  sinful,  soul  with  body  from  the  earthen-grave 
seeks  the  judgment  of  the  Creator,  terrified.  Fire  will  be  in 
motion,  consuming  sin.  There  the  blessed  ones,  after  exile,  will 
be  attired  with  their  works,  by  their  own  deeds.  These  are  those 
noble  and  delightful  herbs  with  which  the  wild  bird  encompasses 
his  own  nest  so  that  it  suddenly  bursts  into  fire  and  burns  up 
beneath  the  sun  and  him  with  it.  And  then  after  the  flame  he 
begins  life  anew.  Just  so  will  each  one  of  the  race  of  men  be 
attired  in  flesh  ,  noble  and  rejuvenated,  who  by  his  own  choice 
works  it  here  that  the  mighty  King  of  Glory  is  mild  unto  him  at 
the  judgment.  Then  holy  spirits  will  sing,  righteous  souls  will  lift 
up  song,  clean  and  chosen  ones  will  praise  the  glory  of  the  King, 
voice  upon  voice,  and  ascend  into  glory  delightfully  perfumed 
with  their  good  deeds.  The  souls  of  men  will  be  purified  then, 
brightly  cleansed,  through  the  conflagration  of  fire.  ] 
Wickedness  will  be  consumed  by  the  flames,  as  the  old  bird's  aged  flesh 
was;  -  but  the  righteous,  -  clothed  in  their  good  deeds  as  the  bird  was 
balmed  by  its  herbs,  will  be  born  again  to  new  and  spotless  flesh,  just  as 
the  phoenix  was  reborn.  The  metaphor  is  succinctly  explicated  by  the 
penultimate  and  ultimate  lines  of  this  passage--by  the  fire  of  judgment 
the  souls  of  men  shall  be  purified--  am  erede--as  silver  is  purified  in  the 
furnace,  or  as  the  phoenix  is  born  anew  from  the  ashes  of  its  pyre.  In  his 
discussion  of  the  eternal,  joys  of  heaven  the  poet  once  again  harkens  back 
to  the  purgative  process  through  which  the  righteous  became  worthy  of 
paradise: 
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manes  amerede,  in  ýwre  maeran  byrig, 
cyneprym  cypa6,  Caseres  lof 
singad  on  swegle,  so6fwstra  gedryht, 
ýam  anum  is,  ece  weor6mynd 
foro  butan  ende.  - 
(11.632-637a) 
[Thus  the  righteous,  purged  of  evil,  discourse  in  that  glorious  city. 
The  company  of  those  steadfast  in  truth  proclaim  his  royal 
majesty-,  they  sing  in  heaven  the  praise  of  the  emperor,  to  whom 
alone  is  eternal  honor  henceforth  without  end.  ] 
The  saved  have  been  purged  of  sin,  purified  through  the  heat  of  the  fire, 
and  so,  like  the  phoenix,  enjoy  rebirth.  56 
It  is  clear  from  such  references  to  spiritual  smithing,  as  it  were, 
that  the  purgation  and  transmutation  of  the  soul--especially  a  soul 
weighed  down  with  sin,  or  "lead"--is  an  arduous  and  painful  process.  In 
this  sense  the  experience  of  Judas  in  the  pit  is  certainly  parallel  to  that  of 
the  souls  in  the  fire  of  judgment.  Just  as  gold  must  be  cast  upon  the  fire 
to  purge  it  of  impurities,  so  also  must  souls  be  on  doomsday.  This 
tradition  of  equating  the  material  labor  of  the  smith  with  the  spiritual 
exertion  of  the  individual  soul  is  an  ancient  one,  as  we  have  seen;  it  is 
important  to  stress,  however,  that  here  the  smith  is  Christ  the  judge, 
unless  we  perceive  of  the  fire  of  judgment  as  a  continuous  enactment  of 
an  eschatological  present,  as  Graham  Caie  has  suggested  (see  my 
discussion  in  the  conclusion  to  this  chapter).  57  In  any  case,  after  gold  is 
purified  and  melted,  it  is  indeed  recast  into  whatever  form  the  goldsmith 
chooses;  this  is  likewise  true  of  the  souls  which  emerge  from  the  fire. 
just  as  Judas,  after  his  cleansing,  became  "leof  gode"  (L  1047),  so  do  the 
souls  emerge  transmuted  through  the  heat  of  God's  spiritual  forge;  their Chapter  Five  373 
sin  has  been  burned  away,  and  they  have  been  reshaped  into  new  forms 
which  are  angelic  in  aspect:  "  For6an  hie  nu  on  wlite  scina6  englum 
gelice"  (11.13  19-1320)  [Henceforth  their  faces  shine  like  unto  angels]. 
We  have  then  in  this  two-step  process  of  purification  and 
refashioning  a  definite  parallel  between  the  spiritual  experience  of  Judas 
in  the  pit  and  the  experience  of  the  souls  of  all  mankind  in  the  fire  of 
judgment.  It  is  only  through  the  spiritual  f  orge  of  the  pit  that  Judas  is, 
first,  geclivnsod-2  cleansed"  --of  sin,  and  then  refashioned  into  the  form 
of  the  Christian  bishop  Cyriacus;  58  likewise,  it  is  through  the  oven  of 
the  fire  of  judgment  that  the  souls  on  judgment  day  first  asodene  beo6-- 
"  shall  be  purified"  --and  then  are  recast  to  be  englum  gelice-2  like  unto 
angels".  These  two  transformative  processes  are  analogous,  and  it  is 
clear  that  this  analogy  is  founded  upon  an  allegorical  image  of 
metallurgic  purification  and  production. 
The  relationship  between  Judas's  spiritual  transformation  and  that 
of  the  souls  in  the  fire  of  judgment  clarifies  the  textual  significance  of 
both  experiences  by  analogy.  The  fire  of  judgment  scene  is  prefigured 
by  Judas's  experience,  and  the  philological  and  metaphorical 
relationship  between  these  two  transmutations  brings  this  final  episode 
from  the  periphery  into  the  center  of  the  narrative.  Further,  the  purgative 
and  transmutative  nature  of  the  fire  of  judgment  serves  to  explicate  the 
means  of  allegorical  metallurgy  by  which  Judas's  spiritual  identity  is 
first  "  cleansed"  and  then  "recast". 
Judas's  transmutation  serves  as  an  example  of  the  temporal 
purgation  and  transformation  through  which  every  soul  should 
persevere.  Judas  serves  in  the  capacity  of  an  "  every-sinner",  as  it  were, 
and  the  relationship  between  his  experience  and  that  of  the  souls  in  the 
fire  of  judgment  serves  to  underscore  the  urgency  and  the  immediacy  of 
transmutation:  it  is  meant  to  be  a  regular  and  an  ongoing  process,  and Chapter  Five  374 
not  one  to  be  put  off  until  judgment;  in  fact,  it  is  those  very  souls  which 
have  labored  most  diligently  in  this  life  which  will  feel  least  the  heat  of 
the  flames  on  Doomsday.  59 
Graham  Caie  has  discussed  extensively  this  concept  of  the 
44  eschatological  present",  in  which  the  spiritual  drama  of  Judgment  Day 
is  played  out  in  the  present  in  the  souls  of  the  faithful.  According  to  this 
schema,  nu  is  the  time  to  purify  one's  soul  in  the  searing  flames  of  the 
spiritual  forge;  after  death  it  will  be  too  late  to  mend  one's  ways,  and  it 
is  therefore  the  duty  of  all  Christians  to  perform  this  laborious  and 
sometimes  painful  task  during  every  hour  of  every  day.  In  his  treatment 
of  the  Judgment  Ds7  and  Chzist  HIpoems,  Caie  argues  that  the  poets 
purposefully  focus  on  the  present  moment  and  conflate  the  flames  of 
punishment  and  those  of  purification  in  order  to  underscore  the  fact  that 
it  is  now--in  this  life  and  at  this  and  every  other  point  in  time  before 
death--that  the  reader  must  turn  his  mind  to  the  task  of  personal 
purification  from  sin.  In  his  discussion  of  Judgment  Da7  I,  for  instance, 
Caie  asserts  that  the  poet  deliberately  avoids  reference  to  a  specific 
purgatorial  period: 
As  in  all  the  Old  English  eschatological  poetry,  there  is  no  specific 
reference  to  a  purgatorial  period.  Evil  is  punished  and  good  is 
purified  by  flames  which  are  ambivalently  apocalyptic  and  from 
hell.  Similarly,  there  is  no  distinction  made  between  the  endedxg 
of  the  individual  and  domesdxg;  the  poet  concentrates  only  on 
the  present  moment,  for  after  death  nothing  can  be  changed.  60 
Caie's  is  an  interesting  point  from  a  theological  point  of  view,  as  one  of 
the  major  criticisms  of  "purgational"  theology  has  always  been  that,  if 
purgation  is  possible  in  the  next  life,  there  is  no  real  reason  to  be  overly Chapter  Five  375 
concerned  with  righteousness  in  this  one.  Caie  argues  that  the  conflation 
of  the  endedwg  of  the  individual  and  the  domesdaag  of  all  mankind  in 
such  poetry  as  this  serves  to  reinforce  the  fact  that  the  final  judgment 
will  be  based  on  how  one  lives  here,  now,  today.  Therefore  the  point  of 
eschatological  visions  of  judgment  is  twofold:  first,  to  frighten  the 
audience  into  repentance  with  a  vision  of  the  torments  to  come  for  all 
sinners  in  the  hellfire  after  judgment;  second,  to  give  those  frightened 
into  repentance  a  blueprint  for  purgation.  For  Caie  this  means  that  those 
who  wish  to  be  saved,  those  who  wish  to  avoid  the  pain  of  the  fire  of 
judgment,  must  seek  out  such  purgational  heat  now  in  this  life. 
Eschatological  verse,  according  to  this  model,  offers  not  a  literal  vision 
of  the  future  (except  for  the  purposes  of  providing  the  impetus  of  fear), 
but  rather  a  metaphor  for  the  individual  act  of  penitence  in  the  soul  of 
the  individual  repentant  sinner;  the  final  judgment,  then,  is  not  painful 
to  the  saved  because  they  already  have  purged  themselves  of  the  "lead" 
of  sin  through  temporal  acts  of  purgation.  Meanwhile,  for  the  sinful,  the 
fire  of  judgment  is  indiscernible  (for  all  practical  purposes)  from  the 
hellfire  awaiting  them: 
The  flames  of  Doom  and  hell  were,  of  course,  intended  to  frighten 
man  into  repentance,  but  the  explicit  use  of  this  Sign  of  Doom  to 
act  as  both  purifier  of  the  good  and  destroyer  of  all  evil  suggests 
the  anagogical  meaning  as  well.  In  Elene  the  dugu6  domgeorne 
"the  host  eager  for  glory"  (1291  a)  will  be  uppermost  in  the 
"purgatorial"  fires  of  Doom,  and  will  be  cleansed  of  venial'sins 
there,  while  the  flames,  viewed  in  most  eschatological  literature  as 
militant  thanes  of  Christ  searching  out  evil,  act  as  the  beginning  of 
the  punishment  of  hell.  The  dugu6  domgeorn  must  seek  out  the 
fire  which  will  purge  them  of  evil  ...  at  the  actual  moment  of Chapter  Five  376 
Apocalypse,  of  Revelation,  man  will  once  more  judge  clearly  and 
will  recognize  the  state  of  perfection  which  he  has  gained  on 
earth.  61 
This  model  clearly  resonates  with  that  of  transmutation,  according  to 
which  the  practitioner  is  attempting  a  very  similar  process  of  spiritual 
reformulation  which  is  expressed  in  a  metaphor  of  metaUurgic 
purification.  -  In  both  models  the  present  moment  is  the  time  for  action, 
and  the  fire  of  judgment  is  a  metaphor  for  the  process  to  be  undergone 
by  each  individual  soul.  The  actual  day  of  judgment  is  one  of  - 
affirmation  to  the  righteous,  who  have  acted  to  purge  themselves  of  sin 
throughout  the  course  of  their  lives. 
Caie's  view  is  that  eschatological  scenes  in  these  poems  were 
meant  to  be  didactic  and  thematic,  and  not  in  any  way  historical;  that  is, 
that  the  poets  did  not  foresee  a  doomsday  such  as  they  described 
awaiting  mankind  at  the  end  of  time,  but  rather  the  opposite.  They  in 
fact  saw  the  present  as  the  moment  of  truth,  and  the  day  of  judgment  as 
the  moment  when  all  such  personal  truths  would  be  revealed  and  forever 
fixed: 
...  the  poets  were  not  at  all  concerned  about  the  occurrences 
surrounding  the  final  Assize;  indeed  they  appear  not  to  have 
believed  that  there  would  be  such  an  event.  The  end  of  the  world 
will  be  literally  the  domeadigra  daeg,  the  Day  or  time  of  those 
blessed  by  glory  already,  the  Day  of  Man,  when  the  perfected 
existence  which  the  righteous  sought  on  earth  will  be 
consummated  and  eternal  day  and  light  attained.  62 Chapter  Five  377 
For  Caie,  the  end  result  of  this  analysis  of  the  eschatological  present  is 
that  dom  is  not  a  fearful  judgment  at  the  end  of  time,  but  rather  a 
laborious  act  of  volition  in  the  present  moment.  Caie  sees  such  a 
definition  of  dom  as  central  to  the  doomsday  verse,  and  therefore  argues 
that  this  verse  is  to  be  seen  as  metaphorical,  and  is  not  to  be  taken 
literally.  63 
I  will  conclude  this  chapter  with  two  fire  of  judgment  scenes,  both 
of  which  combine  metallurgical  images  of  transmutation  with  references 
to  an  eschatological  present  such  as  Caie  suggests.  ý  In  each  case  the 
terminology  used  invokes  the  transmutative  metaphor  of  metallurgy, 
while  simultaneously  each  poet  admonishes  the  reader  to  act  now  to 
smelt  the  lead  of  sin  from  the  gold  of  the  soul,  or  risk  an  eternity  of 
flames  which,  despite  their  agonizing  heat,  will  never  be  able  to  affect 
the  same  spiritual  transformation.  In  Judgment  Da7  II  the  poet  warns 
that  the  doomsday  flame  will  consume  all,  excepting  only  those  who 
have  purged  themselves  here  today: 
Ufenan  eall  pis  eac  by6  gefylled 
eal  uplic  lyft  '  mttrenum  lige. 
Fwr6  fyr  ofer  eall,  ne  by6  ýzer  nan  foresteal, 
ne  him  man  na  ne  mmg  miht  forwyrnan; 
eal  peat  us  ýinO  wmtig  eahgemearces 
under  roderes  ryne,  readum  lige 
bi6  emnes  mid  py  eal  gefylled. 
Donne  fyren  fig  -  blawe6  and  brasla6, 
read  and  rea6e,  rmsct  and  efestei5, 
hu  he  synfullum  susle  gefremme; 
ne  se  wrecenda  byrne  wile  forbugan 
o6oe  mnigum  pwr  'are  gefremman, Chapter  Five  378 
buton  he  horum  sy  her  afeormad, 
and  ýonne  ýider  cume,  ýearle  aclmnsad. 
(11.145-158) 
[Upon  the  top  of  all  this,  all  the  upper  atmosphere  likewise  will  be 
filled  by  poisonous  fire.  Fire  will  proceed  over  all:  there  will  be 
no  hindrance,  none  ever  will  be  able  to  oppose  its  might;  all  of 
that  horizon  which  seems  empty  to  us  under  the  sky's  extent  will 
be  all  fully  filled  thereupon  with  red  flame.  Then  the  fiery  flame 
will  blow  and  roar,  red  and  harsh,  crackle  and  hasten,  thus  will  it 
do  misery  unto  the  sinful.  The  avenging  conflagration  will  not 
pass  by  any  nor  unto  any  there  have  mercy,  unless  he  be  purged 
from  defilement  here,  and  then  come  thither  vigorously 
cleansed.  ]64 
Those  who  repent  and  purify  themselves  now  will  be  spared  by  the  fire, 
but  those  who  do  not  will  suffer  for  all  eternity  after  the  judgment.  Only 
those  who  have  "cleansed"  themselves  "vigorously",  those  who  have 
44purged"  themselves  of  "  defilement"  --those  who  have  melted  away  the 
dross  of  sin  through  the  heat  of  their  penance--in  the  present  life,  here 
and  now,  will  be  spared  by  the  flames  of  the  apocalyptic  fire  in  the  next 
life.  The  poet's  terminology  is  significant.  Acleansad  is  of  particular 
note  in  the  context  of  my  larger  discussion  concerning  the  language  of 
metallurgical  purification;  there  are  three  instances  of  this  past  participle 
appearing  in  Psalm  12:  6  referring  to  the  purification  of  silver  in  the  forge 
(see  my  discussion  of  ametian,  above).  Further,  the  poet's  insistence 
that  the  soul  be  purged  "here",  before  one  journey's  "thither"  to  the 
judgment,  underscores  the  immediacy  of  the  need.  We  have  then  an 
example  of  an  eschatological  scene  which  both  utilizes  the  metaphor  of 
transmutation  and  invokes  the  theme  of  the  eschatological  present. Chapter  Five  379 
In  Chiist  III  we  find  another  such  example.  Here  the  poet  warns 
that  he  who  does  not  presently  care  for  the  state  of  his  soul  will  not  have 
the  option  to  do  so  after  the  judgment;  after  that  point  the  heat  of  the 
hottest  flames  can  no  longer  purify,  but  only  consume: 
Bi6  him  synwracu 
ondweard  undyrne;  pwt  is  ece  cwealm. 
Ne  mmg  pmt  hate  dwl  of  heoloacynne 
in  sinnehte  -  synne  forbEeman 
to  widan  feore,  wom  of  pmre  sawle, 
ac  PM  -r  se  deopa  seai5  dreorge  fede6, 
grundleas  gieme6  gmsta  on  peostre, 
wle6  hy  mid  ýy  ealdan  lige,  ond  mid  ýy  egsan  forste, 
wrqum  wyrmum  ond  mid  wita  fela, 
frecnum  feorhgomum,  folcum  scende6. 
pwt  we  magon  eahtan  ond  on  an  cwepan, 
so6e  secgan,  ýaet  se  sawle  weard, 
lifes  wisdom,  forloren  hmbbe, 
se  pe  nu  ne  gieme6  hwwýer  his  gmst  sie 
earm  pe  eadig,  ý  Oaar  he  ece  sceal 
wfter  hingonge  hamfwst  wesan. 
(11.1539b-1554) 
[The  wages  of  sin  will  be  manifestly  present  unto  them;  that  is 
eternal  torment.  That  hot  abyss  may  never,  not  in  a  perpetuity  of 
nights  nor  in  all  eternity,  smelt  the  sins  from  the  damned,  the 
iniquities  from  their  souls,  but  there  the  deep  pit  will  feed  upon 
the  sorrowful,  the  bottomless  place  will  care  for  spirits  in 
darkness,  it  will  kindle  them  with  the  ancient  flame  and  with  the 
fearful  frost;  by  wrathful  serpents  and  with  many  torments,  with Chapter  Five  380 
savage  jaws  it  -will  injure  the  people.  That  may  we  appreciate  and 
ever  declare,  that  may  we  say  in  truth,  that  he  has  lost  the 
protection  of  the  soul,  the  wisdom  of  life',  he  who  does  not  now 
take  care  whether  his  soul  is  wretched  or  blessed,  there  he  shall 
be  resident  eternally  after  death.  ] 
The  flames  of  hell  are  punishing,  not  purifying,  and  in  all  of  eternity 
they  never  will  serve  to'burn  out  the  sins  of  the  wicked.  Again,  the 
language  here  is  significant,  as  the  poet  both  uses  language  suggestive  of 
material  purification  and  highlights  the  urgent  need  to  get  on  with  that 
process.  65  In  the  dark  and  seething  pit  of  hell  it  will  be  too  late  for 
redemption,  and  that  inf  erno  cannot  help  to  purge  the  souls  of  the  sinful, 
but  can  only  torment  them;  "he  who  does  not  now  take  care"  to  look  to 
his  soul's  cleansing  will  without  a  doubt  spend  eternity  amongst  that 
miserable  throng.  - 
As  we  can  see,  this  understanding  of  the  eschatological  present 
resonates  well  with  our  conception  of  the  nature  of  transmutation;  while 
transmutation  relies  heavily  on  metallurgical  imagery,  and  Caie's  model 
of  the  idiosyncratic  "fire"  of  personal  eschatology  does  not  necessarily 
do  so,  this  is  the  only  real  distinction  to  be  drawn,  and  it  is  a  difference 
of  form  rather  than  one  of  substance.  "  In  both  cases  we  are  dealing  with 
models  for  understanding  the  nature  of  penance,  spiritual  change,  and 
redemption,  and  in  both  cases  the  change  involved--and  its  agency--are 
construed  to  be  the  responsibility  of  each  individual  soul.  One  is 
ultimately  responsible  for  one's  own  salvation,  in  the  sense  that  each 
soul  is  expected  to  determine  and  to  follow  that  course  of  action  and 
mode  of  life  which  God  has  willed.  66 
In  Old  English  eschatological  verse  we  are  confronted  with  texts 
which  conflate  and  extend  various  models  for  understanding  the  nature Chapter  Five  381 
of  spiritual  change.  In  the  fire  of  judgment  scenes  generally,  -  and  more 
specifically  in  the  metallurgic  metaphors  of  the  transmutation  model  and 
in  the  personal  and  immediate  nature  of  the  eschatological  present 
model,  we  catch  glimpses  of  Anglo-Saxon  conceptions  of  the  painful 
and  laborious  process  by  which  the  spirit  may  be  cleansed,  by  which 
identity  maybe  expunged  and  reformulated.,  An  understanding  of  these 
models  and  these  conceptions  is  integral  to  our  larger  discussion  of  the 
transformative  nature  of  pain  and  torture  in  Old  English  poetic  culture. 
Although  all  of  the  texts  and  traditions  involved  have  analogues  or 
sources  in  Latin  or  continental  vernaculars,  the  particular  manifestations 
in  Old  English  versions--the  specific  terminology  utilized  and  the 
stylistic  and  compositional  choices  involved--have  much  to  tell  us  about 
peculiarly  Anglo-Saxon  ideas  concerning  the  nature  of  spiritual 
transformation., 
Elene  is  a  noteworthy  case  in  point.  Judas's  spiritual 
transformation,  the  language  of  transmutation  used  to  describe  his 
cleansing,  and,  most  significantly,  the  relationship  between  his 
experience  and  that  of  the  souls  in  the  fire  of  judgment  scene  (a  scene 
which  does  not  appear  in  the  sources,  and  which  therefore  speaks 
eloquently  as  to  Anglo-Saxon  perceptions  of  spiritual  change),  all 
combine  to  offer  a  profound  statement  on  the  nature  of  spiritual  identity 
and  spiritual  change.  An  understanding  of  the  transmutative  model 
helps  us  to  comprehend  how  the  Anglo-Saxons  perceived  the  substance 
of  the  soul.  Spiritual  identity  is,  according  to  this  model,  neither  fixed 
nor  fluid,  but  a  hard  and  brittle  substance  which,  although  malleable,  can 
be  altered  only  through  a  slow  and  painful  process  of  reduction  and 
reformulation.  The  inscription  model  of  torture,  discussed  in  Chapter 
Four,  provides  one  way  of  understanding  this  painful  process  of  positive 
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spiritual  way  of  perceiving  this  necessary  spiritual  process.  Moreover,  a 
close  examination  of  this  model  helps  to  inform  further  our 
understanding  of  the  relationship  between  physical  torture  in  general  and 
issues  of  spiritual  identity.  Identity  can  be  changed,  and  indeed,  such 
change  as  Judas's  is  desirable;  but  it  is  not  easy.  An  understanding  of 
an  eschatological  present,  as  suggested  by  Caie,  helps  to  explicate  the 
Elene  poet's  addition  of  the  fire  of  judgment  scene  at  the  end  of  the 
poem,  and  also  helps  to  clarify  the  relationship  between  that  episode  and 
the  experience  of  Judas  in  the  body  of  the  text.  More  important  still,  an 
understanding  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  conception  of  the  relationship 
between  soul  and  body,  in  conjunction  with  the  moral  imperative  of 
personal  transmutation  with  which  we  are  confronted  in  such  a  text  as 
Elene,  illustrates  a  perception  of  the  function  and  the  nature  of  torture 
which  is  quite  at  odds  with  modern  sensibilities;  pain,  in  these  texts,  is 
good,  as  is  the  coercive  nature  of  many  of  these  transformations. 
As  I  mentioned  above,  Judas  serves  as  a  model  of  an  "  every- 
sinner",  and  this  role  is  made  manifest  through  its  relationship  to  the 
eschatological  passage  at  the  end  of  Elene.  Such  a  relationship 
underscores  the  immediacy  and  personal  nature  of  transmutation,  which 
is  the  purging  of  sin  from  the  soul  and  the  reconstitution  of  the  spirit  as 
"gold".  The  metallurgic  metaphors  of  transmutation  serve  as  a  reminder 
of  the  painful,  laborious  process  that  is  transmutation,  and  the  fact  that 
Judas's  experience  serves  as  a  contextual  counterpoint  to  that  of  the 
souls  in  the  fire  of  judgment  reinforces  the  message  that  nu  is  the  time 
for  this  process  to  take  place.  Through  this  relationship,  each  reader  of 
Flene  was  meant  to  understand  that  the  fire  of  judgment  is  a  metaphor 
for  their  own  personal  task  of  spiritual  smithing;  those  who  labor  over 
their  craft  now,  in  the  present  moment,  will  find  the  judgment  of  the  last 
day  to  be  an  affirmation  and  a  revelation  of  the  spiritual  purity  for  which Chapter  Five  383 
they  worked  constantly  and  steadfastly.  Those  who  do  not  look  to  their 
craft  now  will  find,  in  that  same  day  of  judgment,  an  altogether  more 
dolorous  revelation;  purification  will  not  come  for  them,  as  that  season 
will  be  past,  and  their  experience  of  fire  will  be  one  of  everlasting 
torment  and  tortuous  self-reproach  in  the  punishing,  not  purifying, 
flames  of  hell. 
Transmutation  is  a  process  whereby  the  sinner  may  be  saved,  and 
the  pain  suffered  in  this  life  is  to  be  embraced  if  by  it  the  soul  may 
forego  eternal  pain  in  the  next.  This  understanding  of  the  role  of 
spiritual  pain,  moreover,  may  be  extended  to  our  interpretation  of  Anglo- 
Saxon  attitudes  towards  physical  torture,  as  well;  the  function  of 
transformative  torture  is  to  exploit  the  link  between  the  physical  and  the 
spiritual,  to  the  short-term  detriment  of  the  former,  to  be  sure,  but  to  the 
long-term  benefit  of  the  latter.  The  transmutative  model  of  spiritual 
reformulation,  therefore,  helps  to  illuminate  for  us  this  fundamental 
axiom  of  Anglo-Saxon  attitudes  towards  torture.  And  lest  we  be  too 
quick  to  assume  that  this  is  merely  a  metaphorical  model,  meant  to  be 
understood  spiritually,  but  with  no  real  relationship  to  literal,  physical 
torture,  it  is  vital  that  we  remember  the  laws  of  Cnut,  and  those  of 
William,  discussed  in  Chapter  One.  Both  codes  substituted  physical 
torment  for  execution,  so  that  "  one  can  punish  and  at  the  same  time 
preserve  the  soul.  "  67  To  the  Anglo-Saxon  mind,  this  sentiment 
illustrates  the  primary  function  of  torture. Chapter  Five  384 
CHAPTER  FIVE  NOTES 
Mircea  Eliade,  The  Forge  and  the  Crucible.  Stephen  Corrin,  trans. 
2nd  ed.  Chicago:  U  of  Chicago  P,  1978.  Page  147.  Eliade's  is  largely 
an  anthropological  approach,  and  his  interest  lies  with  the  development 
of  transmutative  philosophies  as  these  evolve  concurrent  to  the  rise  of 
metallurgic  technologies.  He  studies  a  broad  range  of  cultures  across 
several  millennia,  and  explores  the  philosophical  "points  of  contact" 
common  to  all.  For  a  succinct  introduction,  see  pages  7-8: 
My  aim  has  been  to  attempt  to  gain  an  understanding  of  the 
behavior  of  primitive  societies  in  relation  to  Matter  and  to  follow 
the  spiritual  adventures  in  which  they  became  involved  when  they 
found  themselves  aware  of  their  power  to  change  the  mode  of 
being  of  substances  ...  Wherever  possible,  the  historico  -cultural 
context  of  the  various  metallurgical  complexes  has  been  taken  into 
account;  but  my  main  concern  has  been  to  pierce  through  to  the 
mental  world  which  lies  behind  them. 
Eliade's  is  an  attempt  to  understand  both  why  these  varied  cultures 
should  share  these  points  of  contact  (that  is,  what  is  it  about  metallurgy 
which  seems  to  evoke  more  or  less  universal  intellectual  reactions),  and 
how  these  common  roots  evolve  into  specific  practices  within  the 
various  alchemical  traditions.  The  book  is,  therefore,  split  into  two  main 
sections;  I  include  a  selection  from  pages  7-9  which  gives  an  overview 
of  these  two  parts: 
The  first  section  of  this  small  volume  presents  (through  the  eyes 
of  a  historian  of  religions)  a  group  of  myths,  rites  and  symbols 
peculiar  to  the  craft  of  the  miner,  smith  and  metal-worker  ...  The 
ideology  and  techniques  of  alchemy  constitute  the  main  theme  of 
the  second  part  of  this  work. Chapter  Five  385 
2  Though  Eliade  has  argued  that  the  technical  knowledge  of  the  ancients 
was  such  that  their  metallurgic  practices  must  have  been  somewhat 
"  scientific"  in  character,  -  he  recognizes  that"  empirical"  knowledge  did 
not  stand  in  the  way  of  mystical  revelation.  See  page  145: 
There  is  an  abundance  of  testimony  in  the  works  on  metallurgy 
and  the  craft  Of  the  goldsmith  in  the  ancient  Orient  to  show  that 
men  of  primitive  cultures  were  able  to  gain  knowledge  of,  and 
mastery  over,  matter.  A  number  of  technical  prescriptions  have 
come  down'to  us  ...  Historians  of  science  have  rightly  emphasized 
that  the  authors  of  these  prescriptions  make  -use  of  quantities  and 
, numbers  which  would  prove,  in  their  view,  the  scientific  , 
character  of  these  operations.  It  is  certain  that  the  smelters,  smiths 
and  master-goldsmiths  of  oriental  antiquity  could  calculate 
quantities  and  control  physico-chemical  processes  of  smelting  and 
alloyage.  For  all  that,  we  must  recognize  that  for  them  it  was  not 
solely  a'Metallurgical  or  chemical  operation,  a  technique  or 
science  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word  ...  the  operations  ...  also  had  a 
ritual  aspect. 
Betty  Jo  Teeter  Dobbs,  on  the  other  hand,  argues  from  rather  the 
opposite  position;  for  Dobbs  a  technical  ignorance  of  the  subject  is 
crucial,  although  she  grants  that  a  certain  amount  of  technical 
competence  is  necessary  during  actual  metal-working.  -  See  Dobbs's 
discussion  of  the  roots  of  alchemy  in  chapter  two  of  The  Foundations  of 
Newton's  Alch=7.  or,  "The  Hunting  of  the  Greene  L7on". 
Cambridge:  Cambridge  UP,  1975.  See  especially  pages  28-29: 
A  rational  and  too-detailed  knowledge  of  matter  has  its  own 
structure,  so  to  speak,  and  cannot  have  one  shaped  for  it  by  the 
alchemist.  Nevertheless,  the  use  of  matter  as  the  external  medium Chapter  Five  386 
for  projection,  as  well  as  the  acts  actually  performed  in  the 
laboratory,  were  absolutely  essential  for  the  functioning  of 
alchemy.  It  was  only  that  the  knowledge  of  matter  had  to  be  kept 
vague  ...  Thus  the  older  alchemy  comprised  a  delicate  balance  of 
ignorance,  and  an  overemphasis  on  either  its  material  or  its 
psychological  side  would  seriously  impair  its  vitality. 
Dobbs's  point  that  technical  competence  could  not  have  overshadowed 
ritualistic  significance  in  order  for  transmutation  to  be  an  effective 
metaphor  is  doubtless  sound;  still,  I  find  her  absolute  insistence  on 
technical  ignorance  to  be  somewhat  extreme,  and  I  think  that  Dobbs--in 
Eliade's  word  s--und  erestim  ates  the  intellectual  and  spiritual  capacity  of 
the  practitioners  of  transmutation. 
3  Titus  Burckhardt,  Alchem7.  *  Science  of  the  Cosmos,  Science  of  the 
Soul.  William  Stoddart,  trans.  London:  Stuart  &  Watkins,  1967.  Page 
23.  Burckhardt's  is  an  interesting  and  useful,  if  not  entirely  objective, 
study.  His  exploration  of  the  roots  and  the  history  of  alchemy  is 
particularly  illuminating,  although  his  critique  of  other  possible  ways  of 
understanding  the  evolution  of  philosophies  of  transmutation  can  border 
on  the  rabid  (e.  g.,  see  his  discussion  of  "depth  psychology"  (pages  8-9) 
which  I  discuss  below).  Much  of  his  discussion  of  the  philosophical 
nature  of  transmutation  is  particularly  of  interest,  as  he  seems  (as  I 
mentioned  in  the  text)  to  provide  "a  practitioner's  perspective". 
Burckhardt's  historical  perspective  is  questionable,  however,  and  he 
himself  acknowledges  that  his  is  not  an  unalloyed  "history".  See,  for 
example,  page  202: 
It  is  my  hope  that  the  foregoing  exposition  may  serve  to  rescue  the 
spiritual  horizon  proper  to  alchemy--the  "royal  art"--frorn  the Chapter  Five  387 
misleading  simplifications  inevidently  attendant  upon  a  purely 
historical  approach. 
It  must  be  admitted  that  Burckhardt's  critique  of  reductionist  and 
patronizing  attitudes  towards  pre-modem  societies,  presented  on  pages 
7-8,  is  sound: 
It  never  seemed  to  strike  anyone  as  in  the  least  improbable  that  an 
"art"  of  the  kind  alleged  should;  despite  all  of  its  folly  and 
deceptions,  have  implanted  itself  for  centuries  on  end  in  the  most 
diverse  cultures  of  East  and  West.  On  the  contrary,  people  were 
much  more  inclined  to  take  the  view  that  until  a  century  or  so  ago 
all  humanity  had  been  dreaming  a  stupid  dream,  the  awakening 
from  which  came  only  with  our  own  times,  as  if  the  spiritual- 
intellectual  faculty  of  man--his  power  to  distinguish  real  from 
unreal--were  itself  subject  to  some  sort  of  biological  evolution. 
Unfortunately,  his  attitude  towards  modem  concepts  of  matter,  spirit,, 
and  reality  is,  at  best,  equally  reductionist,  and,  at  worst,  positively 
"New  Age".  Page  203  offers  a  particularly  dogmatic  example: 
Modern  science  has  an  inexorable  eye  for  the  "childish"  errors 
which  exist  "  on  the  margin"  of  traditional  cosmology--but  which 
have  no  serious  consequences.  What  it  will  not  see  however  (but 
what  the  eyes  of  a  spiritual  art  such  as  alchemy  see  as 
overwhelmingly  significant)  are  its  own  infring  em.  ents  --quite 
unforeseeable  in  their  consequences--against  the  equilibrium  of 
man  and  nature,  not  to  speak  of  the  wholly  unjustifiable  claim  to 
totality,  and  the  far-reaching  and  indeed  almost  absolute 
repudiation  of  the  suprasensible  and  the  incorporeal,  which 
characterize  modern  science  ...  In  epochs  and  cultures  where  ego- 
consciousness  is  less  "coagulated"  and  the  relation  to  the  natural Chapter  Five  388 
environment  is  not  dominated  by  the  prejudices  of  a  purely 
rationalistic  outlook,  it  can  happen  more  easily  that  the  powers  of 
the  soul  exert  an  influence  directly  and  without  mechanical 
intervention  on  the  external  world. 
All  in  all,  Burckhardt's  study  is  valuable  insofar  as  he  collates  and 
articulates  various  aspects  of  transmutative  philosophies;  this 
information,  taken  with  the  knowledge  that  the  source  is  openly  biased, 
is  useful  and  at  times  enlightening. 
4  See  Burckhardt's  claim  of  this,  below  (note  also,  however,  my 
criticism  of  Burckhardt's  objectivity,  above).  Still,  his  claim  serves  to 
illustrate  my  point  that  although  alchemy  was  (and,  evidently,  is) 
thought  to  be  primarily  metaphorical,  literal  transmutation  is  not  ruled 
out  as  a  physical  manifestation  of  a  spiritual  transformation. 
5  Burckhardt,  page  24; 
6  See  Burckhardt$,  page  26:  Spiritually  understood,  the  transmutation 
of  lead  into  gold  is  nothing  other  than  the  regaining  of  the  original 
nobility  of  human  nature.  " 
7  See  Eliade,  pages  149-150.  He  discusses  the  representational 
significance  of  passion,  death,  and  resurrection  in  the  initiation  rites  of 
mystery  cults,  and  describes  an  analogy  drawn  between  the 
transmutative  experiences  of  the  initiate  and  the  God/sufferer  which  the 
alchemist  then  extends  from  the  spiritual  into  the  material  world: 
It  is  known  that  the  essence  of  initiation  into  the  Mysteries  , 
consisted  of  participation  in  the  passion,  death  and  resurrection  of 
a  God  ...  one  can  conjecture  that  the  sufferings,  death  and 
resurrection  of  the  God,  already  known  to  the  neophyte  as  a  myth 
or  as  authentic  history,  were  communicated  to  him  during 
initiations,  in  an  "experimental"  manner.  The  meaning  and Chapter  Five  389 
finality  of  the  Mysteries  were  the  transmutation  of  man.  By 
experience  of  initiatory  death  and  resurrection,  the  initiate 
changed  his  mode  of  being  (he  became  "immortal")... 
Furthermore,  it  is  the  mystical  drama  of  the  God--his  passion, 
death  and  resurrection--which  is  projected  onto  matter  in  order  to 
transmute  it.  All  in  all,  the  alchemist  treats  his  Matter  as  the  God 
was  treated  in  the  Mysteries;  the  mineral  substances  "  suffer", 
"  die"  or  "  are  reborn"  to  another  mode  of  being,  that  is,  are 
transmuted. 
8  Eliade,  page  151. 
9  See  Eliade,  page  152: 
There  was  no  hope  of  "resuscitating"  to  a  transcendent  mode  of 
being  (that  is,  no  hope  of  attaining  to  transmutation),  without  prior 
"death".  The  alchemical  symbolism  of  torture  and  death  is 
sometimes  equivocal;  the  operation  can  be  taken  to  refer  to  either 
a  man  or  to  a  mineral  substance. 
10  See  Eliade,  page  154: 
According  to  certain  writers,  dissolution  is  the  first  operation; 
according  to  others  it  is  calcination,  the  reduction  to  the 
amorphous  by  Fire.  However  that  may  be,  the  result  is  the  same: 
"  death". 
Eliade  is  discussing  the  reduction  of  materials  (in  alchemy)  to  the 
Mate1japrima;  it  is  pertinent  to  my  later  discussion  that  he  mentions 
"dissolution"  and  "calcination". 
II  Burckhardt,  page  8. 
12  Eliade,  pages  8-9. 
13  See  Burckhardt,  pages  12-13: Chapter  Five  390 
In  "  archaic"  cultures,  unacquainted  as  yet  with  the  dichotomy  of 
44  spiritual"  and  "practical",  and  seeing  everything  in  relation  to  the 
inner  unity  of  man  and  the  cosmos,  the  preparation  of  ores  is 
always  carried  out  as  a  sacred  procedure.  As  a  rule  it  is  the  , 
prerogative  of  a  priestly  caste,  called  to  this  activity  by  divine 
command.  Where  this  is  not  so,  as  in  the  case  of  certain  African 
tribes  which  have  no  metallurgic  tradition  of  their  own,  the 
smelter  or  smith,  as  an  unauthorized  interloper  into  the  sacred 
order  of  nature,  falls  under  suspicion  of  engaging  in  black  magic. 
14  See  Eliade,  page  169: 
If  our  analysis  and  interpretation  are  well  founded,  alchemy 
prolongs  and  consummates  a  very  old  dream  of  homo  faber: 
collaboration  in  the  perfecting  of  matter  while  at  the  same  time 
securing  perfection  for  himself. 
15  For  criticism  of  Jung's  "ahistorical"  approach,  see  Dobbs,  page  40; 
see  also  Walter  Pagel,  "Jung's  Views  on  Alchemy.  "  Isis  39  (1948):  44- 
48.  In  a  different  vein,  Burckhardt  accuses  Jung  of  basing  his  view  "on 
the  assumption  that  the  alchemist's  prime  intention  was  to  make  gold" 
(page  9),  and  haughtily  dismisses  "depth  psychology"  on  this  basis;  his 
attack  seems  unwarranted  to  me,  and  is  an  example  of  Burckhardt's 
subjectivity  and  consequent  sensitivity. 
16  Eliade,  page  11.  See  also  Dobbs,  page  26: 
Jung  came  to  his  study  of  alchemical  literature  through  the 
realization  that  the  dreams  of  his  patients  were  often  rich  in  the 
archaic  symbolism  of  alchemy  even  though  the  patients  were 
totally  unacquainted  with  alchemical  subject  matter. 
17  Dobbs,  page  29. 
18  See  Dobbs,  -page  30: Chapter  Five  391 
The  "persona"  includes  those  traits  of  character  and  behavior 
which  the  individual  has  emphasized  and  developed  and  become 
conscious  of  in  the  course  of  making  his  social  adjustments  --traits 
which  help  him  hold  a  job,  find  a  marriage  partner,  act  as  a  parent, 
etc.  The  development  of  the  "persona",  however,  necessarily  left 
other  potential  characteristics  repressed  or  underdeveloped, 
according  to  Jung,  and  these  potentialities  are  all  still  present  in 
the  individual's  unconscious.  In  general  a  repressed  or 
underdeveloped  trait  will  be  the  inverse  of  one  which  is 
flourishing  openly  in  the  "persona".  For  example,  a  person  who 
presents  a  benign  and  gentle  aspect  to  the  world  will  yet  have 
buried  aggressive  tendencies  in  his  unconscious,  whereas  the 
converse  might  be  true  in  another  person. 
19  See  Dobbs,  page  30: 
Before  the  maturation  process  begins  in  the  psyche,  the  conscious 
44persona"  or  mask-like  part  of  the  personality  is  able  to  accept 
only  the  "light"  or  socially  desirable  member  of  each  pair  of 
opposites  as  belonging  to  the  personality,  the  "dark"  or  unwanted 
members  having  been  repressed  into  the  personal  unconscious  at 
an  earlier  stage  of  psychic  development.  Here  they  constitute 
what  Jung  calls  the"  shadow". 
20  Dobbs,  page  30. 
21  See  Dobbs,  page  30: 
The  first  step  in  individuation  is  facing  the  "shadow"  and 
incorporating  it  together  with  the  "persona"  in  the  burgeoning  new 
center.  The  first  step  in  alchemy  is  similarly  an  evocation  of  a 
"blackness",  followed  by  its  transformation  into  something 
new  ...  Numerous  symbolic  expressions  for  the  step  occur  in Chapter  Five  392 
alchemy:  ideas  of  putrefaction,  death  and  blackness;  processes  of 
reducing  the  matter  to  the  state  of  nigredo.  Since  in  a  sense  the 
49  persona"  must  kill  its  own  bright  image  of  itself,  must  die  and 
sink  into  the  blackness  of  the  "shadow"  in  order  to  be  born  again, 
these  are  peculiarly  and  dramatically  appropriate  symbols. 
22  See  Dobbs,  page  27: 
...  the  secret  knowledge  about  transformation  was  in  reality  an 
unconscious  or  semi-conscious  understanding  of  certain 
psychological  changes  internal  to  the  adept.  Since  he  was 
unaware  of  their  true  nature,  however,  the  alchemist  projected  the 
process  of  change  upon  matter,  projected,  that  is,  in  the 
psychological  sense,  which  meant  that  he  "saw"  the  processes 
taking  place  externaU7. 
23  Burckhardt,  page  18. 
24  See  Dobbs,  page  29: 
[Jung]  has  amply  demonstrated  the  affinity  of  alchemical  concepts 
with  the  major  religions  of  the  world  as  well  as  with  his  own 
psychological  theories,  so  that  even  though  one  may  not  agree 
with  every  detail  of  his  analyses,  there  hardly  seems  room  to 
doubt  the  general  correctness  of  his  stance. 
25  See  Burckhardt,  page  2  1: 
In  reality  alchemy,  which  is  not  a  religion  by  itself,  requires  to  be 
confirmed  by  the  revelation--with  its  means  of  grace--which  is 
addressed  to  all  men.  This  confirmation  consists  in  the  alchemical 
way  and  work  being  recognized  by  the  alchemist  himself  as  one 
particular  means  of  access  to  the  full  meaning  of  the  eternal  and 
saving  message  of  revelation. 
26  Eliade,  page  157. Chapter  Five  393 
27  Burckhardt,  page  204.  Burckhardt  is  here  defending  the  concept  of 
material  transmutation  as  an  outward  manifestation  of  inward 
transformation;  he  seems  to  be  a  believer: 
The  transmutation  of  base  metals  into  gold  is  certainly  not  the  true 
goal  of  alchemy,  nor  can  it  ever  be  achieved  when  it  is  sought 
after  entirely  for  its  own'sake.  'Nevertheless  there  is  evidence  in 
favour  of  the  visible  achievement  of  the  magisterium,  which 
cannot  simply  b6brushed  aside  with  a  wave  of  the  hand.  The 
metallurgical  symbolism  is  so  organically  linked  with  the  inward 
work  of  alchemy,  that  in  rare  cases  that  which  was  realized 
inwardly  also  occurred  on  the  outward  plane--not  as  the  result  of 
any  chemical  operation,  but  as  a  spontaneous  outward 
concomitant  of  an  extra-ordinary  spiritual  state.  The  occurrence 
of  spiritual  transmutation  is  already  a  miracle,  and  is  certainly  no 
smaller  a  miracle  than  the  sudden  production  of  gold  from  a  base 
metal. 
Though  it  is  clear  that  Burckhardt  is  not  an  uninterested  observer,  his 
lack  of  objectivity  is,  once  allowed  for,  actually  his  strength  as  a 
resource--his  work  illuminates  the  philosophical  position  of  a 
practitioner  of  transmutation  in  ways  that  a  more  empirical  work  could 
not. 
28  See  Eliade,  page  170: 
It  is  through  fire  that  "Nature  is  changed",  and  it  is  significant  that 
the  mastery  of  fire  asserts  itself  both  in  the  cultural  progress  which 
is  an  offshoot  of  metallurgy,  and  in  the  psych  o  -physiol  ogi  cat 
techniques  which  are  the  basis  of  the  most  ancient  magics  and 
known  shamanic  mystiques.  From  the  time  of  this  very  primitive 
phase  of  culture,  fire  is  used  as  the  transmuting  agent. Chapter  Five  394 
,: 
V  in  Anglo-Saxon  29  See  Milton  McC.  Gatch,  Preaching  and  Theolog 
England:  Elftic  and  Wulfstan.  Toronto:,  U  of  Toronto  P,  1977.  See 
page  125: 
The  idea  of  purgatory  appears  to  have  originated  as  an  extension 
of  the  Doomsday  fire,  partly  as  a  means  of  justifying  intercessory 
prayer  and,  rather  later,  in  connection  with  the  concept  that  sins 
must  be  expiated. 
30  See  Jacques  Le  Goff,  The  Birth  of  Purgatory.  Arthur  Goldhammer, 
trans.  Chicago:  U  of  Chicago  P,  1984.  Le  Goff  discusses  the  evolution 
of  this  concept  from  pre-Christian  "Ancient  Imaginings"  (he  cites  , 
sources  from  Hindu,  Egyptian,  and  Persian  texts,  for  example)  until  its 
final  solidification  into  the  form  which  we  recognize  today:  a  place 
where  the  "  sinful  saved"  go  to  "work  off  "  their  spiritual  debt  to  society, 
as  it  were.  For  a  discussion  arguing  that  this  solidified  form  does  not 
emerge  until  late  in  the  middle  ages,  see  page  357: 
Purgatory  was  ultimately  enshrined  in  the  doctrine  of  the  Catholic 
Church  between  the  middle  of  the  fifteenth  and  the  beginning  of 
the  seventeenth  century,  first  being  affirmed  against  the  Greeks  at 
the  Council  of  Florence  (1439)  and  later  against  the  Protestants  at 
the  Council  of  Trent  (IS62). 
31  See  Le  Goff,  pages  112-166.  The  "Waiting  room"  model  of  the 
afterlife  is  illustrated  in  English  ecclesiastical  writing  in  Bede's  eighth- 
, 
ythelm,  in  which  the  narrator  visits  century  account  of  The  Vision  of  Dr 
the  dual  waiting  rooms  in  a  dream;  he  at  first  mistakes  these 
antechambers  for  heaven  and  hell  themselves,  but  his  guide  soon  sets 
him  straight.  Le  Goff  includes  a  version  of  the  pertinent  passages  on 
pages  114-1  IS: Chapter  Five  395 
The  valley  that  you  saw,  with  its  horrible  burning  flames  and  icy 
cold  -  is  the  place  where  souls  are  tried  and  punished  who  have 
delayed  to  confess  and  amend  their  wicked  ways,  and  who  at  last 
had  recourse  to  penitence  at  the  hour  of  death,  and  so  depart  life. 
Because  they  confessed  and  were  penitent,  although  only  at  death, 
they  will  be  admitted  into  the  Kingdom  of  Heaven  on  the  Day  of 
Judgment.  The  fiery  noisome  pit  that  you  saw  is  the  mouth  of 
Hell,  and  whosoever  falls  into  it  will  never  be  delivered 
throughout  eternity.  This  flowery  place,  where  you  see  these  fair 
young  people  so  happy  and  resplendent,  is  where  the  souls  are 
received  who  die  having  done  good,  but  are  not  so  perfect  as  to- 
merit  immediate  entry  into  the  Kingdom  of  Heaven.  But  at  the 
Day  of  Judgment  they  shall  all  see  Christ  and  enter  upon  the  joys 
of  His  heavenly  Kingdom.  And  whoever  are  perfect  in  word, 
deed,  and  thought,  enter  the  Kingdom  of  Heaven  as  soon  as  they 
leave  the  body. 
It  is  notable  that,  in  this  binary  waiting  room  afterlife,  only  the 
antechamber  of  hell  seems  to  correspond  to  what  we  think  of  as 
purgatory:  a  place  where  sin  is  slowly,  painfully  expunged  from  the 
soul,  and  the  duration  of  one's  stay  is  determined  by  the  severity  of 
one's  sinfulness. 
32  See  Gatch,  page  81: 
On  Doomsday  at  the  sound  of  the  trumpet,  all  will  die  in  the 
purging  fire;  the  dead  will  be  raised  and  the  fire  will  purge  those 
who  have  not  yet  atoned  for  all  their  sins;  but  the  conflagration 
will  leave  the  pure  unharmed. 
Commonly,  the  fire  of  judgment  is  preceded  (and,  I  would  argue, 
prefigured)  by  the  doomsday  fire  which  ravages  and  purges  the  world. Chapter  Five  396 
The  examples  of  this  fire  are  numerous,  but  see  Gatch's  discussion 
thereof  On  page  90.  It  is  significant  that  the  earth  is  cleansed  by  fire  in  a 
way  analogous  to  that  whereby  souls  are  purged;  this  earthly  parallel  to 
purgation  on  Doomsday  underscores  the  relationship  between  the  , 
physical  and  the  spiritual  described  by  the  philosophy  of  transmutation. 
33  Le  Goff,  page  54. 
34  See,  for  example,  Le,  ý*icus  10:  1-2;  Deuteronom7  32:  22;  Jeremiah 
15:  14. 
35  Le  Goff,  page  53. 
36  SeeLeGoff,  page54:  "Origen  thought  that  all  men,  even  the 
righteous,  must  be  tried  by  fire,  since  no  one  is  absolutely  pure.  Every 
soul  is  tainted  by  the  mere  fact  of  its  union  with  the  flesh.  " 
37  See  also  Gatch,  page  98: 
Although  serious  sins  cannot  be  atoned  for  by  the  soul;  lesser  ones 
can  be.  The  purgatorial  fire,  inflicting  worse  torture  than  any 
human  king  could  devise,  punishes  remediable  sins  for  as  long  as 
necessary,  given  the  gravity  of  the  misdeeds  and  the  interposition 
of  intercessory  prayers. 
38  Le  Goff,  page  54. 
39  See  Le  Goff,  page  57: 
Nevertheless,  it  was  Origen  who  clearly  stated  for  the  first  time 
the  idea  that  the  soul  can  be  purified  in  the  other  world  after  death. 
For  the  first  time  a  distinction  was  drawn  between  mortal  and 
lesser  sins.  We  even  see  three  categories  beginning  to  take  shape: 
the  righteous,  who  pass  through  the  fire  of  judgment  and  go 
directly  to  heaven;  those  guilty  of  lesser  sins  only,  whose  sojourn 
in  the  "fire  of  combustion"  is  brief;  and  44mortal  sinners,  "  who 
remain  in  the  flames  for  an  extended  period.  Origen  actually Chapter  Five  397 
develops  the  metaphor  introduced  by  Paul  in  1  Corinthians  3:  10- 
15.  He  divides  the  substances  mentioned  by  Paul  into  two 
categories.  Gold,,  silver,  and  the  precious  gems  are  associated 
with  the  righteous;  wood,  hay,  and  straw  indicate  the  "lesser" 
sinners.  And  Origen  adds  a  third  category:  iron,  lead,  and  bronze 
are  associated  with  those  guilty  of  worse  sins. 
It  is  significant  that  Origen  adds  the  base  metals  to  the  metaphor;  over 
time  the  non-metallurgic  symbols  are  completely  supplanted  by  them. 
40  See  Gatch,  pages  126-127: 
On  the  subject  of  the  suffering  of  incorporeal  substances  in 
corporeal  fire  (ch.  xc),  he  held  that  it  is  suitable  to  punish  a 
spiritual  substance  with  a  bodily  thing,  for  in  human  life  this  is 
exactly  the  punishment  of  the  soul  in  the  body.  - 
41  Michael  J.  -  B.  Allen&  Daniel  G.  Calder,  Sources  and  Analogues  of 
OldEnglisbPoetr7.  '  The  Major  Latin  Texts  in  Translation.  Totowa,  NJ: 
Rowman  &  Littlefield,  1976.  In  their  introduction  to  the  sources  for  the 
OE  Flene,  the  authors  state  on  page  59:  ' 
A  large  number  of  Latin  texts  containing  the  various  narrative 
details  still  survive  and,  for  a  number  of  reasons,  Cynewulf's 
source  was  undoubtedly  based  on  the  stem  of  that  tradition  ...  the 
source  of  Elene  must  have  closely  resembled  three  Latin 
versions  ...  (but)  scholars  usually  hold  that  the  Elene  is  most  similar 
to  the  Acta  Quitiaci. 
With  the  exception  of  the  homiletic  addition  with  which  Cynewulf  ends 
his  version,  Mene  follows  closely  the  text  of  The  Acts  of  Saint  Cpjacus 
which  Allen  and  Calder  include  in  their  work. 
42  The  poem  opens  in  the  sixth  year  of  the  reign  of  the  emperor 
Constantine.  His  army  meets  with  a  much  greater  host  of  Huns  and Chapter  Five  399 
Goths  on  the  banks  of  the  river  Danube,  and  Constantine  is  nearly 
overcome  by  despair.  On  the  eve  of  battle  he  falls  into  a  slumber,  and  he 
dreams  that  an  angel  appears  unto  him  and  bids  him  to  look  to  the  skies 
for  the  sign  by  which  he  will  conquer--what  he  sees,  of  course,  is  the 
sign  of  the  cross.  At  daybreak  he  orders  a  cross  made  and  carried  before 
his  troops,  and  the  Romans  are,  in  fact,  victorious. 
-  Needless  to  say,  Constantine  is  quickly  converted  and  baptized, 
and  he  sends  his  mother  Elene  to  Palestine  to  recover  the  true  cross.  She 
goes  eagerly,  and  upon  her  arrival  she  meets  with  a  delegation  of  Jews, 
whom  she  charges  to  lead  her  to  the  cross;  the  wise  men  of  the  Jews,  led 
by  a  man  named  Judas,  'claim  ignorance,  though  they  know  very  well 
where  it  is.  Finally,  Elene  casts  Judas  into  a"  dry  pit"  for  seven  days  and 
seven  nights,  without  food  or  water.  At  the  end  of  this  period  Judas 
readily  converts,  confesses  his  sin,  and  leads  Elene  to  the  cross,  which 
he  himself  unearths  twenty  feet  under  the  ground.  Judas  is  baptized  and 
becomes  a  bishop;  he  later  brings  the  nails  from  the  cross  to  Elene,  who 
promptly  has  them  made  into  a  bit  for  the  bridle  of  her  son.  The  poem 
ends  with  a  seemingly  unrelated  homiletic  passage,  and  it  is  at  this  point 
that  the  author  markedly  diverges  from  his  sources;  this  passage 
describes  doomsday  and  the  fire  of  judgment,  and  contains  the  runic 
signature  of  Cynewulf. 
43  When  the  narrative  ends  on  1.21  of  folio  132b  with  the  word  "finit", 
a  new  section  numbered  XV  begins  (the  narrative  of  the  invention  of  the 
cross  itself  makes  up  sections  I-XIV).  This  final  section  contains  the 
aforementioned  closing  passage,  which  describes  doomsday  and  the  fire 
of  judgment,  and  which  contains  the  runic  signature  of  Cynewulf.  When 
this  section  XV  ends  on  1.6  of  folio  133b  with  the  word  "  amen",  it  is 
immediately  followed  by  a  part  of  the  prose  life  of  St.  Guthlac,  without Chapter  Five  399 
section  numbeting  (See  Krapp  XL).  Both  the  numbering  and  poetic 
nature  of  this  passage  earmark  it  as  a  part  of  the  larger  narrative  work. 
44  Judas's  "cleansing"  seems  to  me  to  be  a  figural  linchpin  of  sorts,  in 
that  it  binds  together  and  helps  to  clarify  several  different  levels  of 
transformation  which  recur  throughout  the  poem,  including  conversion, 
baptism,  salvation,  purgation,  and  damnation.  The  central  role, 
however,  of  Judas's  experience  is  as  an  explication  and  prefiguration  of 
Cynewulf's  description  of  the  day  of  judgment:  such  prefiguration  - 
draws  this  description  into  the  narrative;  in  turn,  the  fire  of  judgment 
episode  both  explicates  and  validates  the  means  of  spiritual 
44  refashioning"  by  which  the  tainted  material  which  was  Judas  is  recast  in 
the  spiritual  mold  of  Christianity.  See  Daniel  G.  Calder,  "  Strife, 
Revelation,  and  Conversion:  The  Thematic  Structure  of  Fdene.  "  English 
Studies  53  (1972):  201-210.  Calder  discusses  the  poem  in  terms  of 
recurring  thematic  cycles.,  Each  succeeding  episode  in  the  poem  is  one 
of  a  series  of  "concentric'!  rings,  and  each  echoes  and  refines  the 
spiritual  message.  Calder  sees  Judas's  experience  in  the  pit  as  twofold: 
literal  and  figural.  Literally,  it  is"the  final'and  most  effective  device 
which  Elene  has  at  her  disposal";  figurally,  this  "entombment"  is  "a 
symbolic  parallel  to  Christ's  burial"  (pages  205-206).  John  P.  Hermann 
points  out  that  the  flaw  in  Calder's  analogy  is  that  Christ  and  the  cross 
are  both  "entombed"  through  the  agency  of  God's  enemies,  while  Judas 
is  cast  in  the  pit  at  the  command  of  Elene,  who  is  an  agent,  presumably, 
of  God's  will.  See  Allegories  of  War.  Language  and  Violence  in  Old 
, 
y.  Ann  Arbor:  U  of  Michigan  P,  1989.  Pages  114-115. 
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45  Bosworth-Toller,  page  380. 
46  Catherine  A.  Regan,  "  Evangelicalism  as  the  Informing  Principle  of 
Cynewulf's  Elene.  "  Traditio  29  (1973):  27-52.  Regan  argues  that Chapter  Five  400 
Judas's  experience  in  the  pit  is  a  figural  representation  of  the  , 
Catechumen's  preparation  for  baptism.  She  describes  Judas's  ordeal  in 
the  terms  of  the  early  Church  liturgy  concerning  baptism;  Elene's 
figural  leading  of  Judas  to  "  see  the  light"  is,  to  Regan,  representative  of 
the  liturgical  process  which  led  to  the  sacrament  of  baptism  (page  35). 
To  Regan,  Elene's  discipline  of  Judas  takes  the  form  of  an  "inverted 
passion"  (page  35)..  Regan  likens  Judas's  privation  to  the  pre-baptismal 
fast  of  the  Catechumen  (page  43).  Regan's  reading  of  Judas  is  literal  in 
the  sense  that  a  new  convert  to  the  early  Church  would,  indeed,  undergo 
a  process  of  purgation  prior  to  baptism,  but  it  is  figural  in  that  it 
represents  "the  conversion  of  a  soul  to  the  Christian  faith"  (page  45). 
47  As  Hermann  points  out,  "torture  in  the  name  of  a  Higher  Truth  is  not 
the  same  as  fasting  voluntarily  chosen.  "  Page  108.  Hermann  takes  issue 
with  Regan  on  two  points  which  are  of  primary  importance:  the  first  has 
to  do  with  the  physical  nature  of  what  Hermann  terms  "torture"  (page 
105);  the  second  concerns  the  involuntary  nature  of  Judas's  conversion 
(page  108).  Regan  states  that  the  relationship  between  Elene  and  Judas 
"is  emblematic  of  the  relationship  of  the  Church  with  its  members.  There 
is  mutual  need"  (page  3  1).  According  to  this  model,  Elene,  the  Church, 
needs  the  faith  and  obedience  of  Judas,  the  unconverted;  in  return  Judas 
needs  the  "prodding"  of  Elene  to  see  the  light  and  seek  salvation  (page 
3  1).  On  page  105  Hermann  questions  Regan's  reading  of  Elene's  role  as 
the  Church,  and  of  Judas's  "need"  for  physical  torture: 
... 
is  "prodding"  the  right  word  for  seven  days  in  a  pit  without  food 
or  drink?  If  the  literal  treatment  of  Judas  and  the  Jews  is  seen  as 
primarily  symbolic,  perhaps  such  diction  is  acceptable.  But  it 
proves  dangerous  to  move  so  quickly  to  a  symbolic  level  that 
justifies  torture  as  a  service  to  the  victim. Chapter  Five  401 
48  See  Graham  D.  Caie,  The  Judgment  Da7  Theme  in  Old  English 
Poetr7.  Publications  of  the  Department  of  English,  University  of 
Copenhagen.  Michael  Chesnutt, Graham  D.  Caie,  Lis  Christensen  and 
Niels  Davidsen-Nielsen,  eds.  Copenhagen:  Nova,  1976.  See  Caie  for  a 
discussion  of  the  relationship  between baptism  by  water  and  baptism  by 
fire,  and  more  specifically  the  relationship  between  flood  and  fire 
imagery  in  the  context  of  spiritual  purification.  See  page  171  for  several 
references  to  Old  English  poetry: 
Fý,  rba&  "bath  of  fire"  appears  in  Chtist  III  985b  to  describe  the 
parallel  between  the  flood  and  the  purgatorial  flames  of  doom, 
while  in  The  Phoenix437  the  fyrba6e  has  definite,  baptismal 
connotations  in  an  explicitly  didactic  and  explanatory 
passage  ...  what  is  definite...  is  the  figurative  "baptismal"  function 
of  the  fire  and  water,  the  cleansing  of  the  soul  in  this  world  (e.  g., 
Pbx  51  8ff.,  Ele  1286ff.,  Dan  346-9,  etc.  )  The  stress  is  once  more 
seen  to  be  placed  on  man  in  his  present  abode  and  not  on 
theological  points. 
For  further  references  to  the  analogy  between  cleansing  by  water  and 
cleansing  by  fire  in  Old  English  eschatology,  see  also  Caie  pages  96, 
10  1,  and  166-168.  For  patristic  influences  on  this  concept,  see 
especially  Caie's  reference  to  Origen,  page  10  1:  fire  burns  away  that 
which  corrupts/detracts  from  the  essence  of  purity;  water  washes  clean 
but  fire  not  only  cleans  but  transforms  base  into  pure. 
49  Bosworth-Toiler,  page  53. 
50  For  a  discussion  of  this  term  as  a  spiritual  metaphor,  see  Caie's 
description  of  the  doomsday  flame  in  Chlist  III,  page  196: 
The  dark  flame  seoýM  "boils",  "seethes"  (994a),  but, 
significantly,  seopan  can  also  mean  "purify",  and  this  line  could' Chapter  Five  402 
also  be  interpreted  as  "the  dark  flame  will  purify  those  [already] 
led  astray  by  sin".  This,  then,  is  the  poet's  conception  of  a 
purgatory,  which,  like  all  the  other  events,  is  occurring 
simultaneously  (cf.  Ele  1295-8  and  Phx520-6). 
51  George  Phillip  Krapp  and  Elliot  Van  Kirk  Dobbie,  eds.  The  Exeter 
Book.  Vol.  III  of  ASPR.  NY:  Columbia  UP,  1936.  All  citations  from 
Chiist  III  are  from  Krapp  &  Dobbie;  all  translations  are  the  author's. 
52  Bosworth-Toiler,  page  37. 
53  Others  include  Malachi  3:  3,  Numbers  31:  22  and  Zechafiah  13:  9. 
54  See  Blake's  note  on  ametian,  page  83. 
55  See  Blake's  note  on  ab7wan,  page  83. 
56  For  a  related  treatment  of  The  Phoenix  and  eschatological  fire 
scenes,  see  Caie,  -pages  148-149. 
57  See  Caie.  In  this  case,  the  responsibility  for  the  act  of  transmutation 
falls  to  the  individual,  who  is  smith  of  his  own  soul,  as  it  were;  see  page 
112: 
, yrd  "fate",  the  destiny  of  the  world,  [Man]  has  no  power  over  w 
but  he  has  freewill  concerning  his  own  destiny.  The  burden  is 
placed  firmly  on  the  shoulders  of  the  individual,  for  the 
apocalyptic  fire  can  either  purify  or  consume  ...  at  a  time  in  the 
future,  ordained  by  fate,  the  holocaust  will  come,  but  the  destiny 
of  the  individual  is  not  ruled  by  that  point  in  time,  but  by  every 
moment  in  the  present. 
In  this  life,  then,  the  individual  acts  as  the  agent  of  his  own 
transmutation;  at  the  time  of  the  apocalyptic  fire,  however,  it  is  too  late 
for  "  self-fashioning",  and  Christ  will  test  the  product  of  each  soul's 
spiritual  labor  in  the  heat  of  the  fire  of  judgment.  See  my  discussion  in 
the  conclusion  to  this  chapter. Chapter  Five  403 
58  The  renaming  of  Judas  in  11.1058-1062  seems  especially  significant 
in  this  context. 
59  For  an  interesting  manifestation  of  a  related  idea,  see  my  treatment 
of  "  exhaltation"  versus  "pain"  in  regards  to  the  youths  in  the  furnace  in 
Daniel  in  Chapter  Two;  I  cite  two  instances  from  the  poem  in  which  we 
are  informed  of  how  pleasant  the  righteous  youths  find  the  flames  of  the 
furnace,  but  there  are  others  (e.  g.:  11.335b-344).  See  also  Riddle  Six,  in 
which  the  sun  is  a  weapon  of  terror  to  some  and  a  comforter  to  others. 
60  Caie,  page  103.  For  related  discussions  of  the  imperative  of 
purification  nu  in  Judgment  Da7  II  and  Chtist  III,  see  (respectively)  Caie 
page  158  and  page  164. 
61  Caie,  page  234.  --  - 
62  Caie,  page  226.  -- 
63  See  Caie,  page  227: 
In  every  moment  slumbers  the  eschatological  moment,  the  time 
when  one's  eternal  "fate",  (dom)  is  determined,  and  the 
responsibility  is  placed  strongly  on  the  shoulders  of  the  individual 
to  choose  to  do  well,  to  be  domgeorn,  or  else  to  forfeit 
immortality  and  become  domleas  ("damned"  in  the  Christian 
sense).  For  this  reason  dom  has  only  the  positive  and  moral  sense 
of  immortality,  and  never  means  everlasting  "infamy";  it 
embodies  the  state  of  perfection  which  everyone  must  strive  to 
reach,  and  which  must  be  upheld  if  society  is  to  function, 
especially  when  the  society  is  based  on'hierarchical  principles 
which  assume  a  state  of  perfection.  And  also,  because  of  this 
definition  of  dom  which  is  at  the  centre  of  the  Doomsday  verse, 
there  is  no  middle  state,  no  Purgatory,  for  man  is  either  domgeorn 
or  domleas.  In  the  eschatological  present  man  decides  to  act  well, Chapter  Five  404 
thus  invoking  a  personal  "parousia",  the  descent  of  Christ  and  the 
perfected  state  of  regeneration  for  the  individual;  otherwise  he 
separates  himself  from  his  God,  from  Perfection. 
While  I  agree  with  Caie's  assessment  of  the  theology  involved  in  this 
understanding  of  the  doomsday  verse,  I  wonder  if  such  a  metaphor  for 
the  labor  involved  in  personal  salvation  was  not  often  interpreted  out  of 
context.  The  popular  understanding  of  the  doomsday  motif  surely  was 
(and  certainly  is)  that  the  fire  (of  purgatory  and/or  of  hell)  at  the  end  of 
time  will  serve  to  purify  and  to  consume  sin  and  sinners.  The  more 
metaphorical  meaning  (i.  e.  the  "  eschatological  present")  certainly 
resonates  very  well  with  our  understanding  of  other  transmutative 
traditions,  and  is  certainly  more  theologically  sound;  still,  I  believe  that 
these  spiritual  issues  are  largely  overlooked  by  the  popular  imagination, 
which,  for  instance,  has  ever  linked  alchemy  with  the  desire  to  produce 
gold  from  base  metal,  and  likewise  has  ever  linked  the  fire  at  the  end  of 
time  with  a  historical  event  (actual  or  imagined)  which  will  occur  at 
some  fixed  point  in  the  future.  In  any  case,  this  is  a  relatively  minor 
point;  my  own  study  is  not  interested  in  the  popular  conception  of  these 
ideas,  except  in  passing,  and  I  raise  these  specters  simply  in  order  to 
address  them.  Caie's  conclusions  are  theologically  sound  and 
meticulously  argued,  and  tend  to  support  my  own  vision  of  the  uses  of 
metallurgical  metaphors  in  Old  English  eschatological  verse. 
64  Elliot  Van  Kirk  Dobbie,  ed.  The  Anglo-Saxon  Minor  Poems.  Vol. 
VI  of  ASPR.  New  York:  Columbia  UP,  1942.  All  citations  from 
judgment  Da7  H  are  from  D  obbie;  all  translations  are  the  author'  s. 
65  Forbwrnan,  while  literally  denoting  "to  bum"  or  "to  consume  with 
fire",  here  clearly  carries  the  connotation  "to  purify  through  fire",  and,  in 
the  context  of  this  fire  of  judgment  scene,  might  be  thought  to  carry  an Chapter  Five  405 
implication  of  "smelting",  or  some  other  such  metallurgical  metaphor. 
Indeed,  in  more  than  one  translation  of  this  passage,  this  term  is  taken  as 
44  smelt".  See,  for  example,  S.  A.  J.  Bradley. 
66  Salvation,  is  of  course,  ultimately  an  act  of  grace  extended  to 
believers  through  Christ's  sacrifice  on  the  cross;  it  is  hardly  doctrinally 
sound  to  imply  that  salvation  may  be  "  earned",  any  more  than  it  is  to 
imply  that  all  actions  are  not  foreseen  and  not  preordained  in  the  first 
place.  But  the  models  in  which  we  are  interested,  although  drawn  from 
some  doctrinal  sources,  as  we  have  seen,  are  more  interested  in  the 
nature  of  personal  morality  than  in  finer  points  of  theology.  These 
models  stress  the  personal  responsibility  of  each  individual  Christian, 
and  although  they  offer  a  template  of  proper  action,  they  do  not  deal  in 
depth  with  the  nuances  of  the  nature  of  salvation. 
67  Whitelock,  page  423;  from  the  laws  of  Cnut,  30.5. Conclusion  406 
CONCLUSION:  Findings,  Significance,  and  the  Role  of  the  "Other" 
The  aim  of  this  study  has  been  to  analyze  the  disparate  elements, 
within  an  Old  English  poetic  context,  which  contribute  to  the  process 
defined  as  "torture".  I  have  achieved  this  objective  by  assembling  a 
variety  of  different  kinds  of  sources  and  evidence  from  across  Anglo- 
Saxon  literature  and  contemporary  disciplines,  and  by  utilizing  these  to 
translate  the  "great  uniform  text"  of  Anglo-Saxon  poetic  torture  into  an 
intelligible  idiom.  This  "text"  is  cumulative,  and  so  I  approached  the 
task  from  a  number  of  perspectives,  each  of  which  added  to  the  sum  of 
our  knowledge  concerning  torture,  pain,  the  relationship  between  the 
body  and  the  spirit,  and  the  specifically  Anglo-Saxon  manifestations  of 
these  phenomena.  Throughout  the  course  of  this  project,  as  this  uniform 
text  unfolded,  I  established  the  following  points:, 
1)  "Torture"  is  any  deliberate  and  systematic  application  of  pain 
or  destruction  of  any  kind  which  is  used  to  achieve  some  specific 
end.  Although  torture  is  unfolded  in  individual  acts,  it  must  be 
perceived  as  a  coherent  process  within  a  culture.  This  process 
may  best  be  identified  and  described  through  a  composite  method, 
through  the  component  parts  of  which  a  profile  of  torture  may  be 
compiled.  Anglo-Saxon  literary  torture  usually  is  concerned  with 
issues  of  identity  and  of  power. 
2)  Pain  is  a  necessary  component  of  torture,  and  thus  a  study  of 
pain  must  be  at  the  heart  of  any  study  of  torture.  Pain  is  a 
complex  and  shifting  phenomenon  with  internal  spiritual, 
psychological,  and  emotional  components  in  addition  to  any 
external  physical  stimuli.  The  Anglo-Saxons  understood  pain  as Conclusion  407 
an  affective  and  largely  spiritual  state,  and  Anglo-Saxon  literary 
torture  consistently  was  formulated  in  terms  betraying  a 
knowledge  of  the  bridge  which  pain  provides  between  body  and 
spirit. 
3)  Individual  torture  acts  may  be  perceived  as  language  acts 
within  the  larger  cultural  discourse  of  the  uniform  text.  Such  acts 
necessitate  a  public  nature  in'order  to  signify;  hence  witnessing 
plays  a  vital  role  in  the  nature  of  torture.  Anglo-Saxon 
descriptions  of  torture  consistently  contain  references  to  such  acts 
of  witnessing. 
4)  Such  contemporary  critical  models  as  "the  body  as  text"  and 
"inscription"-  are  valuable  in  efforts  to  organize  and  to  explicate 
the  functions  of  torture  in  Anglo-Saxon  literary  contexts.  Further, 
such  post-structuralist  models  have  analogues  in  Old  English 
literary  conventions  which  link  literal  acts  of  physical  engraving 
with  metaphorical  acts  of  the  inscription  of  spiritual  identity; 
these  conventions  also  associate  literal  acts  of  physical  burying 
with  metaphorical  acts  of  obscuring  such  identity. 
5)  In  order  to  appreciate  the  function  of  torture  in  Anglo-Saxon 
literature  it  is  necessary  to  understand  the  link  between  the 
physical  and  the  spiritual  within  the  context  of  that  literary 
culture.  This  link  is  based  upon  various  philosophical  and 
theological  traditions  which  are  not  specifically  Anglo-Saxon,  but 
this  conception  is  particularly  popular  in  Old  English  literature, 
and  Anglo-Saxon  poetic  torture  very  often  utilizes  these  links. 
For  example,  torture  might  be  applied  upon  the  body  in  order  to 
affect  a  spiritual  change,  or  conversely,  spiritual  nature  might Conclusion  408 
manifest  itself  in  physical  terms  upon  the  body.  This  relationship 
is  developed  most  fully  in  Old  English  eschatological  models  in 
which  acts  of  spiritual  purgation  are  articulated  through  the 
metaphor  of  material  purification.  These  models,  however,  were 
understood  to  be  literal  as  well  as  metaphorical,  and  therefore  Old 
English  eschatological  poetry  helps  to  illuminate  the  larger 
context  within  which,  for  example,  legal  codes  codify  torture  and 
historical  annals  record  acts  of  torture.  The  converse  is  likewise 
true. 
Torture  is  a  highly  ordered  and  complex  cultural  process  which 
often  seems,  paradoxically,  chaotic  and  utterly  unintelligible.  I  have 
therefore  constructed  an  interdisciplinary  methodological  model  which 
helps  to  organize  and  to  clarify  the  many  facets  and  the  shadowy  nature 
of  torture,  and  I  have  applied  this  critical  model  to  the  specific  context  of 
Anglo-Saxon  literature.  Modem  medicine,  anthropology,  psychology, 
political  science,  and  linguistics  have  much  to  tell  us  about  the  nature  of 
pain,  and  about  the  political,  psychological,  and  semiotic  significance  of 
torture.  Further,  the  contemporary  understanding  which  is  informed  by 
such  disciplines  sometimes  approaches  and  intersects  with  that  which 
may  be  reconstructed  from  the  Anglo-Saxon  literary  milieu  (e.  g.  pain  is 
a  linguistically  inexpressible  experience,  torture  acts  may  function  as 
language,  the  body  may  be  utilized  as  a  document,  torture  may  function 
as  a  force  which  expunges  and  reformulates  identity,  etc.  ). 
It  would  be  inaccurate  to  draw  the  conclusion  from  such  findings, 
however,  that  the  Anglo-Saxons  perceived  pain  and  torture  in  roughly 
the  same  way  that  we  do.  Pain,  in  our  culture,  often  is  perceived  of  as 
the  enemy  which  we  will  spare  no  expense  to  eradicate;  torture  likewise 
is  universally  condemned  as  a  barbaric  throwback  to  earlier,  more  brutal, Conclusion  409 
less  enlightened  times.  I  have  no  wish  to  confront  these  assumptions. 
One  of  the  most  interesting  discoveries  of  my  study,  however,  has  been 
that,  although  we  share  certain  understandings  regarding  pain  and  torture 
with  Anglo-Saxon  literary  culture,  we  go  too  far  when  we  assume  that 
the  Anglo-Saxons  shared  our  most  basic  assumptions.  Pain  and  torture 
need  not  be  evil  in  an  Anglo-Saxon  context--indeed,  they  are  quite  the 
opposite--and  they  represent,  in  fact,  both  necessary  and  desirable 
physical  and  spiritual  exercises.,  These  findings  concerning  both  the 
nature  of  torture  in  Anglo-Saxon  poetry,  and  the  perceptions  of  that 
culture  concerning  pain  and  torture,  serve  to  inform,  not  only  our 
understanding  of  Anglo-Saxon  literature,  but  also  our  understanding  of 
torture  more  generally.  ý  Indeed  i  such  findings  may  provide  a  starting  ý 
point  for  a  deeper  understanding  of  our  own  culture's  attitudes  towards 
violence,  pain,  and  torture.  It  is  my  hope,  therefore,  that  both  my 
methodological  model  and  the  study  based  upon  it  will  be  of  use  to 
Angio-Saxonists  and  to  scholars  of  torture  alike.  In  that  spirit,  I 
conclude  this  study  with  a  brief  overview  of  points  of  convergence  and 
divergence  between  contemporary  and  Anglo-Saxon  models  of  torture, 
placing  special  emphasis  on  the  role  of  the  perception  of  "otherness"  as  a 
pre-condition  of  all  torture  ýa  role  which  is  illustrated  amply  in  Anglo- 
Saxon  models.  I 
Contemporary  torture  and  Anglo-Saxon  poetic  models  of  torture 
share,  of  course,  a  number  of  common  characteristics;  most 
fundamentally  these  comprise  their  relationships  to  pain,  but  they  also 
include  a  number  of  functions  and  preconditions.  In  practice,  however, 
contemporary  torture  has  undergone  a  revolutionary  change  in  the  last 
century;  added  to  such  age-old  torments  as  beating  on  the  soles  of  the 
feet  (called  falanga  or  falaka,  and  attested  to  for  millennia),  general 
beatings,  sleep  and  light  deprivation,  starvation  and  dehydration,  solitary Conclusion  4  10 
confinement,  burning,  branding,  and  mutilation,  are  such  recent 
.  nnovations  as  pointed  electrodes  (picana  elecuica),  cattle  prods,  acids, 
caustic  chemicals,  and  pain-  and  psych  osis-cau  sing  pharmaceuticals,  to 
name  but  a  few.  1,  Some  of  this  shift  in  methodology  is  due  to 
technological  "  advances",  of  course,  but  other  (especially  electrical  and 
pharmacological)  examples  are  characteristic  of  the  primary 
philosophical  difference  between  ancient  and  modem  torture,  which  has 
to  do  with  concerns  regarding  external  perceptions  of  the  practice. 
While  contemporary  practitioners  of  torture  by  necessity  construct 
elaborate  rationalizations  to  validate  such  practices  (as  we  shall  shortly 
see),  they  also  engage  in  a  double-speak  through  which  they  publicly 
denounce  and  deny  the  very  practices  which  they  privately  embrace  and 
justify.  Hence,  while  the  medieval  practice  of  torture  presupposes 
witnessing  and  a  public  nature  as  a  primary  facet  and  precondition  for 
torture,  contemporary  practices  are  by  their  very  nature  hidden.  2 
A  fundamental  common  denominator  between  Anglo-Saxon  and 
contemporary  torture,  however,  is  grounded  in  the  very  rationalizations 
validating  torture  to  which  I  just  alluded.  A  fundamental  precondition  of 
any  act  of  torture  is  a  sense  of  "otherness"  on  the  part  of  the  torturer 
which  allows  him  to  distinguish  himself  from  his  victim.  Such 
alienation  concurrently  removes  both  the  victim's  humanity  from  the 
conception  of  the  torturer  and  the  barrier  against  inhuman  action  from 
the  conscience  of  the  torturer.,  We  tend  to  attribute  monstrous  qualities 
to  our  conception  of  a  torturer,  assuming  that  only  a  bestial  and 
subhuman  sadist  could  possibly  be  involved  in  such  a  horrific  practice. 
By  so  doing  we  seek  comfort  in  our  own  subconscious  act  of 
dehumanization  and  alienation,  assuring  ourselves  that  such  individuals 
are  aberrations,  and  therefore  quantifiable  and  identifiable.  Most, 
research  suggests  that  the  truth  is  far  less  comforting;  although  sadistic Conclusion  411 
monsters  can  and  do  exist  and  practice  torture,  the  real  horror  of  torture 
is  that  most  torturers  are  not  drawn  from  the  ranks  of  the  inhuman.  3 
Participation  in  the  process  of  torture  is  generally  the  result  of  learned 
behavior,  not  natural  predisposition,  and  torturers  are  indoctrinated  into 
the  process  through  conditioning,  the  aim  of  which  is  to  establish  a  sense 
of  superior  humanity  and  purpose  (relative  to  the  victim)  in  the  mind  of 
the  torturer.  Torturers  learn  to  consider  their  victims  to  be  guilty,  evil, 
subhuman,  alien;  it  is  this  very  quality  of  otherness  which  makes  the 
torture  practice  possible.  "  Every  ideology  presupposes  an 
anthropology",  that  is,  a  conception  of  what  it  is  to  be  human,  and  what 
is  appropriate  in  the  treatment  of  human  beings.  4  The  anthropology  of 
torture  presupposes  humanity  and  moral  superiority  on  the  part  of  the 
torturer,  and  subhumanity  and  moral  turpitude  on  the  part  of  the  victim: 
Man  is  capable  of  torturing  fellow  human  beings,  but  he  also  feels 
the  need  to  justify  what  he  is  doing.  It  seems  to  be  a  pre-condition 
for  torture  that  the  torturer  have  a  world  view,  no  matter  how 
crude,  that  divides  man  into  the  torturable  and  the  non-torturable. 
This  distinction  can  be  based  on  any  of  the  manifold  ways  of 
distinguishing  one  man  from  another:  it  can  be  race,  colour, 
nationality,  class,  or  differing  beliefs,  usually  political  or  religious. 
The  torturer  represents,  and  by  the  act  of  torture  is  defending,  the 
4good'  values.  The  victim  is  not  'chosen',  he  is  not  human.  5 
This  bipolarity  is  a  precondition  for  all  torture,  medieval  and  modern;  I 
turn  now  to  an  example  of  such  bipolarity  as  it  manifested  itself  in  the 
process  of  torture  in  late  twentieth-century  Argentina.  This  context  is  of 
particular  relevance  to  my  discussion,  because  the  military  junta  which  it 
concerns  viewed  itself  in  an  explicitly  medieval  and  allegorical  way. Conclusion  412 
After  briefly  considering  the  ramifications  of  this  particular  articulation 
of  the  bipolar  anthropology  of  torture  in  the  context  of  Anglo-Saxon 
torture,  I  will  conclude  this  study  by  noting  the  centrality  of  the  concept 
of  the  other  in  the  Anglo-Saxon  examples  which  we  have  studied. 
, Ychosexuality,  &  Radical  In  Divine  Violence:,  Spectacle,  Ps 
Chiistianiv  in  the  Argentine  "Dirty  War",  Frank  Graziano  explores  the 
anthropology  of  torture  subscribed  to  by  the  Argentine  military  junta  of 
the  1970s.  6  Graziano's  examination  of  this  anthropology  does  much  to 
inform  our  understanding  of  medieval  anthropologies  of  torture,  as 
Graziano  ascribes  to  the  junta  a  self-consciously  medieval  world  view 
which  includes  a  vision  of  the  other  closely  related  to  that  with  which  we 
are  interested.  The  fundamental  philosophy  of  the  Argentine  "dirty 
war",  according  to  Graziano,  was  constructed  in  mythological  terms 
which  were  based  upon  medieval  theological  concepts  and  folklore 
motifs;  the  primary  theological  model  informing  that  mythology  was 
that  of  the  struggle  between  the  Messiah  and  the  Antichrist: 
"The  disappeared"  --that  euphemism  in  itself  conjures  up  the 
magical  possibilities  that  distance  myths  and  folktales  from 
positive  empiricism.  ... 
As  a  complement  to  these  poetics  of 
fantastic  vanishing,  one  finds  in  the  "  dirty  war"  other  motifs  also 
prevalent  in  folklore  and,  notably,  in  the  religious  tales  of  the 
Middle  Ages:  an  enemy-as-monster;  a  diabolical,  invisible  force 
of  evil;  an  Antichrist;  a  society  cast  into  chaos  by  its  own  sins;  a 
legend-laden  Hero--courageous,  self-sacrificing,  divinely  guided 
and  empowered--assuming  the  immense  messianic  task  and 
struggling,  prevailing,  restoring  happy  order  for  the  People.  7 Conclusion  413 
Graziano  describes  a  "Myth  of  the  Metaphysical  Enemy"  in  which 
the  abstract  concept  of  evil  takes  on  physical  form  and  literal  reality  in 
the  persons  of  those  construed  as  the  other;  in  a  self-fulfilling  act  of 
interpretation,  the  acts  of  torture  performed  by  the  junta  then  articulated 
a  doctrine  of  orthodoxy  which  clearly  divided  the  sheep  from  the  goats: 
"I  am  sacred  and  an7one  who  contests  me  is  a  blasphemer-.  8  Inother 
words,  the  program  of  torture  pursued  by  the  junta  was  self-referential  in 
that  this  torture  was  validated  and  explicated  through  its  relationship  to 
the  other,  while  the  other  itself  was  defined  through  acts  of  torture. 
Those  who  must  be  tortured  were  the  enemy,  and  those  who  were  the 
enemy  must  be  tortured.  Either  statement,  in  this  context,  may  serve  as 
the  first  principle  of  the  other  statement.  The  junta,  in  a  like  manner, 
then  defined  itself  through  its  opposition  to  the  other;  the  other  is  the 
Antichrist,  and  therefore  the  self  is  the  Messiah  who  must  battle  and 
subdue  the  Beast.  9 
In  this  context,  the  body  of  the  victim  of  torture  acts  as  a 
microcosm  of  the  larger  spiritual  struggle  between  Good  and  Evil,  and 
between  Savior  and  Satan.  10  In  the  terms  of  this  cosmic  struggle,  then, 
the  violence  of  the  torture  represents  the  attack  of  the  forces  of  light 
upon  those  of  darkness,  and  the  eventual  triumph  of  the  former.  In  the 
terms  of  the  body  of  the  victim  itself,  the  function  of  the  torture  is  to 
destroy  the  evil  localized  in  the  spirit  through  an  attack  upon  the  body: 
When  torture  rituals  in  the  Argentine  detention  centers  exorcised 
the  "unclean  spirit"  from  each  infiltrated  "subversive"  with  the 
touch  of  the  picana,  the  many-in-one  poetics  obtained.  Cleansing 
of  not  only  the  specific  victim  (antichrist)  at  hand  but  beyond  him 
two  corporate  entities  to  which  he  was  integral  was  suggested:  the 
Antichrist  with  the  capital  letter  was  assaulted  through  each Conclusion  414 
embodiment  representing  him  on  the  torture  table,  and  in  the 
process  the  corpus  m7sticum  of  Argentina,  the  social  body  to 
which  the  Yictim,  belonged  and  which  he  defiled  with  his  demonic 
possession,  was  ritually  purified  via  the  casting  out  of  the 
"unclean  spirit".  11 
This  conception  of  the  function  of  torture  is  clearly  related  to  that 
informed  by  Anglo-Saxon  perceptions  of  the  relationship  between  the 
physical  and  the  spiritual  upon  which  we  have  lavished  so  much 
attention.  Further,  both  the  eschatological  models  to  which  Graziano 
refers,  and  the  transmutative  function  of  torture  implicit  in  his 
description  of  the  "exorcising"'of  "unclean  spirits"  from  the  body  of  the 
victim,  recall  and  refine  our  understanding  of  the  relationship  between 
Anglo-Saxon  eschatological  models  of  the  fire  of  judgment  and  the 
methods  and  functions  of  temporal  torture.  We  have  in  this  example  of 
contemporary  political  torture,  then,  a  lens  with  which  we  may  magnify 
and  examine  some  of  the  most  fundamental  aspects  of  Anglo-Saxon 
torture.  Conversely,  it  is  clear  that  these  medieval  models  of  torture,  and 
most  especially  the  explicit  theological,  philosophical,  and  semiotic 
facets  thereof,  reflect  and  reveal  many  components  of  contemporary 
political  torture. 
The  function  of  the  other  is  an  interesting  and  significant  point  of 
convergence  between  medieval  and  modem  anthropologies  of  torture. 
Here  is  an  example  of  a  much-cited  critical  conceit  which,  in  the  context 
of  torture,  becomes  a  horrific  and  necessary  precondition  of  physical 
violence  and  destruction,  and  not  just  another  clever  intellectual 
construct.  This  is  indicative  of  many  theoretical  concepts  which  we 
have  utilized  in  our  exploration  of  the  nature  and  function  of  torture; 
that  which  is intellectual  and  abstract  in  the  realm  of  literary  criticism Conclusion  4  15 
becomes  crushingly  real  and  present  upon  the  bodies  of  victims  of 
torture.  It  seems  the  nature  of  humankind  to  divide  itself  by  any  number 
of  criteria:  kin  groups,  social  and  economic  classes,  race,  religion, 
ethnicity,  nationality;  This  predilection  to  seek  the  community  of  like 
persons  is  often  defended  as  a  search  for  "identity",  but  any  such  identity 
by  necessity  is  exclusive.  As  we  have  seen,  torture  is  one  result  of  such 
exclusivity. 
Torture  presupposes  the  presence  of  the  other,  and  the  definition 
of  self  in  opposition  to  that  other.  In  torture  generally,  that  which  is 
alien  is  hated,  feared,  threatening,  and  therefore  must  be  silenced, 
transformed,  destroyed.  More  to  the  point,  in  the  Anglo-Saxon  contexts 
which  we  have  studied,  the  other  must  be  silenced,  destroyed, 
reformulated,  re-voiced  with  the  language  of  the  dominant  discourse; 
Anglo-Saxon  torture,  and  especially  literary  torture,  ultimately  attempts 
to  replace  unacceptable  discourse  and  identity  with  their  acceptable 
counterparts:  Elene  reduces  and  reformulates  the  person,  spirit,  and 
voice  of  Judas;  the  Mermedonians  attempt  to  destroy  the  holy  Andreas, 
but  unwittingly  transform  him  into  a  type  of  Christ;  Judith  reduces  the 
sinful  body  of  Holofernes  into  a  text  upon  which  is  written  the  glory  and 
majesty  of  God. 
It  is  vital  to  recognize,  however,  that  this  paradigm  of  identity 
ultimately  rests  upon  opposition  to  the  other,  and  therefore  the  other 
must  never  be  wholly  eradicated;  otherwise,  the  self  is  indefinable. 
Thus  Satan,  the  souls  in  hell,  and  those  who  are  irredeemable  in  the  fire 
of  judgment,  are  not  utterly  reduced,  which  would  seem  most 
reasonable,  but  instead  undergo  a  process'of  eternal  destruction.  Such 
eternal  destruction  acts  not  simply  as  a  punishment  for  the  sinful,  but 
concurrently  as  a  necessity  for  the  righteous,  for  the  sinful  serve  a  vital 
function;  the  acceptable  is  defined  by  its  opposition  to  the  other.  This  is Conclusion  416 
the  paradox  of  the  other,  and  the  house  of  cards  which  is  torture  rests 
upon  such  a  paradox.  We  may  torture  only  that  which  we  define  as 
alien,  other,  inhuman,  but  as  we  define  ourselves  in  direct  opposition  to 
the  other,  we  must  never  wholly  destroy  that  other,  or  else  we  must 
constantly  reevaluate  our  sense  of  otherness  in  order  to  maintain  our 
sense  of  self.  Further,  each  such  act  of  alienation  and  dehumanization 
serves  to  erode  our  humanity  in  proportion  to  that  of  the  other;  such  is 
the  slippery  slope  of  torture. 
In  The  Dream  of  the  Rood,  the  Savior  brings  together  the 
Christian  community  through  his  experience  of  the  common 
denominator  of  pain  at  the  hands  of,  and  in  opposition  to,  those  who  are 
overtly  described  as  the  "enemy":  the  evil,  the  minions  of  Satan,  the 
alien,  the  other.  In  all  of  the  poetic  cases  which  I  have  described,  a  clear 
distinction  is  made,  in  the  terms  of  the  manifestation  of  each  torture  act, 
between  the  community  of  the  cross  and  the  powers  of  darkness.  In  the 
historical  and  legal  sources  such  a  distinction  is  not  always  explicit,  but 
is  present  nonetheless,  and  often  in  overtly  moral  terms.  All  pain,  all 
suffering,  is  part  of  God's  Providence,  part  of  the  Divine  plan,  and  it  is 
all  therefore  good;  but  not  all  agents,  nor  all  victims,  are  good.  A  clear 
bipolar  opposition  always  is  drawn,  however,  in  this  dualistic  world:  the 
other  is  alien,  and  thus  the  enemy,  black  as  night,  necessarily  evil.  In  the 
Anglo-Saxon  paradigm  of  torture,  the  victim  must  be  good  if  the  torturer 
is  evil,  or  the  victim  must  be  evil  if  the  torturer  is  good.  There  is  no 
ambiguity,  there  is  no  room  for  shades  of  gray.  In  this  manner,  our 
contemporary  model  of  torture,  and  its  imperative  relationship  to  the 
other,  helps  to  illuminate  the  fundamental  bipolarity  of  Anglo-Saxon 
spirituality  as  this  was  manifested  in  the  literary  construct  of  torture, 
which  comprises  historical,  legal,  theological,  spiritual,  physical, 
literary,  and  linguistic  elements.  Likewise,  our  understanding  of  the Conclusion  417 
function  of  such  cross-cultural  bipolarity  in  the  terms  of  Anglo-Saxon 
literary  torture  has  much  to  teach  us  about  the  nature  of  literal  torture,  its 
function  as  an  aspect  of  culture,  and  the  basic  chauvinistic  cultural 
mechanism  which  ultimately  allows  torture,  medieval  or  modem,  to 
exist.  12 Conclusion  418 
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types  of  torture  and  the  semantic  significance  of  such  slang  in  Amnesty 
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interest  to  this  study  in  that  the  reformulation  of  the  torturer  parallels  that 
which  we  have  discussed  in  the  terms  of  the  victim.  For  a  discussion  of 
long-term  psychological  affects  upon  torturers,  see  Amnesty 
International,  Report,  pages  63-68.  For  an  account  of  ordinary  men  cast 
into  the  roles  of  torturer  and  victim,  and  forced  to  come  to  terms  with 
their  relationship  to  each  other  outside  of  the  torture  room,  see  Eric 
Lomax,  The  Railway  Man.  London:  Vintage,  1995.  See  especially 
pages  238-276. 
4  Peters,  page  163. 
5  Amnesty  International,  Report,  page  3  1. 
6  Frank  Graziano,  Divine  Violence:  Spectacle,  Ps7chosexualiýy,  & 
Radical  Chtistianityin  the  Argentine  "Dirty  War.  "  Boulder,  CO: 
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7  Graziano,  page  107.  Throughout  his  work,  Graziano  consistently 
invokes  and  explains  medieval  models  of  the  other  and  of  the  battle 
between  good  and  evil  as  these  manifest  themselves  in  the  anthropology 
and  practice  of  torture  by  the  junta;  see  discussion  below.  See 
especially  pages  108-109  and  144  for  a  full  analysis  of  the  medieval 
metaphor  of  the  other  in  this  context.  Graziano's  theoretical  model  is 
sophisticated,  and  draws  upon  the  work  of  Barthes,  L6vi-Strauss,  Hegel, 
Koj6ve,  and  Lacan,  to  name  but  a  few  who  are  cited  in  this  section  of  his 
study. 
8  Graziano,  page  127;  the  citation  is  from  Barthes,  and  the  italics  are 
original.  Graziano  discusses  at  length  the  role  of  Marxism  as  the 
doctrine  of  the  Antichrist  in  this  context;  further,  my  allusion  to  the 
eschatological  role  of  the  Savior  is  deliberate,  as  here  Graziano  utilizes 
the  medieval  model  of  eschatology  as  it  pertains  to  the  other.  See Conclusion  420 
especially  pages  126-129.  See  also  Graziano's  discussion  of  the  other  as 
a  representation  of  the  presence  of  an  absence  which  "  arouses"  the 
action  of  the  "hero",  pages  138-146. 
9  See  Graziano,  pages  120-125,  for  a  discussion  of  the  torturer  as 
Messiah;  once  again,  Graziano  consistently  interprets  the  junta  through 
a  medieval  gloss. 
10  See  Graziano,  page  13: 
When  the  naked  Argentine  victim  was  bound  to  the  torture  table 
and  subjected  to  electrical  discharge  on  his  or  her  gums,  genitals, 
and  nipples,  the  magnitude  of  the  offense  was  symbolically 
avenged.  Here  the  medieval  view  of  the  body  as  a  microcosm 
where  cosmic  struggles  between  Good  and  Evil,  between  Christ 
and  Antichrist,  are  battled  out  is  apparent:  Each  victim's  body 
tortured  in  the  Argentine  detention  center  localized,  rehearsed,  and 
ritually  mirrored  the  grand  eschatological  battle  that  the  just  war, 
the  "  dirty  war",  represented  in  the  grand  view  of  the  military 
perpetrators. 
See  also  page  129. 
11  Graziano,  page  129. 
12  The  necessity  of  a  bipolar  relationship  between  torturer  and  victim, 
between  self  and  other,  is  also  the  basis  for  another  consistent  facet  of 
torture,  medieval  and  modern:  the  rationalization  of  this  process  as  a 
44necessary  evil",  as  the  bitter  tonic  which  will  heal  the  body  politic.  See 
Amnesty  International,  Eighties,  pages  6-7,  for  "the  moral  argument" 
consistently  offered  in  support  of  torture  practices;  see  also  Amnesty 
International,  Report,  pages  22-24.  See  Peters,  pages  177-179,  for  a 
similar  discussion  concerning  French  rationalizations  for  torture 
practices  in  Algeria.  The  basic  argument  is  that  "we"  do  not  really  wish Conclusion  421 
to  torture  "them"  but  "must"  in  order  to  affect  a  "greater  good  of  the 
greater  number"  (i.  e.  the  greater  good  is  whatever  we  want  it  to  be). Appendices  422 
AFrERWORD, 
In  this  thesis  I  have  aspired  to  a  number  of  goals,  some  of  which 
have  been  more  fully  realized  than  others.  In  the  broadest  possible 
terms,  I  think  that  it  would  be  fair  to  say  that  I  have  begun  a  serious 
enquiry  into  the  relationship  between  the  ideas  of  pain  and  torture  (as 
these  are  developed  and  revealed  through  Old  English  religious  poetry) 
and  the  language  utilized  to  express  and  interrogate  these  ideas.  I  have 
attempted  to  examine  this  relationship  by  marrying  close  textual  and 
linguistic  analysis  with  larger  theoretic  constructs.  As  successful  as  I 
feel  this  beginning  has  been,  it  is,  asyet,  only  a  beginning.  It  is  the 
purpose  of  this  Afterword  and  the  succeeding  Appendices  to  give  the 
reader  a  sense  of  the  larger,  on-going  project  which  I  envision,  as  well  as 
an  idea  of  its  direction  and  utility. 
As  I  stated  in  the  body  of  my  thesis,  my  primary  interest  is  literary 
and  poetic,  and  thus,  while  I  take  an  interest  in  history,  the  law, 
medicine,  and  the  like,  my  project  is  and  will  remain  primarily  a  study  of 
Old  English  poetry.  Therefore,  although  I  plan  to  look  at  non-poetic  and 
non-literary  texts  where  these  inform  and  clarify  my  examination--and 
especially  in  the  context  of  linguistic  studies  utilizing  such  works  as  A 
Tbesaurus  of  Old  English  and  The  Microfiche  Concordance  to  Old 
English--this  is  first  and  foremost  a  study  of  poetic  language  and  ideas. 
As  I  develop  this  project  more  fully,  however,  I  hope  to  extend  my 
investigation  of  torture  into  a  wider  survey  of  the  language  involved, 
focusing  on  a  number  of  non-poetic  genres  which  were  only  tangentially 
touched  upon  in  this  preliminary  study;  notable  genres  would  include 
homiletic  and  medical  texts,  both  of  which  offer  rich  possibilities  for  the 
student  of  the  language  of  pain  and  torture  (both  literary  and  non- 
literary).  Moreovers'I  plan  to  ground  my  discussion  of  larger Appendices  423 
philosophical  ideas  concerning  pain  and  torture  in  an  Old  English  poetic 
lexicon  of  these  concepts,  look  at  the  semantic  flexibility  of  this  lexicon, 
and  examine  how  individual  terms  in  specific  instances  serve  to  develop 
such  ideas  by  employing  such  flexibility. 
The  tools  which  I  will  use  to  develop  this  lexicon  include  A 
Thesaurus  of  Old  English  and  The  Microfiche  Concordance  to  Old 
English.  The  Historical  Thesaurus  of  English  is  a  project  which  aspires 
to  the  systematic  classification  of  the  entire  English  lexicon  through  a 
notational  and  historical  survey  of  each  term;  such  a  tool  will  allow 
scholars  to  systematically  chart  structural  shifts  in  the  organization,  of  the 
English  lexicon.  The  first  volume  of  A  Thesaurus  of  Old  English,  the 
preliminary  component  of  The  Historical  Thesaurus,  arranges  the  Old 
English  lexicon  conceptually  under  the  rubrics  of  semantic  fields;  the 
second  volume  lists  each  term  alphabetically,  cross-referencing  it  with 
the  semantic  fields  outlined  in  the  first  volume.  This  tool  is  particularly 
well-suited  to  a  compilation  of  a  lexicon  of  pain  and  torture  (or  indeed, 
of  any  other  conceptual  lexicon);  the  category  from  the  Thesaurus  most 
relevant  to  my  study  is  02.08.03  (Pain,  bodily  discomfort)  and  its 
subcategory  02.08.03.01  (Extreme  pain,  torture,  torment).  The 
Microfiche  Concordance  to  Old  English,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a 
compendium  of  each  occurrence  of  every  form  of  every  term  in  the 
entire  old  English  lexicon;  used  in  conjunction  with  A  Thesaurus  of  Old 
English,  this  tool  allows  a  comprehensive  survey  of  the  terms  under 
scrutiny.  In  the  context  of  my  project,  the  combination  of  these  two 
resources  will  allow  me  to  develop  a  sense  of  the  semantic  flexibility  of 
the  terms  in  the  Old  English  poetic  lexicon  of  pain  and  torture. 
I  have,  of  course,  already  made  forays  in  the  direction  of  a  lexicon 
of  pain  and  torture,  but  I  intend  to  formalize  and  to  codify  my 
methodology  in  the  following  manner.  By  systematically  examining Appendices  424 
every  poetic  instance  of  pain  and  torture  in  the  poetic  corpus,  I  plan  to 
cull  a  sizeable  lexicon  of  terms  which  are  used  consistently  in  the 
descriptio'n  of  pain  and  torture.  This  lexicon  will  be  context-based;  that 
is,  the  terms  will  appear  in  their  poetic  contexts  in  order  to  illustrate  the 
meaning  of  each  term'in  that  context,  the  applicability  of  that  term  to  my 
larger  study,  and  the  relationship  of  each  term  to  the  other  terms  in  the 
lexicon.  Next  I  plan  to  develop  a  database  which  includes  each  instance 
of  each  term,  and  which  collates  each  term  with  A  Thesaurus  of  Old 
English,  in  order  to  assess  the  semantic  range  of  each  term  outside  of  the 
particular  poetic  context  in  which  it  was  found.  In  a  sense,  therefore, 
this  database  will  be  context-free.  'Finally,  utilizing  The  Microfiche 
Concordance  to  Old  English,  I  will  re-contextualize  a  number  of 
important  terms  in  a  wide  range  of  texts--poetic  and  non-poetic,  literary 
and  non-lite-rary--in  order  to  examine  the  functions  of  the  complex  and 
sometimes  paradoxical  natures  of  the  concepts  which  are  expressed 
through  this  lexicon.  Each  of  the  following  three  Appendices 
exemplifies  one  of  the  steps  which  I  have  described.  Although  each  of 
these  Appendices  serves  as  a  pilot  project  of  an  aspect  of  my  on-going 
study,  and  not  as  a  completed  research  tool,  I  hope  that  each  is  of  some 
immediate  use  to  scholars  of  the  poems  in  question,  as  well  as  to  those 
interested  in  pain,  torture,  or  related  concepts.  It  is  my  purpose  that  the 
finished  research  tools,  as  well  as  informing  my  own  studies  of  literary 
pain  and  torture,  will  be  of  use  to  scholars  of  other  subjects  as  well,  most 
notably  to  those  interested  Anglo-Saxon  medicine,  law,  and  history,  but 
also  to  some  who  study  semantics,  linguistics,  and  torture  itself. Appendices  425 
APPENDIX  A: 
Preliminary  Lexicon  of  Torture  and  Pain  in  Old  English  Poeuy: 
In  this  appendix  I  have  compiled  a  preliminary  poetic  lexicon  of 
Old  English  torture  and  pain  by  examining  two  pilot  texts  according  to 
the  systematic  criteria  discussed  below.  Juliana  and  The  Dream  of  the 
Rood  were  selected  as  the  pilot  texts  both  because  of  their  importance  to 
the  present  study,  and  because  of  the  relatively  high  incidence  of  terms 
related  to  pain  and  torture  within  these  texts.  This  lexicon  is  context- 
based;  that  is,  each  term  is  presented  within  the  poetic  context  in  which 
it  appears  in  order  to  illustrate  that  term's  meaning  within  that  context, 
and  to  make  clear  the  relationship  of  each  term  to  the  lexicon  as  a  whole. 
All  terms  and/or  phrases  used  in  the  pilot  texts  to  describe  abuse, 
distress,  and/or  pain  of  any  kind  were  identified  and  included  in  this 
preliminary  lexicon  of  pain.  The  criteria  by  which  samples  were  chosen 
were  based  upon  my  definition  of  torture  as  the  deliberate  and  systematic 
application  of  pain  in  order  to  achieve  a  specific  objective.  Drawing 
upon  that  general  definition,  I  identified  samples  for  this  survey  by 
following  these  specific  principles: 
1)  Torture  in  these  texts  includes  physical  abuse  of  any  kind,  including 
execution  &  physical  death,  and  the  means  of  torture  or  place  of 
execution:  beheading,  crucifixion,  gallows,  cross,  fire  related  to 
burning,  destruction. 
2)  Torture  in  these  texts  also  includes  mental  or  spiritual  abuse, 
including  terror/  horror/  fear/  humiliation/  damnation/  persecution/ 
oppression/  threat  of  judgment,  vengeance  or  requital. Appendices  426 
3)  Torture  in  these  textialso  includes  imprisonment,  confinement,  and 
binding--physical,  mental  or  spiritual--including  the  means  of 
binding  or  place  of  confinement:  fetters,  chains,  descriptions  of 
prison  &  hell  as  prison,  and  related  fire  imagery:  oven,  furnace, 
firepit. Appendices  427 
Pilot  Text  1:  Dream  of  the  Rood  Torture  Vocabulary 
Ne  wEes  iNer  huru  fmcodesl  gealgit2,  ac  hine  pEer  beheoldon  halige 
gastas(I  Ob-  11) 
ond  ic  synnum  fah3,  forwunded4  mid  wommum(13b-14a) 
Hwaa6re  ic  purh  pmt  gold  ongytan  meahte  earmraS  wrgewin6,  ýwt  hit 
wrest  ongan  SWWtan7  on  pa  swi6ran  healfe.  EaH  ic  wws  mid 
sorgum8  gedrefed9,  forhtl  0  ic  wws  for  pmre  fwgran  gesyh6e(l  8- 
21  a)  - 
hwilum  hit  wws  mid  wmtan  b  estemed,  beswyled  II  mid  swates  12 
gang  13,  hwilum  mid  since  gegyrwed(22b-23) 
beheold  hreowceadg  14  hmlendes  treow(25) 
PaDt  ic  waDsRheßwen'5  hOltes  on  ende,  astyred  16  Of  stefne  minum(29- 
30a) 
Ifracod,  adj.  bad,  wicked;  subst.  evil  man,  criminal 
2gealga,  m.  n-stem,  gallows,  cross 
3fah,  adj.  guilty,  outlawed,  hostile 
4forwundian,  w.  v.  (2),  badly  wound 
Searm,  adj.  wretched,  miserable,  poor 
6wrgewin,  n.  a-stem,  ancient  struggle,  former  agony 
7swwtan,  w.  v.  (I),  bleed  I 
8sorg,  f.  o-stem,  sorrow,  care,  anxiety 
9drefan,  w.  v.  (I),  trouble,  disturb;  stir  up,  make  turbid 
I  Oforht,  adj.  afraid,  frightened,  terrified;  fearful,  apprehensive 
I  lbeswyllan,  w.  v.  (l),  drench 
l2swat,  m.  a-stem,  blood 
13gang,  m.  a-stem,  path;  flow 
14hreowcearig,  adi.  sorrowful,  troubled 
l5aheawan,  v.  (7),  cut  down 
16astyrian,  w.  v.  (I),  move,  remove Appendices  428 
geworhton  him  par  to  wwfers)rne  17;  heton  me  heora  wergaslg 
hebbanl9(31) 
Ealle  ic  mihte  feondas  gefy1ljLn20,  hww6re  ic  fwste  stod(37b-38) 
Gestah  he  on  gealgan2  1,  heanne,  modig  on  manigra  gesyh6e(40b-4  I  a) 
purhdrifan22  hi  me  mid  deorcan  nEeglum.  On  me  syndon  pa  dolg23 
gesiene,  opene  inwidhlemmiLS24.  Ne  dorste  ic  hira  nEenigum 
sceaun25.  Bysmeredon26  hie  unc  butu  wtgaudere.  Eall  ic  wws 
mid  blode27  bestemed28(46A8) 
Geseah  ic  weruda  god  pearle29  penian30(5lb-52a) 
Weop  eal  gesceaft,  cwi6don  cyninges  fyI13  I  (55b-56a) 
Sare32  ic  wws  mid  sorgum33  gedrefed34(59a)  ý 
Genamon  hie  pwr  Eelmihtigne  god,  ahofon  hine  of  6ambeffitn35 
.  wite36(60b-61a) 
17wwfersyn,  f.  i-stem,  something  to  be  gazed  at,  a  spectacle,  exhibition, 
show 
l8wearg,  wearh,  m.  a-stem,  criminal,  felon 
19hebban,  v.  (6),  raise,  lift  up 
20gefiellan,  w.  v.  (I),  fell,  strike  down,  slay;  cut  down 
21gealga 
22ýurhdrifan,  v.  (l),  pierce 
23dolg,  n.  a-stem,  wound 
24inwidhlemm,  m.  a-stem,  malicious  wound 
2.5sce66an,  v.  (6),  with  dative  object,  injure 
26bismerian,  w.  v.  (2),  mock, 
27blod,  n.  a-stem,  blood 
28besteman,  w.  v.  (I),  make  wet,  suffuse 
29pearle,  adv.  very,  extremely;  fiercely;  sorely,  grievously 
30penian,  W.  V.  (l),  stretch  out,  rack 
3  Ifyll,  m.  i-stem,  fall,  death 
32sare,  adv.  sorely,  grievously 
33sorg 
ý4drefan 
35hefig,  adj.  heavy,  grievous,  bitter 
36wite,  n.  ja-stem,  punishment,  torment,  pain Appendices  429 
Forleton  me  ýa  hilderincas  standan  steame37  bedrifenne38;  eall  ic  wws 
mid  strMIUM39  forwun'dod40.  Aledon  hie  08arlimWerigne4l(6lb- 
63  a) 
Ongunnon  him  0a  moldern42  wyrcan  beornas  on  bangLn43  gesyh6e(65b- 
66a) 
Hraaw  colode44,  feager  feorgbold.  0a  us  man  fyllan45  ongan  ealle  to 
eor6an.  0aat  wws  egeslic46  wyrd!  BedeaU47  us  man  on  deopan48 
sea0e49(72b-75a)ldiom 
omt  ic  b  ealuwara  weorc  gebiden  hmbb  e,  sama5O  sorga5l(79-80a) 
On  me  bearn  godes  orowode52  hwile(83b-84a) 
mghwylcne  anra,  para  pe  him  bi6  egesa53  to  me(86) 
Iu  ic  wws  geworden  wita54  beardostSS,  leodum  lai5ost56(87-88a) 
se  6e  wlmihtig  god  on  prowodeS7(98) 
37steam,  m.  a-stem,  moisture,  blood 
38bedrifan,  v.  (l),  drive,  compel,  force;  sprinkle 
39strwi,  m.  a-stem,  arrow;  goad,  provocation 
40for-wundian,  w.  v.  (2),  badly  wound 
411imwerig,  adj.  weary  of  limb 
42moldem,  n.  a-stem,  "  earth-house",  sepulcher 
43bana,  m.  n-stem,  slayer 
44colian,  w.  v.  (2),  cool,  grow  cold 
45gefiellan. 
46egeslic,  adj.  terrible,  frightful 
47bedelfan,  v.  (3),  bury 
48deop,  adj.  deep;  profound 
49sea6,  M.  u-stem,  pit;  cistern 
Idiom  "  deep  pit"  could  be  literal  and/or  metaphorical  hell,  prison 
50sar,  adj.  sore,  grievous,  painful 
51sorg 
52prowian,  w.  v.  (2),  suffer 
53egesa,  m.  n-stem,  fear,  terror,  awe;  awful  power;  menace 
54wite 
55heard,  adj.  bard,  fierce,  bitter 
561a6,  adj.  hateful,  hated;  with  dative  hateful  to,  hated  by;  used  as  subst. 
foe 
57prowian Appendices  430 
Dea658  he  ýwr  byTigde59,  hwwi5ere  eft  dryhten  aras(IO  I) 
dea&S60  wolde  biteres6l  onbyTiggLn62(113b-1  14a) 
se  6e  her  on  eorpan  Eer  prowode63  on  pam  gealgtreowe64(145-146a) 
mid  bledum  ond  mid  blisse  pam  pe  peer  bryne65  poloditn66(149) 
58dea6,  m.  a-stem,  death 
59byrigan,  w.  v.  (l),  taste 
60dea6 
61biter,  adj.  bitter,  fierce,  sharp,  painful 
62onbyrigan,  W.  V.  (l),  with  genitive  object  taste 
63  prowian 
64gealgtreow,  n.  wa-stem,  gallows-tree,  cross 
65bryne,  m.  i-stem,  burning,  fire,  conflagration 
66polian,  w.  v.  (2),  suffer,  endure Appendices  431 
ýr1.  v 
Pilot  Text  2:  JuUana  Torture  Vocabular 
.y 
eahtn)rsse67  ahof,  68  cwealde69  Cristne  men,  circan  fylde70,  geat 
7  Ion  grw  swong  ... 
haligra  blod(4b-6a  &  7b) 
oft  hi  ýrwce72  rwrdOn73  ...  hofon  hmpengield,  halge  cwelmdon74, 
breotun75  boccrmftge,  bwrndon76  gecorene,  'goi3ston77  Godes 
cempan(12b  &  15-17a) 
nmfre  pu  pms  swi6lic7g  sar79  gegearwast,  purh  hostne80ni,  581, 
hesrdm82  witg83(55-56)  ý 
purh  deora  gripe84  deap  sweltesO-5  (125) 
doMas86  pine,  ne  me  weorce  sind  witebrogan87,  hildewoman88  (134b- 
136a) 
67eahtnys,  f.  jo-stem,  persecution 
68ahebban,  v.  (6),  [AHEAVE];  raise;  wage 
69cwellan,  w.  v.  (1c),  QUELL;  slay 
'70fyllan,  w.  v.  (lb),  FELL,  destroy 
71geotan,  V.  (2),  [YET];  shed 
72ýracu,  f.  o-stem,  violence 
73rwran,  W.  v.  (lb),  REAR;  wage;  exalt 
74cwelman,  w.  v.  (lb),  [QUELM];  slay 
75breotan,  v.  (2),  [BRET];  destroy 
76bwrnan,  W.  v.  (lb),  BURN 
77gwstan,  w.  v.  (lb),  persecute 
78swi6lic,  adj.  [SWITHLY  adv.  ];  severe 
79sar,  n.  a-stem,  SORE;  suffering,  torment 
80hwste,  adj.  violent 
81nip,  m.  a-stem,  [NITH];  hatred,  enmity 
82heard,  adj.  HARD,  severe;  stern  (sometimes  subst.  ) 
83wite,  n.  ja-stem,  [WITE];  punishment,  torment 
84gripe,  m.  i-stem,  GRIP,  grasp 
85sweltan,  v.  (3),  [swelt];  die 
86dom,  m.  a-stem,  DOOM;  judgment,  opinion;  decree;  will,  discretion 
87witebroga,  m.  n-stem,  fearful  torment 
88hildewoma,  m.  n-stem,  hostile  violence Appendices  432 
Het  hi  ýa  swingLn89,  susle90  preagan9lwitunL92  wwgan  93(142-143  a) 
pam  wy=estujn94  wites9-5  pegnum(152)  -- 
wraýe%  geworhtra  wita97  unrim,  grimra98  gyTna99(172-173a) 
ne  wital  00  pws  fela  wrai5ra  10  1  gegearvvast(I  77) 
ýurh  nii5wrwce  102  nacode  oenngLn,  103  ond  mid  sweopunL  104 
swingan  105  synna  lease(I  87-188) 
pe  pa  lestnl06  sceolan  wiperhycgendre,  witebrogan107(195b-196) 
Ne  ondrwde  ic  me  domas  108  pine,  awyrged  womscea6a,  ne  pinra 
wita  109  b  ealo  110(210-211) 
89swingan,  v.  (3),  SWING,  SWINGE;  scourge,  beat;  afflict 
90susl,  n.  a-stem,  or  f.  o-stem,  torment 
91  preagan,  w.  v.  (2),  orig.  w.  v.  (3),  [THREA];  torture,  afflict;  chastise 
92wite 
93wwgan,  w.  v.  (Ib),  afflict 
94wyrrest,  adj.  sup.  WORST 
95wite 
96wrape,  adv.  [WROTHE];  cruelly 
97wite 
98grim,  adj.  GRIM,  fierce,  horrible 
99gyrn,  f.  or  n.  i-stem,  evil,  trouble 
I  00wite 
101wra6,  adj.  WROTH;  cruel,  fierce;  evil 
102nipwracu,  Lo-stem,  [NITHWRAKE];  severe  punishment 
103pennan',  w.  v.  (I  a),  [THIN];  stretch  out 
104swipu,  f.  n-stem,  [SWEPE];  scourge,  rod 
105swingan 




II  Ob  ealo,  n.  wa-stem,  BALE;  evil Appendices  433 
He  bi  feaxe  het  &bon  I  11  ond  ahebban  112  on  heanne  b  eam  113,  ýwr  seo 
sunsciene  siege  114  prowade  115,  sace  116  singrimme  117,  siex  tida 
dmges(227b-230) 
ond  gelmdan  bibead  to  carcerne  1  18(232b-233a) 
Dawws  mid  clustre119  carcemesl20durubehlidenl2l,  homra 
geweorc(236-237b) 
in  ýam  n)rdclenfanl22  ... 
heolstre123  bihelmad(240a  &  241  a) 
-D  a  cwom  semninga  in  pmt  hlinreacedl24(242b-243a) 
gleaw  gyrnstafal25,  gzestgeni6la,  hellehwftlingl26(245-246a) 
De  pes  dema  hafa6  pa  wyTrestanl27  witu  128  gegearwad,  sar129 
endeleas(249b-251a) 
wr  pec  swyltl30  nime,  deai5l3l  fore  dugu6e(255b-256a) 
III  ah  on,  v.  (7),  [AHANG];  hang 
112ahebban 
113beam,  m.  a-stem,  BEAM;  cross 
114slege,  m.  i-stem,  [SLAY];  stroke,  blow 
I  15(ge)ýrowian,  w.  v.  (2),  [THROW];  suffer 
116sacu,  f.  o-stem,  [SAKE];  strife,  dispute 
117singrim,  adj.  [SEN  (as  in  SENGREEN)  +  GRIM];  unceasingly  fierce 
II  8carcern,  n.  a-stem,  [CARCER(AL)  +  EARN];  prison 
119clustor,  n.  a-stem,  [CLAUSTER];  bolt 
120carcern 
121behlidan,  v.  (l),  [BE  +  LID];  close 
122nydcleafa,  m.  n-stem,  prison 
123heolstor,  m.  a-stem,  darkness 
124hlinrwced,  n.  a-stem,  prison 
125gyrnstwf,  m.  a-stem,  [-STAFF];  affliction 




130swylt,  m.  i-stem,  death 
13  1  dea6,  m.  a-stem,  orig.  u-stem,  DEATH Appendices  434 
pe  sind  heardlicu  132,  wundrum  welgrim  133,  witu  134  geteohhad  to 
gringwrwce  135(263b-265a) 
ealra  cyninga  Cyning  to  cwglel36  syllan(289) 
Waldend  wundianl37  (weorud  to  segon)(291) 
pwt  he  Iohannes  bibead  heafde  biheawanl38(294b-295a) 
Simon  searo  poncum  paot  he  sacLn  13  9  ongon(298) 
pzet  he  acwellan140  het  Cristes  pegnas(3  03) 
on  rodel4l  aheng142  rodera  Waldend(305) 
ahonl43  haligne  on  heanne  beam144,  pwt  he  of  gajggLnl45  his  gmst 
onsende(309-3  10) 
for.  htl46  afongenl47,  friýes  orwena(320) 
hider  onsende  of  pam  enganl4ghaM149,  se  is  yfla  gehwws  in  pam 
grorahofel5O(322b-324a)ldiom 
132heardlic,  adj.  [HARD  +  LY];  severe 
133welgrim.,  adj.  [WAL  +  GRIM];  cruel 
134wite 
135gringwracu,  f.  o-stem,  [-WRACK];  deadly  punishment 
136cwalu,  f.  o-stem,  [QUALE];  violent  death,  slaughter 
137wundian,  w.  v.  (2),  WOUND 
138biheawan,  v.  (7),  [BEHEW];.  heafde  bihenwan,  behead 
139sacan,  v.  (6),  [SAKE  n.  ];  strive,  contend 
140acwellan,  w.  v.  (Ic),  [AQUELL];  kill 




145galga,  m.  n-stem,  GALLOWS,  cross 
146forht,  adj.  [cf  FRIGHT  nj;  fearful,  afraid 
147afon,  v.  (7),  [AFONG];  seize 
148enge,  adj.  narrow 
149ham,  m.  a-stem,  HOME,  dwelling 
150grornhof,  n.  a-stem,  house  of  sorrow 
Idiom  "narrow  dwelling"  &  "house  Of  sorrow"=  hell  as  prison Appendices  435 
pat  hi  usic  bindenl5l  ond  in  bwlwvlme  152  suslujn  153  swingenl54(336- 
337a) 
we  pa  beardestanl55  ond  ýa  wy=estanl56  Witu  157  gepoliaa  158  purh 
sarslege  159(339b-34  I 
nalms  feam  siäum,  synna  wundum  1  60(354b 
-355a) 
geornor  gyme  ymb  paas  gmstes  forwyrd  16l(414) 
pe  weari5  helle  sea8162  niper  gedolfen,  pEer  ýu  nydbysig163(422b-423) 
paat  pu  mec  pus  feaste  fetrum164  gebunde165(433) 
swa  me  her  gelamp  sorg166  an  sipe(442b-443a) 
se  pe  an  rode  167  treo  168  geprowade  1  69(447b-448a) 
151(ge)bindan,  v.  (3),  BIND  - 
152bmlwylm,,  m.  i-stem,  [BALE  +  WALM];  surging  fire 
153susl 
154swingan 
155heardest,  adj.  sup. 
156wyrrest 
157wite 
158(ge)polian,  w.  v.  (2),  [THOLE];  suffer,  endure,  undergo 
159sarslege,  m.  i-stem,  [SORE  +  SLAY];  painful  blow 
160wund,  f.  o-stem,  WOUND 
161forwyrd,  n.  a-stem,  orig.  f.  i-stem,  [FOR  +  WEIRD];  destruction 
162sea6,  m.  a-stem,  orig.  u-stem,  [SEATH];  pit 
163nydbysig,  adj.  [NEED  +  BUSY];  harassed  by  misery 
164feter,  f.  o-stem,  FETTER 
165(ge)bindan 
166sorg,  f.  o-stem,  SORROW,  affliction 
167rod 
168treo,  n.  wa-stem,  TREE 
169(ge)prowian Appendices  436 
ýreanedlM  polianl71;  is  peos  prgLgl72  ful  strong,  prejLt173  ormwte.  Ic 
sceal  pinga  gehwylc  polianl74  ond  ýQfijLn175  on  ýinne 
doml76(464-466) 
yne179  ond  ic  sumra  fet  forbrmc177  bealoseamum178,  sume  in  brý  sende, 
inliges180  lo'canl8l(472b-474a) 
eac  ic  sume  gedyde  ýwt  him  banlocan  blode  spioweditnl82,  pwt  hi 
fwringa  feorh  aleton  purh  wdre  wyJM183(47Sb-478a) 
sume  ic  rodeI84  bifealhl8S,  pwt  hi  heorodreorgel86  on  hean 
galg,  Lnl87(48lb-482) 
fwge  188  scyndan,  samin  189  gesohte(489b-490a) 
bendum190  bilegde,  -pream191  forprycte192(S19b-520a) 
pEer  mec  sorg  193  bicwom(525b)  --- 
170preaned,  f.  i-stem,  [-NEED];  punishing  affliction 
17  1  (ge)ýolian,  w.  v.  (2),  [THOLE];  suffer,  endure,  undergo 
172prag,  f.  o-stem,  [THROW];  time  (of  distress) 
173preat,  m.  a-stem,  THREAT;  punishment 
174poli&a 
175pafian,  w.  v.  (2),  [THAVE];  endure,  submit  to 
176dom 
177forbrecan,  v.  (4),  [FORBREAK];  crush 
178bealosearo,  n.  wa-stem,  wicked  snare 
179bryne,  m.  i-stem,  [BRUNE];  fire,  furnace 
180lig,  m.  i-stem,  [LEYE];  fire,  flame 
18  hoca,  m.  n-stem,  LOKE;  embrace 
182spiowian,  w.  v.  (2)  orig.  (lb),  SPEW;  w.  dat.  spurt 
183wylm,  m.  i-stem,  [WALM];  surge,  gushing 
184rod 
185bifeolan,  v.  (3),  commit 
186heorodreorig,  adj.  [-DREARY];  covered  with  blood 
187galga 
188fwge,  adj.  [FEY];  doomed  to  die 
189sar 
190bend,  m.  i-  or  f.  jo-stem,  [BEND],  BOND 
191  prea,  f.  wo-stem  or  m.  n-stem,  punishment,  misery 
192forpryccan,  w.  v.  (Ic),  [FOR  +  THRUTCH];  overwhelm,  torment 
193sorg Appendices  437 
Ic  bihlyhhan  ne  pearf  Eefter  sarwrwce  194(526b 
-527a) 
agiefan,  gnomceadgl9S,  gafulrwdenne  in  pam  reonganl96,  haMI97(529- 
530a)ldiom 
of  pam  enganl  98  hofe  199  ut  gelmdan(532)ldiom 
bendUM200  fwstne20l  halig,  hmpenne(535b-536a) 
pone  snotrestan  underhlinscugLn202(544) 
Hwwt,  pu  mec  preadeS203  purh  sarslege204(546b-547a) 
6a  hine  seo  fwmne  forlet  mfter  praschwile205  pystra  neosan  in 
irweartne2O6  grund207,  sawla  gewinnan,  on  wita208 
forwyrd209(553b-556a)ldiom 
magum  to  secgan,,  susleS210  pegnum(557b-558a) 
ond  pone  jig2ll  towearp,  heorogiferne2l2(566b-567a) 
194sarwracu,  f.  o-stem,  [SORE  +  WRACK];  grievous  suffering  or 
punishment 
195gnomcearig,  adj.  [-CHARY);  sorrowful 
196reonig,  adj.  dark,  gloomy 
197ham 
Idiom  "gloomy  home"  =  hell  as  prison 
198enge 
199hof,  n.  a-stem,  dwelling 
Idiom  "narrow  dwelling"  =  prison  cell 
200bend 
201fwst,  adj.  FAST,  firmly  bound 
202hlinscua,  m.  n-stem,  [-SCU(?  )];  darkness  of  prison 
203  preagan 
204sarslege,  m.  i-stem,  [SORE  +  SLAY];  painful  blow 
2050raochwil,  f.  o-stem,  time  of  suffering 
206sweart,  adi.  SWART;  dark,  black 
207grund,  m.  a-  orig.  u-stem,  GROUND;  earth;  abyss 
208wite 
209forwyrd 
Idiom  "dark  abyss"=  hell  as  prison 
21  0susl 
21  Ilig 
, 
212heorogifre,  adj.  [-YEVER];  fiercely  ravenous Appendices  438 
paet  pam  weligan  waas  weorC213  to  Oojj&fLne2l4(569) 
hu  he  sarlicast215  purh  pa  wy=estan2l6  witU217  meahte  feorhcwale2l8 
findan(571b-573a) 
pmt  he  Immen  fwt2l9  biwyrcan  bet(574b-575a) 
pmt  mon  pmt  lamfwt220  leades  gefylde,  ond  pa  onbmrnan  het  bwlfirgL221 
mmst,  ad222  onmlan(578-580a) 
leahtra  lease  in  ýws  leades  Wy1m223(583) 
lead  wide  Sprong224,  hat,  heorogifre225(585b-586a) 
pwr  on  rime  forborn226  purh  pms  fireS227  fnwst228(587b-588a) 
Da  gen  sio  halge  stod  ungewemde229  wlite;  nws  hyre  wloh  ne  hrwgl,  ne 
feax  ne  fel  fyre230  gemmled23  1,  ne  lic  ne  leopu.  Heo  in  lige232 
stod  wghwws  onsund233(589b-593a) 
213weorc,  n.  a-stem,  WORK;  distress;  dat.  w.  beon,  to  be  painful  to 
214(ge)oolian 
215sarlice,  adv.  SORELY,  painfully  (sup.  ) 
216wyrrest 
217wite 
218feorhcwalu,  f.  o-stem,  [-QUALE];  violent  death 
219fwt,  n.  a-stem,  [FAT],  VAT;  vessel 
2201amfwt,.  n.  a-stem,  [LOAM  +  FAT,  VAT];  earthen  vessel 
22  1b  w1fir,  n.  a-stem,  [BALEFIRE];  funeral  fire 
222ad,  m.  a-stem,  [AD];  funeral  pyre 
223wylm 
224springan,  v.  (3),  SPRING,  burst  out 
22-5heorogifre 
226forbyrnan,  v.  (3),  [FORBURN];  destroy  by  fire 
227fyr,  n.  a-stem,  FIRE 
228fnwst,  m.  a-stem,  [FNAST];  blast 
229ungewemmed,  adj.  [UNWEMMED];  uninjured 
230fyr 
23  Immlan,  W.  v.  (lb),  [MEAL];  damage 
232lig 
233onsund,  adj.  [ON  +  SOUND];  uninjured Appendices  439 
aswebb&n234,  sorcearig,  purh  sweordbite235,  on  hyge  halge,  heafde 
bineotgLn236(603-604) 
clwne  ond  gecorene  to  cwale237  lmden(613) 
ýone  heo  wr  gebond238,  awyrgedne,  ond  mid  witun,  239 
swong240(616b-617) 
ýurh  wwl)nes241  spor242,  wrecgLi5243  ealdnenii5244(623) 
Ic  pa  sorge245  gemon,  hu  ic  benduln246  fwst247  bisg&248  unrim,  on 
anre  niht,  eade6a249  dreag250(624b-626) 
ongon  pa  on  fleam  sceacan,  wita251  neosan(63  Ob  -63  1  a) 
earmne  gehynan252  yflum  ymýujn253(633b-634a) 
Da  hyre  sawl  wear6  almded254  of  lice  to  pam  langan  gefean  purh 
sweordslege255(669b-671 
234aswebban,  w.  v.  (l  a),  [ASWEVE];  put  to  death 
235sweordbite,  m.  i-stem,  [SWORD  +  BIT];  sword  wound 





24  lwwpen,  n.  a-stem,  WEAPON 
242spor,  n.  a-stem;  wwpnes  spor,  wound 
243wrecan,  v.  (5),  WREAK;  avenge;  recite 
244.11io 
245sorg,  f.  o-stem,  SORROW,  affliction 
246bend 
247fwst 
248bisgo,  f.  o-  or  n-stem,  [BUSY];  affliction 
249earfe6,  n.  a-stem,  earfe6e,  n.  ja-stem  [ARVETH];  difficulty, 
hardship,  suffering 
250dreogan,  v.  (2),  [DREE];  suffer 
25  1  wite 
252gehynan,  w.  v.  (Ib),  [I  +  HEAN];  humiliate 
253yrmpu,  f.  o-stem,  later  indec.  [ERMETHE(E)];  misery 
254almdan,  w.  v.  (Ib),  [A+  LEAD];  lead  -away  , 
255sweordslege,  m.  i-stem,  [SWORD  +  SLAY];  sword  stroke Appendices  440 
Sw.  ylt2S6  ealle  fomOM257  secga  hlqe(67Sb-676a) 
in  pam  pystrgLn2S8  hgLm2S9,  seo  geneatscolu  in  pam  neolan260 
scrwfe261(683b-684)ldiom 
Sar262  eal  gemon,  synna  wunde263  (709b  -71  Oa) 
256swylt 
257forniman,  v.  (4),  [FORNIM];  destroy 
258pystre,  adj.  [THESTER];  dark,  gloomy 
259ham 
260neol,  adj.  [NUEL];  deep 
26  1  scrcef  ,  n.  a-stem,  pit 
Idiom  "gloomy  home"  &  "deep  pit"  -=  hell  as  prison 
262sar 
263wund Appendices  441 
APPENDIX  B: 
Preliminary  Thesaurus  of  the  Lexicon  of  Torture  and  Pain 
in  Old  English  Poetry: 
Selected  Torture  Vocabulary  terms  from  Juliana  Cross-Referenced  with 
Other  Semantic  Fields  through  the  Use  of 
A  Thesaurus  of  Old  English 
In  this  appendix  I  have  examined  more  closely  the  first  one 
hundred  or  so  terms  from  Juliana  which  I  identified  as  torture  vocabulary 
in  Appendix  A.  A  hundred  terms  is  a  good-sized  sample  in  that  it  is 
large  enough  to  give  a  representative  idea  of  the  terminology  involved, 
but  is  small  enough  that  it  is  not  unwieldy  for  the  limited  purposes  of  this 
project.  What  I  have  done  is  take  each  term  out  of  its  poetic  context  and, 
using  A  Thesaurus  of  Old  English,  cross  reference  it  in  order  to  give  a 
complete  picture  of  the  breadth  of  semantic  fields  encompassed  by  each 
term.  Thus,  while  Appendix  A  contextualizes  each  term  within  its 
semantic,  thematic,  and  poetic  contexts  (therefore  illuminating  for  us  the 
sense(s)  of  each  given  term  in  said  contexts,  and  offering  for  us  a  further 
context  of  a  lexicon  of  pain  and  torture  within  which  each  term  has 
resonance  with  many  other  terms),  Appendix  B  situates  each  term  in  the 
wider  matrix  of  the  various  semantic  rubrics  under  which  it  may  be 
categorized.  The  value  of  the  semantic  cross-referencing  to  my  on-going 
research  was  touched  upon  in  the  Afterword;  I  hope  to  construct  a 
definitive  lexicon  of  pain  and  torture  in  Old  English  poetry,  and 
concurrently  to  cross-reference  each  term  in  turn  in  this  semantic 
database.  For  the  moment,  I  hope  that  scholars  interested  in  Juliana  will 
find  the  present  pilot  project  of  use  in  pointing  to  interesting  linguistic 
and  semantic  areas  of  research  concerning  the  lexicon  of  pain  and 
torture. Appendices  442 
Each  term  is  listed  in  alphabetical  order,  based  upon  the  form  in 
which  it  appears  in  the  text.  This  form  is  followed  by  the  root  form, 
specific  information  as  to  its  conjugation/declension,  etc.,  a  gloss  of  an 
accepted  reading  in  that  particular  context,  the  text  from  which  it  was 
taken  (all  are  from  Juliana  for  the  moment),  and  the  line  number.  There 
then  follows  a  list  of  the  various  semantic  fields  under  which  the  root 
form  is  listed  in  A  Thesaurus  of  Old  English.  In  cases  where  related 
forms  offer  additional  and/or  similar  information,  I  have  included  these 
for  reference.  Although  I  have  made  clearly  subjective  judgments  in  my 
selection  of  the  terms  under  scrutiny,  in  this  appendix  I  have  aspired  to 
objectivity  by  including  all  listed  information  from  the  Thesaurus. Appendices  443 
Word  acwejlgxn 
Root  acwellan 
Part  of  Speech  W.  V.  (Ic) 
Gloss  kill 
Text  Juliana 
Line  303 
Thesaurus  of  02.02.04.03  to  kill,  slay 
Old  English  ((ge)cwellan)  02.02.04.03  to  kill,  slay 
Category  or  (acwelan)  02.02.03  to  die,  perish 
Categories  (cwelan)  02.02.03  to  die,  perish 
Word 
Root 




Thesaurus  of 
Old  English 








05.10.05.04.02.04.02  support,  maintenance;  08.01  heart,  spirit,  mood,  disposition;  10.01.01  acceptance,  receiving;  10.01.02  acquisition; 
10.04.02.02  to  seize,  take,  grasp,  lay  hold  on Appendices  444 
Word  ahebban 
Root  ahebban 
Part  of  Speech  s.  v.  (6) 
Gloss  raise 
Text  Juliana 
Line  228 
Thesaurus  of  04.01.02.02.05.04.01  preparation  of  bread;  04.05  building,  construction; 
Old  English  05.03.01  a  cause  (of  anything);  05.12.02.02  to  carry  off,  remove; 
Category  or  06.02.07.01  strength,  fortitude;  07.04.04  praise,  acclamation,  applause; 
Categories  07.06.01.03  to  be  proud/arrogant;  07.08.06  exhaltation 
Word 
Root 




Thesaurus  Of 
Old  English 








02.02.04.04.03  putting  to  death;  05.12.01-07.01  to  hang;  14.05.05.01.01 
crucifixion,  death  on  cross Appendices  445 
Word  ahof 
Root  ahebban 
Part  of  Speech  s.  v.  (6) 
Gloss  wage 
Text  Juliana 
Line 
Thesaurus  of  04.01.02.02.05.04.01  preparation  of  bread;  04.05  building,  construction-, 
Old  English  05.03.01  a  cause  (of  anything);  05.12.02.02  to  carry  off,  remove; 
Category  or  06.02.07.01  strength,  fortitude;  07.04.04  praise,  acclamation,  applause; 
Categories  07.06.01.03  to  be  proud/arrogant;  07.08.06  exhaltation 
Word 
Root 




Thesaurus  Of 
Old  English 








02.02.04.04.03  putting  to  death;  05.12.01-07.01  to  hang;  14.05.05.01.01 
crucifixion,  death  on  cross Appendices  446 
Word  shon 
Root  ahon 
Part  of  Speech  s.  v.  (7) 
Gloss  hang 
Text  Juliana 
Line  309 
Thesaurus  of  02.02.04.04.03  putting  to  death;  05.12.01.07.01  to  hang;  14.05.05.01.01 
old  English  crucifixion,  death  on  cross 
Category  or 
Categories 
Word  bwlwylme 
Root  bmlwylm 
part  of  Speech  in.  i-stem 
Gloss  surging  fire 
Text  Juliana 
Line  336 
Thesaurus  Of  02.02.05.0  1.01  a  grave,  burial  place,  sepulchre;  03.01.09.02.0  1.01  a  kind 
Old  English  of  fire 
Category  or  (b  eel)  02.02.05.0  1.01  a  grave,  burial  place,  sepulchre;  03.01.09.02  fire, 
Categories  flame 
(wielm)  01.01.03.01.01  moving  water;  01.01.03.01.01.07  spring, 
fountain,  well;  01.01.03.01.02.06  surging,  rolling,  heaving  of  waves; 
02.08.05  inflammation;  03.01.09  heat;  03.01.09.02.01  fire,  burning; 
05.08.02  violence,  force;  08.0  1.0  1.01  ardour,  fervour,  strong  feeling; 
08.01.03.05.02  anger 
(wielma)  02.08-05  inflammation Appendices  447 
Word  baBrndon 
Root  beBman 
Part  of  Speech  w.  v.  (Ib), 
Gloss  bum 
Text  Juliana 
Line  16 
Thesaurus  of  02.08.12.02.06  surgical' 
Old  English  ((ge)bmrnan)  03.01.09.01  warmth,  heat;  03.01.09.02.01  fire,  burning; 
Category  or  17.05.04  to  kindle,  set  alight  (fire,  lamp) 
Categories 
Word  bealo 
Root  bealo 
part  of  Speech  n.  wa-stem 
Gloss  evil 
Text  Juliana 
Line  211 
Thesaurus  of  (bealu)  04.06.02.06  poison,  07.03.02  ill,  harm,  hurt,  08.01.03.09.03 
old  nglish  malevolence,  malice 
Category  or 
Categories Appendices  448 
Word  beam 
Root  beam 
Part  of  Speech  m.  a-stem 
Gloss  cross 
Text  Juliana 
Line  228 
Thesaurus  of  02.07.03  a  tree;  03.01.12.02  abeam  of  light;  04.02.04.06.07  ploughing 
Old  English  equipment;  05.12.01.09.03.01  a  ship,  boat;  16.01.01.02.03  a  wonder, 
Category  or  miracle;  16.02.05.11  the  cross  (as  Christian  image);  17.03.09  a  post,  rod, 
Categories  stick,  etc. 
Word  beatn 
Root  beam 
pstrt  of  Speech  m.  a-stem 
Gloss  cross 
Text  Juliana 
Line  309 
Thesaurus  Of  02.07.03  a  tree;  03.01.12.02  a  beam  of  light;  04.02.04.06.07  ploughing 
Old  English  equipment;  05.12.01.09.03.01  a  ship,  boat,  16.01-01-02.03  a  wonder, 
Category  or  miracle;  16.02.05.11  the  cross  (as  Christian  image);  17.03.09  a  post,  rod, 
Categories  stick,  etc. Appendices  449 
Word  behliden 
Root  behlidan 
Part  of  Speech  S.  V.  (I) 
Glass  close 
Text  Juliana 
Line  237 
Thesaurus  of  05-10-05.04.12  the  condition  of  being  covered 
Old  English 
Category  or 
Categories 
Word  biheawan 
Root  biheawan 
part  of  Speech  s.  v.  (7) 
Gloss  behead 
Text  Juliana 
Line  295 
Thesaurus  Of  (beheawan)  04.02.04.05.04.01  a  forester,  woodman;  05.06.02  cleaving, 
old  English  splitting,  cutting;  10.04.03.01  to  take  away,  deprive  of 
Category  or  (heawan)  13.02.08.04.03.02.01  striking/attack  with  sword 
Categories  ((ge)heawan)  04.02.04.05.04.01  a  forester,  woodman;  05.06.02  cleaving, 
splitting,  cutting;  13.02.08.04.03.02.01  striking/attack  with  sword; 
17.02.04.02.01  cutting,  hewing,  shaping Appendices  450 
Word  binden 
Root  (ge)bindan 
Part  of  Speech  s.  v.  (3) 
Gloss  bind 
Text  Juliana 
Line  336 
Thesaurus  of  03.03.06.01  a  whole  formed  by  joining;  05-05.03  binding,  fastening; 
Old  English  11.11.02  a  hindrance;  14-05.07  binding,  fastening  with  bonds 
Category  or 
Categories 
Word  breotun 
Root  breotan 
part  of  Speech  s.  v.  (2) 
Gloss  destroy 
Text  Juliana 
Line  16 
Thesaurus  of  05.06.01  devastation,  laying  waste 
Old  English 
Category  or 
Categories Appendices  451 
Word  carcerne 
Root  carcern 
Part  of  Speech  n.  a-stem 
Gloss  prison 
Text  Juliana 
Line  233 
Thesaurus  of  14.05.08.01  prison,  confinement,  durance 
Old  English 
Category  or 
Categories 
Word  carcernes 
Root  carcern 
Part  of  Speech  n.  a-stem 
Gloss  prison, 
Text  Juliana 
Line  236 
Thesaurus  of  14.05.08.01  prison,  confinement,  durance 
Old  English 
Category  or 
Categories Appendices  452 
Word  clustre 
Root  clustor 
Part  of  Speech  n.  a-stem 
Gloss  bolt 
Text  Juliana 
Line  236 
Thesaurus  of  05.10-05.04.15.01  a  bar,  bolt;  14.05.08.01  prison,  confinement,  durance; 
Old  English  17.03.10.01  a  bolt,  lock,  bar 
Category  or 
Categories 
Word  cwale 
Root  cwalu 
Part  of  Speech  f.  o-stem 
Gloss  slaughter 
Text  Juliana 
Line  289 
Thesaurus  of  02.02.04  killing,  violent  death,  destruction 
Old  English 
Category  or 
Categories Appendices  453 
Word  cwealde 
Root  cwellan 
Part  of  Speech  W.  V.  (Ic) 
Gloss  slay 
Text  Juliana 
Line  5 
Thesaurus  of  ((ge)cwellan)  02.02.04.03  to  kill,  slay  Old  English 
Category  or 
Categories 
Word  cwelmdon 
Root  ewelman 
Part  of  Speech  w.  v.  (Ib) 
Gloss  slay  - 
Text  Juliana 
Line  Is 
Thesaurus  of  ((ge)cwellan)  02-02.04.03  to  kill,  slay  Old  English 
Category  or 
Categories Appendices  4S4 
Word  dea6 
Root  dea6 
Part  of  Speech  m.  a-stem 
Gloss  death 
Text  Juliana 
Line  256 
Thesaurus  of  02.02  death;  02.02.01  particular  mode  of  death;  02.02.03.02  state  of  being 
Old  English  dead;  02.02.03.04  spiritual  death;  02.02.04.01  cause/occassion  of  death; 
Category  or  16.01.03.01  soul  of  a  deceased  person 
Categories 
Word  domas 
Root  dom 
part  of  Speech  m.  a-stem 
Gloss  doom 
Text  Juliana 
Line  134 
Thesaurus  Of  05.02.01.01  the  course  of  human  affairs;  07  judgement,  forming  of 
Old  English  opinion;  07.01  appraisal,  appraising;  07.01.01  choice,  ele  ction;  07.08 
Category  or  reputation,  fame;  09.04.03  exposition,  malting  clear  by  explanation; 
Categories  12.01.01  authority;  14.01.06  a  rule,  order,  precept,  tenet,  principle; 
14.03.01  judicial  body,  authority;  14.03.03  law,  action  of  the  courts; 
14.03.03  '  09  a  sentence,  judgement,  ruling;  14.03.03.09.01  unfavourable 
judgement,  condemnation Appendices  455 
Word  domas 
Root  dom, 
Part  of  Speech  m.  a-stem 
Gloss  doom 
Text  Juliana 
Line  210 
Thesaurus  of  05.02.01.01  the  course  of  human  affairs;  07  judgement,  forming  of 
Old  English  opinion;  07.01  appraisal,  appraising;  07.01.01  choice,  ele  ction;  07.08 
Category  or  reputation,  fame;  09.04-03  exposition,  making  clear  by  explanation; 
Categories  12.01.01  authority;  14.01.06  a  rule,  order,  precept,  tenet,  principle; 
14.03.01  judicial  body,  authority;  14.03.03  law,  action  of  the  courts; 
14.03.03.09  a  sentence,  judgement,  ruling;  14.03.03.09.01  unfavourable 
judgement,  condemnation 
Word 
Root 




Thesaurus  Of 
old  English 








(eahtnes)  12.05.06.02.02  persecution Appendices  456 
Word 
Root 




engan  ham 
[enge]  ham 
[adj.  ]  m.  a-stem 
[natTow]  dwelling 
Juliana 
323 
Thesaurus  of  [enge]  05.10.02  narrowness,  scantiness  of  space;  08.01.03.07.04  severity, 
Old  English  harshness 
Category  or  (ham)  04.02  farm;  04.05.03  a  dwelling-place,  abode,  habitation; 
Categories  04.05.03.02.01  a  building,  house,  hall,  palace,  etc.;  05.10.04.02  a  region, 
zone;  12.06.04  native  land;  16.01.02.01  heavenly  dwelling  place 
Word 
Root 




Thesaurus  of 
old  English 








(fetor)  04.02.05.05.04  rope,  rein;  14.05.07  binding,  fastening  with  bonds 
(fetorwrasen)  14.05.07  binding,  fastening  with  bonds 
(gefetred)  14.05.08  captivity Appendices  457 
Word 
Root 




Thesaurus  of 
Old  English 








Thesaurus  Of 
old  English 








06.01.08.06.03  cause  of  fear,  terror,  horror 
((ge)forht)  06.01.08.06  fear 
forwyrd 
forwyrd 




05.06  destruction,  dissolution,  loss,  breaking 
(wyrd)  02.02.03.03  appointed  death,  doom;  05.03.02.01  chance,  hap. 
event Appendices  458 
Word  fylde 
Root  fyflan 
Part  of  Speech  w.  v.  (Ib) 
Gloss  destroy 
Text  Juliana 
Line 
Thesaurus  of  ((ge)fyllan)  03.03.04.02.01  abundance;  03.03.06  wholeness;  03.03.06.02 
Old  English  fullness;  05.06.01  devastation,  laying  waste;  05.10.04.03  presence;  Category  or  05.12.05.13.03  to  fall;  11.01.04  a  doing,  accomplishing  (of  something);  Categories  11.0  1.05  accomplishment,  fulfilment;  11.0  1.06  end,  completion  (of 
action),  fulfilment 
Word  gEeston 
Root  gmstan. 
Part  of  Speech  w.  v.  (Ib) 
Gloss  persecute 
Text  Juliana 
Line  17 
Thesaurus  of  06.01.08.06.03.01  causing  dread,  terrifying 
Old  English 
Category  or 
Categories Appendices  459 
Word  gslgan 
Root  galga 
Part  of  Speech  m.  n-stem 
Gloss  gallows 
Text  Juliana 
Line  310 
Thesaurus  of  (gealga)  14.05.06  means/implement  of  torture 
Old  English 
Category  or 
Categories 
Word  geat 
Root  geotan 
Part  of  Speech  s.  v.  (2) 
Gloss  shed 
Text  Jufiana 
Line  6 
Thesaurus  of  03.01.16.01  moisture;  05.08.02  violence,  force;  05.12.05-03-04.02  to  flow 
Old  English  out,  well  up,  erupt;  11.08.03  needless,  useless,  unprofitable 
Category  or  ((ge)geotan)  17.02.04.03-03  smelting,  heating,  scorification 
Categories A  ppendices  460  1  Ir 
Word  gebunde 
Root  (ge)bindan 
Part  of  Speech  s.  v.  (3) 
Gloss  bind 
Text  Juliana 
Line  433 
Thesaurus  of  03.03.06.01  a  whole  formed  by  joining;  05.05.03  binding,  fastening; 
Old  English  11.11.02  a  hindraace;  14.05.07  binding,  fastening  with  bonds 
Category  or 
Categories 
Word  gepoliaa 
Root  (ge)pofian 
part  of  Speech  w.  v.  (2) 
Gloss  suffer 
Text  Juliana 
Line  340 
Thesaurus  Of  06.02.07.01  strength,  fortitude;  08.01.03.07.03  suffering,  torment,  pain; 
old  English  10.02.01  loss,  deprivation;  12.05.06.04.01  submission  to  action,  toleration 
Categor,  V  or  (ýolian  hyde)  14.05.05  physical  punishments 
Categories  (ýolle)  04.01.02.02.06.01  cooking  vessel/pot;  14.05.06  means/implement 
of  torture Appendices  461 
Word  grimra 
Root  grim 
Part  of  Speech  adj. 
Gloss  fierce 
Text  Juliana 
Line  173 
Thesaurus  of  (grimm)  05.06  destruction,  dissolution,  loss,  breaking;  05.08.02.01  (Of 
Old  English  living  creatures)  fiercness,  roughness;  07.03.02  ill,  hami,  hurt; 
Category  or  08.01.03.07.04  severity,  harshness;  08.0  1.03.09.11  hardheartedness, 
Categories  cruelty,  severity  " 
Word 
Root 






f.  O-stem 
deadly  punishment 
Juliana 
265 
Thesaurus  of  (wracu)  08.01.03.07.03  suffering,  torment,  pain;  08.01.03.09.05  enmity;  Old  English  12.05.04.02  vengeance,  revenge;  12.06.05.01  state  of  exile,  banishment; 
Category  or  14.03.03.09.03  outlawry;  14.05.02  torment,  punishment;  14.05.03 
Categories  retribution,  requital Appendices  462 
Word 
Root 




Thesaurus  of 
Old  English 














10.04.02  to  grasp,  take  hold  of;  12.05.06  grasp,  power,  control,  mastery; 
13.02.03.01  an  attack,  assault 
grornhofe 
grornhof 
n.  a-stem 
house  of  sorrow 
Juliana 
324 
Thesaurus  of  16.01.05  hell,  lower  world,  abode  of  the  dead 
Old  English  (grorn)  08.01.03  bad  feeling,  sadness;  08.01.03.03  anxiety 
Category  or  (grorne)  08.01.03.04  grief 
Categories  (hof)  04.05.03  a  dwelling-place,  abode,  habitation;  16.02.05.02.01  a 
temple Appendices  463 
Word 
Root 




Thesaurus  of 
old  English 














08.01.03  bad  feeling,  sadness;  08.01.03.07.02  misery,  trouble,  affliction 
gymstafa 
stmf 




Thesaurus  of  (gymstafas)  08.01.03.07.02  misery,  trouble,  affliction 
Old  English  (gym)  08.01.03  bad  feeling,  sadness;  08-01.03.07.02  misery.  trouble, 
Category,  or  affliction 
Categories  (stwf)  05.12.01.09.03.01.03  part  of  a  ship;  06.01.07.01.01  strictness, 
exactness;  09.03.07.01  a  written  character,  letter;  09.03.07.04.01  to 
punctuate,  divide;  12.01.01.03  symbols  of  power;  16.02.05.05.08  a  staff, 
wand  of  authority;  16.02.05.10.12  a  computus  ans  calendar;  17.03.09  a 
post,  rod,  stick,  etc. 
(see  also  stafas:  learning,  writing,  a  letter) Appendices  464 
Word  hieftling 
Root  hieftling 
part  of  Speech  m.  a-stem 
Gloss  captive 
Text  Juliana 
Line  246 
Thesaurus  of  14.05.08  captivity 
Old  English  (hwft)  10  having,  owning,  possession;  12.01.01.09  bondage,  slavery; 
Category  or  14.05.07  binding,  fastening  with  bonds;  14.05.08  captivity;  17.03 
Categories  implements,  tools,  etc. 
((ge)haeft)  10.04.02.02  to  seize,  take,  grasp,  lay  hold  on;  14.05.08 
captivity 
((ge)haeftan)  12.01.01.09  bondage,  slavery;  14.05.07  binding,  fastening 
with  bonds;  14.05.08  captivity 
(gehaeftan)  03.03.06.01  a  whole  formed  by  joining;  12.05.06.01  restraint, 
check,  curb,  control;  12.05.06.04  a  trampling  upon,  subjection 
Word  hmstne 
Root  hmste 
Part  of  Speech  adj. 
Gloss  violent 
Text  Juliana 
Line  56 
Thesaurus  Of  (hmst)  05.08.02  violence,  force;  05.08-02.01  (of  living  creatures) 
Old  English  fierceness,  roughness 
Category  or 
Categories Appendices  465 
Word  heardestan 
Root  heard 
Part  of  Speech  adj.  sup. 
Gloss  most  severe 
Text  Juliana 
Line  339 
Thesaurus  of  02.05.07.01  strong  taste,  acidity,  pungency;  02.07.03.05  particular 
old  English  trees/shrubs  (alphabetical  order);  03.01.03  hardness,  callosity,  hard 
Category  or  material;  03.01.03.02  strength,  power;  05.08.02.01  (of  living  creatures) 
Categories  fierceness,  roughness;  06.02.07  will,  determination,  resolution; 
06.02.07.04.01  obduracy;  06.02.07.06.02  boldness;  08.01.03.07.04 
severity,  hardness;  08.01.03.07.04.01  unb  earableness;  08.01.03.09.10 
wrath,  sternness,  displeasure;  12.08.03.02  strictness,  austerity,  severity 
Word 
Root 




Thesaurus  of 
Old  English 








06.02.07  will,  determination,  resolution;  06.02.07.06.02  boldness; 
08.01.03.07.04.01  unbearableness;  08.01.03.09.12  pitilessness 
(see  also  heard  and  heardlice) Appendices  466 
Word  heardra 
Root  heard 
Part  of  Speech  adj. 
Gloss  severe 
Text  Juliana 
Line  56 
Thesaurus  of  02.05.07.01  strong  taste,  acidity,  pungency;  02.07.03.05  particular 
Old  English  trees/shrubs  (alphabetical  order);  03.01.03  hardness,  callosity,  hard 
Category  or  material;  03.01.03.02  strength,  power;  05.08.02.01  (of  living  creatures) 
Categories  fierceness,  roughness;  06.02.07  will,  determination,  resolution; 
06.02.07.04.01  obduracy;  06.02.07.06.02  boldness;  08.01.03.07.04 
severity,  hardness;  08.01.03.07.04.01  unbearableness;  08.01.03.09.10 
wrath,  sternness,  displeasure;  12.08.03.02  strictness,  austerity,  severity 
Word 
Root 




Thesaurus  of 
old  English 








03.01.13  darkness,  obscurity;  04.04.08  a  covering,  curtain,  veil,  garment, 
etc.;  04.05.03.05.02  a  privy;  09.05.04.01  concealment,  obscurity Appendices  467 
Word  hildewoman 
Root  woma 
Part  of  Speech  m.  n-stem 
Gloss  hostile  violence 
Text  Juliana 
Line  136 
Thesaurus  of  (hildewoma)  02.05.10.03  noise,  tumult,  uproar;  13.02.02  battle 
Old  English  (woma)  02.05.10.03  noise,  tumult,  uproar,  06.01.08.06.02  great  fear, 
Category  or  terror,  horror 
Categories 
Word  hlinrmced 
Root  roced 
Part  of  Speech  n.  a-stem 
Gloss  prison 
Text  Juliana 
Line  243 
Thesaurus  of  (hlinreced)  14.05.08.01  prison,  confinement,  durance 
old  English  (reced)  04.05.03.02.01  a  building,  house,  hall,  palace,  etc.  Categor.  y  or 
Categories Appendices  469 
Word  lean 
Root  lean 
Part  of  Speech  n.  a-stem 
Gloss  retribution 
Text  Juliana 
Line  195 
Thesaurus  of  06.02.06.03.01  to  dissuade  (from);  07.05.01  censure,  reproof,  rebuke; 
old  English  10.03.05  recompense,  reward;  12.05.04.02.01  retribution,  requital; 
Category  or  15.02.04  spending,  disbursement 
Categories 
Word  ni6 
Root  niý 
part  of  Speech  m.  a-stem 
Glass  hatxed 
Text  Juliana 
Line  56 
Thesaurus  of  08.01.03.06  adversity,  affliction;  08.01.03.09.05  enmity;  08.01.03.09.08 
old  English  envy,  jealousy;  12.05.04  strife,  hostility;  12.08.06.02  wickedness,  evil; 
Category  or  12.08.06.02.01  wrong,  evil-doing;  13.02.02  battle;  16.0  1.05  hell,  lower 
Categories  world,  abode  of  the  dead Appendices  469 
Word  ni6wrace 
Root  niýwracu 
Part  of  Speech  f.  o-stem 
Gloss  severe  punishment 
Text  Juliana 
Line  187 
Thesaurus  of  14.05  punishment 
Old  English  (nip)  08.01.03.06  adversity,  affliction;  08.01.03.09.05  enmity; 
Category  or  08.01.03.09.08  envy,  jealousy;  12.05.04  strife,  hostility;  12.08.06.02 
Categories  wickedness,  evil;  12.08.06.02.01  wrong,  evil-doing;  13.02.02  battle; 
16.01.05  hell,  lower  world,  abode  of  the  dead 
(wracu)  08.01.03.07.03  suffering,  torment,  pain;  08.01.03.09.05  enmity; 
12.05.04.02  vengeance,  revenge;  12.06.05.01  state  of  exile,  banishment; 
14.03.03.09.03  outlawry;  14.05.02  torment,  punishment;  14.05.03 
retribution,  requital 
Word  nydbysig 
Root  nydbysig 
part  of  Speech  adj. 
Gloss  harassed  by  misery 
Text  Juliana 
Line  423 
Thesaurus  Of  08.01.03.06  adversity,  affliction 
old  English  (nied)  06.02.04  necessity,  inevitability;  06.02.04.01  want,  need; 
Category  or  08.01.03.06  adversity,  affliction:  09.03.07.01.01  a  runic  letter; 
Categories  12.05.06.03  necessity,  constraint;  12.07  an  obligation,  bounden  duty; 
14.05.08  captivity Appendices  470 
Word  nydcleafan 
Root  cleafa 
Part  of  Speech  m.  n-stem 
Gloss  pnSon 
Text  Juliana 
Line  240 
Thesaurus  of  (nydcleofa)  14.05.08.01  prison,  confinement,  durance 
Old  English  (nied)  06.02.04  necessity,  inevitability;  06.02.04.01  want,  need; 
Category,  or  08.01.03.06  adversity,  affliction;  09.03.07.01.01  a  runic  letter; 
Categories  12.05.06.03  necessity,  constraint;  12.07  an  obligation,  bounden  duty; 
14.05.08  captivity 
(cleofa)  0  1.0  1.02.01.03.01  cave;  04.05.03.02.02.01  dwellings  in  particular 
places;  04.05.03.04  a  closet,  chamber,  room:  16.02.05.04.01  parts  of 
monastery 
Word  rmrdon 
Root  rwran 
part  of  Speech  w.  v.  (Ib) 
Gloss  wage 
Text  Juliana 
Line  12 
Thesaurus  Of  04.05  building,  construction;  05.05.01  &author,  source,  originator; 
old  English  05.12.05.12.02  to  raise,  lift  up,  elavate;  06.02.06.03.03  incitement; 
Category  or  08.01.01.01.03  an  incitement,  cause  of  strong  feeling;  11.0  1.05.02 
Categories  furtherance,  promotion Appendices  471 
Word  rode 
Root  rod 
Part  of  Speech  f.  o-stem 
Gloss  cross 
Text  Juliana 
Line  305 
Thesaurus  of  04.02.03.03  a  measure  of  land;  05.10.05.03  a  measure  of  distance; 
old  English  14.05.05.01.01  crucifixion,  death  on  cross;  14.05.06  means/implement  of 
Category  or  torture;  16.02.04.18.01  sign  of  the  cross;  16.02.05.11  the  cross  (as 
Categories  Christian  image) 
Word  sacan 
Root  sacan 
Part  of  Speech  s.  v.  (6) 
Gloss  contend 
Text  Juliana 
Line  298 
Thesaurus  of  09.07.03.02  refusal,  denial;  12.05.03.01  quarrel,  contentiousness,  strife; 
old  English  12.05.04.01  fighting,  contention,  warfare,  strife;  14.03.03  law,  action  of 
Category  or  the  courts;  14.03.03.01  accusation 
Categories  (gesaca)  12.05.02  hostility,  contention,  opposition;  14.03.03.01  accusation 
(sacu)  07.05.01  censure,  reproof,  rebuke;  08.01.03.06  adversity, 
affliction;  12.05.03.01  quarrel,  contentiousness,  strife;  12.08.09  guiltiness, 
guilt;  14.02.01  an  offence;  14.03.03  law,  action  of  the  courts Appendices  472 
Word  sace 
Root  Sam 
Part  of  Speech  f.  o-stem 
Gloss  strife  , 
Text  Juliana 
Line  230 
Thesaurus  of  07.05.01  censure,  reproof,  rebuke;  08.01.03.06  adversity,  affliction; 
Old  English  12.05.03.01  quarrel,  contentiousness,  strife;  12.08.09  guiltiness,  guilt; 
Category  or  14.02.01  an  offence;  14.03.03  law,  action  of  the  courts 
Categories  (sacan)  09.07.03.02  refusal,  denial;  12.05.03.01  quarrel,  contentiousness, 
strife;  12.05.04.01  fighting,  contention,  warfare,  strife;  14.03.03  law, 
action  of  the  courts;  14.03.03.01  accusation 
(gesaca)  12.05.02  hostility,  contention,  opposition;  14.03.03.01  accusation 
Word 
Root 




Thesaurus  of 
old  English 








02.08.03  pain,  bodily  discomfort;  02.08.05.02  particular 
inflammation/swelling;  08.01.03.04  grief;  08.01.03.06  adversity,  affliction 
((ge)sar)  02.08.03  pain,  bodily  discomfort Appendices  473 
Word  sar 
Root  sar 
Part  of  Speech  n.  a-stem 
Gloss  suffering 
Text  Juliana 
Line  251 
Thesaurus  of  02-08.03  pain,  bodily  discomfort;  02-08.05.02  particular 
Old  English  inflammation/swelling;  08.01.03.04  grief;  08.01.03.06  adversity,  affliction 
Category  or  ((ge)sar)  02.08.03  pain,  bodily  discomfort 
Categories 
Word  sarslege 
Root  sarslege 
Part  of  Speech  m.  i-stem. 
Gloss  painful  blow 
Text  Juliana 
Line  341 
Thesaurus  of  05.06.09  act  of  striking 
Old  English  (sar)  02.08.03  pain,  bodily  discomfort;  02.08.05.02  particular 
Category  or  inflammation/swelling;  08.01.03.04  grief;  08.01.03.06  adversity,  affliction 
Categories  ((ge)sar)  02.08.03  pain,  bodily  discomfort 
(slege)  0  1.03.01.03.0  1.01  thundering,  thunder;  02.02.04  killing,  violent 
death,  destruction;  02.08.03.02  itch,  irritation;  02.08.10.03.01  plague, 
pestilence;  04.04.03  a  spinning-house  or  chamber;  05.06.09  act  of 
striking;  05.12.02.06.01  to  push,  drive;  13.02.05.02  defeat;  etc. Appendices  474 
Word  sea6 
Root  sea6 
Part  of  Speech  -  m.  a-stem,  orig.  u-stem 
Gloss  Pit 
Text  Juliana 
Line  422 
Thesaurus  of  0  1.0  1.02.01.03  hollow/depression  in  land;  0  1.0  1.03.01.03  lake; 
Old  English  0  1.0  1.03.01.03.01  pool;  02.06.01.08  a  lair,  den;  04.05.03.05.01  a  cess- 
Category  or  pool,  midden,  sewer;  17.02.04.02.04  leading/conducting  of  water 
Categories 
Word  singrimme 
Root  grim 
Part  of  Speech  adj. 
Gloss  unceasingly  fierce 
Text  Juliana 
Line  230 
Thesaurus  of  (singrim)  08.01.03.09.01  fierceness 
Old  English  (grimm)  05.06  destruction,  dissolution,  loss,  breaking;  05.08.02.01  (of 
Category  or  living  creatures)  fiercness,  roughness;  07.03.02  ill,  harm,  hurt; 
Categories  08.01.03.07.04  severity,  harshness;  08.01.03.09.11  hardheartedness, 
cruelty,  severity Appendices  475 
Word  slege 
Root  slege 
Part  of  Speech  m.  i-stem 
Gloss  stroke 
Text  Juliana 
Line  229 
Thesaurus  of  0  1.03.01.03.0  1.01  thundering,  thunder;  02.02.04  killing,  violent  death, 
Old  English  destruction;  02.08.03.02  itch,  irritation;  02.08.10.03.01  plague,  pestilence; 
Categor,  y  or  04.04.03  a  spinning-house  or  chamber;  05.06.09  act  of  striking; 
Categories  05.12.02.06.01  to  push,  drive;  13.02.05.02  defeat;  14.05.05  physical 
punishments;  14.05.06  means/implement  of  torture;  15.01.04  coinage, 
money;  17.03  implements,  tools,  etc.;  18.02.07.02.03  stringed  instruments 
Word  Sorg 
Root  Sorg 
part  of  Speech  f.  o-stem 
Gloss  sorrow 
Text  Juliana 
Line  443 
Thesaurus  Of  08.01.03  bad  feeling,  sadness;  08.01.03.03  anxiety 
old  English 
Category  or 
Categories Appendices  476 
Word  susle 
Root  susl 
Part  of  Speech  n.  ý  a-stem  or  f.  o-stem 
Gloss  torment 
Text  Juliana 
Line  142 
Thesaurus  of  08.01.03.07.03  suffering,  torment,  pain 
Old  English 
Category  or 
Categories 
Word  suslum 
Root  susl 
Part  of  Speech  n.  a-stem  or  f.  o-stem 
Gloss  torment 
Text  Juliana 
Line  337 
Thesaurus  of  08.01.03.07.03  suffering,  torment,  pain 
Old  English 
Category  or 
Categories Appendices  477 
Word  sweltest 
Root  sweltan 
Part  of  Speech  s.  v.  (3) 
Gloss  die 
Text  Juliana 
Line  125 
Thesaurus  of  02.02.03  to  die,  perish 
Old  English 
Category  or 
Categories 
Word  sweopum 
Root  swipu 
Part  of  Speech  f.  n-stem 
Gloss  scourge 
Text  Juliana 
Line  188 
Thesaurus  of  12.05.06.02.03  trouble,  disturbance;  14.05.06  meanslimplement  of  torture 
old  English 
Category  or 
Categories Appendices  478 
Word  swingan 
Root  swingan 
Part  of  Speech  s.  v.  (3) 
Gloss  scourge 
Text  Juliana 
Line  142 
Thesaurus  of  04.01.02.02.08  chum;  05.06.09.01  a  slap  with  the  hand,  blow; 
Old  English  05.12.01.07  to  fly  (with  wings);  18.02.02  play,  (atheltic)  sport 
Category  or  (swingan  on  twa)  05.06.02.01  a  cleft,  split 
Categories  ((ge)swingan)  12.05.06.02.03  trouble,  disturbance;  14.05.05  physical 
punishments 
Word  swingan 
Root  swingan 
part  of  Speech  s.  v.  (3) 
Gloss  scourge 
Text  Juliana 
Line  188 
Thesaurus  of  04.01.02.02.08  churn;  05.06.09.01  a  slap  with  the  hand,  blow; 
Old  English  05.12.01.07  to  fly  (with  wings),  18.02.02  play,  (atheltic)  sport 
Category  or  (swingan  on  twa)  05.06.02.01  a  cleft,  split 
Categories  ((ge)swingan)  12.05.06.02.03  trouble,  disturbance;  14.05.05  physical 
punishments Appendices  479 
Word  swingen 
Root  swingan 
Part  of  Speech  s.  v.  (3) 
Gloss  afflict 
Text  Juliana 
Line  337 
Thesaurus  of  04.01.02.02.08  churn;  OS.  06.09.01  a  slap  with  the  hand,  blow; 
Old  English  OS.  12.01.07  to  fly  (with  wings);  18.02.02  play,  (atheltic)  sport 
Category  or  (swingan  on  twa)  OS.  06-02.01  a  cleft,  split 
Categories  ((ge)swingan)  12.  OS.  06.02.03  trouble,  disturbance;  14.  OS.  OS  physical 
punishments 
Word  swi6lic 
Root  swi6lic 
Part  of  Speech  adj. 
Gloss  severe 
Text  Juliana 
Line  55 
Thesaurus  of  01  .  03.01.03  bad  weather;  02.05  sensation,  perception,  feeling; 
Old  English  03.03.04.01.01  greatness,  bigness,  size;  05.08.02.01  (of  living  creatures) 
Category  or  fierceness,  roughness;  08.0  1.0  1.01  ardour,  fervour,  strong  feeling;  12 
Categories  power,  might;  12.08.03.02  strictness,  austerity,  severity Appendices  480 
Word  swylt 
Root  swylt 
Part  of  Speech  m.  i-stem 
Gloss  death 
Text  JuHana. 
Line  255 
Thesaurus  of  02.02  death;  02.02.03.04  spiritual  death 
Old  English 
Category  or 
Categories 
Word  weagan. 
Root  wwgan 
Part  of  Speech  w.  v.  (Ib) 
Gloss  afflict 
Text  Juliana 
Line  143 
Thesaurus  of  06.01.07.04.01  deception,  a  leading  astray 
old  English  ((ge)waegan)  12.05.06.02  oppression 
Category  or  (gewwgan)  06.01.07.04.01  deception,  a  leading  astray  Categories -  endices  481  FP 
Word  welgrim 
Root  grim 
Part  of  Speech  adj. 
Gloss  cruel 
Text  Juliana 
Line  264 
Thesaurus  of  (grimm)  05.06  destruction,  dissolution,  loss,  breaking;  05.08.02.01  (of 
Old  English  living  creatures)  fiercness,  roughness;  07.03.02  ill,  harm,  hurt; 
Category  or  08.01.03.07.04  severity,  harshness;  08.01.03.09.11  hardheartedness, 
Categories  cruelty,  severity 
Word  wita 
Root  wite 
pgtrt  of  Speech  n.  ja-stem 
Gloss  tonnent 
Text  Juliana 
Line  56 
Thesaurus  of  02.08.03  pain,  bodily  discomfort;  02.08.10.03.01  plague,  pestilence; 
old  English  08.01.03.07.02  misery,  trouble,  affliction;  14.05.02  torment,  punishment; 
Category  or  14.05.04.01  a  fine;  14.05.06  meanslimplement  of  torture;  16.01.05.01 
Categories  damnation,  perdition,  reprobation 
((ge)wite)  14.05.02  torment,  punishment Appendices  482 
Word  wita 
Root  wite 
part  of  Speech  n.  ja-stem 
Gloss  torment 
Text  Juliana 
Line  172 
Thesaurus  of  02.08.03  pain,  bodily  discomfort;  02.08.10.03.01  plague,  pestilence; 
Old  English  08.01.03.07.02  misery,  trouble,  affliction;  14.05.02  torment,  punishment; 
Category  or  14.05.04.01  a  fine-,  14.05.06  means/implement  of  torture;  16.01.05.01 
Categories  damnation,  perdition,  reprobation 
((ge)wite)  14.05.02  torment,  punishment 
Word  wita 
Root  wite 
Part  of  Speech  n.  ja-stem 
Gloss  torment 
Text  Juliana 
Line  177 
Thesaurus  of  02.08.03  pain,  bodily  discomfort;  02.08.10.03.01  plague,  pestilence; 
old  English  08.01.03.07.02  misery,  trouble,  affliction;  14.05.02  torment,  punishment; 
Category  or  14.05.04.01  a  fine;  14.05.06  means/implement  of  torture;  16.0  1.05.01 
Categories  damnation,  perdition,  reprobation 
((ge)wite)  14.05.02  torment,  punishment Appendices  483 
Word  wita 
Root  wite 
Part  of  Speech  n.  ja-stem 
Gloss  tonnent 
Text  Juliana 
Line  211 
Thesaurus  of  02.08.03  pain,  bodily  discomfort;  02.08.10.03.01  plague,  pestilence; 
Old  English  08.01.03.07.02  misery,  trouble,  affliction;  14.05.02  torment,  punishment; 
Category  or  14.05.04.01  a  fine;  14.05.06  meanslimplement  of  torture;  16.01.05.01 
Categories  damnation,  perdition,  reprobation 
((ge)wite)  14.05.02  torment,  punishment 
Word 
Root 




Thesaurus  of 
old  English 




m.  n-stem 
fearful  torment 
Juliana 
135 
(witebroga)  06.01.08.06.02  great  fear,  terror,  horror Appendices  484 
Word  witebrogan 
Root  wite 
Part  of  Speech  m.  n-stem 
Gloss  fearful  torment 
Text  Juliana 
Line  196 
Thesaurus  of  (witebroga)  06.01.08.06.02  great  fear,  terror,  horror 
Old  English 
Category  or 
Categories 
Word  wites 
Root  wite 
pgtrt  of  Speech  n.  ja-stem 
Gloss  torment 
Text  Juliana 
Line  152 
Thesaurus  Of  02.08.03  pain,  bodily  discomfort;  02.08.10.03.01  plague,  pestilence; 
Old  English  08.01.03.07.02  misery,  trouble,  affliction;  14.05.02  torment,  punishment; 
Category  or  14.05.04.01  a  fine;  14.05.06  means/implement  of  torture;  16.01.05.01 
Categories  damnation,  perdition,  reprobation 
((ge)wite)  14.05.02  torment,  punishment Appendices  485 
Word  witu 
Root  wite 
Part  of  Speech  n.  ja-stem 
Gloss  torment 
Text  Juliana 
Line  250 
Thesaurus  of  02.08.03  pain,  bodily  discomfort,  02.08.10.03.01  plague,  pestilence; 
Old  English  08.01.03.07.02  misery,  trouble,  affliction;  14.05.02  torment,  punishment; 
Category  or  14.05.04.01  a  fine;  14.05.06  means/implement  of  torture;  16.0  1.05.01 
Categories  damnation,  perdition,  reprobation 
((ge)wite)  14.05.02  torment,  punishment 
Word  witu 
Root  wite 
p,  jLrt  of  Speech  n.  ja-stem 
Gloss  torment 
Text  Juliana 
Line  264 
Thesaurus  of  02.08.03  pain,  bodily  discomfort;  02.08.10.03.01  plague,  pestilence; 
old  English  08.01.03.07.02  misery,  trouble,  affliction;  14.05.02  torment,  punishment; 
Category  or  14.05.04.01  a  fine;  14.05.06  means/implement  of  torture;  16.0  1.05.01 
Categories  damnation,  perdition,  reprobation 
((ge)wite)  14.05.02  torment,  punishment Appendices  486 
Word  witu 
Root  wite 
Part  of  Speech  n.  ja-stem 
Gloss  torment 
Text  Juliana 
Line  340 
Thesaurus  of  02.08.03  pain,  bodily  discomfort;  02.08.10.03.01  plague,  pestilence; 
old  English  08.01.03.07.02  misery,  trouble,  affliction;  14.05.02  torment,  punishment; 
Category  or  14.05.04.01  a  fine;  14.05.06  meanslimplement  of  torture;  16.01.05.01 
Categories  damnation,  perdition,  reprobation 
((ge)wite)  14.05.02  torment,  punishment 
Word  witum 
Root  wite 
part  of  Speech  n.  ja-stem 
Gloss  torment 
Text  Juliana 
Line  143 
Thesaurus  of  02.08.03  pain,  bodily  discomfort;  02.08.10.03.01  plague,  pestilence; 
old  English  08.01.03.07.02  misery,  trouble,  affliction;  14.05.02  torment,  punishment; 
Category  or  14.05.04.01  a  fine;  14.05.06  means/implement  of  torture;  16.0  1.05.01 
Categories  damnation,  perdition,  reprobation 
((ge)wite)  14.05.02  torment,  punishment Appendices  487 
Word  wraýe 
Root  wraýe 
Part  of  Speech  adv. 
Gloss  cruelly 
Text  Juliana 
Line  172 
Thesaurus  of  08.01.03.05.02  anger;  08-01.03.07.04  severity,  harshness;  08-01.03.09.11 
Old  English  hardheartedness,  cruelty,  severity;  12.08.06.02.03.01  wickedly 
Category  or 
Categories 
Word  wraora 
Root  wrab 
Part  of  Speech  adj. 
Gloss  cruel 
Text  Juliana 
Line  177 
Thesaurus  of  08.01.03.05.02  anger;  08.01.03.06  adversity,  affliction;  08.01.03.07.04 
Old  English  severity,  harshness;  08.01.03.09.11  hardheartedness,  cruelty,  severity; 
Category  or  16.01.01.01  attributes  of  God 
Categories Appendices  488 
Word  wundian 
Root  wundian 
Part  of  Speech  w.  v.  (2) 
Gloss  wound 
Text  Juliana 
Line  291 
Thesaurus  of  ((ge)wundian)  02-08.04.01  a  wound;  02.08.12.02.06  surgical;  Old  English  08.01.03.07.02.01  injury,  offence 
Category  or 
Categories 
Word  wundum 
Root  wund 
part  of  Speech  f.  a-stem 
Gloss  wound 
Text  Juliana 
Line  355 
Thesaurus  of  02.08.04.01  a  wound;  02.08.05.02  particular  inflammation/swelling; 
old  English  08.01.03.06  adversity,  affliction;  08.01.03.07.02.01  injury,  offence 
Category  or 
Categories 
0 Appendices  489 
Word  wvrrestan 
Root  wymest 
Part  of  Speech  adj.  sup. 
Gloss  worst 
Text  Juliana 
Line  250 
Thesaurus  of  (wierst)  03.02.01  decay,  decline,  corruption;  03.03.05.01.03  inferior; 
Old  English  07.03  evil;  08.01.03.06  adversity,  affliction;  12.08.06.01.03  evilly,  badly 
Category  or 
Categories 
Word  wyrrestan 
Root  wyrrest 
Pgtrt  of  Speech  adj.  sup. 
Gloss  worst 
Text  Juliana 
Line  340 
Thesaurus  of  (wierst)  03.02.01  decay,  decline,  corruption;  03-03.05.01.03  inferior; 
Old  English  07.03  evil;  08-01.03.06  adversity,  affliction;  12.08.06.01.03  evilly,  badly 
Category  or 
Categories A13  ppendices  490 
Word  wyrrestum 
Root  wyrrest 
Part  of  Speech  adj.  sup. 
Gloss  worst 
Text  Juliana 
Line  152 
Thesaurus  of  (wierst)  03.02.01  decay,  decline,  corruption;  03.03.05.01.03  inferior; 
Old  English  07.03  evil;  08.01.03.06  adversity,  affliction;  12.08.06.01.03  evilly,  badly 
Category  or 
Categories 
Word  ýennan 
Root  ýennan 
pgtrt  of  Speech  w.  v.  (Ia) 
Gloss  stretch  out 
Text  Juliaaa 
Line  187 
Thesaurus  of  05.06.01  devastation,  laying  waste;  05.10.06.02.02  curvature,  bend,  twist; 
Old  English  07.08  reputation,  fame;  11.03  endeavour 
Category  or  ((ge)ýennan)  05.10.05.02  extension,  stretching;  05.10.05.02.01  diffusion, 
Categories  effusion,  spreading Appendices  491 
Word 
Root 




Thesaurus  of 
Old  English 














05.08.01  vigour,  activity,  force-,  05.08.02  violence,  force;  12  power,  might 
ýreagan 
ýreagan 




Thesaurus  of  (ýrea)  07.05.01  censure,  reproof,  rebuke;  08-01.03.06.01  affliction, 
old  English  misfortune,  calamity;  08.0  1.03.09.07  threat,  threatening,  menace;  14.05.01 
Category  or  correction,  discipline 
Categories  (ýreagan/preawian)  08.01.03.09.07  threat,  threatening,  menace 
((ge)ýreqgan)  08.01.03.07.02  misery,  trouble,  affliction; 
08.01.03.07.02.01  injury,  offence;  14.05.01  correction,  discipline 
(geOreaganIgqreawian)  05.06.04  damage,  injury,  defect,  hurt,  loss; 
12.05.06.03  necessity,  constraint Appendices  492 
Word 
Root 










Thesaurus  of  11.06.02  suffering  (not  acting) 
Old  English  ((ge)ýrowian)  02.02.01  particular  mode  of  death;  02.08.03  pain,  bodily 
Category  or  discomfort;  16.02-04.07.02.03  penance,  an  act/instance  of  penance; 
Categories  16.02.04.16  martyrdom 
(gqrowian)  03.06.03.01  compatible;  08.01.02.05  compassion Appendices  493 
APPENDIX  C: 
Examining  the  Lexicon  of  Torture  and  Pain  in  Old  English  Poetry  in  the 
Context  of  the  Language  at  Large: 
A  Sample  Term  from  the  Torture  Vocabulary  of  Juliana  Examined  in  All 
of  its  Extant  Contexts  through  the  Use  of 
The  Microfiche  Concofdance  to  Old  English 
In  this  appendix  I  have  examined  in  depth  a  single  term--sorg-- 
drawn  from  my  survey  of  the  torture  vocabulary  of  Juliana.  In  Appendix 
AI  identified  all  such  terminology  and  presented  it  in  its  literary  context, 
while  in  Appendix  BI  examined  a  sample  group  of  such  terms  outside 
of  such  context,  focusing  instead  upon  the  varied  semtintic  fields  in 
which  each  term  might  fall.  In  Appendix  CI  narrow  the  subject  of  my 
examination  to  a  single  term,  while  simultaneously  broadening  the  field 
of  my  interest  to  include  all  extant  usages  of  that  term.  In  the  same  way 
that  Appendix  B  was  designed  to  offer  a  sense  of  the  multivalence  of  the 
lexicon  of  torture  in  Old  English,  I  hope  that  Appendix  C  will  provide 
insight  into  the  precise  nature  of  the  usage  of  a  term  which  is  of  some 
importance  to  this  study.  In  Chapter  Two  I  discussed  this  term  at  some 
length,  and  so  I  need  not  reiterate  my  thematic  arguments  here.  Instead 
this  appendix  is  designed  to  present  a  fuller  picture  of  the  kinds  of  texts 
and  usages  in  which  this  term  appears.  This  appendix  both  serves  as  a 
more  formal  example  of  the  kind  of  research  which  I  presented  in  the 
body  of  my  thesis  in  my  discussion  of  sorg,  spor,  sceran,  gecliansod,  and 
other  terms,  and  offers  a  very  specific  idea  of  the  linguistic  basis  upon 
which  I  hope  to  construct  my  on-going  research  into  the  function  and 
nature  of  pain  and  torture  in  Old  English  verse. 
The  term  sorg  most  often  appears  in  poetic.  works;  as  I  noted  in 
Chapter  Two,  -  its  received  meaning  in  such  contexts  is  "sorrow,  anxiety, 
rare"  ,  and  the  emotional  state  described  by  this  term  is  often  directly Appendices  494 
related  to  physical  circumstances.  In  all,  the  form  sorgmaybe  found  in 
20  instances,  15  of  which  are  poetic  (several  of  which  I  discussed  in 
Chapter  Two).  A  complete  break-down  is  as  follows: 
Table  of  Instances  of  the  Form  Sorg: 
Genesis  A,  B  2180 
Andreas  1689 
Chzist  A,  B,  C  1284 
Guthlac  A,  B  348,379,1038,1091 
Phoenix  50 
Juliana  438,525,717 
Wanderer  29,37,50 
Solomon  and  Saturn  312 
Blickling  HomiI7  Number  8  13  3 
The  Pastoral  Care  of  Gregory  the  Great  36.259.17 
The  Consolation  of  Philosoph7  of  Boethius  31.70.27 
Co,  rpGL  2  (Hessels)  [Latin-Old  English  Glossaries]  1.165 
CLGL  1  (Str7ker)  [Latin-Old  English  Glossaries]  1316 
It  is  clear  that  this  form  occurs  most  often  in  poetry,  and  its  meaning  in 
such  contexts  has  been  the  subject  of  some  investigation  in  this  thesis. 
What  is  of  particular  interest  in  the  terms  of  my  larger  project,  however, 
is  the  nature  of  the  non-poetic  texts  in  which  terms  from  the  Old  English 
lexicon  of  pain  and  torture  appear,  and  what  such  terms  mean  in  these 
more  varied  contexts.  I  therefore  include  in  the  following  table  the 
complete  citation  for  each  occurrence  of  the  form  sorg  from  non-poetic 
sources.  It  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  appendix  to  present  a  cogent 
analysis  of  the  significance  of  these  non-poetic  occurrences,  but  rather  to Appendices  495 
possible  directions  for  further  enquiry.  These  citations  appear,  therefore, 
without  critical  comment: 
Table  of  Citations  of  Non-Poetic  Instances  of  the  Form  Sorg. 
Ne  bip  por  sar  ne  gewinn,  ne  nwnig  unepnes,  ne  sorg  ne  wop,  ne 
hungor,  ne  purst,  ne  ece  yfel. 
[Blickling  Homily  8] 
Sio  sorg  8onne  aswmp6  aweg  6Eet  yfel  of  6zem  mode. 
[The  Pastoral  Care] 
Hwmt,  aelc  mon  mzeg  witan  hu  hefig  sorg  men  beo6  seo  gemenhis 
bearna;  ne  ýearf  ic  pe  peah  pwt  secgan,  for  6mm  pu  hit  hzefst 
afunden  be  pe  selfum. 
[The  Consolation  of  Philosophy] 
[Accidia  tedium  uel  anxietas  id  est]  sorg 
[CorpGL  2  (Hessels)] 
[Cura]  sorg 
[CLGL  1  (Stryker)] 
It  is  clear  that  the  form  sorg  is  primarily  a  poetic  one.  Indeed, 
although  it  is  not  my  purpose  in  this  appendix  to  analyze  the  significance 
of  these  findings,  it  is  clear  that  the  poetic  sense  of  the  term  sorg  is 
reflected  in  the  non-poetic  instances  noted  in  the  table  above.  Moreover, 
this  term  in  all  its  various  and  related  forms  is  most  often  found  in  poetic 
contexts,  a  fact  which  the  three  most  common  forms  (sorga,  sorge, 
sorgum)  overwhelmingly  illuminate  (see  comprehensive  break-down, 
below).  Further,  there  are  a  large  number  of  forms  derived  from  sorg 
(most  of  which  appear  only  one  time)  which  are  found  exclusively  in Appendices  496 
poetry.  In  each  of  these  cases,  the  use  of  the  term  is  consistent  with  our 
understanding  of  the  root  term  sorg: 
Table  of  SoT-Variants  and  Compounds  which  Occur  Only  in  Poetry: 
sorgbyrpen  (1) 
sorgceare  (1) 
sorgcearig  (4) 
sorgcearu  (1) 
sorgedon  (2) 
sorgfullne  (1) 
sorgfulran  (1) 
sorgfulre  (1) 
sorgiendum  (1) 
sorglease  (2) 
sorgleasra  (1) 
sorglufu  (1) 
sorgna  (1) 
sorgstafum  (1) 
sorgwwlmum  (1) 
sorgwylmum  (1) 
The  purpose  of  this  appendix  is  to  suggest  the  semantic  flexibility 
of  a  sample  term  from  the  Old  English  lexicon  of  pain  and  torture;  it  is 
notable,  therefore,  that  although  sorg  and  its  related  and  derivative  forms 
are  primarily  poetic  terms,  many  of  these  forms  appear  in  varied 
contexts.  The  further  exploration  of  the  significance  of  such  variety  is  a 
fundamental  cornerstone  of  my  on-going  investigation  into  the  nature 
and  function  of  pain  and  torture  in  Old  English  poetry,  and  so  it  is fitting Appendices  497 
to  conclude  this  appendix  with  a  comprehensive  table  which  illustrates 
the  sorts  of  contexts  (outside  of  poetic  descriptions  of  torment)  in  which 
the  various  forms  of  this  sample  term  appear: 
Comprehensive  Table  of  Forms  Derived  from  and  Related  to  Sofg.  - 
(Listed  by  descending  number  of  occurrences) 
sorge:  36  poetic,  I  Lord's  Prayer,  1  metrical  charm,  3  prose 
saints'  lives,  I  iElfric  letter,  I  Elfric  de  creatore  et  creatura,  12 
homiletic,  I  OT  (Judges),  8  Pastoral  Care,  I  Orosius,  4  Boethius,  2 
Gregory  the  Great  Dialogues,  I  Bede,  1C  chronicle,  1  medical,  2 
prognostics,  I  glossary 
sorgum:  24  poetic,  4  homiletic,  I  OT  (Psalms),  1  Pastoral  Care,  2 
Boethius,  I  Bede,  2  glossaries,  I  runic  (Ruthwell  Cross) 
s6rýa:  1  13  poetic,  7  homiletic,  1  OT  (Proverbs),  I  OT  (Psalms),  4 
Pastoral  Care,  I  runic  (Franks'  Casket) 
soEgende:  3  poetic,  4  Bede,  I  glossary 
soEgode:  2  poetic,  I  homiletic,  4  Pastoral  Care 
sorgian:  2  poetic,  2  homiletic,  I  Pastoral  Care,  I  Gregory  the 
Great  Dialogues 
soEgiende:  1  poetic,  2  Boethius,  2  Bede,  I  glossary 
sorgleas:  I  precepts,  5  Durham  Ritual 
sorgab:  I  poetic,  2  Pastoral  Care,  I  medical,  I  NT  (Gospels) 
sorgiaý:  2  homiletic,  I  NT  (Gospels) 
sorgigende:  2  prose  saints'  lives,  I  OT  (Psalms) 
sorgendi:  2  glossaries 
soEgendum:  1  poetic,  1  prose  saints'  lives 
sorges:  1  homiletic,  I  Boethius 
sorgful.:  I  precepts,  I  Pastoral  Care Appendices  498 
sorgfulle:  2  homiletic 
sorgienne:  I  Boethius,  I  Bede 
sorgleasum:  2  Durham  Ritual 
sorgodon:  1  poetic,  I  Gregory  the  Great  Dialogues 
sorguM:  2  homiletic 
sorgfullan:  I  Pastoral  Care 
sorgfulra:  I  Pastoral  Care 
sorgiarme:  I  homiletic 
soEgie:  I  prose  saints'  lives 
soEgiendan:  I  Theodulf  of  Orleans  Capitula 
sorgiendne:  1  Boethius 
sor,  gigaeb:  I  NT  (Gospels) 
soEgigab:  1  NT  (Gospels) 
sorgige:  I  NT  (Gospels) 
sorgleasne:  I  Durham  Ritual 
sorglic:  I  OT  (Psalms)  , 
sorglice:  I  Prudentius  Psychomachia Bibliography  499 
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